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Summary 
This thesis examines the emergence and development of the 
African working class in Durban between 1959 and 1985. It 
begins with an analysis of Durban's economy, which 
significantly changed .the lives of Africans. It shows how, 
during an era of economic boom, of intensive state repres•ion 
and unparalleled social engineering, the state intervened in 
the shaping of the African community and created the 
oppressive setting of the African working class, which was to 
pose the greatest challenge to the established order. 
The forced removals of the underclasses to the newly 
established apartheid townships during the late 1950s and 
early 1960s had a profound influence on the social and 
political history of this working class. Once African trade 
unions had been crippled and formal oppositional politics 
crushed, South African industrial relations enjoyed relative 
"peace" which was disturbed by the covert forms of worker 
resistance. 
In the 1970s the economic position of Durban's African 
working class was rather tenuous, as earnings had remained 
static since the 1960s despite the booming economy. Because of 
this, urban workers felt social and economic pressures from 
both apartheid and capitalism and responded in a way that 
shocked both employers and the government. 
In January 1973 Durban was rocked by strikes, which broke 
the silence of the 1960s when the South African Congress of 
Trade Unions declined and the African National Congress and 
Pan-African Congress were banned. The outbreak of the 1973 
Durban strikes marked a new beginning in the labour history 
and industrial relations of Durban and South Africa in 
general. 
ii 
A new blend of African independent trade unions emerged 
with their distinctive style of organisation. They focused on 
factory-based issues which reaped benefits for the workers in 
the long-run and managed to sustain pressure from both the 
state and employers. During this period, however, the African 
working class paid a high price, enduring miserable 
conditions, earning wages below the poverty line, experiencing 
a breakdown in family structure, and living with crime and 
violence, police repression and the criminalisation of much 
social and economic life. By 1985, these unions had 
established themselves so firmly that the state regarded them 
as a serious challenge. Indeed, the making of Durban's African 
working class was no easy task and its history shows 
suffering, change, mobility and accomplishment. 
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
This thesis owes a great deal to the input of several 
scholars. Among those who have supported and helped to shape 
my thesis in various ways, I wish to thank the following 
academics and colleagues, all of whom have read and commented 
on my draft chapters: Drs Jane Carruthers, Julie Pridmore and 
P.G. Eidelberg, Mr Nic Southey, and Professor e.G. 
Cuthbertson. 
I am particularly indebted to two scholars who have 
contributed much to the shaping of this thesis: Professors 
A.M. Grundlingh and J. Lambert (promoter and joint-promoter 
respectively), who inspired me, provided guidance throughout 
the period of its composition, and were extraordinarily 
generous with their time. I benefited greatly from the 
incisive guidance and unflagging support of my promoters, and 
without them this study would not have been possible. 
The collection of material for this thesis was made 
easier and more manageable through the assistance of 
archivists and librarians at the Natal Archives, the Killie 
Campbell Africana Library, the Don Africana Library, the 
William Cullen Library of the University of the Witwatersrand, 
the Durban Metropolitan Chamber of Commerce Library, the 
University of Natal, Natal Room, and the Durban Local History 
Museum Collection. I am very grateful to Dr David Hemson and 
the Durban Local History Museum for permission to reproduce 
photographs. 
Some portions of this thesis have appeared as articles in 
various journals and have been largely reproduced here. I 
gratefully acknowledge the useful comments given by various 
anonymous referees. 
I am also grateful for financial assistance from the 
University of South Africa, History Departmental Research 
Fund. 
To you all, my profound and heartfelt thankfulness for 
having shown an interest in my thesis. 
ANC 
ANCWL 
BAC 
BAD 
BAWU 
BF 
BWP 
CASS 
CBAC 
CWIU 
DCC 
DHCP 
DSLSC 
FAWU 
FCI 
GOP 
GFWBF 
GWIU 
HLP 
ICA 
ICU 
IDC 
IIE 
ISR 
ITGLWF 
iv 
ABBREVIATIONS 
- African National Congress 
- African National Congress Women's League 
- Bantu Affairs Commissioner 
- Bantu Administration and Development 
- Black Allied Workers' Union 
- Benefit Fund 
- Black Workers' Project 
- Centre for Applied Social Sciences 
- Chief Bantu Affairs Commissioner 
- Chemical Workers Industrial Union 
- Durban Chamber of Commerce 
- David Hemson Collection and Papers 
- Durban Stevedoring Labour Supply Company 
- Furniture and Allied Workers' Union 
- Federated Chamber of Industries 
- Gross Domestic Product 
- General Factory Workers' Benefit Fund 
- Garment Workers' Industrial Union 
- Historical and Literary Papers 
- Industrial Conciliation Act 
- Industrial and Commercial Workers' Union 
- Industrial Development Corporation 
- Institute for Industrial Education 
- Institute for Social Research 
- International Textile, Garment and Leather Workers' 
Federation 
KCAL 
KCAV 
MK 
NA 
NCI 
NP 
NR 
NTC 
NUTW 
PAC 
PDL 
PNAAB 
PUTCO 
RNLB 
SACP 
SACTU 
SACTWU 
SAIRR 
SALB 
SASO 
SCF 
TUACC 
TUCSA 
TWIU 
TYFMA 
UBC 
v 
- Killie Campbell Africana Library 
- Killie Campbell Audio Visuals 
- Umkhonto we Sizwe 
- Natal Archives 
- Natal Chamber of Industries 
- National Party 
- Natal Room 
- National Transport Commission 
- National Union of Textile Workers 
- Pan-African Congress 
- Poverty Datum Line 
- Port Natal Affairs Administration Board 
- Public Utility Transport Company 
- Rhodesia Native Labour Bureau 
- South African Communist Party 
- South African Congress of Trade Unions 
- South African Clothing and Textile 
Workers' Union 
- South African Institute of Race 
Relations 
- South Africa Labour Bulletin 
- South African Students' Organisation 
- Strictly Confidential Files 
- Trade Union Advisory Co-ordinating 
Council 
- Trade Union Council of South Africa 
- Textile Workers' Industrial Union 
- Textile, Yarn and Fabric Manufacturers' Association 
- Urban Bantu Council 
UCT 
ULPP 
UND 
WCL 
vi 
- University of Cape Town 
- Urban Labour Preference Policy 
- University of Natal, Durban 
- William Cullen Library 
vii 
ILLUSTRATIONS 
Maps 
The greater Durban area 
The Durban region in its wider setting 
Industrial establishments in the peripheral zone of the 
Durban region, 1965 
Industrial establishments in the core area of the Durban 
region, 1965 
Employment totals in the principal industrial areas and 
clusters of the Durban region, 1965 
Major industrial establishments in the core area of the 
Durban region, with insets for establishments in the 
peripheral zone, 1965 
Industrial land in the core area of the Durban region, 
1971 
(Map number 1 reproduced from Maylam, P and Edwards, I 
(eds), The People's City: African Life in Twentieth-
Century Durban (Pietermaritzburg, University of Natal 
Press, 1996), and the rest from Young, B.S, "Industrial 
Geography of the Durban Region (University of Natal, 
unpublished Ph.D, 1972). 
Photographs in their order (Chapter 8) 
Durban City engineers workers marching in the streets 
Coronation workers at the Sports ground 
Frame's textile workers outside the mills 
Coronation workers marching in the streets 
Durban City engineers workers marching and escorted by the 
police 
Durban's acting mayor addressing engineers workers 
Frame's textile workers on strike and led by the KwaZulu 
Community Affairs Councillor, Barney Dladla (1974) 
White volunteers unloading vegetables at the market during 
the 1973 strike. 
Clermont 
Umlazi 
KwaMashu / / 
The greater Durban area 
Durban Borough 
prior to 1931 
f]i1 Durban Borough 
l.2tl post 1931 
D KwaZulu Homeland 1925 -1990 
current 
= mainroads 
0 2.5 5 
Kilometres 
UNP 
29" 
Piet Relief® 
·-... . ..__.....~ . .--\. TRANSVAAL-· _ 
'-...... /. '·-· ·-· ........ , \ Volkrust® • ·~~/.j.j.(/ . •--' ' ...... ,J 
®Frankfort 
28° 
ORANGE 
FREE STATE 
® 
Bethlehem 
Lesotho 
Harrismith 
® 
30° 
Kokstad ® 
·y 
New~tle@ 
I 
( 
Utrecht 
@) 
Vryheid ® 
~ Glencoe ® Dundee 
.. ® 
TUG ELA 
BASIN 
®Ladysmith 
Colenso <•: 
Babana.ngo® 
NATAL 
Estcaurt @ Greytown 
® 
0 
/ 
e 
I Thirty-mile line 
Mount Frere @ l!!ll/ll!lt Under 2000 ft. 
TRAN SK.EI 
0 20 40 60 
MILES 
31" 
F i g u r e 1 T h e D u r b a n Re g i o n i n i ts w i d e r s e tt i n g 
N 
30° 
80 
./ 
/ 
./ 
./ ·--
_,..... 
/• PERIPHERAL ZONE 
• NORTH WEST 
lnanda Location 
Railway 
National Road 
Main Road 
NUMBER OF E~.IPLOYEES 
Fewer :ha:; 99 
t1 5CSt - 99~< 
N 
Figure 2 Industrial establishments in tho Periplwral ZonC' of the Durban 1-:.egion, 1965' 
D Wyebank 
..... --- .. 
................ 
' 
.'I" 
' .z., t;:;,. \ 
~~ .. _ 
• Clermont 
New Garmany 
... 
·• • 
. ..-.· . :. •: • Pow« Station -~·:: ;\ .. ·.·:. ·?;({:~::· 
.Mariannhill 
· .. 
. ~ .. 
•·• PinErtown 
·.:. 
Sarnia 
Outer Zone 
West 
-.. 
0 
~ •......... Cato Menor 
o..,_ ... ,...., •••·•• 
..................................................... -... -.............. ... 
Escombe Bell air Road: 
··.· 
........ 
Malvern 
---
Outer Zone 
South 
Jaipingo/." 
..... 
... 
·.·· ... 
0u-~----·-· _·--.-.-.. -.ct-·~----.--···----,-~- ~--i~· ~~i~~"-~~'~...,~-~u?.m~boginhYini 
J•cot•bu•Gh 
Um~on•o 
Duffs Road 
"--•·· l t T~ • • ••• ••• p_.,.__, 
v-..,.. ...... z-
~ ... . 
--·jo"'-~.. z-
·Glen Anil 
Outer Zone 
North Avoca 
.· 
Sea Cow Lake l North Coast 1V!~ia::e 
.· 
... 
Springfield / 
./ ... 
/ 
/ 
• / .:sydenham I .. 
;. :·:.· ' 
. 
I 
I 
1 .. . 
Brlatow Inner 
·:.·;·• Weslern 
' ..
/ . :: ·.May~llla 
1.." 
\ 
\ 
\ 
~OUSTRIA.L ESTABUSHMBilTS 
1966 
NUMBER OF EMPlOYEES 
Fewer than99 
100-499 
600 -999 
• 1000 + 
9 , ~s~~v~~~:J7yents not shown 
Zone br.lu"d¥y 
Se<:~or boune • .., 
...... 
Figure 3 lndustri;:d establishments in the core area of the Durban Region, 1965 
0 Mariannhill 
Sowthern 
~ Areas 
Pinetown-
New Germany 
0 escombe ~ 
Mayville-
Cato Manor 
0 
0 
Avoca & Area 
Sydenham-
@Overport U 
Stam 
* 30,000 in Harbour and 
Railway Activities 
Peripheral Zone 
4 5 
Figure 4 Employment totals in the principal industrial areas and clusters of the 
Durbaf! Region, 1965 
·- w·-·--· ------·-
-----· --· 
-----
----·-
__ gy 
_______ ===? 
------=:::? 
--·---.~-
-
·--~-----
··---
~ 
.... -._::==t ' 
New Germany 
S T 
T • fa 
T • S 
T T C 
r .. 
* 
p* 
SV sV aS E 
Fsv . * ,. 
"o•"• a• c 
0 
Pinetown 
Hammarsdale • r r r r • • 
Cato Ridge * • 
-
Outer Zone 
West 
Eacombe 
• 
......... 
-.; .. 
.,., .. 
~~·~\ 
• 
Tongaat FF 
Canelandat 
Verulam F 
Ottawa • 
Mt Edgecombe F 
Avoca 
Effingham 
Outer Zone 
North 
• 
Brlardene 
·····-··········-..... 
I 
/ 
I 
• 
-<" / 
• 
II 
/ Bri:!ow \ 
( /:r .. F ( • * Inner Western F :.P 
\ ··!J'\p. p 
\ 
Congella .. ·;;t;"•~ .. •* 
.. ·:,~~~ 
\ .·• Dq F,.tF 
\. 
'( F 
Umbllo • '\PF E 
........ ~ 
Inner Southern 
t 
................... 
......... 
............................................................................. 
• •• •• R ........ 
.. .. .. .. .. .... ........ Rpa"Sburgh T '-..,_ 
...... F: •• -....._ 
~ 
---- \, 
' \ 
' 
' ' 
·::j Umkomaaa CF 
·::j Scottburgh F l ==-.. 
Outer Zone 
South 
* 
lalplngo 
Louis Bothe 
* tc 
Umboglntwlnl 
0 
.:.:· ....___ 
.• Clalrwood 
Oil 
R 
0 Drink 
• Clolhing 
T T<ll<tiles 
C Chemicals 
Major 
Industrial 
Establishments 
1965 
F IOG-999 Employees 
F 1,000+ Employees 
F Food 
R Rubbo< 
S Shoes 
*Metal & Engineering 
P Paper & Prinling 
a Brick &Concrete 
t Wood & Furniture 
V Transporl Equipment G Grain Elevator 
E Power Station 
0 Sugar Terminal 
- 3 
Zone Boundary 
S eel or Boundary 
Pcnpheral Zone 
4 5 
Figure 5 Major industrial establishments in the core area of the Durban Region, 
with insets for establishments in the Peripheral Zone, 1965 
* 
Clermont 
Ntuz.yma 
Outer Zone 
West 
Chatsworth 
Avoca 
~lenAnil 
Outer Zone 
North 
( Brickfield 
I rdi 
\ 
INDUSTRIAL LAND 1971 
0 Extractive 
Zcr.~ Sc.:di? .. ''Y 
--- S£.-.:;:cr E"'.;und:~.ry 
=== PL-ripf,cv,.i!/ Zone 
r"·mos 
0 1 2 3 4 
"=-=i:' ===== 
Figure 6 Industrial land in the core area of the D~rban Region, 1971 
i 
I 
I' I 
1 
Chapter One 
Introduction 
Introduction 
During the past few decades South African history has 
broadened to include a range of specifically socio-economic 
studies. Since the 1970s there has been an enormous outpouring 
of works focusing on the relationship between capital, the 
state and labour. Such studies, particularly those written in 
the 1970s by radical scholars, were not supplemented by 
regional or urban case studies, but tended to remain at a high 
level of generality. Numerous works during these years 
concentrated largely on the relation between capital, the 
state and labour, and were notable for one main hypothesis: 
capital and the state were viewed as monolithic entities. The 
conventional picture of an "all powerful capitalist class 
using an omnipotent state to mow down all that stood in its 
path" was portrayed. 1 
In the 1980s there was a methodological shift and change 
of focus in this historiography. A number of academics began 
to articulate the role played by workers and the community at 
large in making their own history. 2 Historians also began to 
s. Marks and R. Rathbone (eds), Industrialisation and 
social change in South Africa (London, Harlow, 1982), p 13. 
2 See, for instance, C. Van Onselen, Studies in the 
social and economic history of the Witwatersrand, 1886- 1914: 
vol.1: New Babylon; vol.2: New Nineveh (Johannesburg, Ravan 
Press, 1982); B. Bozzoli (ed), Town and countryside in the 
Transvaal: capitalist penetration and popular response 
(Johannesburg, Ravan Press, 1983); and w. Beinart, "Worker 
consciousness, ethnic particularism and nationalism: the 
experience of a South African migrant, 1930-1960", inS. Marks 
and S. Trapido (eds), The politics of race, class and 
2 
move away from concentrating on broad themes and tended to 
examine historical themes in specific regions at particular 
times. Such case studies are important in that they explore 
regional variations and show the varied responses of African 
workers to capital. 
My thesis is concerned with struggles between the state, 
capital and labour within the industrial and commercial 
landscape of Durban from 1959 to the mid 1980s. It examines 
the relationship between the state and labour, between capital 
and labour, between strikers and unions. Having been 
integrated into the capitalist economy, the African workers' 
struggle became intensified around the production line itself. 
The period in question is important to developments in 
South Africa because it revived African resistance to 
apartheid policies after almost a decade of "silence", 
especially when the state had managed to crush "open" 
political and trade union resistance during the early 1960s. 
The 1970s and 1980s are crucially important in that they 
marked the birth of a new political order in African urban 
politics. 
1. Historiography: aspects of the apartheid-capital 
debate 
Significant to my period of study are issues concerning the 
relationship between apartheid and capital. What follows is, 
however, not a comprehensive survey of this debate but an 
outline which raises important issues in the debate with 
relevance to the study of African urban labour between 1960 
and 1985. 3 
nationalism in twentieth-c§ntury South Africa (London, 
Longman, 1987). 
3 For further details of the debate, see for instance D. 
Posel, "Rethinking the race-class debate in South African 
historiography", Social Dynamics,vol 9, no 1 (1983); M. 
Legassick, "Legislation, ideology, and economy in post-1948 
South Africa", Journal of Southern African Studies (JSAS),vol 
1, no 1 (1974); and D. Hindson, Pass controls and the urban 
African proletariat in South Africa (Johannesburg, Ravan 
3 
(a) The liberal perspective 
The debate, which originated in the 1970s, focused on the 
primacy of class and/or race in explaining the relationship 
between South Africa's economic development and apartheid 
policies, and the question of whether apartheid was functional 
or dysfunctional to the industrial expansion of the 1960s. The 
liberal modernisation theory articulated the view that 
apartheid was completely independent of, and indeed conflicted 
with, the logic of capitalism. The incompatibility took two 
forms. First, apartheid policies retarded the full growth of 
the economy. Second, despite this retardation, it was argued 
that the economy was growing and that with the passage of time 
this growth would gradually erode and dismantle the apartheid 
system as its economic irrationality became more apparent. 
Apartheid, according to liberal theory, tended to hinder the 
economic growth of the country by limiting training skills and 
hampering the mobility of labour. The liberal theory also 
noted a contradictory, dysfunctional relationship between 
capitalism and racial domination. 4 
One of the most interesting aspects of the liberal debate 
on the relationship between apartheid and capital is the 
analysis of influx control mechanisms employed by the state. 
According toR. Horwitz (a prominent early liberal historian), 
the apartheid state was economically myopic, in pursuit of 
political power without any consideration of economic costs. 5 
Because the state's political agenda resulted in the imple-
mentation of some labour policies which retarded the economic 
expansion of the country, Horwitz argued that South African 
industrialists were faced with "a hopelessly wasteful and 
crippling[ly] costly system of labour use". 6 The curtailment 
Press, 1987). 
4 M. Lipton, Capitalism and apartheid (Cape Town, 
Claremont, 1985), p 141. 
5 R. Horwitz, The political economy of South Africa 
(London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1967), p 10. 
6 Ibid, p 11. 
4 
of any free labour movement and the denial of the right to 
sell labour freely in the market were enforced upon African 
work-seekers by influx control restrictions. According to the 
liberal modernisation theory, such a situation retarded 
economic growth in as far as "the lack of competition for 
white workers led to slackness on the job, high turn-over and 
absenteeism, while the barriers to job advancement were a 
disincentive to hard work, motivation and commitment among 
blacks". 7 Thus the liberal theory, based on classical laissez-
faire economic theory, saw apartheid as dysfunctional to the 
economy. As for the second incompatibility, some liberals 
argued that as the economy grew and expanded it would 
eventually lead to greater racial interaction and integration. 
(b) The radical position 
Radical scholars in the 1970s, armed with the Marxist 
paradigm, built a critique of the liberal modernisation 
theory. It is important, however, to point out here that 
radical theory did not necessarily supersede liberal theory. 
In many senses they coexisted.a 
South African Marxist literature, particularly that of 
the 1970s, characterised the relationship of capitalism and 
apartheid as mutually dependent on one another. 9 F.A. 
7 Lipton, Capitalism and apartheid, p 145. 
8 See, for instance, D. Yudelman, "State and capital in 
contemporary South Africa", in J. Butler, R. Elphick and D. 
Welsh (eds), Democratic liberalism in South Africa (Cape Town, 
1987); D. Yudelman, The emergence of modern South Africa: 
state, capital, and the incorporation of organised labour on 
the South African gold fields, 1902-1939 (Westport, Greenwood 
Press, 1983); and Lipton, Capitalism and apartheid. Merle 
Lipton wrote in the 1980s, so did David Yudelman. 
9 See M. Legassick, "South Africa: capital accumulation 
and violence", Economy and Society, 3 (1974); F.A. Johnstone, 
"White supremacy and white prosperity in South Africa today", 
African Affairs, 69 (1970); H. Wolpe, "Capitalism and cheap 
labour-power in South Africa: from segregation to apartheid", 
Economy and Society, 1 (1972); R. Davies, Capital, state and 
white labour in South Africa, 1900 -1960 ( Harvester Press, 
1979); and J. Slovo, "South Africa- no middle road", in B. 
5 
Johnstone, a Marxist scholar, contended that there was a link 
between capitalism and racism and that the latter could be 
destroyed only with the demolition of the former. To 
Johnstone, the liberalising power of economic growth did not 
threaten to bring apartheid to its knees but rather "the 
relations between capitalist development, apartheid policies 
and the core structure of white supremacy are essentially 
collaborative ... quite contrary to the prevailing thesis, 
white supremacy is continually being reinforced by economic 
development". 10 
While liberals saw capitalism as a beneficial modernising 
force, Marxists saw it as a class-based exploitative system. 
In fact, Marxists such as Johnstone posed a set of key 
questions: 
Who owns what? Who does what? Who gets what? Who 
does what to whom? Who does what for whom? How are 
who does what and who gets what linked to who owns 
what and who controls what? How is all this linked 
to what is going on in society and history? 11 
To Marxist scholars, the functional compatibility of apartheid 
with the development of capitalism needed closer examination. 
They therefore argued that apartheid was designed to boost 
industrial expansion and that the apartheid state was an 
instrument developed by capitalist classes to serve their 
interests. 12 
Central to Marxist analysis was the impact of influx 
control, the workings of labour bureaux, and the pass system, 
which intensified in the 1960s during the period of high 
Davidson, J. Slovo and A.R. Wilkinson, Southern Africa: the 
new politics of revolution ( Penguin Books, 1976). 
10 Johnstone, "White supremacy and white prosperity." See 
also T.R.H. Davenport, South Africa: a modern history, ( 
Southern, 3 rd ed., 1987). p 574. 
11 F. Johnstone, "Most painful to our hearts: South Africa 
through the eyes of the new school", Canadian Journal of 
African Studies, 16, 1 (1982), p 8. 
12 See, for instance, R. Davies, Capital, state and white 
labour in South Africa, 1900- 1960 (Sussex, Harvester Press, 
1979). 
6 
apartheid and the industrial boom. M. Legassick, a leading 
Marxist scholar, saw the use of influx control mechanisms as 
an extension of the migrant labour policy to manufacturing 
industries in urban areas and as a way of supplying cheap 
African labour to urban industries. 13 In his view, African 
labour was cheapened because workers had " ... a limited time to 
get a job [and were] faced with exclusion from urban 
employment altogether should [they] get fired". 14 Such an 
interpretation was further extended by H. Wolpe, also a 
Marxist scholar, who characterised apartheid as a specific 
mechanism meant to " ... guarantee a cheap and controlled work-
force under circumstances in which the conditions of 
reproduction of that labour force are rapidly 
disintegrating". 15 These scholars emphasised official rhet-
oric about the intended aims of influx control policies, which 
led them to view the entire process as a " ... monolithic, 
smoothly functioning and effective system of labour 
distribution and control".16 
In most Marxist works, the liberal paradigm that saw 
capitalism as " ... a liberalising and progressive force which 
has been hampered in its work by the external imposition of 
racial rule and ideology" was completely rejected. 17 Marxists 
argued that "the economy determines and produces those racial 
structures and practices which are conducive to its expansion 
and reproduction". 18 Consequently, racism was perpetuated in 
the economy and " ... only the economic determination of 
13 Legassick, "Legislation, ideology and economy", p 9. 
14 Legassick, "South Africa: capital accumulation", p 276. 
15 Wolpe, "Capitalism and cheap labour-power", pp 430-31. 
16 Hindson, Pass controls, p 3. 
17 H. Wolpe, Race, class and the apartheid state ( Paris, 
UNESCO Press, 1988), p 16; Also see Charles Simkins, 
"Agricultural production in the African reserves of South 
Africa, 1918-1969", Journal of Southern African Studies, 
vol.7, no.2 (1981). 
18 Ibid, pp 16-7. 
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politics and its economic functions" was advanced. In line 
with Wolpe's assessment, "politics and the state are merely 
the means to economic ends". 19 Pre-eminent in Marxist 
literature are terms such as "exploitation", "dominant" and 
"subordinate classes", "onslaught", and "accumulation of 
capital", which are sometimes misleading. Certainly, Marxist 
writings often portray South African society as divided into 
two or more insulated worlds, inhabited by self-contained 
classes, who are essentially connected only in the process of 
material production and exploitation. The Marxist mode of 
approach, however, like that of the liberal theory, has proved 
inadequate for an overall analysis of such a complicated 
period as the 1960s onwards. 
The early Marxist writing were largely determined by the 
developments that took place during the 1960s, the complete 
impasse of the reform promised by the liberal paradigm and in 
fact its very opposite; the crushing of movements for change 
and the installation of the granite period of apartheid. 
During that decade, South Africa experienced unprecedented 
economic growth. Similarly, it was during that time that 
repressive state policies were intensified. Apartheid, viewed 
from this angle, was thus a monolithic, smoothly functioning 
' 
system that catered for both the needs of state and capital. 
During the 1980s, however, there were some significant 
shifts in the debate and the context also changed. Both the 
liberals and radicals began to re-define their positions. 
These shifts were most profoundly influenced by the political 
and economic developments of the 1980s. 
(2) Significant shifts of the 1980s and 1990s 
A distinctive contribution to the historiographical debate was 
made by S. Greenberg, a radical thinker, in his book Race and 
State in Capitalist Development, in which he demonstrated how 
segregationist measures benefited, more or less, different 
capitalist classes at different times. He argued that the 
19 Ibid I p 1 7 . 
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racial order which developed between 1890 and 1960, and in 
particular the various policies that were put into effect to 
control African labour, had to do with the development of the 
mining and farming sectors. 20 White farmers often benefited 
from successive governments' policies towards African labour. 
Quite significant was the view that for several decades 
measures were passed to assist white farmers in their quest 
for particularly labour and land. However, as Greenberg 
showed, farmers became more mechanised in their agricultural 
production and less dependent on official repressive labour 
mechanisms. As Greenberg explained, segregation and apartheid 
never served the needs of industrial capital to the same 
extent as they did those of the mining and farming sectors. 
Thus, some industrial capitalists have at times shown 
hostility to apartheid labour policies, although they have 
generally tried to accommodate the racial order. Greenberg's 
analysis, further extended in his book Legitimating the 
Illegitimate, made a distinctive contribution from a 
materialist perspective, which has been utilised by D. Hindson 
and D. Posel (both critics of the nee-Marxist paradigm) in 
their studies. 21 Certainly, Greenberg showed how different 
capitalist sectors benefited from apartheid. 
In Hindson's view, influx controls were instituted 
deliberately by the state to prevent the dispersal of farm 
labour to the urban areas. 22 Influx control, he argued, was 
adopted as a mechanism to ensure that the reserve army of 
African labour could be removed from apartheid cities and 
confined to the bantustans. Hindson saw influx control as a 
means of accommodating the interests of urban capitalists in a 
differentiated labour market. 23 In the words of Hindson, 
20 S. Greenberg, Race and state in capitalist development 
(Johannesburg, Ravan Press, 1980). 
21 Hindson, Pass controls and the urban African 
proletariat and Posel, The making of apartheid. 
22 Ibid, p 7. 
23 Hindson, Pass controls, pp 10-12. 
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... cheap labour was g~v~ng way to differentiated 
labour power, and the reconstruction and extension 
of influx control barriers under the Urban Areas Act 
[of 1952] were a means of securing the reproduction 
of differentiated forms of labour power in the 
cities in the face of the incoming tide of surplus 
population from the rural areas. 2~ 
Hindson's work, which attempted to explain the differentiated 
labour market only in terms of the interests of manufacturing 
capital and government institutions, failed to analyie the 
concept of capitalist interests in terms of its different 
aspects. Moreover, Hindson's account treated African labour as 
a docile, passive victim of state labour regulations. The 
implementation of pass and labour bureau legislation during 
the 1960s and 1970s was problematic and complicated. A series 
of pass and influx control laws (although the latter were a 
response to a very different situation than that which existed 
when they were introduced) were promulgated, and bureaux and 
courts were established, but these were resisted by both 
employers and prospective workers. As a disciplinary measure, 
influx control failed dismally to stop the trend towards 
urbanisation, but it did provide an apparatus of control which 
generally was effective for a whole period in policing and 
controlling the movements of the African working class. It was 
far too explicit and coercive. In a situation of extensive 
repression and grinding poverty in reserves, breaking the law 
offered better rewards than observing it. Hindson's work paid 
little attention to the struggles, such as those in Durban, 
which played an important role in shaping employment 
patterns. 25 In spite of these criticisms levelled against 
Hindson, his work nonetheless remains of considerable 
importance. 
The study by Posel has shown that state intervention in 
the sphere of the urban African labour supply was based on the 
24 As cited in Posel, The making of apartheid, p 16. 
25 See, for example, L. Schlemmer and H. Giliomee (eds), 
Up against the fences: poverty, passes and privilege in South 
Africa (Cape Town, David Philip, 1985). 
1 0 
Urban Labour Preference Policy (ULPP). 26 The ULPP was meant 
to deny urban employers access to migrant labour if local or 
resident urban labour were available. This policy, Posel 
argued, was geared towards reducing the size of the urban 
labour reservoir and creating virtually full employment in 
urban areas, "so as not to cheapen African labour". 27 Posel 
explained that the policy of influx control was brought into 
question by labour bureau officials who failed to deter 
employers from recruiting migrant workers from the distant 
reserves. However, Posel noted that from 1959 to 1961 the 
policy of influx control was toughened by curbing the growing 
demand for migrant labourers by urban employers, thereby 
hindering the process of economic integration. 28 Posel's 
views about cheap labour differ from Hindson's and she 
criticises him for neglecting popular responses. 
During the 1980s, the discussion on whether apartheid has 
been functional or dysfunctional to capitalism radically 
changed as South Africa continued to experience socio-economic 
and political crises. From the mid-1970s, as rightly pointed 
out by the economic historians J. Saul and S. Gelb, South 
Africa was moving towards a deepening economic and political 
crisis. 29 The economy experienced problems: a falling growth 
rate; rising unemployment and inflation; and a shortage of 
skilled labour. On the political front, the government was 
beset by its own internal divisions, a rising tide of African 
militancy and reforms in labour legislation from 1979, the 
I 
Soweto uprisings of 1976, violence (particularly in Natal), 
the 1980 KwaMashu school boycotts, and mounting international 
26 Posel, The making of apartheid, Chapters 4 and 5. 
27 Ibid, p 84. 
28 Ibid, p 228. 
29 See J. Saul and S. Gelb, The crisis in South Africa 
(London, Zed Books, 1986). 
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pressure. 30 By the 1980s, the apartheid system was no longer 
functioning as it had in the 1960s. Seemingly, because of 
these events, radical scholars began to see some aspects of 
the dysfunctionality and contradictions of the apartheid 
system. Methodologically, there was also a shift in historical 
writing among radical scholars. During the 1970s they had 
concentrated on the broad structures and had neglected local 
case studies, which examined the specifities of time and 
place. 
(3)Placing urban studies in perspective: "history 
from below" 
Major works of the 1970s, which concentrated on the apartheid-
capitalism debate31 undermined in many ways the significance 
of struggles from below, which had played an important role in 
challenging apartheid. With the emergence of a new approach to 
history-writing in the 1980s, spearheaded by a new generation 
of social historians, detailed case-studies which emphasized 
the role of the rank and file, proliferated. Such works show 
how "ordinary" people managed to resist apartheid policies and 
capital in various ways. Workers, as social historians have 
argued, were not simply victims of apartheid policies and 
capital: on various occasions, workers challenged the state 
and capital through open and, what the social historian C. van 
Onselen termed, "silent and unorganised responses". 32 Van 
30 See, for instance, T. Lodge and B. Nasson, All, here, 
and now: Black politics in South Africa in the 1980s (Cape 
Town, David Philip, 1991). 
31 See, for instance the major protagonists of the debate, 
M. Legassick, "Legislation, ideology, and economy in post-1948 
South Africa'', Journal of Southern African Studies (J~AS), 1, 
1 (1974); F.A. Johnstone, "White supremacy and white 
prosperity in South Africa today", African Affairs, 69 (1970); 
and H. Wolpe, "Capitalism and cheap labour-power in South 
Africa: from segregation to apartheid", Economy and Society, 1 
(1972). 
32 C. Van Onselen, Chibaro: African mine labour in 
Southern Rhodesia 1900-1933 (London, Pluto Press, 1976), p 
244. 
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Onselen's work contributed significantly to a fresh approach 
to labour history which examines history from below and which 
does not separate workers' responses at work from their 
culture. 
This approach is vital in the sense that it distances 
itself from the theoretical abstractions that had been 
dominant in the 1970s, and instead emphasizes the perceptions 
of ordinary people. 
Once serious cognisance has been taken of 
experience, it proves impossible to sustain the sort 
of Marxism which seeks only to generalise or perhaps 
even reify on a large scale and at a high level. To 
identify 'the working class' in South Africa, or to 
discover the nature of 'the state', 'the ruling 
class' and 'the reserve economies', becomes an 
impossibility.33 
As argued by E.P. Thompson, workers' "aspirations [are] valid 
in terms of their own experience".34 He further wrote that 
" ... all men are philosophers, [and] experience ... arises 
because men and women ... are rational, and they think about 
what is happening to themselves and their world". 35 The 
picture painted by Johnstone of a "downtrodden Black labour 
army", one that is characterised by "rightlessness, 
powerlessness" and that is a victim of the state and capital, 
is overdeveloped. 36 However, this was hardly a period of 
African worker initiative and the state and employers seemed 
to have a crushing weight for a whole period. 
This social-history approach, spearheaded by the "History 
33 B. Bozzoli, "History, experience and culture", in B. 
Bozzoli (ed), Town and countryside in the Transvaal: 
caPitalist penetration and popular response (Johannesburg, 
Ravan Press, 1983), p 17. 
34 E.P. Thompson, The making of the English working class 
(London, 1963), p 11. 
35 As cited in Bozzoli, "History, experience and culture", 
p 7. 
36 F.A. Johnstone, "The labour history of the 
Witwatersrand in the context of South African studies, and 
with reflections on the new school", Social Dynamics, 4 
(1978). 
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Workshop" organised at the University of the Witwatersrand, 
has its points of strength; for instance, its willingness to 
break the bonds of both "economic Marxism'' and perhaps also a 
romantic nationalism. 37 Particular emphasis has been placed 
on local issues or case studies, which tend to be factually 
detailed - a process that sociologist B. Bozzoli describes as 
"the cultural forms of the grassroots".38 Such an approach is 
evident in numerous "History Workshop" papers and in 
Apartheid's Genesis, 1935 -1962, edited by P. Bonner, P. 
Delius and D. Pose1. 39 More importantly, the 
interdisciplinary nature of the social history tradition has 
produced exciting new insights into the South African past, in 
particular that of the marginalised groups. 
In spite of its significant achievements, the "History 
Workshop" genre of scholarship has certain limitations which 
are derived from what participants define as "the grassroots": 
"Such a history should resonate with the lives of ordinary 
people rather than reflect the deliberations of the ruling 
classes or the theoretical concerns of structuralist 
abstractionism." 40 To concentrate on the grassroots to the 
exclusion of the ruling classes does, however, raise concern. 
The reason for their exclusion is the notion of "struggle.,, 
which Bozzoli has described as " ... that culture [that should] 
be viewed from a perspective which ties it inextricably to the 
conflicts between classes; the attempt by some to dominate 
others; and to the responses of the subordinated to these 
attempts". 41 The impression created by Bozzoli's analysis is 
that members of the ruling classes are not "philosophers", and 
they do not express their thoughts about themselves and their 
37 Bozzoli, "History, experience and culture", p 42. 
38 Ibid, p 19. 
39 P. Bonner, P. Delius and D. Posel (eds), Apartheid's 
genesis, 1935-1962 (Johannesburg, Ravan Press, 1993). 
40 Bozzoli, "History, experience and culture", p 8. 
41 Ibid, p 22. 
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world in any interesting or meaningful way. 42 Theirs is a 
different form of thinking - quite distinctive from ordinary 
people's perceptions, experiences, and the values of those 
engaged in resistance. The "History Workshop" has, 
undoubtedly, created certain assumptions: a conflictual model 
of society has been assumed and, secondly, unequal social 
relations have tended to be attributed to the actions of one 
group of society, which dominated others. In spite of these 
criticisms, however, the History Workshop's approach is 
indispensable, particularly for its contribution to the new 
thrusts in mainstream South African historiography. The 
approach's "incorporation of indigenous people into the 
analysis, not only as forces resistant to the designs of 
capitalist masters but as actors who go through their own 
social, political and cultural processes" and which "portrays 
Africans as enterprising and independent social agents whose 
lives and activities cannot be reduced to their responses to 
the initiatives taken by others", 43 remains a useful 
analytical tool in the study of the African past. 
Quite convincingly, "history from below", as articulated 
by the "History Workshop" participants, offers a way forward 
and can make an important contribution to the understanding of 
the underlying dynamics of African labour (though it may sound 
controversial to give preference to one particular section of 
society). In this study, however, the deliberate silence on 
the ruling classes (with the exception of Posel and Adam 
Ashforth's works 44 ) will be broken; in fact, the approach to 
be utilised will be a normative one which analyses all social 
actors involved in the making of history. Certainly, the 
analysis of labour history calls for open-mindedness, which 
42 Ibid, p 13. 
43 R. Greenstein, "The future of the South African past", 
Journal of Southern African Studies, vol 22, no.2 (June 1996), 
p 327. 
44 See Posel, The making of apartheid; and A. Ashforth, 
The politics of official discourse in twentieth-century South 
Africa (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1990). 
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should take into account struggles from both above and below. 
There are, indeed, a number of stimulating works on urban 
and labour history: studies such as P. Maylam's analysis on 
urban apartheid, 45 P. Bonner's work on African independent 
trade unions, 46 G. Wood's account of the 1973 Durban 
strikes, 47 D. Hemson's pioneering doctoral thesis on African 
dockworkers of Durban, 48 Posel's research on influx control 
49 and P. Harries's meticulous work on Mozambican migrant 
workers. 50 Recently, a new and perhaps the first book on 
Durban's African underclasses, edited by P. Maylam and I. 
Edwards, was published. 51 Indeed this book offers a nuanced 
history of the African underclasses who suffered during 
decades of urban segregation and apartheid in twentieth-
century Durban. These works and numerous articles published 
and presented from the 1980s onwards, offer rich perspectives 
on the dominant and the dominated. Classic research works by 
Hemson and Edwards 52 , in particular, influenced my interest 
in the history of Durban's Africans. 
45 P. Maylam, "The rise and decline of urban apartheid in 
South Africa", African Affairs, 89 (1990). 
46 P. Bonner, "Independent trade unions since Wiehahn", 
SALB, 8, 4 (1983). 
47 G. Wood, "The 1973 Durban strikes: of local and 
national significance", Contree, 31 (1992). 
48 D. Hemson, "Class consciousness and migrant workers: 
dockworkers of Durban" (University of Warwick, Ph.D, 1979). 
49 D. Posel, "Influx control and urban labour markets in 
the 1950s'', in Bonner, Delius and Posel (eds), Apartheid's 
genesis, 1935-1962. 
50 P. Harries, Work, culture and identity (Johannesburg, 
Witwatersrand University Press, 1994). 
51 P. Maylam and I. Edwards (eds), The people's city: 
African life in twentieth-century Durban (Pietermaritzburg, 
University of Natal Press, 1996). 
52 See Hemson, "Class consciousness and migrant workers"; 
and I. Edwards, "Mkhumbane our home: a history of African 
shantytown society in Cato Manor farm, 1946-1960" (University 
of Natal, Ph.D, 1989). 
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This research's focus on African labour history reflects 
the influence of Durban's historiography which has been 
modelled by the racial composition of Durban. Histories of 
Durban have tended to restrict themselves to "white", "Indian" 
or "African" studies. 53 It is an unfortunate scenario and, 
regrettably so, that past and present historians have failed 
to bridge the gap and integrate all Durban's workers into a 
single political economy. This work will, however, only 
concentrate on Africans because of their distinctive past as 
the most exploited and oppressed group. Furthermore, since the 
1960s the African working class has been extremely important 
in the socio-economic history of Durban and indeed, have 
remained relatively important since that time. 
< 4 > Why study Durban? 
In Durban as elsewhere, ordinary people (although with the 
problem of divisions and conflicts) have always been the 
pillar of African resistance to white autho~ity and have been 
in the forefront of the struggle for freedom; during the 1949 
and 1959 riots54 ; in the 1973 Durban strikes and the 
subsequent formation of the African independent trade union 
movement55 ; the 1976 student uprisings; and in the violence 
of the 1980s and 1990s. Durban has always been an important 
locus of African resistance and it remains a city of both 
worker resistance and political complexity. It is, moreover, 
an important area to examine in detail because of its 
53 See, for instance, an Indian example by B. Freund, 
Insiders and outsiders: the Indian working class of Durban 
(Pietermaritzburg, University of Natal Press, 1995). 
54 See, for instance, I.L. Edwards, "Mhkumbane our home: 
African shantytown society in Cato Manor farm, 1946-1960" 
(University of Natal, Durban, Ph.D Thesis, 1989); and S.L. 
Kirk, "The 1949 Durban riots: a community in conflict" 
(University of Natal, Durban, MA Thesis, 1983). 
55 See, for example, J. Baskin, Striking back: a history 
of COSATU (Johannesburg, Ravan Press, 1991); and S. Friedman, 
Building tomorrow today: African workers in trade unions, 
1970-1984 (Johannesburg, Ravan Press, 1987). 
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importance in the rise of an independent trade union movement 
in the 1970s. 
What is interesting about the new African trade unionism 
which arose in Durban in the 1970s is that it tried to avoid 
alignment with any banned political movement. During the 
1970s, African trade unions in Durban organised themselves 
from the bottom up, industry by industry; indeed, it was not 
long before a strong shop floor structure was in place. 
Furthermore, trade unions of the 1970s clamoured for 
individual recognition in each particular industry rather than 
seeking any broad agreements across industrial barriers. In 
many respects this approach strengthened the independent trade 
union movement, unlike the broad industrial mass movement of 
the late 1950s and early 1960s, which had aligned itself to 
Congress Alliance politics. However, the early 1980s saw the 
re-emergence of the debate over the relationship between trade 
unions and politics. Some independent unions felt that high-
profile involvement in national politics was inappropriate and 
detrimental to union organisation. Others were in favour of 
populist nationalist politics, arguing that unions should 
fight for their members' interests beyond the factory floor. 
Precisely because of these divergent views, independent trade 
union officials failed to develop an integrated policy on the 
role of unions in politics. 
Natal was central to worker resistance during the 1970s, 
which spilt over into the rest of the country. During that 
period Durban was vital, because as G. Kraak (labour 
historian) contends, in the national economy, it " ... contained 
the largest concentration of manufacturing industry outside 
the PWV area''. 56 Durban had become an industrial and 
manufacturing city of sizeable proportions in the 1960s, 1970s 
and 1980s. It was in Durban particularly that worker 
activities became widespread, and the city became a 
" ... stimulus to the re-emergence of independent trade unions 
with majority African membership, mostly formed in the areas 
56 G. Kraak, Breaking the chains: labour in South Africa 
in the 1970s and 1980s (London, Pluto Press, 1993), p 128. 
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around Durban ... ". 57 It is therefore appropriate to examine 
African trade unions of the 1970s, since worker resistance of 
the time marked a turning point in the labour movement in 
South Africa. 
Natal can be regarded as a historically distinct region 
in South Africa because of the tenacity of pre-capitalist 
social and economic structures that survived on a larger scale 
and perhaps for longer than elsewhere in the country. The 
continuing role played by the Usuthu royal house in the 
province was a factor which led to the development of a 
powerful Zulu ethnic chauvinism. With the formation of Inkatha 
as a political movement in 1975, the political situation in 
Natal changed. This was further complicated by the severance 
of links between Inkatha and the ANC-in-exile in 1979, which 
exacerbated relations between Chief Mangosuthu Gatsha 
Buthelezi and the militant youth. 58 The result was conflict 
and violence beginning in the 1980s. 
The processes of urbanisation and proletarianisation of 
' Natal's African people - a byproduct of what A. Sitas, an 
industrial relations expert, described as the "demographic 
upheavals pioneered by agrarian capitalism and apartheid 
policies of relocation which lashed them [workers] into wage-
labour in the last two decades"59 - resulted in a conflict 
between a "traditional" consciousness and popular organisation 
(mainly reflected by Inkatha) and a more militant 
consciousness (reflected by trade unions and other popular 
movements). Natal then becomes an interesting region to study 
and very different from the rest of South Africa because of 
its long-term history, short-term urban history, the nature of 
its political organisations (strength of traditional leaders) 
and particularly the nature of its industry. 
57 Ibid. 
58 See G. Mare, An appetite for power: Buthelezi's Inkatha 
and South Africa (Johannesburg, Ravan Press, 1987); and B. 
Temkin, Gatsha Buthelezi: Zulu statesman (Cape Town, Purnell, 
1976). 
59 A. Sitas, Notes in the Natal Room, 1986, p 93 
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This thesis attempts to reconstruct and record Durban's 
extremely complex African labour history from 1959 to 1985. It 
differs from my previous research not only because of the 
extended period of study but also because it provides a 
detailed historical account of the shaping of the African 
labouring class, the new industrial relations system 
established and the emergence of African independent trade 
unions in Durban and their struggles at the shop floor. Of the 
four famous unions established in Durban after the 1973 
strikes, namely the Metal and Allied Workers' Union (MAWU), 
the Transport and General Workers' Union (TGWU), the National 
Union of Textile workers (NUTW) and the Chemical Workers' 
Industrial Union (CWIU), this thesis will only examine two 
selected case studies: the NUTW and CWIU. The two were unique 
in that they eschewed involvement in politics and concentrated 
on shop floor structures; they were pioneers in the 
development of strong plant level organisation and the 
building of shop steward structures, which were adopted by the 
emerging unions in the 1980s and 1990s. Furthermore, prior to 
1985, the two formed the backbone of the Federation of South 
African Trade Unions (FOSATU) from its inception in 1979, and 
became symbols of opposition to alliance politics in the 
federation. 
This thesis begins by examining the development of the 
African working class and its resistance to the apartheid 
policies of the 1960s, which eventually led to the Durban 
strikes of 1973. These shook the apartheid state that had 
enjoyed relative industrial "peace" from the time it banned 
the African National Congress and the Pan-Africanist Congress 
and had assumed greater powers of coercion. The Durban strikes 
were unique yet were also emblematic for country-wide worker 
resistance in the 1970s and later. The explosion of industrial 
unrest which began in Durban ignited a series of responses 
which, for almost two decades, the apartheid state was unable 
to control. It also marked the birth of a new brand of 
independent trade unionism which forced the state to institute 
labour reforms and contributed to the eventual collapse of the 
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government. It would be misleading, however, to say that the 
collapse of apartheid was a process forced by the worker 
resistance movement alone. Rather, the demise of apartheid was 
a byproduct of its own internal contradictions and conflicts, 
of the widespread popular resistance which began in Durban in 
1973, and of escalating pressure from the international 
' 
community. Nevertheless, Durban has not always been at the 
vortex of change, the peculiarities of its "backwardness and 
isolation" and sudden centrality are not quite adequately 
explored. 
My thesis consists of twelve chapters divided into two 
parts. Part One deals with the formation and restructuring of 
Durban's African working class and community from 1959 to 
1973. It examines the covert forms of resistance during that 
period. Part Two begins by analysing the 1973 Durban strikes 
which played a major role in the formation of African 
independent trade unions. It evaluates the new industrial 
relations system and formation of independent trade unions, 
their organisation and activities at the plant level; the 
issues they faced in the 1970s and early 1980s; and the 
industrial conflict and strikes in which unions were involved 
up to the formation of the Congress of South African Trade 
Unions (COSATU) in November 1985. 
The year 1985 marked a turning point in the history of 
KwaZulu-Natal, which has been characterised by widespread 
violence and, more importantly, the birth of one of the 
strongest federation of unions in South Africa, COSATU. This 
thesis, therefore, provides a social, political and economic 
framework for labour issues prior to this date. The pre-1985 
context laid a crucial foundation for the future of labour 
history in this volatile region. 
PART ONE 
Creating an African Working Class and Popular 
Struggles 
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Chapter Two 
Durban's Economy, 1960-1985 
Introduction 
The years immediately following the Sharpeville massacre and 
the banning of African political organisations in South Africa 
witnessed unprecedented economic growth. The boom conditions 
which prevailed throughout the world and in South Africa in 
particular were mirrored in Durban where the rate of 
industrial expansion was second only to that of the southern 
Transvaal. B. Freund notes that "the growth of Durban was more 
rapid, for the first time since World War I, than that of 
South Africa as a whole". 1 In Durban, the textile industry was 
the major item in this boom. Despite this boom, the growth and 
structure of Durban's economy during the 1960s, 1970s and 
early 1980s has hardly been studied, the only exception being 
R.T. Bell's study on manufacturing employment in Natal. 2 A 
handful of scholars, namely M. Katzen3 , D.J.L. McWhirter4 and 
1 B. Freund, Insiders and outsiders: the Indian working 
class of Durban, 1910 -1990 (Pietermaritzburg, University of 
Natal Press, 1995), p 77. 
2 R. T. Bell, The growth and structure of manufacturing 
employment in Natal (University of Durban-Westville, Institute 
for Social and Economic Research, Occasional Paper No.7, 1983) 
3 M. Katzen, Industry in greater Durban, Part 3, Natal Town 
and Regional Planning Report, vol. 3 (Pietermaritzburg, 
University of Natal Press, 1961). 
4 D.J.L. McWhirter, Industry in greater Durbgn, Part 4, 
Natgl Town and Regional Planning Report, vol. 4 (Pietermaritz-
burg, University of Natal Press, 1961). 
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I. Edwards5, have covered the earlier period while a few 
scholars provided general surveys of the whole country. 6 While 
important contributions have been made by various scholars of 
South Africa's industrial development, case studies which 
could show the historical roots of the present economic 
situation have been neglected. However, such high and 
sustained growth of the 1960s took centre-stage in the 
"liberal-radical" debate. The existence of state repressive 
structures with an unprecedented economic growth was 
questioned by radical scholars who sought for a theoretical 
understanding of why there was no collapse and indeed a 
strengthening of both the apartheid state and economy during 
the 1960s. However, the economy witnessed one of the longest 
booms in South African economic history, which lasted for 
almost 15 years. 
This chapter makes an attempt to examine the structure of 
manufacturing production; the racial composition and structure 
at the workplace; and the distribution of income among African 
workers. It encapsulates the general economic trend in Durban 
which is crucially important for the understanding of how 
African life was changed significantly during the boom years 
and thereafter. Furthermore, it is important to understand 
such economic trends since industrialisation, urbanisation and 
labour processes are closely linked to each other. 
Economic conditions in South Africa: a brief 
overview 
During the 1960s, the performance of the South African economy 
was impressive. Manufacturing output grew at average annual 
5 Edwards, "Mkhumbane our home". 
6 See, for instance, H. Houghton, The South African economy 
(Cape Town, OUP, 5th ed, 1978); see also a recent publication 
which examines a partially-driven industrial policy by the South 
African government by N. Clark, Manufacturing apartheid: state 
corporations in South Africa (New Haven, Yale University Press, 
1994). 
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rate of well over 24 percent and the Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) averaged almost 8 percent. Employment in manufacturing 
grew rapidly and by the end of the decade, manufacturing made 
up almost 24 percent of GDP compared with 13,5 in the 1950s. 
This boom occurred despite the fact that the country was 
isolated internationally: from the end of May 1961, South 
Africa was no longer part of the Commonwealth after becoming a 
Republic and in 1962, the Kennedy administration in the United 
States banned the supply of certain arms to South Africa. 
Furthermore, in 1963, the United Nations called on member 
states to impose a voluntary arms embargo on South Africa. 7 In 
spite of these problems, the economy of South Africa boomed. 
South Africa experienced an exceptionally rapid economic 
expansion averaging between 5 and 8 percent per annum from 
1945 to the early 1970s.s Quite significantly, the period 
between the end of the Second World War and the early 1970s 
saw South Africa experiencing rapid industrial growth. 9 The 
success story of this period has been noted by various writers 
and scholars of different persuasions. Some scholars, for 
instance Hobart Houghton, speculated that in the 1960s, "The 
South African economy with that of Japan probably had the 
highest growth rate in the world ... " 10 Such observations have 
been castigated by T. Moll's recent studies which refuted the 
7 c. Jenkins, "Sanctions, economic growth and change", in 
N. Nattrass and E. Ardington (eds), The political economy of 
South Africa (Cape Town, OUP, 1990), pp 275-6. 
8 See T. W. De Jongh, "Review of the financial economic 
situation in the Republic of South Africa", South African Journal 
of Economics, vol.39 (1971); South African Reserve Bank, "Post-
war growth and structural changes in the South African economy: 
an analysis of national accounts and balance of payments data", 
in the South African Reserve Bank Quarterly Bulletin; and South 
African Commerce and Industry [all volumes], 1960 -1973. 
9 T.J. Stadler, "Some aspects of the changing structure of 
the South African economy since World War II", South African 
Statistics, ( 1969), p 9. 
10 Houghton, The South African economy, p 213. 
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conventional wisdom and concluded that "the apartheid economy 
grew curiously slowly and can be said to have 'failed' ... " in 
terms of benefiting the majority of people. 11 Nevertheless, 
this particular study, although confined to Durban, suggests 
that the period in question was crucial to South Africa's 
economic boom, precipitating an unprecedented growth in 
manufacturing, construction and service industry output, 
especially during the 1960s and early 1970s. 
In the early 1970s the South African economy managed to 
escape from external constraints, particularly the oil crisis 
which resulted from the war in the Middle East. From 1970 to 
1974, the manufacturing sector experienced a rapid growth and 
was less affected by the oil crisis, than were the advanced 
capitalist countries; in fact, South Africa's economy was 
cushioned by the sharp increase in the gold price during that 
period. Thus the performance of the economy during the four 
year period was intimately connected to that of gold. 
Productivity rose, manufacturing employment increased and 
there was a huge capital inflow into the country except in 
1973 (which was largely dominated by labour unrest and 
unfounded speculation of further devaluation of the rand). 
However, from 1975 to 1977, productivity slowed down to be 
followed by a brief upturn in a short-lived boom from 1978 to 
1984. The economy thereafter was hard-hit by one of the worst 
recessions though between 1987 and 1988 it had a brief 
upturn. 12 The economic fortunes and misfortunes of the period 
(1970 to 1985) were also marked by problems: inflation, labour 
shortages, labour unrest beginning in Durban in 1973 and major 
concerns about the slow-down in productivity growth relative 
to wage increases that were being granted that time. 
11 T. Moll, "Did the apartheid economy fail?", Journal of 
Southern African Studies, vol. 17, No. 2 (June 1991), p 271. 
12 See, 
new skills, 
workforce", 
p 27. 
for example, D. Hindson and 0. Cranks how, "New jobs, 
new divisions - the changing structure of SA's 
South Africa Labour Bulletin, vol 15, No. 1 (1990), 
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Economic conditions in Durban: the boom years, 1960-
1970 
During the early 1950s the South African economy experienced a 
downward trend with the industrial sector of Durban suffering 
a "rather considerable fall in the rate of growth, 
particularly of net output". 13 The Durban-Pinetown-Inanda 
industrial complex (better known as the greater Durban area) 
contributed 12,3 percent of the country's total gross output 
in 1950 while southern Transvaal and the western Cape 
contributed 45,6 percent and 17,1 percent respectively. 14 The 
following years, particularly from 1953 onwards, witnessed 
profitability rising gradually for the next ten years and this 
trend was further facilitated by the annual rate of inflation 
which declined sharply and remained low until the early 1960s. 
During the 1950s, industrial capitalism in South Africa 
was concentrated largely in the four main industrial areas, 
namely, southern Transvaal, the western Cape Province, Port 
Elizabeth and Uitenhage, and greater Durban. 15 In 1954-55 
greater Durban had a record number of approximately 1322 
establishments with a gross value of output of R166,7 million, 
representing 12 percent of total industrial output in the 
Union. 16 Net output of these industrial establishments 
amounted to R62,1 million, representing 11 percent of the 
Union's total. 17 The greater Durban industrial complex showed 
1 3 Edwards, "Mkhumbane our home" , p 9 6 . 
14 W.F.J. Steenkamp, "Labour policies for growth during the 
seventies in the established industrial areas", South African 
Journal of Economics, vol 39 (1971), p 101. 
101. 
15 South African Industry and Trade, vol. 56, Mar. 1960, p 
16 Ibid. 
17 Ibid. 
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a relatively consistent 11 to 12 percent share of the total 
Union output up to the early 1960s attaining a 13 percent 
contribution to the country's gross output by 1963-64. 18 The 
same period also saw an increase in capital invested in 
industrial machinery, redemption charges and industrial 
development loans. 19 
In a drive to encourage rapid economic growth in Durban, 
the City Council provided incentives to potential investors. 
The City Council charged reasonably low rates for industrial 
land. 2° From 1954 onwards, greater Durban tended to 
18 Steenkamp, "Labour policies for growth", p 101. 
19 Edwards, "Mkhumbane our home", p 96. 
20 The Sharpeville shootings of 1960 severely depressed land 
and property prices and they remained relatively low for almost 
three years, but gradually picked up during the early months of 
1963. From 1965 onwards, industrial land prices in the central 
area of Durban (the Old Borough North and South) were higher as 
compared to outskirts areas. [See Table below for comparison 
purposes]. In 1972 rates in central Durban were 2,25 cents in the 
rand and 0,25 cents on improvements; compared with 3,24 cents on 
land and 0,54 cents on buildings in Durban. In Pinetown and New 
Germany, the rates were: Land, 1,8 to 2,4 cents, and 1,25 cents; 
buildings, 0,5 to 0,8 cents and 0,75 cents. 
Average grice of industrial land in foyr ar~9:S: 
1965 - 1970 rates 
Year Durban Old Borough Durban South Pinetown 
North South 
1965 1 1 76 3,21 0,53 0110 
1966 1,86 2,68 0,67 0,13 
1967 1 '80 4,45 0,99 0,20 
1968 2,41 4,09 1 ' 11 0,30 
1969 3,15 6,60 1 '34 0,50 
1970 4,92 6,49 1 '80 0,90 
Increase 1965 -1970 
Rands: 3,16 3,28 1 '27 0,28 
% 180 102 240 800 
Source : City Estates Department, "Published Sales Schedules", 
Durban, and For Pinetown Fieldwork, as cited in B.S. Young, "The 
Industrial Geography of the Durban Region" (University of Natal, 
Ph.D, 1972), 145. 
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concentrate substantially on heavy chemical industries, 
textiles and clothing, furniture and paper and printing. Such 
industries which gradually replaced Durban's "traditional" 
industries such as food, paint and fertilizers required 
large supplies of water for manufacturing processes 
and for effluent disposal, large numbers of 
operatives, as well as unskilled labourers, nearness 
to a port for local and export markets, and some 
local raw materials. 21 
These attempts to expand Durban's economy were not 
without their problems. The consumer market was still 
relatively small. The African people in the rural areas, who 
constituted about 40 percent of the total population in 
Durban's market area, had "but a very low purchasing power"22 
by then. Related to this problem was the geographical location 
of Durban around a major port. Instead of industries 
benefiting from nearness to port facilities, they tended to be 
disadvantaged owing to "state transport tariff rates which 
negated any local advantage due to harbour facilities and 
location". 23 Such a state policy long remained a bone of 
contention amongst Durban's industrialists; despite this the 
tariff rates were upheld by the state to ensure that the 
railway and port facilities of East London and Port Elizabeth 
received a share of the transportation business needs of the 
southern Transvaal industrial complex. In Durban port charges 
were deliberately increased, as were the rail tariffs between 
Durban and Johannesburg.24 
Despite these disadvantages, Durban's industrial revol-
ution took off in the 1960s, along the South Coast, through 
Congella and Mobeni (see maps). These two areas had 
21 SA Industry and Trade, vol 61, Jan. 1965. 
22 McWhirter, Industry, p 4. 
23 Edwards, "Mkhumbane our horne", p 98. 
24 Katzen, Industry, p 30. See also Edwards, "Mkhumbane our 
home", p 98. 
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experienced an industrial upturn in the 1930s and 1940s. 
Industries were expanded to Isipingo and to Umbogintwini, 
which were aptly described as comprising a "complex of 
factories and plants owned by African Explosives, then further 
along the Coast ... to Saiccor rayon plant at Umkomaas and 
to ... the titanium plant at Umgababa". 25 Related to this 
industrial take-off were major developments in rail and road 
facilities. The opening of the Southern Freeway and the 
improvement of roads in the Pinetown-New Germany area, 
Prospecton and Central Durban went a long way to facilitating 
industrialisation. New railway facilities were established in 
Pinetown, Verulam and Prospecton. The late 1960s also saw the 
improvement of telephone exchanges, the extension of sewerage, 
electricity services and water supplies to Cato Ridge, 
Hammarsdale and Pinetown. 26 No doubt J. Martin's remarks 
about London, that "if one looks for the explanation of 
changes in the distribution of industry •.. in the last decade, 
their planning control must be treated as a major factor," 27 
were also applicable to the industrial development of the 
Durban region. 
With the state policy of industrial decentralisation 
(which was meant to exploit African cheap labour fully while 
minimizing their presence in white urban areas) implemented in 
1961, manufacturing industries were established in border 
areas such as Hammarsdale, Tongaat, Verulam, Stanger, 
Isipingo, Glen Anil and Umzinto, and in areas such as New 
Germany and Pinetown. Hammarsdale, in particular, was singled 
out as an important industrial developmental area between 
Durban and Pietermaritzburg. The presence of the railway line 
between Durban and Johannesburg made it possible to launch 
25 SA Industry and Trade, vol.60, Apr. 1964, p 45. 
26 Young, "The industrial geography of the Durban region", 
pp 114-5. 
27 J. Martin as cited in Young, "The industrial geography of 
the Durban region", p 116. 
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extensive industrial development in the area. Hammarsdale was 
also selected due to its proximity to the Umlazi African 
Reserve from which migrant labour could be extracted, and 
because it fell in an area where there were already regulated 
wage agreements for the textile industries. 28 
Through the state's policy of industrial 
decentralisation, Elangeni Estates was launched by the 
Industrial Development Corporation (IDC) in 1961 in 
Hammarsdale to develop a township, and 163 acres were set 
aside for industrial development. In 1971, the roc argued that 
"a well-established textile industry would have tremendous 
employment potential for semi-skilled operatives, which meant 
that it could raise the standard of living of the Bantu"29 , 
hence the develppment of textile industries within the area. 
Notable industries set up at Hammarsdale included the 
clothing factory, three textile plants and a sewing machine 
plant. 30 
The tidal wave of industrialisation gathered momentum 
along border areas, and in 1964 Humphreys and McCrystal 
commented that: 
The industries at Hammarsdale have been attracted 
there largely because of the incentives offered by 
the government and to that extent they are 
subsidised industries in the sense that the rest of 
the economy has to bear the burden of reducing their 
costs below what they would otherwise have been had 
it not been for the subsidies. However, the natural 
process of decentralisation to peripheral areas, 
referred·to previously, is taking place in the 
Region, and the government's incentives are an added 
centrifugal force. Hammarsdale, being only about 15 
miles from Pinetown, may for all practical purposes 
28 SA Industry and Trade, vol. 59, June 1963, p 45. 
29 Industrial Development Corporation, Report ... for 1971, 
p 57; See also Figure 2. 
30 Young, "The industrial geography of the Durban region", 
p 206. 
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be regarded as a peripheral area.31 
By the end of 1971 there were 16 industrial establishments on 
the Elangeni Estates and its surrounding areas.32 
Factories began to mushroom in Durban and 4 900 acres of 
its 94 square miles were zoned for industry; by 1965, 3 430 of 
these acres were already industrially occupied. 33 As part of 
its promotion drive, the City Council set aside 750 acres in 
1965 to allow for industrial expansion during the following 
fifteen years. 34 The City Council allowed an extremely 
favourable rate structure as well: the gross ratable value of 
land and buildings in the industrial areas of the City on 31 
July 1964 stood at R492 132 780.35 Whereas the gross and net 
output for 1954-55 had been 166,7 million (R333,4) and 
62,1 million pounds (R124,2) respectively, by 1964-65 they had 
risen to an annual gross output of R600 million from the 
manufacturing and construction industries of greater Durban, 
and a net output of R210 million.36 
From 1967 onwards the rate of industrial growth declined. 
By 1968 even the textile industry, although ideally suited to 
the border areas, experienced a tremendous decrease in 
production and suffered greatly from international 
competition, particularly from Japan and Rhodesia (now 
Zimbabwe). In Rhodesia, for instance, factory regulations were 
more relaxed and labour cheaper than in South Africa. In 1967-
68, the gross output of textiles for the greater Durban 
industrial complex stood at 12,7 percent of the Union's total, 
31 Humphreys and McCrystal as cited in Young, "The indus-
trial geography of the Durban region'', p 207 
32 Ibid., p 207. 
33 SA Industry and Trade, vol 62, Mar. 1966, p 128. 
34 Ibid; See also Figure 3 & 5. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Ibid. 
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showing a decline in terms of real production. 37 Overall, the 
South African economy from 1965 to 1967 was characterised by a 
lower rate of growth. The lower rate of growth could be 
explained as an effect of the drought which took place in 1965 
and led to lower agricultural production and exports, as well 
as an effect of the grossly high level of white consumer 
spending which affected the local price structure and the bal-
ance of payments. 38 Industrialists expressed concern over the 
slump and remained suspicious about future prospects for 
industrial survival.39 
A major industrial sector with a substantial increase in 
production in Durban during the early 1960s was the textile 
industry. In 1963 this industry received a financial boost 
from the Minister of Economic Affairs who allocated the sum of 
R45 million for textile development, particularly in the 
border areas. 40 However, Durban's manufacturing industry 
during the period was also fairly extensive, embracing 
furniture, printing, timber, hides and skins, farm implements, 
industrial machinery, office equipment, beverages, fertilisers 
and breweries, among other industries. 41 The availability of 
sugar, timber and coal facilitated the process of industrial 
development in the city, and the harbour provided conditions 
conducive to the ship-building industry. Needless to say, it 
was in these industries that increasing numbers of Africans 
were employed at low wages. In order to maximise profit, 
industry relied heavily on cheap, unskilled African labour, 
while importing white labour for skilled and managerial 
positions. The textile industry, particularly the Frame Group 
of Companies based in the New Germany and Mobeni areas, 
37 Steenkamp, "Labour policies", p 101. 
38 SA Commerce and Industry, vol. 24, Dec.1965, p 165. 
39 Ibid. 
40 South Africa Commerce and Indystry, vol.21, 1963, p 239. 
41 SA Industry and Trade, vol. 62, Mar. 1966, p 128. 
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utilised largely female, African migrant labour. 
Between 1960 and 1966, productivity rose in the textile 
industry simply because they applied the piece-rate system. 42 
Each piece of cloth manufactured had a price, pegged at 100 
performance leve1, 43 which was what a worker should produce 
at a machine working at 100 percent efficiency. Some textile 
industries required a 102 percent loom efficiency. 44 At 
Afritex, an Andrea piece of cloth of 230 em by 250 em size was 
worth a wage of 38 cents while a Jabula piece of 100 em by 
110 em was worth 6 cents. 45 Also at Wentex, a Basuto piece of 
152 em in width was paid at a wage of 34 cents per unit, while 
a Demon, 180 em by 200 em, was worth 22 cents. 46 
The actual pay for the day's work was determined by the 
number of pieces of cloth handled. At Frame, for instance, if 
a worker failed to attain the pre~set norm, she/he could be 
penalised through a deduction of wages; if the work was 
continuously below the norm, the worker risked dismissal. 47 
The supervisors were there to enforce discipline and to keep 
42 For an interesting account on piece-rates, see M. 
Burawoy, The Politics of production (London, Verson, 1985), pp 
167-183. Burawoy provided a detailed analysis on how the piece-
rate system has been applied in some developed countries in order 
to increase productivity. 
43 I.Q.i.Q, p 170; Bob Lange and J. Lange, "Organising piece-
rate workers in the textile industry", Science for the People, 
vol.16, No.3 (May -June 1984), p 12; and A. Hirsch, "Ducking and 
weaving: problems of worker organisation in the textile industry 
of Durban-Pinetown-Maritzburg" (University of Witwatersrand, B.A 
Hons Thesis, 1978), p 56. 
44 H. Dickenson, Work Study Department, 10 January 1964. 
Author's personal collection. Documents given by Jabulani Gwala, 
leader of the South African Textile and Clothing Union, Durban 
Branch. 
45 J.H.J' van Leen, Afritex to Head Office, Jacobs, 19 
February 1976. Author's personal collection. 
46 Consolidated Textile Mills Limited: Wentex Mill, Piece-
Rates, January 1976. Author's personal collection. 
47 Hirsch, "Ducking and weaving", p 56. 
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production up. M. Burawoy, a Marxist scholar, saw the role of 
such supervisors as: "emperors, ... they hold us all in their 
hands. They dole out favours as they feel like." 48 
Supervisors could enforce discipline at work by placing 
recalcitrant workers on less productive machines, thus 
lowering their wages. 49 
Productivity, among women textile workers was maintained 
through the coerced intake of contraceptives so as to avoid 
work stoppages due to pregnancy. 50 J. Westmore and P. 
Townsend commented that: 
A sexual stereotype is being manipulated here: 
management does not want a stoppage of work due to 
pregnancy, but the reproduction function of women is 
used as a rationalisation for keepinq women amongst 
the unskilled and low paid workers.sr 
Most textile firms hired women to do work that was 
usually done by men, simply because women were cheaper. In 
1966 the woolwashing industry, for example, paid women wages 
which were 30 percent less than those of men. 52 
The text~le industry in South Africa has been identified 
as a leading sector in providing low wages to its workers. The 
industry has therefore tended to locate itself where there is 
an abundance of cheap labour. This practice had both interna-
tional and local implications. Internationally, rising wages 
in the major western countries led to relocation in less 
developed countries where cheap labour was abundant, while in 
South Africa, industry tended to locate in decentralised areas 
48 Cited in Burawoy, The politics of production, p 177. 
49 Hirsch, "Ducking and weaving", p 56. 
50 J. Westmore and P. Townsend, "The African women workers 
in the textile industry in Durban", South African Labour 
Bulletin, vol.2, No. 4 (1975), p 24. 
51 Ibid. 
52 The Woolwashing Industry, Report by the Research Officer 
of the Textile Workers' Industrial Union (SA), David Hemson, 
March 1973, p 2. Author's personal collection. 
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to take advantage of the state border industries concessions. 
The textile industry has consistently been protected through 
tariffs on imported textiles and nurtured through inflows of 
state capital. The fact that industries located in border 
areas were exempted from wage determinations and minimum wage 
legislation clearly shows how the government supported infant 
industries in the process of capital accumulation. 
Interestingly enough, established industry vigorously pointed 
out the possibilities of "unfair competition" from the 
emerging border area industries. 53 Textile industries were 
established in border areas where a very low-wage, usually 
female, African workforce could replace better-paid Indian and 
African men workers - a manoeuvre largely adopted by many 
white industrialists. 
On the policy of industrial decentralisation, various 
industrialists clashed over the principle of establishing 
border industries. Even when organised industry initially 
opposed the policy, disagreements arose among individual 
members. However, "many industrialists in the proclaimed 
Border Areas that were able to take advantage of the con-
cessions strongly supported the policy, as did several 
employers in such labour intensive industries as tex-
tiles ... "54 By the end of the 1960s industry was diversifying 
and textiles becoming one of many. 
The Frame Group of Companies, with headquarters in 
Durban, is the largest textile manufacturing concern in South 
Africa. This particular company has factories stretching from 
Cape Town, East London, Ladysmith, and Johannesburg to as far 
afield as Zimbabwe, Malawi and zambia. By 1964, P. Frame could 
rightly claim that his industry constituted the largest 
spinning and weaving complex in Southern Africa. In 1964 the 
53 D.F. Kaplan, "Class conflict, capital accumulation and 
the state: an historical analysis of the state in twentieth 
century South Africa," (University of Sussex, D.Phil., 1977), p 
320. 
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labour force of Frametex industries, a division of the Frame 
group, comprised 51 percent African men, 19 percent African 
women and 29 percent Indian workers.55 In addition, during 
the 1960s and early 1970s the Frame Group of Companies 
operated a recruiting organisation in northern and eastern 
Transkei. This recruitment operation was undertaken to ensure 
the supply of a cheap labour force but was terminated in 1973 
soon after the strikes. It was pressure from the government 
which led to the collapse of the system. 
Although the end of the 1960s proved to be somewhat 
difficult for the industrialists, the boom conditions were not 
yet altogether over. The launching of new industries continued 
despite a decline in the total gross industrial output of 
Durban's economy, which stood at approximately 12 percent of 
the national gross output in 1967-68 while Natal's regional 
share had retrogressed to slightly less than 20 percent of the 
tota1. 56 During the 1960s Durban's industrial sector 
consolidated its operations, and returns on capital investment 
increased. During the period 1961 to 1970 a sizeable number of 
new firms entered the market so that by 1968 Durban had a 
record number of approximately 1 800 industries as compared to 
1 500 industries in the region in 1966. 57 By 1971, the number 
of new firms had increased to approximately 2 200 while the 
Natal region as a whole had a record 4 168 industries. 58 
The period between 1965 and 1971 witnessed the 
55 Frame Group statement, Annual year review, 1964. The 
total number of people employed by the Frame Group in 1964 stood 
at ±3 600. This is not an accurate figure because some firms 
provided rounded figures. 
56 Natal Chamber of Industries, 64th Ann. Report, 1971-72, 
p 18. 
57 Natal Chamber of Industries, 61st Ann. Report, 1968-9, 
and see also SA Industry and Trade, vol 62. Mar. 1966, p 128. 
58 Natal Chamber of Industries, 64th Ann. Report, 1971-72, 
p 15. 
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establishment of 230 new firms in the greater Durban 
region. 59 However, a sizeable number of these new firms were 
launched in low cost decentralised areas. A number of them, 
for example Adorable Footwear, Newman Hender's valve shop, and 
Air Products, were established in the Pinetown-New Germany 
area. Other new firms established at Prospecton-Isipingo 
included Isipingo Textile Corporation, the Henkel Chemical 
plant, Argus Printing and Rheen's Drums, while the large new 
Mondi Paper Mill was established at Merebank. At Verulam, the 
Republic Stationery industry was established, while at 
Tongaat, the David Whitehead Textile factory came into 
existence. The Coronation Group of companies also established 
a new brick and tile works at Avoca, and Reindeer Toys and 
Shield Clothing, as well as a new textile mill were 
established at Hammarsdale and Umzinto respectively. 60 The 
new buildings established in the central area of Durban during 
this period were relatively small businesses and rented 
premises. Industrial expansion was thus concentrated largely 
on the outskirts of Durban where land and labour were cheap 
and readily available. 
In this favourable climate, organised industry, 
particularly the Durban Chamber of Commerce and the Natal 
Chamber of Industries, made positive comments as to the 
industrial potential of the region, challenging Durban's 
manufacturing industry to become "more export conscious and 
export oriented". 61 This optimistic viewpoint was reflected 
in the "get out and sell" campaign,62 promoted by F.W.H. 
Stafford of the Natal Chamber of Industries, in a bid to 
59 Cameron as cited in Young, "The industrial geography of 
the Durban region", p 12; See also Figure 6. 
60 Young, "The industrial geography of the Durban region", 
pp 123-4. 
61 Natal Chamber of Industries, 56th Ann. Report, 1963-4, p 
54. 
62 SA Industry and Trade, vol. 62, Sept. 1966, p 37. 
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promote export trade during a period when South Africa was 
facing international isolation as a result of its apartheid 
policies. Trade links between South Africa and Rhodesia were 
intensified since the two countries were facing the same fate. 
Rhodesia's unilateral declaration of independence from the 
United Kingdom in 1965 and the resultant imposition of 
sanctions against it encouraged the two countries to operate 
more closely. However, before the end of the 1960s, South 
Africa experienced a slight decline in the growth rate of the 
GDP and industrial production, particularly the manufacturing 
output, was poorer as compared to the first six years of the 
decade. Between 1967 and 1969, the textile and clothing 
industries were largely affected by competition from abroad 
and as a result these two sectors, mainly dominant in Durban, 
experienced a slower rate of growth which affected South 
Africa's industrial performance. Nevertheless, by 1970 the 
economy had once again picked up. 
1970-1985: difficulties and changing economic trends 
Between 1970 and 1974, the South African economy experienced 
rapid growth, particularly in the manufacturing sector. 
Durban's growth for the period 1972 to 1985 is shown in Table 
A. 
Table A 
The growth of manufacturing in the greater Durban region, 
1972- 198563 
Year No. of Manuf. Establ. Gross Output Net Output 
(R1000) (R1000) 
1972 1432 1052 218 407 334 
1976 1766 2761 300 1010 200 
1979 1985 3822 826 1406 611 
1985 2346 9565 769 3778 812 
From the available data, the manufacturing sector 
63 Censuses of manufacturing reports for 1972, 1976, 1979 
and 1985. 
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expanded quite significantly in the 1970s. With regard to the 
productivity of all sectors, the magnitude of increase was 
less than that of the 1960s. Productivity in the manufacturing 
sector increased during 1970-74 but slowed-down between 1975 
and 1977, which possibly led A. Black, an economist, to refer 
to "South Africa's dismal economic performance since the mid-
1970s''.64 Generally, the level of output grew in all sectors 
of manufacturing industry though with some periodical slow-
downs during the period under investigation. Between 1975 and 
mid-1977, the economy declined but before the end of 1977 it 
had began to recover. In 1979, for instance, the chemicals, 
food, textiles and clothing and footwear industries 
contributed about 56,3 percent of the total manufacturing 
gross output for the Durban region. Their contribution 
declined, however, to 52,2 percent in 1985.65 In 1985, the 
gross output for these high growth industries were: chemicals 
(R1 844 593), food industry (R1 503 506), textiles (R940 204), 
and paper products (R710 018). 66 Fabricated metals, motor 
vehicles and printing were next in order of importance. Small-
scale and family enterprises such as furniture and various 
types of repair shops, mainly dominated by Indians, also 
contributed about 0,8 percent of the total manufacturing value 
added. However, since 1985 there has been a modest decline in 
the percentage contribution to GOP from the manufacturing 
sector, which has adversely affected the economy at large. 
Employment patterns, 1960-1985 
By the beginning of 1966, Durban enjoyed a total of 1 500 
industries in the city, with an employment record of 87 500 
64 A. Black, "Manufacturing development and the economic 
crisis: a reversion to primary production?", in S. Gelb ( ed), 
South Africa's economic crisis (Cape Town, David Philip, 1991), 
p 156. 
65 Census of manufacturing, 1985, p 185. 
66 Ibid. 
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workers, of whom 20,57 percent were whites, 27,42 percent 
Indians, 5,14 percent coloureds and 46,9 percent Africans. 67 
By 1967/8, greater Durban region had a total employment of 
131 496 (representing 13,2 percent of South African 
employment), of which 16,9 percent was white, 35,2 both 
coloured and Indian and 47,9 percent African. 68 These 
statistics reveal the accelerated tempo of industrial growth 
in the Durban metropolitan area. By 1970, the total number of 
Africans employed in greater Durban had increased to 48,4 
percent of the total workers, reaching a 50,3 percent mark in 
1972. 69 During the 1960s, the proportion of Indian workers 
also increased, particularly in the low-intensity clothing, 
footwear, food and beverages, and furniture industries. 70 
The growth and structural transformation of the economy 
had profound implications for the growth of employment and 
wages and for the distribution of the labour force by sector 
and occupation during the 1960s. The following statistics on 
employment patterns in eighty-eight Durban firms are useful 
indicators of the position of African workers in the economy: 
67 Ibid; See also Figure 6. 
68 Department of Statistics, Report No. 10-21-18, Census of 
manufacturing, 1967-8. 
69 See Report No.10-21-27, Census of manufacturing, 1970 and 
Report No.10-21-29, Census of manufacturing, 1972. 
70 Bell, The growth and structure of manufacturing 
employment in Natal, p 38. 
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Table B 
Proportions of the total labour 
employment, 1962 and 197271 
Occupational Category and Year 
Managerial and Executive 
1962 
1972 
Medium and Senior Clerical 
1962 
1972 
Low Clerical 
1962 
1972 
Higher Semi-Skilled & Skilled 
1962 
1972 
Lower Semi-Skilled 
1962 
1972 
unskilled 
1962 
1972 
force within 
Race 
Afr. Ind. 
Nil 1% 
1% 2% 
2% 15% 
2% 24% 
4% 24% 
4% 33% 
14% 43% 
17% 49% 
45% 49% 
43% 53% 
88% 11% 
88% 11% 
categories of 
Groups 
Col. Whites 
Nil 99% 
Nil 97%. 
1% 82% 
1% 73% 
Nil 72% 
Nil 63% 
7% 36% 
9% 25% 
3% 3% 
3% 1% 
1% Nil 
1% Nil 
As these figures show, "the only significant advance for 
Africans has been in the higher semi-skilled/skilled category 
where the proportions rose from 14 percent in 1962 to 17 
percent in 1972 (in absolute terms the numbers were 1 088 and 
1 483 respectively in the eighty-eight firms}". 72 During the 
1960s, many African workers were largely unskilled although a 
few managed to advance at a painfully slow rate. The Indian 
working class, as Freund has shown, was preferred as semi-
skilled and clerical staff, particularly in the footwear and 
clothing industries. Freund further notes that, during the 
71 L. Schlemmer and M. Boulanger, "Race and employment 
patterns among larger employers in Durban: a brief case study of 
employment policy in relation to social change", in L. Schlemmer 
and E. Webster (eds), Change, reform and economic growth in South 
Africa (Johannesburg, Ravan Press, 1977), p 177. 
72 L. Schlemmer and M. Boulanger, "Race and employment 
patterns among larger employers in Durban", in L. Schlemmer and 
E. Webster (eds), Change, reform and economic growth in South 
Africa (Johannesburg, Ravan Press, 1977), p 176. 
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1960s, "the Indian worker [was] generally regarded as being 
particularly suited to work demanding initiative and quick 
thinking, especially process-minding, while the African worker 
seems to show more aptitude for routine repetitive work". 73 
By the late 1960s, some employers believed that the Indian 
worker showed "greater facility than the Bantu for skilled 
manipulative work and clerical employment but lacks the 
physical strength and stamina of the Bantu". 74 L. Douwes-
Dekker (an industrial expert) and H.L. watts' study on 
employers' attitudes towards African and Indian workers in 
1973 came to the conclusion that "viewed overall the Indian 
worker tends to be regarded less favourably than the African 
worker". 75 Nonetheless the African worker has always been 
portrayed in a negative manner; the most common stereotype 
being that he/she lacks initiative, imagination and dexterity 
and therefore should be an unskilled labourer. For long, Natal 
Africans were viewed as "lazy Kaffirs", "a fickle race" with 
"unconquerable laziness", 76 which had to be taught about 
notions of work and productivity. Such crude and racist 
perceptions of Natal African workers were expressed by some 
white employers and even Indian industrialists in the 1960s, 
particularly in the clothing industry, who preferred to employ 
Indian workers rather than Africans. However, some parts of 
Durban economy were open to African advancement, particularly 
in the food, beverage, textile, rubber and motor vehicle 
industries. Dunlop, one of the largest employers in Durban, 
preferred African to Indian workers right up to the late 
73 Freund, Insiders and outsiders, p 79. 
74 Ibid. 
75 L. Douwes-Dekker and H.L. Watts, "Certain attitudes of 
white industrial employers in Durban towards the Indian worker 
in contrast to the African worker" 1 Humani tas, vol. 2, No.2 (1973), p 119. 
76 K.E. Atkins, The moon is dead! give us our money: 
cultural oriqins of an African work ethic, Natal, South Africa, 
1834-1900 (Portsmouth, Heinemann, 1993),p 2. 
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1980s. In the 1980s, Dunlop also was known for ridding itself 
of Indian workers in order to take on migrants from Zululand. 
The same applied to the textile industry where African workers 
were given preference over Indians. The new automobile 
assembly industry, dominated by Toyota, largely employed 
Africans and avoided both Indian and coloured workers. 
As industrial output increased in the greater Durban 
region, it meant also some structural changes in the size of 
firms. The relevant data is provided in Table C. 
Table C 
Employment in manufacturing industries in greater Durban, 
1972- 198577 
Year Total No. Employed Average No.empl per Establ. 
1972 119 775 84 
1976 186 427 106 
1979 181 434 91 
1985 193 093 82 
Between 1972 and 1985, the number of establishments 
operating in the manufacturing sector almost doubled in size. 
The increase in the employment contribution of the 
manufacturing sector was mainly the result of the 
establishment of new industries year after year, as shown in 
Table A. For instance, in 1972, greater Durban had a total of 
1 432 establishments, while in 1985 the number had increased 
to 2 346 (see Table A). The average number employed per 
establishment increased substantially from 84 in 1972 to 106 
in 1976, while the national average number employed per 
establishment in the same year was 88. 78 
By 1978, Durban's manufacturing sector was by far the 
largest sector of economic activity in South Africa in terms 
of the value of its output, producing almost 22 percent of 
Natal's total of 29,7. By 1979, as Freund notes, Natal created 
77 Censuses of manufacturing reports for 1972, 1976, 1979 
and 1985; and South African Statistics, 1978. The average number 
employed per establishment is rounded off to the nearest figure. 
78 J. Nattrass, The South African economy: its growth and 
change (Cape Town, OUP, 1988 ed), p 168. 
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21,3 percent of manufacturing jobs in general but of 38,8 
percent of jobs in clothing, 38,3 percent of jobs in textiles 
and 50,1 percent of jobs in footwear in South Africa. 79 In 
1979, greater Durban was the site for 63,6 percent of the 
total manufacturing employment in Natal.ao The data in Table 
D summarize the contribution of Durban's manufacturing 
employment to the total of South Africa. 
Table D 
Spatial distribution of manufacturing employment in greater 
Durban, 1961- 1985 (% of S.A)81 
Year 
1961/2 
1967/8 
1970 
1972 
1976 
1979 
1985 
Percentage 
12,7 
13,8 
13,6 
13,6 
13,7 
13,8 
14,7 
With increasing decentralisation of economic activities 
along border areas in the 1970s and 1980s, Durban's 
contribution to employment opportunities in Natal was 
weakened, for instance, in 1979, it contributed only 17 
percent of all manufacturing employment, but provided 32,1 
percent of textile jobs and 34,8 percent of clothing jobs in 
the country. 82 Generally, from 1976 to 1984, employment 
growth was very rapid beyond the Durban region. Similarly, 
during the same period, there was a substantial decrease of 
over 40 000 in total manufacturing employment in the whole 
country. Between 1982 and 1984, many job opportunities were 
79 Freund, Insiders and outsiders, p 78. 
80 J. Stanwix, "Capital accumulation, crisis and spatial 
restructuring: a study of spatial shifts in South African 
manufacturing with particular reference to Natal (University of 
Natal, Durban, M.Comm. Thesis, 1987), p 168. 
81 Censuses of manufacturing reports for 1961/2, 1967/8, 
1972, 1976, 1979 and 1985. 
82 Stanwix, "Capital accumulation", p 198. 
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created by border industries, for example, Isithebe, which is 
about 100 kilometres north of Durban, accounted for 40 percent 
of all new jobs in Natal, particularly in newly established 
fabricated metal products, clothing and textile industries. 83 
Many of these border industries were smaller and independently 
owned and were mainly dominated by Indian capitalists, for 
example, the famous Paruks and A.M. Moollas of Durban. 84 On 
the other hand, large firms, mainly centred in Durban, were 
owned by the few industrial and financial conglomerates that 
have dominated the South African economy. 
Some changes also took place in the racial structure of 
the labour force in Durban. By 1976, of the total 186 427 
workers, 13,5 percent were whites, 36,7 coloureds and Indians, 
and 50 percent Africans. The major proportion of Indian 
workers were employed in clothing and footwear industries 
where they represented 80,6 and 69,8 percent respectively. 85 
African workers were employed in greater proportions in 
textile, wood and wood products, chemicals, machinery and 
transport industries. By 1979, 14 570 African workers were 
employed in the food industry of which the total was 22 766, 
2 108 of 2 956 in beverages, 19 961 of 27 565 in textiles, and 
4 423 of 5 867 in the non-metallic industry. 86 In 1979 also, 
Indian workers were heavily concentrated in the wearing and 
leather industries where 26 249 of the total 35 296 and 5 652 
of 7 948 were employed respectively. 87 In Durban in 1985, 
whites provided only 13,6 percent of the total labour force, 
coloureds 6 percent, Indians 30 percent and Africans 50,4 
83 Ibid., p 197; and Bell, The growth and structure of 
manufacturing employment in Natal, p 68. 
84 Freund, Insiders and outsiders, p 80. 
85 Bell, The growth and structure of manufacturing 
employment in Natal, p 39. 
86 Report No.10-21-40, Census of manufacturing, 1979, p 59. 
87 Ibid. 
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percent. From this data, it appears that Africans, as Nattrass 
notes, "have been employed in greater proportions, labour 
costs per rand output increased in some industries and 
remained constant or declined in others".88 
One of the biggest changes in the occupational and racial 
structure in industry was the upward mobility of African 
workers from unskilled into semi-skilled jobs. During the 
1960s, quite a big percentage of African workers were 
unskilled, but in the mid-1980s, many of them, particularly in 
the formal sector, were semi-skilled as well. In other words, 
during the 1980s, the greatest proportion of African workers 
were either unskilled or semi-skilled. 
African wages 
Associated with a decade of very rapid economic growth was the 
rise of African wages in the manufacturing sector. In the 
early 1960s, the issue of compulsory minimum wages for all 
African workers was extensively debated by economists, 
industrialists and other interested parties. The Wage Board, 
which was instituted in the early 1920s to safeguard and 
improve the position of the white working class, began in 1957 
to be actively involved in the wage determinations of African 
workers. The chairman of the Wage Board in 1962, W.F.J. 
Steenkamp, saw "a large, rapid and general wage rise ... " 89 as 
a social and political necessity. In his concluding remarks, 
Steenkamp called for: 
a larger rise in Bantu real wages than in European 
real wages, but it must be a steady and measured 
advance rather than a sudden general rise that would 
be certain to affect at least certain industries and 
parts of the country deleteriously and would, in 
particular, disregard the long-term employment 
88 Nattrass, The South African economy, p 175. 
89 W.F.J. Steenkamp, "Bantu wages in South Africa", South 
African Journal of Economics, vol. 30, No.2 (1962),p 114. 
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problem facing us.90 
The call for higher wages for the African labour force 
came from various quarters. In the late 1950s, the African 
National Congress and the trade union umbrella body, the South 
African Congress of Trade Unions (SACTU), launched a "One 
Pound a Day" campaign and the workers adopted the "Asinamali, 
Sifunamali" (we have no money, we want money) slogan. 91 The 
Durban Chamber of Commerce, the Natal Chamber of Industries 
and the Natal Employers' Association called for a living wage 
amongst its African work force although they were actually 
opposed to any specific wage increase. 92 After the 
Sharpeville massacre, major employers of African labour met 
and petitioned the government to legislate a minimum wage for 
their employees. Employers regarded government intervention as 
necessary to prevent under-cutting by those firms which did 
not increase wages out of choice.93 The government, however, 
was hostile to these representations and Prime Minister 
Verwoerd accused the businessmen of "paving the way for black 
domination". 94 He dismissed members of the Association of 
Chamber of Commerce as "traitors" and for many years refused 
to see or receive correspondence from them. 95 
African workers themselves persistently demanded wage 
increases during the late 1950s. The period immediately 
following the Sharpeville massacre, however, saw the 
90 Ibid. 
91 See, for instance, K. Luckhardt and B. Wall, Organise or 
starve (London, Lawrence and Wishart, 1980). 
92 See The Durban Chamber of Commerce, 1959/1960, .An.!:L. 
Report of the Council of Directors: Natal Chamber of Industries, 
56th Ann. Report, 1963-64, p 28. 
93 Rand Daily Mail, 20 June 1960. 
94 As cited in M. Lipton, Capitalism and apartheid: South 
Africa, 1910-1986 (Cape Town, David Philip, 1989 ed), p 171. 
95 Ibid. 
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suppression of mass political movements and trade unions, and 
there was very limited pressure forthcoming from political or 
trade union organisations to force wages up. Furthermore, 
strikes had declined to the extent that resistance was no 
longer coming directly from the workers themselves or from 
mass movements. Given a scenario seemingly so favourable, why 
did employers now support wage increases as proposed by the 
Wage Board? 
Perhaps it was necessary for wages to be increased in 
order to increase the buying power of the African workers. 
That principle is very important if we realise that 
capitalists saw increases in wages as creating demand 
particularly for industrial products. If the consumer market 
remained limited, it would turn out to be, as K. Marx noted, 
"production for production's sake" without expanding the basis 
for profit. 96 Capitalists as a class stood to gain although 
some individual capitalists were opposed to wage increases. 
Organised industry called relentlessly for an increase in 
African wages as "the most effective way of reaching optimum 
productivity". 97 In September 1963, the president of the 
Transvaal Chamber of Industries criticised the state policy of 
job reservation and maintained that: 
The time has come when organised industry must state 
categorically that ... no exploitation of labour 
should be allowed ... and that our recommended 
safeguard is not to pay a man according to9gis colour or race but to the job he is doing. 
In essence, this proposal was meant to support the de-
skilling of craft jobs to allow Africans to take over sections 
of the work. The rate for the job was the slogan of the Trade 
Union Council of South Africa (TUCSA) and some liberal 
employers, who advocated that there should be no racial 
96 See K. Marx, Capital: a critique of political economy 
(New York, New York Publishers, 1967 ed), pp 557-585. 
97 SA Industry and Trade, vol.59, Jan. 1963, p 41. 
9B Ibid., Sept. 1963, p 45. 
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demarcation of jobs rather a more open labour market in which 
job fragmentation should take place. During the 1960s and 
1970s, similar complaints about the job colour bar were lodged 
to the government by various businessmen and organisations. 99 
On the extreme right, Dr Verwoerd maintained: "Don't give 
the poorly paid worker too much or he will become lazy and 
inefficient." 100 Despite the government's rejection of the 
request from businessmen to increase African wages, events of 
the early 1960s played a role in contributing to wage 
adjustments, particularly from the Wage Board. Some 
businessmen continued to lobby for higher legislated minimum 
wages for African workers. The Association for the Improvement 
of Bantu Wages and Productivity made several statements to the 
effect that African wages were rising at a painful slow-
rate.101 Nevertheless, the Wage Board increased unskilled 
wages as much as 20 to 40 percent between 1961 and 1964 as 
part of an attempt to stabilise conditions after the height of 
political unrest in Durban.102 
Although African wages were increased substantially, such 
increases did not take into account the Poverty Datum Line 
(PDL). In 1960, the South African Institute of Race Relations 
(SAIRR) estimated a POL of £24 (R48) for an African urban 
family of five. 103 The average African manufacturing wage 
was £16 (R32) at that time. However, by 1964, the gap between 
the POL and the average African manufacturing wage had 
narrowed slightly. The SAIRR estimated a POL in 1964 of R52,67 
99 See Lipton, Capitalism and apartheid, Chapter 6, pp 138-
182. 
100 SA Industry and Trade, val 59, Jan 1963, p 41. 
101 SAIRR, Survey of race relations, 1961, p 191; and Survey 
of race relations, 1962, p 200. 
102 See Tables showing wage increases from D.E. Pursell, 
"Bantu real wages and employment opportunities in South Africa", 
South African Journal of Economics, 36 (1968), pp 97-101. 
103 SAIRR, Race relations news, March 1960, p 21. 
50 
a month for an urban African family of five. At the time, the 
average African monthly wage in manufacturing was R43,0s. 104 
From the early 1960s, the vast majority of African 
workers, whether migrant or urban residents, participated in 
the economy as casual, unskilled and semi-skilled labourers. 
In Durban there is evidence which shows that in the 1960s 
industry opened its gates to African workers to take up semi-
skilled and skilled jobs. However, the abundance of unskilled 
African labour largely explains why historically the South 
African economy has grown through greater inputs of capital 
and land but without adequately improving the efficiency of 
these inputs. In his assessment in 1973 of manufacturing 
growth since 1963, the Director of the South African Federated 
Chamber of Industries, Dr H.J.J. Reynders, stated that ''the 
Republic experienced a high rate of growth of total output, 
but the percentage increase in employment was one of the 
lowest in the world. "105 
During the 1960s there was an outcry among industrialists 
about the shortage of skilled manpower and most employers 
realized the value of utilising African labour. While job 
reservation was widely condemned by employers, the state saw 
it as a measure designed to safeguard industrial peace rather 
than deprive Africans of job opportunities. By the mid-1960s, 
the available reserves of white labour could not cope with 
demand of skilled labour although the government had allowed 
the importation of 76 481 immigrants. 106 Because of the 
l 
shortage of skilled labour, the Prime Minister's Advisory 
Council recommended the use of African trained manpower, 
though Verwoerd insisted that such labour utilisation should 
104 SAIRR, Survey of race relations, 1966, p 205. 
105 H.J.J. Reynders, "Industrialisation and productivity", 
Address at the 7th AIESEC Congress, Pretoria, 5 July 1973. 
106 See South African statistics, 1982. 
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not threaten white jobs or lead to racially mixed 
employment. 107 
Against this background, we need to examine the African 
wage structure in Durban to see whether there was any impact 
at all by the Wage Board which after 1957 became increasingly 
interested in African real earnings (See Table E below). 108 
Table E 
Average weekly earnings for unskilled labourers from selected 
industries in Durban, 1958 and 1965 (In Rand, October 1958 R = 
.1QQ.ll09 
Ind Real Earn Real E % !ncr Real Min % !ncr of R 
1958 1965 58 & 65 in 1965 min '65 over 
R Earn 1965 
Gas 5.44 5.71 4.96 5.64 1.2 
Motor 6.97 9.86 41.5 9. 12 8. 11 
Meat 5.99 9.86 64.6 9.63 2.4 
Goods 5.83 6.70 14.9 6.50 3. 1 
Bags 5.07 6.51 28.4 5.68 14.6 
Transport 4.62 6.54 41.6 4.98 31.3 
Asphalt 4.34 5.69 31 . 1 5.65 0.7 
Grease 4.73 6.21 31.3 6. 14 1.1 
Shipping 7.05 9.19 30.4 8.90 3.3 
Delivery 5.70 6.89 20.9 6.86 0.4 
Building 5.02 5.72 13.9 5.12 11.7 
Wool-Hide 4.90 5.72 16.7 5.72 0.0 
Bridge Con 4.36 5.72 32.7 6.0 -4.7 
Excavation 5.26 5.72 8.7 6.43 -11.04 
Tanning 4.58 5.73 25.0 5.35 7. 1 
On a comparative basis, the real wages of unskilled African 
workers had remained static since the end of the Second World 
War, "in spite of virtual full employment and a 74 percent 
growth of the real national income over the period 1945-46 to 
107 SAIRR, Survey of race relations, 1964, p 190. 
108 Real earnings refers to actual earnings adjusted to take 
into consideration inflation. Average real earnings would usually 
exceed the minimum real wage by definition. 
109 See the following reports, Report of the Wage Board, 
Meat Trade, Natal and Pretoria, 28 March 1966; Report of the Wage 
Board, Private Hotels, Durban, 13 January 1960; and Reports of 
the Wage Board, unskilled labour, and the relevant wage 
determinations. Some of these documents were obtained from Dr 
David Remson's collection. 
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1958-59. Real wages of skilled workers (mostly whites], on the 
other hand, have risen steadily since the war." 110 The wages 
o.f the white workers rose after the war by almost 40 
percent111 , making them one of better paid working-classes 
of the world with average annual earnings well above £1 200 in 
the late 1950s. Yet African workers in the greater Durban 
area, particularly those in the manufacturing industry, 
experienced a decline of 11 percent in their wages between 
1946-47 and 1953-54. 11 2 The Wage Board was challenged to 
address such disparities which existed in the economy and the 
distinction between skilled and unskilled work came to be 
"more or less identified with the distinction between the 
races, and the operation of market forces came in some measure 
to be replaced by the convention that a white man's wage was 
usually five to ten times the wage of a black man." 113 
In 1971 the Natal Employers Association conducted a wage 
and salary survey which indicated that 10 percent of the 
unskilled African workers earned less than R9 per week, 50 
percent between R9 and R10 per week and 40 percent slightly 
above R10. About 25 percent of semi-skilled Africans earned 
over R18 per week while 20 percent of skilled workers earned 
between R18 and R23 per week. 11 4 The real minimum wage for 
unskilled workers in Durban, as published in the Government 
Gazette of 21 May 1971, was R8,95 per week which indicated an 
increase of R1,70 from the regulated figure of R7,25. 115 The 
11 0 L. Katzen, "The case for minimum wage legislation in 
South Africa", SA Journal of Economics, vol 29 (1961), p 195. 
111 Ibid. 
112 Ibid, See Katzen's footnote number 3. 
11 3 Houghton, The South Africa economy, 1973, p 144. 
114 KCAL, PNAAB, KCF 79, Roll 61, 3 (c), Public Relations, 
Natal Employers' Association, Aug. 1971. 
11 5 KCAL, KCF 80, Roll 62, Public Relations, SA Institute of 
Race Relations (Natal Region), Minutes of a meeting of the 
regional committee, 7 June 1971, p 3. 
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salary scales for white workers were reasonably high compared 
to African wages. The average white fitter earned R1,50 per 
hour and junior clerks appointed with matriculation results 
earned R157 per month while those without matric 
qualifications were paid R141 per month. 11 6 
The sad story of African workers was that the consumer 
price index figures rose dramatically for all items to 107,8 
while those for food rose to 108,9 which showed a 1,3 and 2,4 
increase respectively in a month. 117 Professor Watts esti-
mated, on the basis of figures produced by the Bantu Wage and 
Productivity Association, that the real minimum income for an 
African worker with a family in Durban in July 1971 was R77 
per month which meant that a family of five would need at 
least R17,91 per week to sustain itself. 118 The consumer 
price index for all items in Durban had consistently gone up 
between 1966 and 1973. In December 1961, the consumer price 
index was 120,8 and by December 1971, it had gone up to 
148,6. 119 On that same note, on the basis of research 
conducted by the Institute for Social Research at the 
University of Natal, for KwaMashu residents, "after the deduc-
tion of expenditure on rent, transport, water and fuel, very 
little more than 5,5 cents per head remained for the purehase 
of food and other essential requirements". 120 The extent of 
such poverty in African townships was measured by the indices 
of health published by the Durban Medical Officer of Health. 
The infant mortality rate for 1969 was 103,4 per 1 000 live 
births as compared to 14,2 for whites. During the same year, 
116 KCAL, KCF 79, Roll 61, Natal Employers' Ass, Aug. 1971 . 
117 KCAL, KCF 79, Roll 61, NEA, Oct. 1971 . 
118 Ibid. 
119 Ibid, Mar. 1972. 
12° KCAL, KCF 80, Roll 62, SA Institute of Race Relations, 
Memorandum presenting information relevant to a consideration of 
m1n1mum wage rates for unskilled labourers in the region, Sept., 
1970, p 2. 
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tuberculosis claimed 5,9 per 1 000 Africans compared to 0,4 
per 1 000 for whites. 121 
Because of the unhealthy economic situation prevalent 
among urban Africans in Durban, the Chairman of the Natal 
Region of the South African Institute of Race Relations 
(SAIRR), L. Schlemmer, commented: "Ultimately all of us will 
have to pay dearly for this neglect of human needs." 122 
Similarly, in 1971, the Director of the Institute of Race 
Relations, F.J. van Wyk, warned of the "explosive discontent 
building up among urban Africans - a simmering anger, which 
has not yet been recognised by the Government, or if it has 
been, is being ignored". 123 
During the 1970s, the issue of wages remained one of the 
areas of conflict between employers and employees. 
Increasingly during this period, African workers in Durban 
showed their displeasure over poor wages by resorting to 
strike action. This eventually led to the great Durban strikes 
of 1973. However, wages alone cannot adequately explain the 
unpredicted, complicated, unexpected and now most celebrated 
1973 Durban strikes. 
It is very interesting to note, however, that during 
the 1970s, African wages increased by almost 38 percent. Wage 
increases offered an incentive to work harder: both in -the 
passive sense that at higher wages workers will co-operate 
with management's attempts to raise productivity, and in the 
active sense that higher wages will stimulate economic growth. 
Indeed, the wage issue was of significance during the 1970s 
but one should not place too great an emphasis on it since 
there were other pressing issues as well. One of the major 
concerns of the period was that of the shortage of skilled 
labour, which led the SAIRR in 1971 to conclude: "Labour 
121 Ibid. 
122 SAIRR, A Survey of race relations, 1971, p 179. 
123 The Rand Daily Mail, 16 Mar. 1971. 
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shortages are the largest single obstacle which will in all 
probability make it difficult for the private sector to 
achieve the proposed level of investment without causing other 
serious problems such as inflation.'' 124 In the 1970s, the 
manufacturing sector (particularly clothing) and construction 
experienced a shortage in skilled labour. In a survey that was 
conducted in 1972 by the SAIRR, it was established that the 
greatest labour shortage was of skilled African and coloured 
artisans and African clerical, operative and administrative 
workers. 125 Despite these problems, the level of output 
between 1970 and 1974 went up in all the sub-sectors of 
industry. 
Conclusion 
During the period 1960 to 1975, the South African economy grew 
at an average annual rate of almost five percent. Contributing 
significantly to the gross domestic product was the 
manufacturing sector. It was during that era that Durban 
became one of country's greatest industrial and manufacturing 
centres; it became Natal's leading manufacturing and 
industrial centre, and a gateway to the rest of the country. 
However, from mid-1975 to 1977, the South African economy 
experienced a sharp decline partly because of the recession, 
the Soweto uprisings of 1976 and international pressure. By 
1978, the economy had a brief upturn; in fact, from the mid-
1970s to 1985, the economy experienced both upswings and 
downswings. 
From the mid-1980s, as rightly noted by s. Gelb, South 
Africa was "marked by stagnation in output growth; inflation 
entrenched at over 13 percent per annum; a week rand; a 
permanent decline in foreign exchange reserves; and 
124 SAIRR, Survey of race relations, 1971, p 96. 
125 SAIRR, Survey of race relations, 1973, p 265. 
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historically low personal savings ratios". 126 These economic 
developments shed some light on the liberal-radical debate on 
the state-capital relationship. In the following chapters, 
evidence will be given that shows that during the 1960s 
apartheid was both functional and detrimental to the country's 
economic growth. The relationship seems to have been complex: 
some capitalists took advantage of the state's economic 
policies and reaped highest profit margins while others were 
not satisfied with particular apartheid policies, for instance 
on job reservation, low wages, lack of skilled workers and 
influx control measures (discussed in Chapter 3), which 
contributed to declining productivity in their establishments. 
On the whole, the functional relationship between capitalism 
and apartheid can possibly be sustained for the period between 
1960 and 1972, during which period South Africa experienced an 
economic boom. It was also a period when the cheap labour 
system and the securing of law and order were further 
extended. However, after 1972 the relationship became clearly 
one of open hostility since apartheid hampered economic growth 
as industry expanded and developed new imperatives that could 
not be catered for by the existing apartheid structures. 
Furthermore, apartheid had become too costly to maintain and 
rendered the manufacturing industry uncompetitive and 
restricted the market because of economic sanctions imposed by 
the international community on South Africa. 
The economy is still experiencing its own classic 
problems and economic growth is very low, which makes the 
tasks of the present government difficult to achieve. While 
the ANC government may find it absolutely necessary to correct 
racial economic imbalances, economic policies and programmes 
should be such as not to contravene the minimum political 
requirements of economic growth. 
126 Gelb (ed), South Africa's economic crisis, p 1. 
57 
Chapter Three 
The State Labour Control Policies and African 
Workers of Durban, 1960-1985 
Introduction 
Politically, socially and economically, the 1960s, 1970s and 
early 1980s constitute a crucial period for South Africa. The 
1960s are important to modern South African history in that it 
was the era of high apartheid. It was also a period of 
economic boom and slump, when Durban finally became an 
industrial and manufacturing city of significant proportions. 
It was also during those years that African workers were 
deeply integrated into apartheid's booming economy, but in 
ways which in the long term prevented that economy from 
further expansion. Furthermore, the period witnessed both the 
state and capital endeavouring to fashion a particular type of 
African worker. Consequently, the integration process brought 
about various conflicting and contradictory relations between 
the state, capital and labour over the nature of African 
employment in urban cities. This chapter is concerned 
initially with the application and effectiveness of 
apartheid's labour policies. Secondly, it will examine the 
reasons why Africans migrated into urban areas and, lastly, 
Durban's recruitment areas and the type of African worker 
engaged by employers. Certainly, the period under 
investigation is under-researched. This chapter attempts to 
throw some light on important issues, but does not claim to 
have covered all aspects relating to African labour in the 
apartheid city. 
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The state labour control mechanisms 
The early 1960s marked a new era in the implementation of 
apartheid laws and regulations. It was a notable period of 
both exceptionally impressive capitalist expansion and the 
intensification of state repressive policies. The pass control 
laws were tightened up particularly after 1961 and their 
enforcement was greatly intensified. Prosecutions increased 
for "illegal" entry into white towns. This was the time when 
the state also embarked on forced removals and pursued its 
policy of industrial decentralisation and relocating urban 
populations to the "homelands". Yet critical contradictions 
emerged in all urban areas of South Africa when large pools of 
workers emerged despite tough control measures instituted 
during this period. State officials in the Department of Bantu 
Administration and Development called for tighter influx 
controls and the subsequent "elimination of Bantu labour in 
the white areas" and suggested that, "If the white community 
cannot continue without Bantu labour, then it must also be 
assumed that the western lifestyle has an uncertain future in 
South Africa". 1 The workings of the labour framework in South 
Africa have produced enormous contradictions in the labour 
market which tended to strengthen or, at least, create some 
openings for the African working class in undoing the 
mechanisms of control. 
The analysis of influx control, the workings of labour 
bureaux and the pass system during the 1960s and 1970s have 
aroused controversial debate among scholars of different 
persuasions. The debate is centred on whether apartheid labour 
policies were structured to reproduce and advance capitalist 
interests or limited capitalist growth. To understand the 
situation during this period, Durban's labour policies should 
be discussed and the successes and failures of control 
mechanisms ascertained. 
1 s. Greenberg, Legitimating the illegitimate (Berkeley, 
Univ. of California Press, 1987), p 16. 
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As D. Posel noted, a striking feature of apartheid 
throughout the country during the 1950s was the "resounding 
failure of the state's urban labour preference policy, which 
ran aground due to tenacious,informal resistance from hundreds 
of thousands of workers and employers alike". 2 The urban 
labour preference policy could only succeed if properly 
implemented by the labour bureaux officials. But an 
interesting scenario that developed, not only in Durban, was 
that work-seekers and employers alike by-passed the labour 
bureaux. The more influx control measures were tightened up, 
the more they were avoided. Consequently, conflicts arose 
between employers and the state over labour control policies. 
As for state officials like W.J.P. Carr, the manager of the 
Johannesburg Non-European Affairs Department, the 
implementation of the urban labour preference policies meant 
"a constant argument every day of your life". 3 Furthermore, 
the Botha Report of 1962 neatly summarised the situation when 
it wrote: "The anomaly exists, that [African] work-seekers 
from outside the urban areas are admitted in, despite the fact 
that there is already a surplus in the towns". 4 D. Hindson's 
argument that the state's control mechanisms were designed to 
accommodate industrialists' demands for a differentiated 
labour force - both semi-skilled and unskilled - rather than 
an undifferentiated mass of cheap unskilled labour, does not 
seem to hold much water.s 
In a report submitted by the Grobbelaar Committee of 
Inquiry into rioting in Cato Manor in 1960, it was stated that 
2 D. Posel, "Influx control and urban labour markets", in 
P. Bonner, P. Delius and D. Posel (eds), Apartheid's genesis, 
1935-1962 (Johannesburg, Ravan Press, 1993), p 421. 
3 Ibid., p 423. 
4 As cited in Posel, "Influx control and urban labour 
markets", p 426. 
5 See D. Hindson, Pass controls and the urban African 
proletariat in South Africa (Johannesburg, Ravan Press, 1987). 
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"the Committee has no doubt whatever that there is, in actual 
practice, no control over the influx of Bantu who have no 
right to be in Durban".6 The year following the Sharpeville 
massacre saw, on the contrary, an increase in the number of 
people convicted in Durban of evading pass and control laws 
and regulations. In 1961 alone, 4 098 people were prosecuted 
in Durban 7 and by 1964, 7 721 were prosecuted for 
contravening those laws.a The state's key mechanism for 
control over African urban drift and presence was Section 10 
of the Urban Areas Act of 1945. Although this section of the 
act forbade Africans from remaining in "prescribed areas" for 
longer than 72 hours without permission, in reality the state 
failed to control the movement of people into the urban area. 
Influx control seems to have been a failed exercise in Durban 
because the African reserves abut Durban's boundaries, 
compared to Johannesburg where the reserves are far-away, and 
in 1962 the Botha Report stated that "the existing measures do 
not further the purposes for which they were introduced". 9 
Section 10, which was the key mechanism for control, was 
constantly challenged by African work seekers and could not 
operate effectively as "an instrument of control". As 
correctly noted by s. Greenberg, the system itself had managed 
to create a substantial number of African labourers who were 
strong enough to undo "the Berlin wall" and "to circumvent the 
system of labour regulations and shoot straight to 
Durban ... " 1 0 
6 Killie Campbell Africana Library (hereafter KCAL), 
Bourquin Papers, KCM 55224, Extract from report of the Inter-
Departmental Committee of Inquiry ... , 1960, p 5. 
7 Durban Corporation, Department of Bantu Administration, 
Annual report for 1961, p 4. 
8 Ibid., Annual report, 1964, p 106. 
9 As cited in Posel, The making of apartheid, 1948- 1961: 
conflict and compromise (Oxford, Claredon Press, 1991), pp 227-8. 
10 Greenberg, Legitimating the illegitimate, p 53. 
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The work-seekers exploited a loophole in Section 10 (1) 
which did not impose restrictions on Africans' entry into 
white urban areas, but rather gave them the right to spend 72 
hours in proclaimed areas without permission from state 
officials. Armed with this loophole, the African workers in 
most cases pretended to be visiting relatives and did not 
return to their reserves after the expiry of the 72 hour 
provision. The Chief Commissioner for Natal noted that uthe 72 
hour provision had disappeared as such". He went further to 
observe that the provision was no longer" ... being used in 
Natal". 11 The Chief Director for the Port Natal 
Administration echoed a similar sentiment when he stated that 
"72 hours is out". 12 
As soon as they entered white urban areas, the workers 
strategically activated ethnic networks, used relatives, or 
sought employment directly rather than follow local labour 
bureau procedures. Some industrialists in favour of migrant 
labour, together with the work-seekers, adopted methods which 
were geared towards circumventing the state labour recruitment 
policies. It was the hostile environment which led the worker 
struggle to assume a distinctive characteristic. Workers 
adopted ways to "work the system" and confronted repression in 
the shadows, "in the nooks and crannies of the day-to-day work 
situation". 13 C. van Onselen's remarks about resistance on 
the colonial Zimbabwean mines are equally important for an 
analysis of African resistance to labour control framework in 
Durban: 
Ideologies and organisations should be viewed 
essentially as the high-water marks of protest. At 
least as important, if not more so, were the less 
dramatic, silent and often unorganised responses, 
and it is the latter set of responses, which 
11 Ibid., p 67. 
12 Ibid. 
13 C. Van Onselen, Chibaro (Johannesburg, Ravan Press, 1980 
ed), p 239. 
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occurred on a day-to-day basis, that reveal most 
about the functioning of the system and formed the 
woof and 'warp of worker consciousness ... It was the 
unarticulated, unorganised protest and resistance 
which ... the state found most difficult to detect or 
suppress.f4 
Many African work-seekers bypassed the labour bureaux and 
on various occasions the state pressurised Durban authorities 
to implement strictly influx control and afflux measures. The 
state urged a .total control over the labour market and S.B. 
Bourquin, the Director of Bantu Administration of Durban, 
consistently argued that he was not in agreement with all 
rules and regulations and their methods of implementation 
since, as he stated, "mitigation is better than 
litigation". 15 
Throughout the 1960s, Durban was the weakest area in 
implementing control measures though statistically the number 
of prosecutions tended to increase on a yearly basis. Yet this 
evidence of control and repression should not be equated with 
effective control over the labour market and the process of 
African proletarianization. Nor should it be taken for granted 
that laws enacted managed to keep down the numbers. The 
diaspora from the surrounding reserves of Durban brought rapid 
urbanisation and the birth of shantytowns. In the 1960s Durban 
was surrounded by a belt of squatter camps. These squatter 
settlements present the realities of the control problems in 
the city. 
In its b~d to strengthen influx control, the state 
promulgated the Bantu Labour Regulations (Bantu Areas) Act in 
1968. The act paved the way for the establishment of tribal, 
district and territorial bureaux in the surrounding reserves. 
The regulations stipulated that work-seekers had to register 
at their home labour bureaux and could only be employed in 
14 Ibid. 
15 KCAL, KCAV, 987-991, S.B. Bourquin by I. Edwards, 10 
September 1980, p 4. 
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urban areas as long as their contracts were attested there. As 
in the case of Durban, the legal work-seekers were those with 
permanent residential status in the municipal townships and 
those who qualified under Section 10. 16 From 1968 onwards, 
work-seekers were to be contractually engaged annually, with 
the possibility of their contracts being renewed on payment of 
R1,00. 17 As for the migrant workers, a new system was created 
in 1969 whereby those workers who took up employment with 
their previous employers and engaged to work in the same town 
were not required to re-register as work-seekers. 18 This 
procedure became known as the call-in-card system. 19 The 
major aim of this system was to make sure that migrant workers 
would not become urban workers; it aimed to prevent them from 
obtaining residence rights. Commenting on the system, the 
Secretary for Bantu Administration and Development noted that 
"the intention was surely to prevent all people signed on 
after April 1968 from acquiring rights under 10 (1) (b), but 
not those who at that date were already in service". 20 The 
call-in-card system was terminated in all urban areas in 1974 
under ministerial order except in Durban. What is evident in 
the Durban metropolitan area is that the labour bureaux system 
was not effective and in fact had been bypassed by both work-
seekers and employers. The employers regarded the whole system 
16 Durban Corporation, Annual report, 1968. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Bantu Laws Amendment Act 42 of 1964. See also Natal 
Archives (hereafter NA), Port Natal Affairs Administration Board 
(hereafter PNAAB), 1/2/1/1/9, Labour, Bantu labour in prescribed 
areas: placing of Bantu in employment policy 12/11/73 - 6/12/74. 
Seer. for BAD to Mr N.P. Smith, 5 Nov. 1973. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Ibid., Seer. for BAD to all Chief Directors of Bantu 
Affairs Admin. Boards, 6 Nov. 1973. 
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as "a cumbersome exercise" 21 (though a majority of their 
employment took place on the official basis) and by May 1974 
about 41 percent of African workers in employment in Durban 
were not legally engaged. 22 The control of African labour 
supply and demand remained a contested area between the state, 
capital and labour. The employees themselves preferred to be 
engaged "at the gate" or "off the street", rather than 
register and apply for work at a local labour bureau. The 
Natal Employers Association and the Durban Chamber of Commerce 
constantly reported in the 1970s that it had become a habit 
for employers to engage migrant workers in this manner. 23 
At face value, the state's labour control framework 
seemed like an effective state control mechanism of the labour 
market. During the 1960s and early 1970s a series of laws were 
promulgated, bureaux and courts were established and that in 
itself, to many, represented effective and repressive state 
control of African labour. Added to this form of control was 
the establishment of aid centres in Durban and throughout the 
country. These centres which came into being in 1971 were by-
products of the Bantu Labour Act of 1964. 24 The aid centres 
were created to assist technical offenders from being sent to 
courts and prisons unnecessarily. In 1974 Durban had an 
estimated 80 000 new entrants in the labour market of whom 
21 NA, PNAAB, 1/2/1/1/9, Labour, R.F. Drew, Convenor of Sub-
Committee to the Chairman, District Managers, Labour Officers and 
the Dept. of Finance of the PNAAB, 29 Oct 1975. 
22 NA, PNAAB, 1/2/1/1/9, Labour, Box 53, 22/6/73- 5/7/74, 
H.D. van Wyk, Manager, North Coast District to the Control 
Officer, 15 May 1974. 
23 See for instance, NA, PNAAB, 1/2/1/1/9, Labour, 1/10/75-
31/1/76, G.F. Baker, Manager, Central District to the Chief Dir., 
26 Nov. 1975; and memorandum submitted by the Durban Chamber of 
Commerce to the Hon T.R.H Jansen, Deputy Min. of Bantu Admin and 
Education on the laws governing the influx and employment of 
Bantu in white areas, 1973. 
24 NA, PNAAB, 1/2/1/1/9, Labour, 22/6/73 - 5/7/74, PNAAB, 
Minutes of Ad Hoc Committee Re: Aid Centre meeting held 18 Feb. 
1974. 
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only 2 109 were prosecuted and sent back to the homelands. 25 
In 1975 alone over 4 000 Africans were referred to the aid 
centres in Durban (see table below). 
Year 
Table A 
African Workers Referred to Durban Aid Centre, 1973-
197826 
Men Women Total 
1973-4 
1974-5 2104 427 2531 
1975-6 4564 1324 5888 
1976-7 7482 3893 11375 
1977-8 9245 4764 14009 
Justifying the establishment of aid centres in Durban, the Ad 
Hoc Committee of the Port Natal Administration Board observed: 
Although legislation has been in effect for years to 
control influx into White areas and more recently, 
afflux from the Bantu Homelands, the desired 
objectives have not been attained, namely a 
regulation of the supply and demand of labour. The 
majority of engagements of labour occur on an 'off 
the street' basis which is indicative of a lack of 
confidence in the official labour bureaux system or 
a deliberate avoidance thereof in order not to 
become enmeshed with the laws and regulations until 
some assurance of success has been obtained. 27 
By 1975 the number of people prosecuted as "idle and 
undesirable" in Durban had dropped to 1 795. 28 Aid centres 
played an important role in circumventing "excessive" court 
action and had become service centres for African workers. In 
25 NA, PNAAB, 1/2/1/1/9, Labour, Box 49, 1/2/76- 31/3/76, 
Inquiry from parliament from Mrs H. Suzman, MP, 22 Mar. 1976. 
26 NA, PNAB, 1/2/1/1 /9, Labour, Box 56, W .M. Dinkele, 
Manager, Aid Centre, Durban to the Manager, Central District, 14 
June 1976; and yearly reports from Aid Centres in Durban, 1974-
1979. 
27 NA, PNAAB, 1/2/1/1/9, Labour, 16/2/12/P, 16/8/73-
11/4/75, Report of the Sub- Committee on Bantu Aid Centres, 18 
Feb. 1974. 
28 NA, PNAAB, 1/2/1/1/9, Labour, Box 49, Inquiry from 
parliament, 22 Mar. 1976. 
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other words, there was a dramatic shift in the 1970s from 
"excessive" control and prosecution to service. The new 
challenge in the 1970s, particularly in Durban, was to 
streamline the movement, recruitment drive and processing of 
forms for African labour, and hence the call by R.F. Drew, the 
Labour Officer for Durban Central District, to establish 
manpower development centres. 29 These development centres, it 
was hoped, would "prepare prospective employees for employment 
and ... offer them guidance in respect of the identification 
and application of tools and implements used in different 
types of employment, industrial safety and hygiene, 
punctuality, dangers of drugs and alcohol etc". 30 The state's 
intensified effort to control effectively the labour market 
and African "proletarianization" undoubtedly showed that the 
state apparatus was not effective, and completely failed to 
control the African urban drift and the growing urban 
shantytowns and to normalise economic relations between 
employers and their workers. 
The early 1970s not only produced strikes at the 
production line and disturbances in the townships but 
witnessed murmurings of discontent from both employers and 
African work-seekers. With the establishment of the 
administration boards and the take-over of the labour bureaux 
in the early 1970s, it was anticipated that the labour control 
system would greatly improve the necessary administration, 
control and labour recruitment procedures. In Durban, 
employers complained that tribal bureaux did not function 
properly, charged exorbitant registration fees and were too 
bureaucratic. 31 Employers in the Harding District noted with 
29 NA, PNAAB, 1/2/1/1/9, Labour, 1/6/76- 30/7/76, R.F. Drew, 
Labour Officer, Central District to employer organisations, 23 
June 1976. 
30 Ibid. 
31 See, for instance NA, PNAAB, 1/2/1/1/9, Labour, Box 51, 
Chief Dir. to the Deputy Director, Natal Chamber of Industries, 
15 Sept. 1975. 
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dismay registration fees demanded from the African workers by 
tribal authorities. The total amount paid to register a worker 
was approximately R9,S0. 32 The amount included the chief's 
personal fund of R3, registration fees amounting to R3,00, a 
monthly contribution of R1,50 to the board and R2,00 for 
travelling expenses for the worker. Various employers 
complained about chiefs who demanded excessive fees for their 
personal use. For instance, Chief Mageba of the Madlakazi clan 
demanded a payment of R1,50 from all work-seekers in order for 
them to be registered.33 Falling into this corrupt tendency 
was Chief Sigidi of the Cele whose secretary demanded R2,50 
from B. F. Ndayeni in order to stamp his registration book. 34 
For the African work-seeker in the rural areas who followed 
regulations, the consequences were great. The chiefs wanted 
their share in the process although there was no law requiring 
such payment. As noted by one tribal recruiter: "This is 
Africa. You don't visit the Chief's kraal without paying".35 
In Durban complaints were lodged with Bourquin, the Chief 
Director of Port Natal Administration, by various employers 
particularly in the Harding area, 
regarding certain levies being charged by Tribal 
Authorities in that district,which must be paid by 
work seekers before they are permitted to proceed to 
Harding for employment. In many instances the Bantu 
are not in a position to pay the relevant fee and it 
is thus up to the prospective employer to pay the 
fee in order to obtain labour. 36 
32 NA, PNAAB, 1/2/1/1/9, Labour, Box 50, 1/1/75- 30/4/75, 
A.P. Mynhardt, Town Clerk and Treasurer, Township of Harding to 
the Manager, 19 Mar. 1975. 
33 Ibid., J.P.J, Macquet, Inluku Store to the Manager, 
PNAAB, 20 Jan. 1975. 
34 Ibid., Mine Labour Organisation (NRC) Ltd, Rep. to PNAAB, 
7 Jan 1975. 
35 As cited in Greenberg, Legitimating the illegitimate, p 
72. 
36 NA, PNAAB, 1/2/1/1/9, Labour, Box 50, R.G. Wilson to the 
Chief Dir., 21 Apr. 1975. 
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Such corrupt practices tended to "invite" African work-seekers 
to bypass their tribal labour bureaux and "shoot straight" to 
the urban areas, risking prosecution under the pass laws. 
In addition, African work-seekers greatly resented 
medical examinations undertaken at labour bureaux, which they 
viewed "as being yet another instance of them being regarded 
as 'inferior', and even 'dirtier', than members of~ other 
racial groups who do not have to submit to such examinations 
at employment centres".37 In the Central District of Durban, 
there were two centres where the African work- seeker was 
medically examined, " ... visually to see whether he is 
suffering or appears to be suffering from syphilis, gonorrhoea 
or similar disease, bilharzia or scabies".38 In the New 
Germany area, domestic servants and any workers who handled 
food were medically checked.39 However, this practice was 
stopped in Durban in 1974 when the Port Natal Executive Board 
gave in to criticism, particularly from employers and 
discontinued such examinations. 40 
Uncontrolled exodus, 1973-1985 
The period 1973 to 1986 emerges as an era in which the 
government relaxed its labour policies towards Africans. This 
sudden change of attitude by the government was necessitated 
by a combination of factors: pressure from employers of 
African labour, who felt that apartheid was no longer 
economically viable, the international community and, most 
37 NA, PNAAB, 1/2/1/1/9, Labour, Bantu labour in prescribed 
areas 12/11/73- 6/12/74, Executive Committee Agenda, Medical 
examination of Bantu work-seekers, 10 Sept. 1974. See also NA, 
PNAAB, Box 51, 12/3/74- 24/9/74, Bantu labour in prescribed 
areas: policy, PNAAB, Interim report of ad hoc committee on 
friction points labour supply and registration, 5 Apr. 1974. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Ibid. 
40 Ibid. 
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importantly, African resistance to apartheid legislation. It 
was during this period that the largest number of Africans 
migrated into Durban precisely because of its economic 
opportunities.41 
In response to this problem, the government modified 
influx control measures in an attempt to curtail movement and 
settlement. In 1973, the Minister of Bantu Administration and 
Development publicly announced that wives, but not children, 
of key employees should be allowed to join their husbands on 
condition that suitable housing was available. 42 To that 
effect, the Chief Bantu Affairs Commissioner for Natal called 
for strict control (particularly on women) by using housing as 
a control mechanism, but further indicated that "only in very 
exceptional circumstances consideration be given to the 
admission of such Bantu females and then only from the KwaZulu 
homeland". 43 Thwarting the exodus of women was not an answer 
to the problem, however: in fact, thousands of work-seekers 
were already in urban areas and continued to stream in numbers 
into Durban, "our city". Commenting on the number of "illegal" 
migrants, the Durban Inspectorate Division stated that "the 
situation [was fast] deteriorating". 44 
The majority of work-seekers in Durban were found around 
the Point Road area, very close to the harbour and were 
largely employed by the stevedoring firms and cartage 
contractors. In 1974, these two major employers of casual 
' labour were cited as notorious for "not taking proper steps in 
complying with the law when they engage[d] this [unauthorised] 
41 See v. Moller and L. Schlemmer, The situation of African 
migrant workers in Durban (University of Natal, CASS, 1977). 
42 SAIRR, Survey of race relations, 1973, p 135. 
43 NA, PNAAB, 1/2/1/1/9, Labour, influx control policy: Chief 
Bantu Affairs Commissioner to the Chief Director, PNAAB, Durban, 
5 January 1973. 
44 KCAL, PNAAB, KCF 82, Roll 64, Inspectorate Division, 
Central District to the Manager, 5 Nov. 1974. 
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labour ... " 45 The Bamboo Square of the Point, Road area was a 
well-known gathering centre for all casual labourers. In 1974 
the Labour Department had to establish an office in the area 
in an attempt "to control casual labour being employed by 
employers that utilise that category of labour". 46 The Labour 
Division had to move away from excessive control to relaxation 
of influx control regulations. All work-seekers in that 
particular area had to report on a daily basis at an assembly 
point, had to pay a R1 fee monthly and were issued with a card 
reflecting personal details with 31 boxes for stamping 
purposes. 47 The shipping and cartage employers were given the 
privilege of recruiting from this labour pool, which compelled 
Drew, the Labour Officer, to write: "Durban being a harbour 
city and one of the largest industrial centres, there will 
always be a need for casual labour". 48 
In order to avoid criticism from the central government 
over lax implementation of influx control, the Sub-Committee 
on Labour and Transport wrote a detailed report to the 
Minister of Bantu Administration and Development explaining 
the reasons why it was necessary to have such a labour pool 
and, secondly, requested condonement of temporary employment 
of such labour, though "illegal" and unregistered. 49 Some of 
the relevant points that were singled out for the Minister to 
consider when making a decision to that effect were: firstly, 
the work that was carried out was of national importance in 
bringing in foreign capital and necessitated the fast clearing 
of ships from the harbour; secondly, the African work-seekers 
45 Ibid. 
46 KCAL, PNAAB, Central District, Labour Officer to the 
Manager, 7 Nov.1974. 
47 Ibid. 
48 Ibid. 
49 NA, PNAAB, Minutes of the special meeting of the sub-
committee re: labour and transport, 6 Feb. 1975. 
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in and around Durban were selective and not prepared to do the 
work, which was heavy, dirty, unpopular and unattractive; 
thirdly, registered work-seekers were unreliable and avoided 
work where possible; and lastly, that only 40 percent of the 
labour force which employers were granted requisitions had 
returned to work. 5° Furthermore, the Sub-Committee 
recommended, "The establishment by the Board of a labour pool 
in the area where all present illegal labour must report and 
from where employers in the stevedore and ship painting and 
cleaning industries must draw all their additional labour 
requirements and that the workers in such pool be registered 
as independent contractors". 51 The Manager of the Central 
District had also to make representations with the Senior 
Public Prosecutor "to defer cases before the courts of 
employers charged with the illegal employment of Bantu until 
after the Minister's reply has been received". 52 The Minister 
approved the Sub-Committee's requests and recommendations. For 
six months, there were no prosecutions on employers who 
engaged unregistered labour. For a while employers of casual 
labour were given a free hand in the labour market. 
In 1975 labour pools were also launched in surrounding 
areas of Durban to cater for dock employers' demands of 
additional labour requirements. In a meeting that was held on 
4 March 1975 between the KwaZulu government (which had begun 
to play a role in the labour question), the three 
administration boards of Natal and the Chief Bantu Affairs 
Commissioner it was agreed that employment service centres be 
established adjacent to the major cities. 53 It was envisaged 
that such centres could provide 
50 Ibid. 
51 Ibid. 
52 Ibid. 
53 NA, PNAAB, 1/2/1/1/9- 16/2/7/P, Labour, Executive 
Committee Agenda, 17 June 1975 
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opportunity ... for employers and work-seekers to 
meet, interviews to be conducted, selection to take 
place, aptitude tests to be carried out etc. It 
would be possible to eliminate most of the present 
day red tape connected with control measures whilst, 
by means of correlating the supply of labour with 
the demand, still maintaining effective control on 
the influx of migrant workers to the white areas and 
at the same time permits far greater freedom of 
choice and selection to work-seekers as well as to 
employers. The system will result in the gradual 
phasing out of the present local and district labour 
bureaux and aid centres. 54 
Employment service centres were thus established in areas such 
as Umlazi, Ntuzuma, Clermont, Umbumbulu, Ndwendwe, Umzinto, 
Mapumulo, Mpumalanga and Port Shepstone. After one year of 
establishment, the number of work-seekers registering with 
such centres had declined since very few of them were 
recruited. From these centres about 3 276 people were employed 
in 1976. The following table shows the breakdown according to 
each centre. 
Table B 
Employment figures from established centres, 197655 
Area 
Umlazi 
Ntuzuma 
Clermont 
Umbumbulu 
Ndwendwe 
Umzinto 
Mapumulo 
Mpumalanga 
Port Shepstone 
Number of work-seekers recruited 
764 
420 
405 
386 
381 
320 
245 
198 
157 
By 1976 the government had relaxed influx control measures: 
the monthly signing of reference books by employers of labour 
was dropped. During the same year, the Chief Director of PNAAB 
declared a moratorium on prosecutions of employers who engaged 
54 Ibid. 
55 NA, PNAAB, 1/2/1/1/9, Labour, Figures from various 
reports of employment centres, January to November 1976. The 
figures for December could not be obtained. 
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unregistered labour. 56 The PNAAB failed to cope with the 
policing of unregistered employment and for that it blamed the 
shortage of staff, which comprised only seven inspectors 
"active in the field" for the entire greater Durban region. 57 
Commenting on unregistered employment, a PNAAB official 
stated: "To be honest about it, we are not very successful 
about following this up". 58 Generally, by the mid-1970s, 
there was surplus labour which could not be absorbed into the 
economy although some sectors had some problems in filling up 
their vacancies. The Table below shows the number of vacancies 
that were reported between 1974 and 1980. 
Table c 
Vacancies regorted (R) in the Durban area£ 1974-198059 
Year Total ( R) Men (R) Men Filled Women (R) w Filled 
1974 5782 5124 3204 658 566 
1975 7551 6540 4620 1011 820 
1976 7910 6820 5112 1090 880 
1978 10702 9250 7475 1452 1265 
1980 14850 12210 10642 2640 2110 
The main sectors providing jobs were the wholesale and retail, 
construction, government and domestic service industries. 
About the reasons why some vacancies were not filled when 
thousands of registered work-seekers were jobless, Drew 
56 NA, PNAAB, 1/2/1/1/9, Labour, 1 June 1976 -30 July 1976, 
S. Bourquin, Chief Director to the Seer. Natal Agric Union, 23 
June 1976. 
57 s. Greenberg and H. Giliomee, "Managing influx control 
from the rural end: the black homelands and the underbelly of 
privilege", in H. Giliomee and L. Schlemmer (eds), UQ against the 
fences: goverty£ passes and grivilege in South Africa (Cape Town, 
David Philip, .1985), p 81. 
58 Ibid. 
59 NA, PNAAB, Labour Officers' reports to District Managers, 
1974-1980; Township managers' monthly general reports, KwaMashu 
and Umlazi, 1974-1977; and information to the Chief Director. 
Some records for December (yearly) are missing. 
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commented: 
The only explanation I can offer is that the 
selectiveness of the urban Bantu should not be 
overlooked. Attempts are made to encourage work-
seekers to take the employment offered but often 
with poor response. Insofar as vacancies in the 
domestic field are concerned the urban Bantu is not 
interested in taking up this type of employment in 
spite of the fact that employers are offering higher 
wages. 60 
Employers who were mainly affected were those who followed 
rules and regulations and did not engage unregistered labour 
otherwise, as rightly noted by the spokesperson of the Sugar 
Cane Growers' Association of Natal, "there was no labour 
shortage at all ... ". 61 During this period, even those people 
who were reluctant to accept mine or plantation work and only 
accepted jobs ·as clerks and mine policemen or team leaders 
(boss-boys), were no longer choosy. Natal farmers who used to 
recruit from Transkei were no longer travelling long distances 
in order to get casual labourers but now were bothered by too 
many work-seekers. Claassens summarised the situation very 
well when he wrote: 
Since it was so difficult to recruit local Zulu 
workers to work as cane cutters, the sugar industry 
set up a recruiting corporation, SILO, which 
recruited Pondos. However, as unemployment became 
more serious, individual Pondos did not wait to be 
recruited, but found their own way to the sugar 
estates. At the same time, increasing numbers of 
local Zulus began to offer themselves for employment 
on the estates. SILO, then became redundant and 
ceased to operate.62 
Because of the over-abundance of cheap labour in Durban, the 
PNAAB, in 1978, made attempts to issue permits to legal 
60 NA, PNAAB, 1/2/1/1/9, Labour, Box 56, R.F.Drew, Labour 
Officer, Central District to the Manager, Central District, 4 
June 1976. 
61 A. Claassens, "The Riekert commission and unemployment: 
the KwaZulu case", in The Wiehahn and Riekert Reports (Workshop 
Reports by SALDRU and SALB editors, 1979), p 51. 
62 Ibid. 
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residents of nearby townships. The Lamontville and 
Chesterville residents were given 30 days permit, while 
residents from Umlazi, KwaMashu and Ntuzuma were given 14 days 
permit. As for the people residing in Marianhill-St Wendolins-
Klaarwater areas, in Clermont and KwaNdengezi, they were no 
longer issued with permits from Durban but in Pinetown and 
were informed to search for jobs in that particular area. 63 
This was a clear sign of confusion and no wonder the Black 
Sash wrote: "The PNAAB, which controls the lives of all blacks 
wanting work in Durban changes its influx control tactics 
every few months".64 The first attempt of minimising the flow 
into Durban was a complete failure. The second attempt was to 
introduce a "labour zoning" policy whereby work was offered to 
work-seekers from the Durban metropolitan area, then to those 
in the neighbouring ~ownships, then to those in the adjacent 
rural areas and, lastly, to work-seekers from the Transkei. 
This was also a failed exercise. 
The occurrence of a large-scale inclination to migration, 
which reached a climax in the mid-1970s, when Durban possessed 
over 300 000 to 400 000 unemployed persons, alarmed the 
government. 65 During this period, a significant number of NP 
parliamentarians maintained that whites should enjoy the 
privilege of getting jobs in cities and "only when they are 
not in a position to exercise that claim would Africans be 
recruited for that purpose". 66 However, others, particularly 
the verligte element within the party, objected to influx 
63 University of the Witwatersrand (hereafter UW), William 
Cullen Library (hereafter WCL), FOSATU, C 3.15.2, AH 1999/C4, 
4.1, Dealings with non-trade union organisations, Black Sash 
miscellaneous, nd) 
64 Ibid. 
65 See, for example, Moller and Schlemmer, The situation of 
African migrant workers in Durban. 
66 Giliomee and Schlemmer ( eds) , Up against the fences: 
poverty, passes and privilege in South Africa, p 3. 
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control measures and called for a reform process. 67 The fear 
of widespread structural unemployment and, in fact, political 
instability created by poverty and pauperization of Africans 
was undoubtedly the main motive behind the appointment of the 
Riekert Commission of 1977. On 8 August 1977, Dr P.J. Riekert 
was appointed as chairperson and only member of the Commission 
of Inquiry into Legislation affecting the Utilisation of 
Manpower. In 1979, the Commission released its findings and 
recommendations. It made a recommendation for "the 
improvement, modernisation and reform of the existing official 
institutional and statutory framework of the labour market in 
South Africa, with a view to the better utilisation especially 
of Black manpower". 68 On influx control measures, the 
Commission noted that a "serious social and sociological 
welfare problem" would emerge if influx control measures were 
removed and the rural-urban migration was allowed to continue 
unchecked, and pointed out that "control over the rate of 
urbanisation is ... an absolutely essential social security 
measure" . 69 
There were some important recommendations by the 
Commission: firstly, Riekert advocated the use of housing and 
employment related measures to control migration; secondly, 
the imposition of fines on employers who engaged unregistered 
workers; thirdly, labour zoning and the establishment of 
assembly centres was encouraged; and lastly, the freer 
movement of qualified urban African residents, the "insiders" 
as against that of migrants, the "outsiders". Also of 
significance was that employers who used "illegal", 
unregistered workers were to be fined R500 for a first offence 
67 Ibid, p 7. 
68 RSA, Commission of inquiry into legislation affecting the 
utilisation of manpower (Chairman: Riekert, RP32-1979), para.1.8. 
69 Ibid, para.4.204 (d) and (f). 
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and a minimum fine of RSOO for a second offence. 70 Quite 
significantly, the Commission recommended that workers could 
seek employment without being registered as work-seekers and 
that contracts could be registered after being employed; and 
in addition to this, the 72 hour provision had to be 
removed. 71 
For obvious reasons, the Riekert Report was an attempt to 
contain potential urban unrest arising from deepening 
unemployment levels by making the system more efficient. It 
defined segmentation of the African labour force and its 
strategy was to give preferential treatment to permanent urban 
workers and to improve their conditions. However, the attempt 
by Riekert to remove discriminatory measures from the 
legislation has to be viewed in the light of buying off 
international pressure and criticism of South Africa. In 
essence, the Report called for tighter application of influx 
control, particularly on migrant workers. 
An important development that took place in Durban in 
1980 was the attempt to implement the bantustan policy. 
Earlier on in 1977 urban boundaries were redrawn in a manner 
that disqualified all township residents (with the exception 
of Lamontville and Chesterville residents, who lived within 
the prescribed areas), from having urban rights. KwaMashu and 
Umlazi townships were integrated into the KwaZulu bantustan, 
which meant that all residents were disqualified as urban 
insiders. Residents of the two prescribed areas (i.e 
Lamontville and Chesterville) were allowed to search for jobs 
in Durban without permits. From mid-1981, however, other 
township residents had to be registered within their townships 
and could no longer search for work in the city. This new set-
up created discontent among African work-seekers: in 1981, the 
70 S. Duncan, "The effect of the Riekert report on the 
African population", in The Wiehahn and Riekert Reports, p 72. 
71 s. Bekker and R, Humphries, From control to confusion 
(Pietermaritzburg, Shuter and Shooter, 1985), p 69. 
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Umlazi labour bureaux office was stoned, and threats of 
burning it down were reported. 72 Labour officials had to 
compromise: Umlazi and KwaMashu home-owners and rent-paying 
residents were given the privilege of seeking employment in 
Durban without permits, but lodgers had to be registered in 
the townships. Quite clearly, the compromise was not in line 
with influx control regulations and in 1982, labour officials 
made an attempt to reverse the earlier decision which once 
again led to violent stoning of labour offices in the 
townships. 73 
The reversal of policy was in accordance with the Orderly 
Movement and Settlement of Black Persons Bill of 1982, which 
called for further alienation of Africans (particularly those 
living in the non-prescribed townships) since they could not 
qualify for privileges of "permanent urban Africans". 74 At 
least for a year, the labour zoning policy had to be enforced 
though many work-seekers managed to undermine the system. 
Under these circumstances, Inanda residents were also required 
to register at Verulam labour office except those who had 
lived in Durban before 1968. People who were exempted were 
allowed to seek jobs in the city but had to be registered at 
the Ordinance Road labour office. 75 Residents of the 
Umbumbulu area were in addition required to seek employment in 
the Isipingo/Amanzimtoti area and no longer in Durban. 
Employers, who before 1980 were required to register 
existing vacancies in their firms for three days, were from 
1980 onwards required to register for seven days. The Orderly 
Movement Bill of 1982 suggested an increase in the fine from 
RSOO toRS 000 or 12 months imprisonment for engaging 
72 The Surplus People Project (hereafter SPP) , Forced 
removals in South Africa, volume 4, Natal (Cape Town, January 
1983), p 188. 
73 Ibid. 
74 Ibid, p 187. 
75 Ibid, p 188. 
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unregistered labour. 76 Furthermore, the Bill called for the 
arrest of work-seekers without permits. In 1980, for instance, 
about 7 251 Africans were arrested in Durban for pass and 
influx control related matters, of which 1 785 were women and 
5 466 men. 77 In 1981, 379 Africans were deported to homelands 
and a significant number of them were detained for 72 hours 
under Section 29 of the Urban Areas Act. In their 1982 Annual 
Report, the Black Sash commented thus: 
[Section 29] provides for the arrest, without 
warrant, of any Black in the urban area who is 
suspected of being 'idle or undesirable' and for his 
imprisonment for up to 72 hours before being brought 
before a Commissioner. Supposedly designed to rid 
the white areas of unemployed criminals, it can in 
fact result in someone with no criminal record at 
all being sent off to a work colony for two 
years. 78 
There are well documented cases by the Black Sash where 
individual, unregistered work-seekers were arrested and 
sentenced to work on Orange Free State potato farms for two 
years instead of prison. 79 Some of the unregistered work-
seekers who were arrested had to be sent to sugar-cane 
plantations where they worked for R0,50 per day. 8° Foreign 
labourers, particularly from Mozambique and Transkei, were 
deported to their respective countries. Any Transkeian work-
seeker who had entered Durban after 1976, soon after 
Transkei's "independence", could no longer be registered as a 
76 Ibid, p 189. 
77 Hansard, Questions 84 and 85, 25 and 26 February 1981, as 
cited in SPP, Forced removals, p 189. 
78 Black Sash, Natal Region as cited in SPP, Forced 
removals, p 189. 
79 Ibid, pp 189-190. 
80 Discussions with Mr Ntuli, 25 October 1994. Mr Ntuli was 
once arrested in 1975 for not observing influx control 
regulations and was send to work on a sugar plantation in 
Northern Natal. 
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work-seeker, but the system was open to abuse. Bribery was 
rife among migrant workers, which led to huge sums of money 
being paid to officials in order to be registered or, at 
least, become KwaZulu citizens. 81 
Between 1979 and 1985, there were various attempts to 
implement the Riekert Commission's recommendations but all 
were a resounding failure. For Durban, the situation 
deteriorated because of the dissolution of the PNAAB in 1980, 
which left a vacuum in the implementation of the Report's 
recommendations (although labour bureaux officials remained at 
work until 1986). The government had to disband the PNAAB 
because of its failure to cut down the numbers of Africans 
migrating into Durban. After all, its purpose as an apartheid 
tool had proved unworkable in the face of African resistance. 
This marked the end of the granite period of apartheid and the 
entering of the period of retreat and confusion. From 1980 
onwards, in the words of Hindson: 
The period was characterised by a deepening cr1s1s 
of bantustan legitimacy, the exposure of desperate 
rural poverty, the flight of impoverished Africans 
from the countryside to the cities and the 
mushrooming of peri-urban squatter settlements 
inside and outside the bantustans. 82 
It was clear to the government that the situation of the 1980s 
could not continue and the only alternative was to institute 
reforms. In 1986, the government abolished what was then known 
as influx control through repeal of a network of laws, for 
instance, the Black Labour Act 67 of 1964 and the Blacks 
(Urban Areas) Consolidation Act 25 of 1945 and in particular 
the abolition of the passes on 1 May. 83 Once the Act of 1945 
was repealed, it meant "therefore no influx control of 
81 SPP, Forced removals, p 190. 
82 Hindson, Pass controls, p 85. 
83 J.C. Bekker, The abolition of influx control and other 
law reform measures ( Isando, The South African Legal Rights 
Foundation, 1986), pp 1-5. 
81 
whatever nature".84 
African migrants 
African labour in an urban industrial area can be approached 
from various angles and this section analyzes very briefly why 
Africans migrated in large droves into urban centres, 
especially from the late 1950s. Urbanisation has been fairly 
rapid in the last three to four decades and the increase was 
particularly marked in the 1960s. What led to increased 
African urbanisation in Durban in particular was the expansion 
of manufacturing industries (discussed in Chapter Two): as the 
economy boomed in the 1960s, the African population began to 
move from rural areas into urban centres, owing to the need in 
the latter for a stable African labour force and al~o to the 
desire of Africans themselves to settle together with their 
families near their workplace. The urban centre and its 
economic opportunities had a special appeal particularly for 
the youth and for women who came to town to find work and to 
improve conditions for personal advancement and for self-
development. Durban, for instance, was the main employment 
centre for migrants in Natal in the 1970s and it offered 
better opportunities and wages than elsewhere. According to 
Moller and Schlemmer, many people migrated to Durban, 
popularly referred to as "our city", for "good jobs and 
pay". 85 TableD shows the reasons why people migrated to 
Durban during the 1970s. 
84 Ibid. I p 5 . 
85 Moller and Schlemmer, The situation of African migrant 
workers in Durban, p 4. 
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Table D 
Reasons for seeking work in Durban 86 
Good jobs/best money in Durban 
Friends, relatives live in Durban 
Feels more at home in Durban 
Low wages in White agriculture/ canefields 
Fashionable/people in home district tend to 
work in Durban 
To escape from rural life/boredom 
To earn lobola/cattle for lobola 
Specific job obtained in Durban 
Permits/accommodation easier in Durban 
Young men come to town to work 
To earn specific amount of money 
Other 
No information 
32,8% 
16,9 
13, 1 
4,9 
2,7 
2,7 
2,2 
1 I 1 
1 1 1 
1 1 1 
0,5 
5,5 
1,6 
Both push and pull factors were very important in this urban 
drift. Specifically, economic (especially financial) motives 
were of first importance for the migrant. 
F. Wilson's analysis of the migrant labour system 
resembles the typical push-pull model of migration which has 
been considered useful when observing rural-urban 
migration.87 He begins his analysis by including the play of 
forces emanating from the migration centre and shows how the 
economic type of pressure can be sufficient to interpret the 
inter-play of forces moving migrants to the centre. His 
analysis incorporates the "social" type of motivation into the 
economic motif. However, because of the peculiarity of the 
South African situation which permitted the perpetuation of 
the labour migration system beyond the economically based 
duration, Wilson identifies the dominant "political" push 
factors as well.88 
Major works on African labour migration are agreed that 
86 Ibid. , p 5 . 
87 See F. Wilson, Labour in the South African gold mines 
1911-1969 (London, Cambridge University Press, 1972). 
88 See Wilson, Labour in the South African gold mines for 
specific political push factors. 
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the most influential factor in bringing men and women to urban 
areas are the economic opportunities in town which attract 
labour. 89 The poverty that migrants experienced in their 
rural homes and from which they tried to escape was in many 
cases tied up,with the myth of the urban centre with its 
inexhaustible resources within everybody's reach. In a study 
conducted by the United Nations Economic Commission for 
Africa, it was noted: 
The push and pull theory has general currency in 
explaining the phenomenon of urbanisation. According 
to this theory, the push comes from the 
deteriorating conditions in rural areas forcing 
migrants to seek a livelihood in towns, and the pull 
is exerted by the towns to attract rural migrants 
because of desired and increasing opportunities. 90 
Certainly new aspirations, coupled with these economic 
opportunities in the booming economy, brought people to cities 
and what kept them there could best be extrapolated from 
Wilson's remarks: 
As the economy develops, the cities become richer, 
workers' wages rise and society is able to afford 
social security against sickness, accident, 
unemployment and old-age. Hence the economic pull 
back to the rural area fades away and all that is 
left is the "call of the wild", the spiritual pull 
which, without economic reinforcing, tends to vanish 
within a single generation.9 1 
Various other factors, such as increasing poverty due to 
a rapid growth which was unaccompanied by change in 
89 See, for instance, P. Harries, Work, culture and identity 
(Johannesburg, WUP, 1994); T. Dunbar Moodie, Going for gold: men, 
mines and migration (Johannesburg, WUP, 1994); and P. Bonner, 
"African urbanisation on the Rand between the 1930s and 1960s: 
its character and political consequences", Journal of Southern 
African Studies, volume 21, Number 1 (1995) 
90 United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, "Size and 
growth of urban population in Africa", in G. Breese (ed), The 
city in newly developing countries (Englewood Cliffs, Prentice 
Hall, 1969), p 143. 
91 F. Wilson, Migrant labour in South Africa (Johannesburg, 
South African Council of Churches, 1972), p 151. 
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agricultural methods in the rural areas, also drove men and 
women into urban areas. The resulting land pressure and, in 
its extreme form, inaccessibility of arable land - as among 
the South African former homelands of Ciskei, Transkei and so 
on, induced men to migrate.92 Related to poverty was the need 
to earn some form of cash, which was not accessible in a rural 
subsistence economy. Short-term migration was also a response 
to succession rights to land and, in other cases, the 
importance of bridewealth was an incentive to migrate in 
search for money.93 On the other hand, women - unmarried, 
widows, divorcees and prostitutes - found scope in an urban 
environment away from the conservative rural setting. In other 
African countries, for instance in Ghana, migration was 
regarded as a prestigious undertaking and all men had their 
own expectations of at least being a migrant worker once in a 
lifetime. 94 Among the Tonga in Malawi, migration to South 
Africa was an acceptable way of life.95 Among the Mossi of 
Upper Volta, labour migration was so institutionalised that 
"there [was] consensus as to why, how and when certain persons 
should migrate". 96 Although all these push and pull factors 
had an important role, the prime factor of economic 
improvement, dovetailing with the industrial growth, pushed 
men and women into the urban centre. 
92 See, for instance, s. van der Horst, African workers in 
Town (Cape Town, OUP, 1964). 
93 E.P. Skinner, "Labour migration and its relationship to 
socio-cultural change", in Africa, vol.30 (1960), p 389. 
94 J.C. Caldwell, African rural-urban migrationi the 
movement to Ghana's towns (London, Australian National University 
Press, 1969). 
95 J. van Velsen, "Some methodological problems of the study 
of labour migration", inK. Little (ed), Social Change in Modern 
Africa (London, OUP, 1961), p 236. 
96 E.P. Skinner, "Labour migration among the Mossi of Upper 
Volta", in H. Kuper (ed), Urbanisation and migration in West 
Africa (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1965), p 66. 
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In the past, and also at present, the migration of 
countryside people to the city or to industry formed and forms 
an indispensable contribution of supplementary labour for 
economic development. Rural-urban migration, therefore, played 
a major part in economic expansion and in the rise of per 
capita income and wealth in the country. The shift of the 
labour force, particularly from agriculture into manufacturing 
industries made possible enormous increases in per capita 
output. As the country grew industrially, the pace of 
urbanisation accelerated markedly, and so did the African 
working class. Once the people were established in the town, 
the process of urbanisation seemed irreversible. An important 
question to answer is: where did these African urban 
immigrants come from? 
Durban's African labouring class 
In the 1950s, the apartheid city, which evolved gradually, was 
beginning to take some shape.97 The Nationalist Party 
government had a vision of such a racially divided city, one 
which coincid~d with the concerns both of many white urban 
residents and of municipal authorities, especially in 
Durban. 98 Aided by the pass laws, the municipality attempted 
to control African urbanisation by implementing the policy of 
deporting the unemployed and those who lived by their wits, 
who were defined as idle and undesirable. In order to achieve 
an idealised white urban image, the municipality of Durban 
implemented forced removals of people from "black" spots in 
white areas, relocating them in African townships and 
"bantustans", which were far removed from the central urban 
area, thus negating the very reason why immigrants had 
97 P. Maylam, "Explaining the apartheid city: 20 years of 
South African urban historiography", Journal of Southern African 
Studies, volume 21, No 1 (1995), p 19. 
98 D. Hindson, M. Byerley and M. Morris, From violence to 
reconstruction: the making, disintegration and remaking of an 
apartheid city (University of Natal, Durban, CSDS, 1993), p 3. 
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migrated into town. Functionally, these removals benefited a 
minority, through rehousing (for example, the shantytown 
dwellers in Cato Manor), but the majority of those relocated 
were grossly disadvantaged through severe social and financial 
costs, and the loss of urban employment opportunities. 
Certainly, the entire process of transforming Durban into an 
apartheid city was hastened by the outbreak of violence in 
Cato Manor in 1959. 
In the 1950s, African male labour originated not only 
from nearby rural areas such as Lower Tugela, Ndwedwe, Inanda, 
Umbumbulu and Umzinto magisterial districts but from as far 
away as Transkei, Pondoland, Mozambique, Malawi, Swaziland and 
Zimbabwe. 99 Until the end of the 1950s, from the surrounding 
African reserves, Durban's share constituted only 20 
percent. 10° Th~ African population within the immediate 
"native" reserves might still have been sufficiently well off 
agriculturally or had easy access to cash income, so that 
there was no need for them to seek work in the urban 
area. 101 However, the situation gradually changed in the 
1960s and 1970s. Once the process of deterioration of African 
agriculture started (partly because of poor rains and also 
being driven off their land by the apartheid government's land 
policies), it became cumulative, since the lowered and 
continuously decreasing agricultural returns for the peasantry 
99 Natal Archives [hereafter NA], Port Natal Affairs 
Administration Board [hereafter PNAAB], 1/2/1/1/9, Labour , 
volume 8, Box Number 49. See labour monthly returns from various 
Labour Officers. I acknowledge great assistance from the Director 
of Government Archives for having allowed me access to closed 
files dealing with issues in the 1960s and 1970s. These files are 
not arranged and are still in boxes. 
100 I. Edwards, "Mkhumbane our home: African shantytown 
society in Cato Manor farm, 1946-1960" (University of Natal, 
Ph.D, 1989), p 104. See also O.P.F. Horwood, "Some aspects of 
urban African employment in the Durban area", Race Relations 
Journal, vol.25 9 July-Dec.1958), p 24. 
101 R.H. Smith, Labour resources of Natal (Cape Town, OUP 
1952), pp 56-8. 
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in their traditional sector forced an ever growing number of 
women and men into wage and therefore urban employment. 
Competition for unskilled jobs increased and the 
majority of employers preferred Transkeian cheap labour or 
other migrant workers. It seems that there was a general trend 
amongst most employers throughout South Africa to recruit 
especially from Transkei. In 1968, for instance, the total 
number of male Transkeian workers placed in employment in the 
country stood at 155 329, yet by 1974 the figure had risen to 
256 971. 102 In 1974 alone, the labour bureaux recruited 149 
224 work-seekers from Transkei, who were placed in various 
regions, with the Western Cape recruiting 43 percent of this 
total while Natal recruited 10 percent of the total number, of 
which 10 000 were employed in Durban. 103 Within the latter 
regions, the domestic services, civil engineering, building 
construction and the textile industry sectors absorbed the 
largest proportion of migrant labour. 104 
Posel has shown that most employers of African labour 
preferred migrant workers - "particularly those newly 
recruited from rural areas- for unskilled work". 105 Migrant 
workers, it was assumed, were "more obedient, harder working, 
and more easy to satisfy and control". 106 Furthermore, this 
class of worker was thought to be less likely to be 
susceptible to the influence of, as Posel notes, "communistic 
trade unions, being supposedly unaware of industrial 
legislation and wage regulations [and] content, temporarily at 
102 NA, PNAAB, 1/2/1/1/9, Labour, vol. 7, Box No. 49, Dept. 
of the Interior, Transkei, Statistical labour report, 1974. 
103 Ibid. 
104 NA, PNAAB, 1/2/1/1/9, Labour, 1/4/76- 31/5/76, vol. 8, 
Box No. 49, Central District, Labour Officer to the Chief 
Director, 12 April 1976; and D.P. De Lange, District Manager 
[Western District] to the Chief Dir., 15 April 1976. 
105 Posel, "Influx control and urban labour markets", p 418. 
106 Ibid. 
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least, to submit to the stipulations and demands of the 
employer". 107 
The cost benefit of employing contract, migrant or 
illegal labour in the 1960s and 1970s, was fully appreciated 
by employers. This kind of labour was prepared to work for a 
lower wage than were locally registered Zulu work-seekers, and 
migrant labour had additional cost advantages when compared to 
the wage demands of local labour. Surplus capital could be 
generated on a larger scale through the intensive exploitation 
of migrant labour. Two important employers, namely the Durban 
Stevedoring Labour Supply Company (DSLSC) and especially the 
Frame group of companies, the key to the 1960s boom, were 
chief players who depended and prospered largely on migrant 
labour. 
What is clear is that employers of African labour managed 
to keep wages .and labour costs to a minimum in their struggle 
to maximize profits. Surveys conducted of African incomes in 
the late 1950s showed clearly that average earnings were below 
the poverty datum line. 108 The surveys estimated £23 to £24 
per month as the minimum urban subsistence income required to 
maintain a family of five. In Durban, in 1959 most workers who 
lived in the Cato Manor shantytown earned between £11 and £12 
per month. 109 such wages could maintain only workers without 
a family. This was of course one of the arguments for the 
African reserves and the apartheid migrant labour system: 
families would provide for themselves in the reserves, thus 
reducing costs to business, the province, the state and the 
municipality. During the 1960s and the early 1970s, wages for 
107 Ibid. 
108 University of Natal, A survey of Bantu income and 
expenditure in Durban (UND, Unpub. Interim Report, Dept. of 
Economics, Dec.1959); and Joy de Gruchy, "The cost of living of 
urban Africans", SA Institute of Race Relations Journal, (1960). 
109 UND, A survey of Bantu income. 
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the African workers in Durban remained low. 110 
The migrant labour system was heavily entrenched on the 
Durban docks. 111 The system was facilitated by the DSLSC, a 
private company, which came into existence in March 1959. The 
main function of the company was, as its management termed it, 
"an organised and planned attempt to pool labour resources and 
to create a stable, experienced, and permanent labour force 
adequate to any demand". 112 The company depended on migrant 
workers drawn from far-away reserves and never recruited from 
established local labour bureaux. During the 1960s, the 
company was granted preferential treatment by the Bantu 
Administration Department to recruit workers in areas north of 
the Tugela and in Nongoma, Hlambisa, Mtonjaneni and 
Mahlabatini. 113 By the late 1960s, the company had gone even 
further than the original recruitment reserves, going to 
Pondoland, Estcourt, Mtunzini and Alfred. 114 Migrant workers 
from such distant areas were not required to follow the 
registration procedures demanded by the state. The company was 
granted immunity by the state to ignore labour bureaux laws 
and regulations since it supplied labour to one of the most 
important ports in South Africa. Secondly, workers recruited 
were to be accommodated in the company compounds and were not 
therefore a "liability" on the already inadequate housing 
provided in the townships. 
What is important about the Durban dock workers (like the 
11° For an extensive review of African wages in Durban 
during the 1960s, see D. E. Pursell, "Bantu real wages and 
employment opportunities in South Africa", SA Journal of 
Economics, vol 36 (1968). 
111 For a detailed study on the docks, see D. Hemson, "Class 
consciousness and migrant workers: dockworkers of Durban", 
(University of Warwick, Ph.D, 1979). 
112 Ibid. I p 386. 
113 b d 2 
.!._j,_, 1 P 41 • 
11 4 Ibid. I p 41 6 . 
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rest) is that employers were able to extract absolute surplus 
profit from migratory labour. This was made possible by paying 
poverty wages to the workers drawn from distant reserves who 
settled for any wage, even below the going rate of pay. 115 
This labouring class was exploited on the basis that it came 
from remote reserves where homestead production was still 
being sustained to enable a further subsidy to the dockers' 
wage and any form of wage employment was acceptable to it. 
Moreover, employers preferred migrant labourers largely 
because they were cheap and were prepared to work hard for 
long hours. Workers reported for duty on Mondays since it was 
costly for them to travel home. Local labour resisted long 
hours being worked during the weekends, and the rate of 
absenteeism on Mondays was always high following workers' 
prolonged visits home. Migrant labour, therefore, benefited 
the employer in that it was reproduced under conditions which 
suited the level of exploitation in the docks. Similarly, some 
sectors of agriculture, for instance, the Natal sugar fields, 
relied on migrant labour much as did the mine owners, and not 
on available local labour. 11 6 
Employers argued that they were forced to engage migrant 
and "illegal" workers as the labourers locally available were 
"work-shy", "selective" and reluctant to sell their labour for 
"heavy manual work or any domestic work and will not take on 
any 'dirty' work". 117 A sizable number of industrialists as 
115 A detailed survey of the wage structure of migrant 
workers has been provided in Hemson' s thesis. This aspect is very 
important for our understanding of the Marxist concept of surplus 
value which was created through poverty wages paid to African 
workers. 
116 See A. de V. Minnaar, "Labour supply problems of the 
Zululand sugar planters, 1905- 1939", Journal of Natal and Zulu 
History, vol.Xii,(1989). 
11 7 NA, PNAAB, 1 I 2 I 1 I 1 I 9 , Labour, 1 I 1 0 I 7 5 - 3 I 1 I 7 6, G. F . 
Baker, Manager, Central District to the Chief Director, 26 Nov. 
1975. See also Posel, "Influx control and urban labour markets", 
p 418. Posel says that "migrant workers, particularly so-called 
'raw labour', newly arrived from rural areas, were less likely 
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well as farmers complained about the "selectiveness" and 
"laziness" of Zulu labour. 118 It was said that the Zulus 
"are either unable or unwilling to do [work]". 119 A case in 
point was the Durban municipality's Cleansing Services where 
Zulu speaking people did actually refuse to work, regarding it 
as too dirty. 120 Elaborating on that trend, the FCI wrote: 
uin the majority of cases, manual or menial work will only be 
accepted by Natives of the migratory type". 121 During the 
1960s and 1970s, commerce and industry expressed similar 
sentiments. This attitude to the "Zulu Native" was undoubtedly 
racist. A more likely explanation of the reluctance of 
permanent local Zulu labour to engage in these occupations 
concerns the relatively wide range of market opportunities and 
the ability of Zulu labourers to command relatively better 
working conditions and higher wages than migrant labourers 
could. Durban's togt workers in the early 1970s are a classic 
example. The strategy of these togt workers was noted by G.F. 
Baker, the District Manager of the Central Region of Durban, 
when he stated that " ... a new class of togt workers comes 
into being, employed when and where it chooses, on the 
strength of a spurious registration certificate and his 
than city- dwellers to refuse 'obnoxious' work on the grounds of 
low wages or poor working conditions. If detribalised workers 
were 'job choosy' and 'work-shy', raw migrants were purportedly 
more than willing to take any available work for whatever the 
going rate." 
11 8 NA, PNAAB, 1/2/1/1/9, Labour, 22/6/73- 5/7/74, Box 53, 
Natal Agric. Union, Control of Bantu farm labour, P.C Reyburn, 
Seer. 11 June .1974. 
119 KCAL, PNAAB, Roll 7, KCF 24, KwaMashu Township (c), The 
future control of KwaMashu, BA 2/3/3 (ii) 26/11/68- 20/5/69, 
Dept. of Bantu Admin., 15 November 1968. See comments by Mr 
Noble, the Chief Bantu Affairs Commissioner. 
120 Ibid. 
121 Ibid. 
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reference book ... ". 122 Equally affected was the building 
industry, which was hard-hit by the shortage of manpower 
particularly in the 1970s. It will be valuable to illustrate 
this point by examining the building sector more closely as a 
case study. 
In July 1974, the personnel manager of Ilco Homes 
company, C.R. Vial, wrote a letter to the Chief Director of 
Port Natal Administration complaining about the "extremely 
unsatisfactory conditions prevailing as regards the 
availability of suitable labour for the building 
industry". 123 The manager complained that labour supplied 
through the Port Natal Administration Board labour offices in 
Durban, Pinetown and Queensburgh, was "not prepared, even for 
highly competitive wages, to undertake the necessarily 
strenuous manual work required by the very nature of our 
business". 124 At one point the company was allocated eleven 
workers by the labour office and seven of these eleven people 
refused on their first day to dig foundations. 125 Of the 
four who remained working on that day, three absconded the 
following day leaving the company on the third day with only 
one worker. 126 Faced by such a situation the company 
demanded that they be allowed to recruit on an "off-street 
basis" or "at the gates", or that they be allowed to engage 
migrant labourers from outside the surrounding areas of 
Durban. In this way migrant workers became the most favoured 
class of workers in the textile and construction industry of 
Durban. Essentially, the demands of capital for labour 
122 NA, PNAAB, 1/2/1/1/9, Labour Box 51, Central District, 
Manager to the Chief Dir., 22 Aug. 1975. 
123 NA, PNAAB, 1/2/1/1/9, Labour, 1/7/74-31/12/74, Box 53, 
Personnel Manager to the Chief Dir., 18 July 1974. 
124 Ibid. 
125 Ibid. 
126 Ibid. 
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actually conflicted with state policy: capital wanted any 
worker who could do the work, while state preferred Zulu-
speaking work-seekers. Possibly, this is in conflict with the 
much held view that capital has always been in apartheid's 
pocket and co-operative. Here is testimony that this was not 
so; in fact, apartheid skewed an open labour market. 
With the establishment of labour bureaux in all urban 
areas, the state's intention was to control the distribution 
of labour and restrict the movement of Africans into white 
urban areas. Industrialists were now urged to make use of 
labour bureaux which drew recruits from the seven major 
reserves as recruitment areas, and from the townships of 
Umlazi and KwaMashu where labour offices were established. In 
Umbumbulu reserve, work-seekers were registered by the ten 
"Tribal" Authorities. 127 During the early 1960s, while the 
recruitment drive for the majority of Durban's African labour 
force was concentrated in rural areas of Natal and Zululand, 
recruitment in the textile industries was slightly different. 
A similar pattern to that developed by the DSLSC and Dunlop 
Rubber company was put into effect. 
At Dunlop, African migrant working class was clearly an 
important feature which had developed especially during the 
1940s and 1950s. 128 A study by J. Kelly of the employment 
patterns at Dunlop, for example, showed that the majority of 
its employees in the 1940s and 1950s were migrant workers. 
' 
These were recruits from Ixopo, Port Shepstone, Estcourt, 
Mapumulo and Nkandla. 129 The company established a 
recruiting network through its factory indunas who engaged 
mainly their "homeboys" and relatives. 
127 NA, PNAAB, 1/2/1/1/9, Labour, Box 51, Labour Officer, 
Prospecton to Manager, South Coast District, 8 Sept. 1975. 
128 J. Kelly, "Durban's industrialisation and the life and 
labour of Black workers, 1920 -1950" (University of Natal, 
Durban, MA, 1989), p 42. 
129 Ibid. 
94 
Some industrialists, vigorously opposing government 
control over their recruitment practices, responded by 
employing largely migrant labour from outside Natal. During 
the 1960s and early 1970s the Frame group operated a 
recruiting organisation in the northern and eastern Transkei. 
By 1971, of the Frame group's female labour force of 2 855, 80 
percent were recruited from the Transkei. 130 This practice 
of recruiting labour from the Transkei continued until the mid 
1970s despite the continued effort by state officials to limit 
the practice. The situation worsened in the 1970s, as migrant 
labourers began to reject employment with Frame as a result of 
their low wages. In 1973, soon after the Durban strikes, the 
Frame group's recruiting organisation was disbanded although 
20 percent of their labour force was still made up of Transkei 
citizens. The Acting Manager for the Western District of The 
Port Natal Board, G.F. Baker, noted that "an employer of this 
magnitude was encouraged to establish his industry within the 
confines of a Metropolitan area ... and as an economic 
enticement was granted a carte blanche with regard to the 
importation of labour". 131 P. Frame never followed the 
procedures and regulations stipulated by the state for the 
local District Labour Bureaux. Baker summarized the situation 
neatly when he noted that: 
... the local District labour Bureau operated by the 
Bantu Affairs Commissioner's office far from acting 
as a deterrent actually connives with the 
illegalities that have taken place in the sense that 
a call-in-card is issued and the Bantu re-engaged 
without him having to return to his homeland at the 
expiry of the 12 month period- the Frame group is 
and has been the only culprit, but since it is the 
largest single employer, the effects are probably 
more damaging. 132 
130 NA, PNAAB, 1/2/1/1/9, Labour, Box 53, 22/6/73- 5/7/76, 
G.F. Baker, Manager Western District to the Chief Dir., 26 Mar. 
1974. 
131 Ibid. 
132 Ibid. 
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While Frame recruited freely in Transkei in spite of state 
policy, the work-seekers of Transkei in 1973 were in turn 
given the right by the state to by-pass the labour bureaux and 
take up employment on the sugar farms. A temporary measure was 
adopted to cover the period between 1 April 1973 and 28 
February 1974 'whereby the authorities did not stick to the 
labour bureau procedures being followed by the Transkei work-
seekers and their prospective employers were allowed to 
register them without any requirement. 133 
A portion of Frame's work-force was made up of migrants 
from areas of Natal and KwaZulu and those with permanent 
residence status in Clermont and other local townships. 
Amongst the migrants there were relatively few from areas 
close to Durban such as Umzinto and Inanda, and a significant 
number frequently commuted some 55 kilometres from Mpumalanga 
near Hammarsdale. Generally speaking, Frame's labour force 
originated primarily from Transkei and the reserves far 
distant from the city. It was this migrant class of African 
workers who played an important role in the economic history 
of Durban and the massive 1973 Durban strikes. On 9 January 
1973, about 2 000 workers, mainly migrant, at the Coronation 
Brick and Tile Works of Durban were on the streets demanding a 
wage increase. It was this incident which sparked off a three 
month long spontaneous mass action by an estimated 100 000 
African workers in Durban. Migrant labour, it has been argued, 
was docile and retarded class consciousness. Such perceptions 
are challenged outright in this work. 
Given a wave of work-place unrest staged by migrant 
workers in the 1970s on the one hand, and the development of 
widespread institutionalised labour migration on the other, it 
seems plausible to speak of the emergence of migrant workers 
as a social and economic class. S.B. Stitcher, a liberal 
historian, argues that migrants can be defined as a social 
133 Ibid., Chief Bantu Affairs Commissioner, Natal to the 
Seer. SA Cane Growers' Ass., 25 May 1973. 
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class: 
... migrant labour is a distinct form of labour use 
congruent with labour-intensive, low-wage, low-skill 
production. The individual migrant is partly 
involved in two different modes of production. It 
follows that migrants are in a particular class 
position,· different from thr:t of fully 
proletarianized workers ... 1 4 
However, any study dealing with this particular class of 
workers has to examine "the wider economic, social and 
cultural world of the migrants", embracing not only work but 
also life, not only town but also the "countryside."135 What 
was perhaps most striking about migrant workers in Durban was 
that they made their presence felt in the urban industrial 
situation, and the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s saw an interesting 
conjuncture of the advent of mass "labour migrancy" and 
heightened migrant workers' collective consciousness. Yet it 
would be a serious mistake to consider Durban as an emerging 
"town of migrant workers". The process of "full-scale 
proletarianization" of a major section of the urban community 
had already taken place and the African population of Durban 
comprised both migrant and urban residents. 
Conclusion 
As the economy expanded in the 1960s, Durban experienced a 
rapid drift of African work-seekers who threatened the 
existence of the apartheid city which whites sought to control 
as their own. In response to that urban drift, the state 
called for tighter pass and influx control laws in all urban 
centres. Such control mechanisms conflicted with the interests 
of certain sectors of capital which preferred to have a free 
134 See S.B. Stichter, Migrant labourers (Cambridge, CUP, 
1985), p 191. 
135 This particular study does not examine such notions, 
although it recognises the importance of such notions. However, 
the best book to read on this particular subject is by P. Mayer, 
Townsmen or tribesmen (Cape Town, OUP, 1961). 
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hand in the labour market. The labour needs of industrial 
capitalists conflicted radically with official rhetoric, and 
compelled them to evade the law in an attempt to utilise cheap 
and unskilled labour. Similarly, African work-seekers adopted 
methods of circumventing state labour policies. Such state 
labour policies created conflicts between the central state 
and some sections of capital, between African labour and the 
state, and between the local state and the central government, 
especially over the implementation of apartheid labour 
policies. Undoubtedly, the relationship which existed between 
capital, labour and the state was both conflictual and 
complementary. It is clear that the state sometimes failed to 
achieve its goals - goals, moreover, which were resisted by 
employers, employees and, to a certain extent, local 
authorities. 
The period 1973 to 1986 was not only an era of decline in 
the labour market, but witnessed escalating African resistance 
-the outbreak of the 1973 Durban strikes and widespread labour 
unrest and strikes that took place thereafter, the Soweto 
uprisings of 1976, school boycotts of the 1980s, the formation 
of strong African independent trade unions and a growing 
underground organisation in the townships of KwaMashu, 
Lamontville, Clermont, Umlazi and in the immediate 
shantytowns. In the end, the state lost control of the urban 
drift that had been underway since the 1960s, and the three 
decades of escalating state repression and intervention were a 
total failure though the state had succeeded in delaying 
revolution by 30 years. Obviously, African resistance had 
become stronger during the 1980s because state controls 
weakened after 1977, however, weakening of controls, in turn, 
was in response to needs of economic growth and as well as 
internal resistance plus international pressure. 
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Chapter Four 
Apartheid's Forced Removals and the Outbreak of 
Violence in Durban, 1959-1963 
Introduction 
The late 1950s were a watershed in African popular resistance 
and protest, especially in the shantytown called Cato Manor, 
fittingly described as "one of the largest and most horrifying 
slums on the continent", 1 in Durban. The African National 
Congress (ANC) became highly influential in shantytown 
societies, assisting residents to resist forced removals. The 
Pan-African Congress (PAC) was relatively insignificant in 
Durban during that time: in fact, Durban was an ANC-dominated 
area. It was during this decade that the National Party 
government implemented coercive removals of Africans from 
inner-city shantytowns to newly created townships, "far 
afield, where they would be cheaply housed, physically 
controlled, and politically contained". 2 In terms of the 
Durban City Council Group Areas proclamation, Cato Manor was 
ear-marked for white occupation in 1958 although it has never 
been settled by whites. As for the shantytown dwellers living 
in the area, they were forcibly removed to new apartheid 
townships, zoned far away from the white areas. 
Indians living in Cato Manor were to be forcibly 
relocated to Merebank or the newly founded township of 
Chatsworth; African shantytown dwellers, whether illegal or 
legal, were to be evicted from Cato Manor and resettled in two 
newly established townships: KwaMashu and Umlazi, both 
KCAL, KCM 55178, Cato Manor riots, June 1959. 
2 B. Bozzoli, Women of Phokeng (Johannesburg, Ravan 
Press, 1991), p 166. 
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considerable distances away from central Durban. This was part 
of the National Party government's restructuring process of 
African urban society. To apartheid architects, restructuring 
the African community in terms of stable family life was to be 
complemented by an improved and more modern housing. For the 
process to succeed in Durban, both the central and local 
government authorities were agreed that Cato Manor should be 
cleared of Africans, even if force had to be used against 
them. 
Many - both women and men - were illegal residents in 
Cato Manor and lived in poverty. Few could afford or were 
qualified for any form of accommodation in new townships. The 
reaction of these shantytown residents to relocations was a 
divided one. At one end, men who qualified for urban residence 
in terms of Section 10 of the 1952 Amendments to the Natives 
(Urban Areas) Act of 1945 were prepared to accept the 
restructuring process because it provided them with an 
opportunity to own better houses. Also to view relocations 
positively was an important section of lower middle class, 
male Africans who were able to become home-owners in newly 
established townships. At the other, the restructuring plans 
posed the greatest danger to the economic existence of 
shacklords, illegal traders and residents, shebeen queens and 
other emerging entrepreneurs, whose survival largely depended 
on the existence of the shantytown society. The greatest 
bitterness was felt by the women who viewed the NP's far-
reaching segregationist vision with hostility. Because of the 
racial and gender prejudices of the time, African women were 
regarded as legal minors, without property rights. They did 
not qualify for urban housing and could not obtain passes for 
conducting informal business activities, let alone brewing 
beer. For them, removals could not be tolerated for both 
economic and social reasons: removals also meant to many the 
end of their commitment to town life. Women constituted a 
large proportion of the "illegal" residents who were faced by 
evictions and only a few had legal rights to be in Durban. C. 
Walker wrote: 
100 
Many [women] had turned to illicit beer-brewing to 
make a living; the shebeens and shebeen queens of 
Cato Manor were famous. As in other locations and at 
other times, beer-brewing was often the only source 
of income women could find. They resented fiercely 
the laws which made this illegal, as well as the 
municipal beerhalls which took away their cus~omers, 
their income and their husbands' pay packets. 
These were the people who resisted the state's new plans of 
"ordering" society. However, protests and riots, marked by 
violence, were not mounted directly against the state's forced 
removals, but turned instead to focus on municipal raids 
against shebeens. 
Certainly, the urban riots of 1959 were the most acute 
expressions of deep-seated shifts in the structure and 
organisation of urban African society - shifts, moreover, for 
which the state had been largely responsible through racially 
defined polic~es. This chapter analyses some struggles from 
below; it looks at how "ordinary" people resisted apartheid 
policies, and explains their perceptions and experiences. It 
is primarily concerned with the outbreak of riots and violence 
in Cato Manor from 1959 until 1963, during which period Durban 
experienced a sustained era of urban conflict. It also 
examines Cato Manor's past which has recently again come into 
the limelight. Since the 1960s the area has been largely 
undeveloped and vacant, despite some minor Indian housing 
developments that occurred during the 1980s. In the 1990s, 
African people began moving back into the area, claiming 
ownership rights over it and building their shacks, 
particularly in the Wiggins and Cato Crest area. 4 The new 
shack residents justified their return by reaffirming their 
3 C. Walker, Women and resistance in South Africa 
(London, Onyx Press, 1982), p 231. 
4 See I.L. Edwards, "Cato Manor: cruel past, pivotal 
future", Review of African Political Economy, no 62 (March 
1995); and for important analysis on Cato Manor riots of 1959, 
see also I.L Edwards, "Cato Manor, June 1959: Men, women, 
crowds, violence, politics and history'', in P. Maylam and I. 
Edwards (eds), The People's city: African life in twentieth-
century Durban (Pietermaritzburg, University of Natal Press, 
1996) . 
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history based on their 1949 and 1959 struggles. The future of 
Cato Manor remains one of political controversy. It is its 
proximity to Durban which makes it a fiercely and often 
violently contested area and it is only through analysing the 
historical context in which the riots took place that one can 
fully understand the state's intervention in the shaping of 
Durban's African community. 
The outbreak of violence 
During the late 1950s, the municipality of Durban began to 
remove Africans forcibly from Cato Manor to KwaMashu. To 
municipal officials forced removals were necessary since Cato 
Manor had become known as a centre of squalor, disease and for 
its high rate of crime. 
Cato Manor was unplanned, and ... far less controlled 
and policed than any of the townships set up as a 
result of government planning. Because of this 
freedom Cato Manor was a haven for all those who 
were illegally in the urban areas, or whose 
livelihood contravened the multitude of rules and 
regulations governing the lives of Africans ... The 
sense of freedom so characteristic of it meant that 
at weekends and holidays it was a central meeting-
place; over weekends the population of Cato Manor 
almost doubled, many visitors being rural dwellers. 5 
The South African state unequivocally supported the 
municipality's clearance of slums, which seemed married to the 
drive towards urban segregation as promulgated by the Group 
Areas Act of 1950. In this case, both (local and central 
state) had a similar interest - the removal of Africans out to 
the periphery of the city. 
The removal process began in March 1958. 6 In August 1958, 
5 J. Yawitch, "Natal 1959 - the women's protest", in 
Collected papers of conference on the history of opposition in 
South Africa (University of Witwatersrand, 1978}, p 1. See 
also Walker, Women and resistance, p 230. 
6 KCAL, Bourquin Papers, File 3, Municipal Native Admin-
istration Department (Later Bantu Administration Department): 
memoranda, reports and correspondence related to Cato Manor, 
1957-1961; KCM 55226, "memorandum on certain matters 
surrounding the Cato Manor disturbances of June 1959", p 1. 
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the municipality made an attempt to demolish the shack 
settlement of Thusini, where most workers had lived for 
several years. Very little resistance was offered and most 
people simply moved away and re-erected their shacks 
elsewhere. The local advisory board, the Cato Manor Welfare 
and Development Board, under the chairmanship of I. Zwane, 
could not take any decisive action for it was divided over the 
issue of removals. 
During these early removals, the ANC launched an anti-
municipal campaign specifically because of the removals and 
the Director of Bantu Administration, S.B. Bourquin, was 
called "the Satan of the Bantu people". 7 The whole issue was 
viewed by A. Luthuli, the ANC President General, as an 
opportunity to gain followers, thereby leading to a growth in 
ANC membership. Although the ANC had support in the shantytown 
of Cato Manor, some influential members of the community 
remained indifferent to politics. It was only during times of 
trouble that ~hey tended to rally behind political parties. 
However, as demonstrations began to spread, the ANC and its 
Women's League took a leading role, "organising further 
demonstrations and articulating grievances''.a Walker points 
out that the ANC thus "introduced a wider political dimension 
to the protests, linking them to other protests that had gone 
before". 9 From then onwards, the ANC became the motor force 
behind the protests. 
Trouble began in earnest when the municipality attempted 
to clear Mnyasana, the most notorious shack area in Cato 
Manor. It was dominated mainly by a large number of Mpondo 
migrant women, most of whom were "illegal" residents and who 
were well known for beer brewing, illegal trading and 
See al·so I. Edwards, "Mhkumbane our home: African shantytown 
society in Cato Manor farm, 1946 - 1960" (University of Natal, 
Durban, Ph.D Thesis, 1989), p 303. 
7 KCAL, KCM 55226, "Memo on certain matters", p 3. 
8 Walker, Women and resistance, p 233. 
g Ibid. 
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prostitution. 10 These women championed the struggle against 
the municipal removals and took it onto the streets on 23 
February 1959, supported by women from other shack areas of 
Cato Manor. 11 The women staged a demonstration at Bourquin's 
office and were assisted by Aaron Gumede, A.C. Shangase and 
J.J. Shabalala, ANC stalwarts and members of the Location 
Advisory Boards.12 
The demonstrating women were also led by members of the 
ANC Women's League (ANCWL), including G. Kweyama, T. Mazibuko, 
D. Nyembe, F. Mkhize, R. Shabane, F. Mwelene and L. 
Mazibuko. 13 The women told the authorities that they failed 
to understand why they were being removed from Cato Manor, 
their home, which "they fought for ... that they have spilt 
their blood for ... and having conquered the Indians they will 
never give Cato Manor back to the Indians". 14 The women 
demanded an immediate meeting with Bourquin and informed him 
that "since Africa belonged to them [his] office was part of 
it and belonged to them ... and that when Africa returned to 
them they would in any case sack [him]". 15 The involvement of 
women had far-reaching political implications for the ANC and 
the ANCWL gained great support from those women whose 
livelihoods were on the verge of destruction. As rightly noted 
10 Edwards, "Mkhumbane our home", p 309. 
11 KCAL, KCM 55171, Department of Bantu administration, 4 
March 1959, "memo on events arising out of the clearance of 
native shacks at Mnyasana, Cato Manor, February 1959." 
12 Ibid. , p 9 . 
13 KCAL, KCM 55169, "Meeting of African women representa-
tives with Mayor, 27 February 1959". The 1949 riots resulted 
in the destruction of Indian-owned property and the 
displacement of Indian residents from Cato Manor. The riots 
were then viewed by the African women as the "liberation" of 
Mkhumbane - "Cato Manor was now ours through right of 
conquest". See Edwards, "Mkhumbane our home", p 50. 
14 KCAL, KCM 55170, Bourquin to the chairman, Bantu 
administration committee, councillor A.S. Robinson, 2 March 
1959. 
15 Ibid. , p 5. 
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by Edwards, shebeen queens who had previously shunned and 
alienated themselves from politics, saying "this thing with 
politics", flocked in numbers to join the women's league. 16 
The tense atmosphere created by the women's revolt was 
associated with many complex issues and evolved a wide range 
of emotions. At a later meeting addressed by Bourquin, a 
number of complaints were raised. The women demanded that 
forced removals be stopped and Council beerhalls be closed and 
voiced their concern also over lack of transport, and housing, 
influx control, the inability to keep livestock, the 
destruction of family life, illicit beer and poor wages. 17 
However, the central issue was that women wanted permanent 
residential rights in Cato Manor because shack demolition and 
mass removals meant the end of their economic existence in the 
urban area. New houses in KwaMashu and Umlazi were occupied 
only by legal male tenants or prospective buyers with their 
recognised wives and children and single women were 
automatically disqualified from the new set-up. 
In pursuit of their struggle against removals, a sizeable 
number of shebeen queens invaded the Cato Manor beerhalls on 
17 June 1959 chasing men away. 18 Incidents of women raiding 
beerhalls and assaulting men were not new in Natal: the first 
incident took place in Ladysmith in August 1929. 19 This 
incident surprised the Weenen magistrate who told a deputation 
of 98 women that their demand for the legalisation of beer-
brewing and selling was unacceptable: "This is a matter for 
men to make a representation to me"; and a woman from the 
16 Edwards, "Mkhumbane our home", p 310. 
17 KCAL, KCM 55181, Bourquin to the Town Clerk, 23 June 
1959; KCM 55204, memo to the director, 8 July 1959. See also 
M. Blumberg, "Durban explodes", Africa South, 4, 2 (January-
March 1960), p 13. 
18 L. Kuper, "Rights and riots in Natal", Africa South, 4, 
1 (October-December 1959), p 20. 
19 H. Bradford, "We are now the men: women's beer protests 
in the Natal countryside, 1929", in B. Bozzoli (ed), Class, 
community and conflict: South African perspectives 
(Johannesburg, Ravan Press, 1987), p 292. 
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group responded, "We are now the men and that is why we have 
come to you". 20 Another incident took place in October 1959 
at Ixopo when women demonstrated against taxation and influx 
control measures. The commissioner informed them to follow 
"acceptable" procedures by first submitting "their grievances 
to their men, who would then inform the tribal chief, and the 
tribal chief would pass on their complaints to [him]". 21 He 
insisted that no discussions should be entertained with the 
masses of women and their ANC leaders, "but with recognised 
chiefs and responsible male leaders".22 Commenting on this 
incident, the Natal Daily News wrote: "The recognition of 
women's demonstrations on the lines favoured by whites, among 
whom women enjoy a different status, could only have the 
harmful, dangerous effect of undermining the structure of the 
community". 23 The women refused to follow the so-called 
traditional channels since they were "now the men". Kuper 
viewed these incidents as "remarkable for the dominant role of 
traditionally subordinate Zulu women", 24 who were fighting 
not only against a barrage of repressive government laws but 
for their emancipation from men. Quite clearly, women were in 
the process of transforming themselves from being victims of 
social forces to individuals who could create their own lives 
despite structural constraints. These women, Bozzoli writes, 
"are not permanently colonised and dehumanised victims, 
deprived of their humanity and selves"25 but were rather 
active participants in the struggle to gain personal freedom. 
In a nutshell, these incidents confirm the reality of gender 
20 Ibid. 
21 L. Kuper, An African bourgeoisie: race, class, and 
politics in South Africa (New Haven, Yale University Press, 
1965), p 18. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Natal Daily News, 21 August 1959, as cited in Kuper, An 
African bourgeoisie, p 18. 
24 Kuper, An African bourgeoisie, p 17. 
25 Bozzoli, Women of Phokeng, p 239. 
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divisions and women's subordination that existed in African 
community which, in turn, shaped the course of beer protests. 
Perhaps the most valuable and influential detailed early study 
on women and beer protests is H. Bradford's article in Class, 
Community and Conflict.26 
The 1959 riots which erupted were led by thousands of 
embittered women who faced deportation to rural areas owing to 
their lack of legal documents. Serious disturbances began on 
18 June when women blockaded the beerhalls, warning men not to 
try to enter. Thousands of African women from various parts of 
Cato Manor were armed with sticks, hatchets and pieces of 
wood. They marched, danced and "shook sticks in dazzling 
defiance at the whole edifice of white apartheid 
authority". 27 The ANCWL took an active part in this women's 
struggle; D. Nyembe and other Women's League members organised 
marches to the Victoria Street beerhall and the Mobeni 
area. 28 
A large proportion of these women were brewers of beer, 
the sale of which was a source of livelihood to them and their 
children. 29 Women who failed to secure formal employment 
often made ends meet in this way. This conflicted with 
municipal controls over such activities, since the 
municipality had its own beerhalls which were supposed to 
generate revenue. Undoubtedly, the women's demonstration was a 
multi-faceted phenomenon, incorporating a range of grievances. 
There is no doubt, however, that the overriding factor in the 
conflict in Cato Manor was economic and its crux, according to 
Bourquin, was poverty: 
I wish to make bold and say that whatever reasons 
have been advanced are of a purely superficial 
nature. Even the women who started off the tragic 
course did not express their grievances in terms of 
26 Bradford, "We are now the men", pp 292- 323. 
27 KCAL, KCM 55178, Cato Manor riots, June 1959; Blumberg, 
"Durban explodes", p 10. 
28 Edwards, "Mkhumbane our home", p 316. 
29 The Natal Mercury, 19 June 1959. 
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bare, basic and intrinsic facts ... The basic and 
ultimate reason is an economic one. The poverty of 
the urban Bantu; the discrepancy between his earning 
capacity and his cost of living; his inability to 
meet the demands of modern times in a city modelled 
on the western ways of life; his inability even to 
meet the barest necessity of life, to fee~0 clothe, educate and house himself and his family. 
While poverty constituted a major problem in Cato Manor, the 
liquor question was an issue in its own right. Councillor M. 
Gild saw the area as "an illicit brewer's and a prostitute's 
paradise" 31 which needed to be cleansed. As stated earlier, 
municipal officials thought that they were engaged in a noble 
cause of slum clearance on an area which whites saw as a 
threat to their city. 
The demands presented by the African women were rejected 
by the municipality on the grounds that they were "quite 
impossible". 32 Meanwhile, the women sang, danced and chanted: 
"The Boers are using us as a ladder to climb on"; "When you 
strike the women, you have struck a rock"; "Luthuli, give us 
Luthuli. His is the only voice we will hear."33 The presence 
of the police led to a direct confrontation with the masses. 
Riots broke out and large groups of Africans of both sexes 
gathered in the streets, erecting barricades. 
Violence shifted from persons to property, the main 
target being the property of the Durban Corporation - commun-
ity halls, trading centres and buses. 34 The reason why anger 
was directed against the municipality rather than government 
buildings is brought out quite well by Bourquin, and deserves 
quoting at length: 
3° KCAL, KCM 55181, Bourquin to the Town Clerk. See also 
Kuper, "Rights and riots", p 23. 
31 KCAL, KCM 55184, Councillor Mervyn A. Gild to Bourquin, 
25 June 1959. 
32 Blumberg, "Durban explodes", p 13. 
33 Ibid. 
34 The Natal Mercury, 19 June 1959. See also KCAL, KCM 
55204, memo to the director, 8 July 1959. 
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[I] was attacked or singled out as the big bad wolf 
and that all the evils and all the bad things and 
all the oppression and all the hardships emanated 
from [me]. To say Pretoria has decreed that or Cape 
Town has said that or Parliament has said so or the 
City Council has done that - these are ideas which 
are impersonal, which have no meaning to them. So 
when I tried to make excuses and say Pretoria or the 
Minister 'has decreed that they said, who is 
Pretoria, who is the Minister? We don't know them. 
You are the man who is the head so you are the 
guilty one. Who is Parliament, where is he? They 
said, bring Parliament here, let us talk to 
Parli~rent. Tell Pretoria, they must come and see 
us ... 
To an ordinary person there was no difference between the 
municipality and government. 
The crowd became jubilant with the collapse of burning 
buildings, shouting "Africa, Africa" 36 and attacking all the 
"the concrete symbols of domination and indeed any of the 
accessible works of the white man".3 7 While the destruction 
of property was widely condemned by the government, Kuper 
later maintained that though " ... the behaviour [was] 
senseless ... it [was] perfectly intelligible". 38 A similar 
perspective was adopted some years earlier, by British social 
historian E.P. Thompson who noted that "behind every such form 
of popular direct action some legitimising notion of right is 
to be found". 39 Nonetheless, the consequences were 
regrettable; four people died during the clashes, while many 
women and ANC leaders were arrested. 
Concern of the Durban Corporation was that as the illicit 
brewing of beer gained momentum, the municipality lost the 
great profits it used to make. The municipal beerhalls were 
35 KCAL, ··KCAV 987-991, S.B. Bourquin by I. Edwards 10 
September 1980, p 6. 
36 Edwards, "Mkhumbane our home", p 317. 
37 Kuper, An African bourgeoi§ie, p 14. 
38 Ibid. 
39 E.P. Thompson, The making of the English working class 
(London, Harmonsworth, 1968), p 73. 
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closed down for a number of days during the boycott. During 
this period, the municipality on average sold only 900 gallons 
of beer per day at all its beerhalls, against the previous 
average of 14 000 gallons per day. 40 A partial victory was 
therefore scored by the shebeen queens who supported "the cam-
paign because they regarded the beerhalls as competitive 
institutions and a threat to their lucrative business and 
their existence".41 
Although the main thrust of African resistance during the 
1950s came from within the greater Durban area, demonstrations 
also broke out in rural areas of Natal such as Ixopo, Harding, 
Port Shepstone and New Hanover. Perhaps this shows the growing 
role of women 'in resistance and the concern felt by men. Cato 
Manor riots were an obvious catalyst which armed rural women 
with a model for their own demonstrations against the 
government's obnoxious laws. It was in the Port Shepstone 
district that the most serious disturbances took place. Women 
destroyed dipping tanks, a long standing grievance, and 
complained about new Bantu Authorities Regulations which 
stipulated that dipping tanks be refilled by the 
beneficiaries, although no remuneration was provided for this 
service. 42 They also complained against anti-squatter laws 
and increased taxation. On 21 August 1959 trouble began when 
Chief Nane of the Cele banned a woman, M. Cili, from his area 
of jurisdiction, for being a leader and influencing women to 
4° KCAL, KCM 55218, Notes for meeting with Minister of 
Bantu admin and development, Pretoria, 3 August 1959. 
41 KCAL, KCM 55224, "Extract from a report of the inter-
departmental committee of inquiry in connection with the 
disturbances and rioting at Cato Manor, Durban, 24 January 
1960", p 4. 
42 Natal Archives [hereafter NAJ, Senior Inligtings 
Beampte and Bantoe Kommissaris (Bantu Affairs Commissioner's 
Files) [hereafter BAC], 0/3, Cato Manor, Bantu unrest, BAC to 
the chief BAC, 1 September 1959. See also BAC, A/4, ANC, A.J. 
Luthuli, "Word of the president-general concerning riots which 
occurred as a result of the resistance staged by women in 
Natal, 17 August 1959". 
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fill a dip tank with stones. 43 Demonstrating women were 
organised and led by an ANCWL member. The demonstration was 
characterised, as Kuper wrote, by "chanting, frenzy, prayer, 
deputation, and Congress songs provided a strange potpourri of 
tradition, culture change, and political baptism". 44 A large 
group of women were arrested and fined £25 or 30 months in 
jail. 
Later that month men from Chief Nane's area demonstrated 
in solidarity with their women who had been convicted for the 
destruction of government property. 45 The ANC volunteered to 
pay their fines but the men resisted the idea: "We don't want 
the ANC to pay their fines because if this happens, they will 
be absorbed by the ANC and we will lose our control over 
them." 46 This illustrates a fascinating point about the 
struggles of the late 1950s and early 1960s: in Natal, and 
particularly in Durban, men feared that they had lost their 
traditionally strong control over their women if they entered 
the political fray. 
A considerable number of women, especially the shebeen 
queens, did become involved in the ANC's political programmes 
because these seemed to offer assistance in resolving their 
dilemmas and because they could expect no help from men. But, 
as rightly noted by Bozzoli: "The women's responses to the new 
social movements were varied and complex. Many remained 
apolitical, or even antipolitical, their resilience and 
defiance contin[ued] on a personal level." 47 However, from 
June 1959, the ANC gained a considerable number of supporters 
because of its appeal to both women and men who had to leave 
the city. For instance, on 27 June 1959 over 20 000 people 
attended the "Freedom Day" rally in Durban organised by the 
43 NA, BAC, 0/3, BAC to the chief BAC, 1 September 1959. 
44 Kuper, An African bourgeoisie, p 18. 
45 Ibid. 
46 NA, BAC, 0/3, BAC to the chief BAC, 1 September 1959. 
47 Bozzoli, Women of Phokeng, p 167. 
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Congress Alliance.48 
Further struggles between the municipal authorities and 
the shack dwellers for urban space in Cato Manor continued. By 
August 1959, most areas of Cato Manor - mainly Raincoat, 
Thusini, Dunbar Bar and Tintown- were cleared, 49 and about 
7000 shacks were demolished.50 Most of the people who failed 
to meet the requirements for house allocation in KwaMashu, as 
well as illegal residents, simply re-erected their shacks in 
other parts of Cato Manor: the masses' resistance was 
temporarily successful. In the wake of the ongoing 
disturbances, Bourquin called a meeting with the Minister of 
Bantu Affairs to inform him of the defeat of the local 
authority in the area. Bourquin stated that: 
The authority of the Durban City Council - the civil 
government for the area - has been challenged and 
overthrown ... the City Council has been defeated at 
Cato Manor, and cannot restore its authority without 
the fullest co-operation and most active assistance 
of the government.51 
It was not until January 1960 that the Durban local 
authorities once again recommenced removals from Cato Manor to 
KwaMashu although they were warned by the ANC that removals 
would be greatly resisted. The ANC intervened in the removals 
on behalf of the shack-dwellers; it contacted the Mayor of 
Durban requesting the suspension of the removal programme. 52 
The mayor, however, failed to respond. The municipality placed 
notices at vantage points in Ezinkawini and Mnyasana shack 
areas advising the residents of the impending clearance. 53 
The municipality wanted to demolish 100 shacks containing 300 
48 The New Age, 28 July 1959. 
49 G. Maasdorp and A.S.B. Humphreys (eds), From shantytown 
to township (Cape Town, Juta, 1975), p 63. 
5° KCAL, KCM 55218, Notes for meeting with minister. 
51 Ibid. I p 2. 
52 Ibid. 
53 KCAL, KCM 55214, Demonstration by Bantu, 10 February 
1960. 
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African families in the two areas. 54 
It was in Ezinkawini and Mnyasana that violence broke out 
on the evening of 24 January 1960, partly provoked by police 
searching for and arresting illicit beer-brewers. 55 Many 
arrests took place and violence was sparked off when Constable 
Biyela trod on a woman's foot. 56 This seemingly minor 
incident ignited the already discontented and frustrated 
people into violence against the instruments of the state -
the police. 
Women were once again back on the streets with their 
struggle against removals in January 1960 led and championed 
by, in Bourquin's words, 
people who had an axe to grind or who had certain 
interests in the Cato Manor area- particularly the 
illegal traders, the shebeen keepers, the gambling 
school keepers etc. Now they were going to lose out 
on this rather lucrative trade, and they agitated 
against this removal- they knew that they would not 
qualify, or be unable to continue their activities 
in a well controlled township ... 57 
These were the people in the forefront attacking the police 
and chanting "Mayibuye i Africa" (come Africa) and "kill the 
Dutchmen". 58 (There was, of course, the most violent episodes 
against the police in many decades, which affected the whole 
psychology of the police nationally). The violence that 
followed claimed the lives of nine policemen and one 
54 NA, BAC, Cato Manor, "Onluste", 1 September 1959- 16 
March 1960, 0/3 chief BAC to the secretary for BAD, ,27 January 
1960. 
55 Ibid. See also SAIRR, Days of crisis in South Africa 
(SAIRR, 1960), p 3. 
56 SAIRR, Days of crl.Sl.S, p 3. See also L.K. Ladlau, "The 
Cato Manor riots, 1959 -1960" (unpublished MA, University of 
Natal, Durban, 1975), p 15. 
57 KCAL, KCAV 174 -75, S.B. Bourquin by A. Mason and D. 
Collins, 18 October 1979, p 8. 
58 KCAL, KCM 55224, Extract from report, p 15. 
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resident59 and a sizeable number of African residents were 
arrested for murder.6° In response, the Minister of Justice 
banned all political meetings in the locations for four 
weeks 61 and, for a while, the situation remained quiet. 
During March and April 1960, there were organised 
demonstrations in the townships against the detention of Chief 
Albert Luthuli and other African leaders for inciting people 
to riot. On 31 March 1960, the residents of Cato Manor erupted 
violently and destroyed municipal property. 62 Buses and 
lorries were stoned. The ANC organised one big march into the 
Durban city centre demanding the release of their leaders. On 
1 April the residents of Cato Manor, led by ANC stalwarts and 
the Protest Aqtion Committee, also marched into town and 
clashed with the police.63 During this period, most of the 
areas in and around Durban - particularly Clermont, KwaMashu, 
Cato Manor and S.J. Smith hostel - were rocked with unrest. 64 
Violence continued for several days at S.J. Smith hostel and 
in Lamontville township. It was only after the arrest of the 
ANC leaders that this resistance movement was greatly 
weakened. 
Meanwhile, the municipal authorities avoided further 
criticism from central government circles which felt that the 
city fathers were failing to implement tougher removal 
policies. 65 They re-launched the removal programme, and the 
residents of Mnyasana, who earlier had resisted by simply re-
59 NA, BAC, 0/3, chief BAC to the secretary for BAD, 27 
June 1960. 
6
° For the proceedings of the case, see Supreme Court 
Records: Manor 158. 
61 SAIRR, Days of crisis, p 4. 
62 . Ib1d., p 18. 
63 The Natal Mercury, 2 April 1960. 
64 SAIRR, Days of crisis, p 23 
65 See the debate which took place soon after the cato 
Manor June riots in The House of Assembly Debates, 25 January 
1960. 
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erecting their shacks after the demolition, were served with 
eviction notices. 66 An order for demolition of shacks 
remained in force, with some women opposing it. Some women 
spread rumours about KwaMashu in order to persuade others to 
continue resisting the removals alleging that KwaMashu was 
deliberately constructed on a swamp that was likely to subside 
and drown all the African people 67 - a somewhat contorted 
story. Another rumour was told: "the 'serpents' living in the 
KwaMashu area would 'eat us'". 68 Nevertheless, some residents 
decided to brave the swamp and serpents and made their way to 
the newly built houses of KwaMashu township. Those Africans 
who could afford to pay rent or purchase freehold land and who 
qualified for the privileges of urban residence in terms of 
Section 10 of the Amended Natives (Urban Areas) Act of 1952, 
simply moved into their new houses in the townships. Even the 
Mpondo women from Matatiele district who were based in Cato 
Manor hardly resisted the removals. In the late 1950s, the 
Mpondo community was known for fierce resistance to the 
removals, but this time they simply volunteered to move out 
and they erected their shacks in the Newlands area. 69 
For most men, this was the time when women had to pay 
back. Once it had become clearer that houses were provided to 
married men in KwaMashu, their reaction was in practice a 
positive one. Many married men were delighted to have access 
to better houses and expressed interest in moving to KwaMashu. 
For some women, widowed women and single women, unemployed and 
self-employed men, removals meant the end of their future 
lives in the city. To them resistance was the only alternative 
but it could be effective if they had the support of the 
entire Cato Manor community. Women expressed their anger 
towards African men, particularly those who were delighted 
66 The Daily News, 16 February 1960. 
67 KCAL, KCAV 174-75, S.B. Bourquin by Mason and Collins. 
68 Edwards, "Cato Manor, June 1959", p 125. 
69 KCAL, KCAV 174-5, Bourquin by Mason and Collins, p 9. 
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about KwaMashu. Edwards writes: 
Women grew increasingly 'impatient' with the failure 
of 'our men to see what was happening to us. We did 
not think they really were interested. They did not 
seem to be as worried about KwaMashu as us. Things 
were the same to them, and they would just leave us 
out in the cold. 70 
The final blow to resistance to forced removals was the 
banning of the ANC (the driving force behind the resistance) 
and when some leaders were arrested. The resistance died down 
and the municipality was quick to capitalise on that. Forced 
removals from Cato Manor continued after 1960 and the 
clearance took place finally in mid-1966. 
Results of forced removals: the birth of new 
shanties 
The survival of the newly "cleansed" apartheid city was 
threatened by the explosion of shantytowns which re-emerged 
soon after the removals from Cato Manor. Reluctant to return 
to their rural way of life, the evicted residents of Cato 
Manor had no alternative but to find new land on which to re-
erect their shanties. Quite clearly, the new shackland cities 
- like the old - provided women - unmarried, widows, divorcees 
and prostitutes - with the necessary freedom they wanted, 
unlike the conservative rural setting, which imposed normative 
restrictions and social control over them. It was unthinkable 
for most of these women to migrate back to their rural homes. 
The new shanties were erected mainly by those who were 
unable to afford rent or purchase payments for houses in the 
new townships. Workers who felt that they could not pay to 
live in the new township, together with illegal residents, 
made their way to the newly created shantytowns of Malukazi 
and Magabange~jubane 71 and built themselves different 
cities. By the 1960s vast shack settlements had re-emerged 
70 Edwards, "cato Manor, June 1959", p 123. 
71 See Ilanga Lase Natal, 17 September 1960, 25 November 
1961, 12 May 1962. 
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outside the Durban metropolitan area, which made the whole 
exercise somehow futile though segregation at the centre was 
being sustained. In fact, the City Council was strong enough 
to demolish shanties which were located in areas that were 
defined as white. However, the Council did not bother 
preventing people from re-erecting their shanties in the 
peripheral areas of Durban. These squatter struggles are 
crucially important in the history of South Africa for they 
represent the birth of modern urban townships as opposed to 
places like KwaMashu and the type of industrial proletariat 
which they accommodated. 
The new Mkhumbane, Tintown, was erected in the Malukazi 
area in 1960. 72 The area had fallen under the jurisdiction of 
the Makhanya tribal authorities at the beginning of the 
nineteenth century and had became part of the urban squatter 
fringe of metropolitan Durban. It was located on the southern 
border of the,Umlazi township and fell within the 
decentralised industrial zone, which attracted a drift of 
migrant workers to the area. The tin shacks were erected on 
Indian land and the shack dwellers paid a rent of £1 a 
month. 73 Most of the people who erected shacks in the area, 
particularly the Mpondo of Transkei, were from Cato Manor. It 
was estimated that 10 000 African dwellers lived in Malukazi 
shantytown in 1961 and a large proportion were legally 
employed in Durban and qualified for house allocation in the 
townships. 74 
The residents of Malukazi formed a Residents Association 
and were organised at grassroot community level by leaders 
who, having mobilised a large following, organised invasions 
of the "unoccupied lands". The Association was led by D. Gasa, 
a member of the banned ANc. 75 Though this Association was not 
72 Ilanga Lase Natal, 17 September 1960. 
73 Ibid. 
74 SAIRR, A survey of race relatiQns, 1962, p 150. 
75 Ilanga Lase Natal, 17 September 1960. 
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recognised by the local authorities, it presents an important 
point about the way in which the residents collectively 
defended their integrity as urban residents. During these 
years, residents intensified their group activities as people 
affected by government policy: they coped with the hardships 
of urban-cum-industrial life by forming associations. It was 
in this respect that Malukazi emerged as a major shack area in 
the 1960s. 
In 1961 the Bantu Administration and Development 
officials suggested that the squatters of Malukazi should be 
allocated houses in Umlazi township. Those who qualified for 
the allocation were the residents who had previously been 
shifted from the area to pave the way for the construction of 
a township, and also all the Zulu-speaking people in the 
squatter camp who were employed in the southern part of 
Durban. 76 The ~emaining residents who did not qualify were to 
be evicted from the area. 
Despite the accelerated construction of houses in the new 
townships, the housing shortage remained critical which, in 
turn, led to the growth of the African population in the 
squatter camps. By 1962, another new shantytown had come into 
existence on the outskirts of the Umlazi-Glebe areas. This was 
Magabangenjubane, and it fell under the leadership of J.B. 
Matonsi, an informal trader and member of the banned ANC. 77 
The area was occupied by almost 10 000 people but was 
dominated mainly by women. In June 1962 this area too faced 
demolition by the local authorities, with those people who 
were legally employed being temporarily accommodated in Cato 
Manor emergency camp and KwaMashu township. 78 A significant 
number of women who were illegal residents moved away quietly 
andre-erected their shacks in the Malukazi shantytown. 79 But 
76 SAIRR, A survey of race relatiQn~, 1962, p 150. 
77 Ilanga Lase Natal, 9 June 1961. 
78 Ilanga Lase Natal, 30 June 1962. 
79 Ilanga Lase Natal, 20 October 1962. 
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their stay in Malukazi was to be short-lived: by January 1963 
that shantytown was also demolished. Although the municipal 
authorities had succeeded in clearing most of these peri-urban 
shantytowns for a while, the struggle for shelter in the urban 
area continued throughout the 1960s. 
The demolition of shantytowns by the municipal 
authorities intensified during the 1960s as new shacks emerged 
on the borders of the townships, where there was access to 
water and other facilities. In time, conflict arose between 
the legal township residents and the illegal shack dwellers. 
By 1963, Cato Manor had a squatter population of 20 000 
Africans who still had to be resettled in the townships: 80 
and in the middle of that year the Benoni, Kumalo and the 
Dabulamanzi areas of Cato Manor were demolished. Those 
residents of these areas who were regarded as illegals made 
their way into the valleys and re-erected their shacks. Thus 
creating a new squatter belt in the Mariannhill-Thornwood-
Dassenhoek area extending to the Umgeni River and Inanda 
district north of KwaMashu.8 1 
Although at times intense, murmuring of the masses, 
dovetailing with strikes, marches and meetings did not last 
for very long. After the massacre at Sharpeville in March 1960 
and the consequent banning of the ANC and the PAC, 82 
resistance faltered and urban removals became frequent and 
aggressively executed all over South Africa. From this time 
onwards, the state employed considerably expanded repressive 
powers to suppress any form of resistance, particularly from 
Africans. In Cato Manor, removals continued under police 
protection and the municipal authorities did not face any real 
challenges. 
The municipality of Durban was pressured by the central 
government to intensify the removal programme and by July 1960 
about three-quarters of the scattered settlements in Cato 
80 Ilanqa Lase Natal, 23 March 1963. 
81 Maasdorp and Humphreys (eds), From shantytown, p 70. 
82 SAIRR, A survey of race relations, 1959 -60, p 72. 
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Manor had been destroyed. 83 The total number of shacks 
demolished at that date stood at 1 972 and the Cato Manor 
Emergency Camp created by the municipality as transitional 
accommodation hosted almost 55 000 people.84 The banned ANC 
operated through Ruth Shabane who in March 1960 had been 
elected as the chairperson of the Cato Manor Advisory 
Board. 85 The ANC's Emergency Committee worked underground, 
attempting to influence people from the emergency camp not to 
leave Cato Manor. Pamphlets were distributed by ANC stalwarts, 
urging people to continue with their resistance. But the 
movement was already fragmented and disorganised; very little 
support was given by the remaining people in the camp. Lacking 
a very clear organisational structure and facing a state 
determined to proceed, resistance fizzled out. With the State 
of Emergency in place, shack removals in Cato Manor continued 
unhindered and by mid-1966, the municipal authorities had 
managed to clear away all shanties in Cato Manor. 
Conclusion , 
Central to the analysis in this chapter has been an attempt to 
demonstrate initial mass opposition to apartheid urban 
policies in Durban. However, during the 1960s, when mass 
political organisations and activities were ruthlessly 
suppressed in every possible way, the resistance movement died 
out. As a group, Africans in Durban had failed to challenge 
the apartheid state successfully fearing the state's 
retaliation which threatened them with possible expulsion from 
the apartheid city. However, there was a legacy from this time 
when a new dimension later emerged in African resistance and 
83 KCAL, Bourquin Papers, File 11, Municipal native 
administration department, annual reports 1953 -69, KCM 55339 
-55351, Durban Corporation, department of BAD, annual report 
for the municipal year ended 31 July 1960. See also The Daily 
News, 21 October 1960. Some shacks remained intact in 1960. 
84 KCAL, File 11, Department of BAD, annual report for the 
year ending July 1960. 
85 Ilanga Lase Natal, 12 March 1960. 
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community based politics became dominant in apartheid's own 
newly established townships (discussed in Chapter 6). 
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Chapter Five 
Living in the Apartheid City: African Workers, the 
State and Housing, 1960-1977 
Introduction 
The South African government, in the four decades between 1948 
and 1990, implemented policies that were geared towards 
depriving Africans of adequate housing and the necessary 
welfare facilities in the townships and shantytowns. The 
period was also marked by a high degree of social control and 
state intervention: forced removals were imposed so that the 
full brunt of the Verwoerdian racial doctrine was felt, 
particularly by Africans and Indians living within white urban 
areas. Such racial policy was clearly enunciated on 30 May 
1952, when Dr Hendrik Verwoerd, then Minister of Native 
Affairs, stated in parliament: 
Every town or city, especially industrial cities, 
must have a single corresponding black township; 
townships must be large, and must be situated to 
allow for expansion without spilling over into 
another racial group area; townships must be located 
an adequate distance from white areas; black 
townships should be separated from white areas by an 
area of industrial sites where industries exist or 
are being planned; existing wrongly situated areas 
should be moved; everybody wants his servants and 
his labourers, but nobody wants to have a native 
location near his own. 1 
In strict compliance with such views, the NP government, from 
the late 1950s and early 1960s decided to remove Africans and 
1 Speech cited in NA, Bantu Affairs Commissioner's files 
(hereafter BAC), 0/3, BAC, Durban to the CBAC, nd. 1960. 
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Indians forcibly from inner-cities to distant townships. The 
apartheid city was gradually taking shape and was marked by 
struggles between the state, local authorities and the 
dispossessed over urban space and shelter. D. Harvey, a 
Marxist scholar, terms such a struggle as having "its origin 
in the work process but that ramifies and reverberates 
throughout all aspects of the system of relations which 
capitalism establishes". 2 
In South Africa, the state (local and central) and 
capital created apartheid cities which were modelled on 
policies of racial segregation, "evolving over a long period 
of time in a rather haphazard, piecemeal way". 3 The NP 
government had visions of such racially divided cities, ones 
which coincided with the concerns both of many white urban 
residents and of municipal authorities. These concerns were 
particularly evident in Durban. 4 The entire process of making 
Durban an apartheid city was hastened by the outbreak of 
violence in Cato Manor in 1959. 
This cha~ter investigates the state's interventionist 
policy in the process of making Durban an apartheid city. The 
chapter also examines the socio-economic concomitants of the 
process, together with the rapid growth of shantytowns during 
the 1960s and 1970s. These related problems gave rise to the 
apartheid city which eventually, as A. Mabin stated, 
" ... created an environment conducive to strikes by African 
workers, such as those which rolled across the Durban and East 
2 D. Harvey, The urban experience (Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 
1989), p89. 
3 P. May lam, "Explaining the apartheid city: 20 years of 
South African urban historiography", Journal of Southern African 
Studies, volume 21, No 1 (1995), p19. 
4 D. Hindson, M. Byerley and M. Morris, From violence to 
reconstruction: the making, disintegration and remaking of an 
apartheid city (University of Natal, Durban, CSDS, 1993), p3. 
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Rand industrial areas in 1973"5 and beyond. Furthermore, the 
significance of this chapter to the whole thesis can be 
closely linked to, in the words of P. Maylam, "urban history 
[that] inevitably shades into other branches of history: into 
economic history, as industrialisation and urbanisation are 
closely interwoven, and into labour history, political history 
and women's studies".6 
Apartheid's African housing: plans and problems 
In the nineteenth century, as a colonial port serving both 
Natal and the Witwatersrand, Durban grew into one of the most 
racially segregated urban areas in South Africa. 7 During the 
1880s, the Durban City Council expressed concern about 
I 
assaults and criminal-related acts among Africans living in 
shacks and hovels around the city. 8 It was then that the City 
Council expressed the view that African "locations ... be 
established at a convenient distance from the towns". 9 By the 
beginning of the twentieth century the Durban Corporation was 
in the forefront of those institutions articulating racial 
residential segregation "without compulsion, [but] by attract-
ing people to segregated facilities''. 10 Various policies 
implemented in Durban during those early years were taken up 
by many southern African urban areas; they became pillars "of 
the Union government's national policy of urban segrega-
5 A. Mabin, "The dynamics of urbanisation since 1960", in 
M. Swilling (et al) (eds), Apartheid city in transition (Cape 
Town, OUP, 1991), p 38. 
6 Maylam, "Explaining the apartheid city", p 20. 
7 I. Edwards, "Cato Manor: cruel past, pivotal future" 
Review of African Political Economy, No.62, (March 1995). 
8 Lemon, Apartheid in transition, p 211. 
9 Ibid. 
10 Ibid. 
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tion". 11 In Durban, by-laws were proclaimed in an endeavour 
to control the processes of urbanisation among Indians and 
Africans. With the coming to power of the NP in 1948, existing 
policies of urban segregation and spatial management were 
applied with rigour and vitality; in fact, the NP replaced a 
class-differentiated housing policy with ethnic zoning and 
also forced the educated middle class to live together with 
the working class. 12 In a bid to secure support among the 
white electorate, the NP government enforced removals of urban 
Africans living in shantytowns to newly established, far-away 
townships. In Durban, widespread fears among white residents 
about Cato Manor, which was associated with beer-brewing, 
disease, violence and crime, were taken into account by the 
government when the massive restructuring of urban African 
communities commenced. 13 
Throughout the 1940s and 1950s, there were extensive 
debates about the nature of the apartheid city. 14 The 
government intervened in housing matters, thereby reducing 
local authorities' autonomy. During that period, as Maylam 
notes, conflicts arose "between capital and labour, between 
the state and capital, between the local state and central 
state, and between Africans and the state". 15 Such conflicts 
were over the question of financing housing for African 
employees and their immediate families, and also the shape of 
the apartheid city. Maylam continues: 
11 Edwards, "Cato Manor", p 1 . 
12 For a comprehensive study on this aspect, see P. Maylam, 
"Shackled by contradictions: the municipal response to African 
urbanisation in Durban, 1920-1950", African Urban Studies, 14 
(1989); P. Maylam, "Explaining the apartheid city", p 30; Hindson 
(et al), From violence to reconstruction; and Lemon, Apartheid 
in transition. 
13 See Maylam, "Shackled by contradictions". 
14 See Edwards, "Mkhumbane our home", especially Chapter 6. 
15 P. Maylam, "The rise and decline of urban Apartheid in 
South Africa", African Affairs, 89 (1990), p 71. 
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The central state, unwilling to burden taxpayers, 
tended to argue that the responsibility lay with the 
local state and with capital, both being the chief 
beneficiaries of cheap labour in any particular 
urban area. The local state, unwilling to burden 
ratepayers, claimed that capital benefited most from 
cheap African labour and should therefore either 
contribute directly to housing costs or give workers 
a high enough wage to enable them to pay economic 
rents. Capital, naturally unwilling to burden itself 
with these costs if at all possible, and the central 
state argued together that all ratepayers benefited 
from cheap African labour and that they should 
therefore carry the main burden of housing costs. 16 
The municipality of Durban and the government indicated that 
they were too constrained financially to subsidise African 
housing. Employers of African labour were therefore called 
upon to subiidise indirectly the costs of houses, so that the 
financial burqen did not remain the sole responsibility of the 
occupants concerned. It was only in 1962 that the government 
agreed to subsidise African housing, particularly in new 
townships that were being developed. 
During the 1950s, while the central government's 
involvement in African accommodation steadily increased, the 
local urban authority was left with the responsibility for the 
development of housing. In the 1950s, the Department of Native 
Affairs insisted that local authorities must develop site-and-
service schemes in KwaMashu. 17 In fact, during the 1950s, 
Verwoerd, the Minister for Native Affairs, assumed distinctive 
powers over approval and disapproval of housing plans. Com-
menting on Verwoerd's actions, Edwards writes: 
Having little knowledge of the principles of town 
planning, being more concerned with the African 
housing shortage in the Johannesburg area, and 
unfamiliar with the topographical features 
prevailing in the Durban area, Verwoerd remained 
dogmatic that KwaMashu could be developed on a site-
16 Ibid., p 74. 
17 Edwards, "Mkhumbane our home", p 171. 
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and-service scheme. 18 
In contrast, the City Council remained adamant that the 
development of a site-and-service housing scheme in KwaMashu 
was completely unsuitable. KwaMashu's hilly terrain and clay 
soil were impediments to such a scheme. 19 However, after 
considerable pressure from local authorities and employer 
organisations, the Department of Native Affairs agreed that 
formal housing be developed in KwaMashu. 20 
By the late 1950s, new residential zoning plans for the 
entire Durban area were developed. Both local and central 
state authorities agreed that the success of such a project 
needed the removal of Africans and Indians from Cato Manor. 
The plans were also intended to increase " ... the 
capitalization of inner city land by clearing land of Blacks 
and allowing for white ownership and residence". 21 According 
to the Durban City Council Group Areas proclamations, Cato 
Manor was to become a white area. The entire core city area 
was reserved.for white housing, while Indians were zoned in 
Merebank and the new township of Chatsworth22 ; Africans were 
to be relocated to KwaMashu in the north and later in 1962 to 
Umlazi in the south. Durban was thus set to become an ideal 
apartheid city. 
In KwaMashu township, single male hostel accommodation 
and single-tenant nuclear family accommodation were to be 
provided. 23 African residents who qualified for nuclear 
18 Ibid., p 172. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Ibid., p 174. 
21 Edwards, "Cato Manor", p 5. 
22 See, for instance, Freund, Insiders and outsiders; and K. 
Subramony, "A history of Chatsworth: impact of the group areas 
act on the Indian community of Durban, 1958 -1975" (unpublished 
MA, Unisa, 1993). 
23 Edwards, "Mkhumbane our home", p 182. 
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family accommodation were those who were legally married and 
who qualified to be in the urban area under Section Ten 
(1)(b). Bachelors were to be provided with accommodation in 
the hostels. No woman was allowed to rent a house in KwaMashu; 
tenancy remained a preserve of married men. 24 S. Parnell 
writes, 
So, township housing was only available to certain 
sections of the formal urban workforce ... Unmarried 
women, who serviced the urban working classes with 
cheap food, sex and alcohol were barred from the new 
urban housing. Along with other "undesirables" they 
were left to shelter in the urban crev~ces, in the 
slum yards hidden from the public eye. 5 
In that respect the new society was fundamentally different 
from Cato Manor society, where both men and women, whether 
illegally or legally, owned shacks. Ideal townships, as 
envisaged by the state were gradually taking shape. 
The gove~nment, capital and the local authorities of 
Durban all agreed that KwaMashu should be constructed as a 
site for relocating the African shack dwellers of Cato Manor. 
The first houses to be completed in KwaMashu were occupied in 
March 1958. Despite consensus among employers, local 
authorities and the government to relocate African shantytown 
dwellers to KwaMashu, problems of subsidising African housing 
continued. 
The new township of KwaMashu brought about some changes 
in the lifestyle of many African dwellers. With the passage of 
time, however, some of the workers could not afford the 
24 Ibid. Edwards notes that sometimes marriages of con-
venience resulted in order for men to qualify for the new house 
in the township. Sometimes those who were not legally married 
were "given a short period of time to formalise their 
relationship, at which time they would be removed to formal 
housing. If such a couple failed to become legally married, the 
male would be resettled in the hostel area and the woman evicted 
from the city". 
25 S. Parnell, "South African cities: perspectives from the 
ivory tower of urban studies" (University of the Witwatersrand, 
Institute for Advanced Social Research, Seminar Paper No. 388, 
9 October 1995), p 10. 
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rentals and transport costs which they had to meet in the new 
township. This fact was backed up by a survey conducted in 
1960, which disclosed that 68 percent of the house dwellers 
received a monthly income of £8 (R16) or less, and such 
workers could ill afford the rentals and the cost of 
transport. 26 Some of these relocated themselves into the 
squatter settlements on the fringe of the city. 
The development of KwaMashu and its initial growth 
failed to cater for all the shack dwellers of Cato Manor, 
Merebank and Chatsworth. 27 As a response to broader crises of 
' the 1950s, the government, which earlier on had been 
reluctant, began developing further African housing to the 
south of the city on the Umlazi Reserve. As the agent of the 
South Africa Native Trust in the development of Umlazi 
township, the municipality of Durban launched in 1961 the 
construction of houses. 28 In 1962 Umlazi township came into 
being. With the availability of houses in two townships, 
Africans living in shacks and compounds in the city, despite 
having legal rights to remain in the urban area, were 
nonetheless relocated to one or the other of the townships. An 
"imaginary line" was drawn to divide the city into north and 
south. 29 All those Africans employed in areas north of that 
imaginary line were to be resettled in KwaMashu, while those 
employed in the south were to be relocated to Umlazi town-
ship.30 However, the imaginary line did not really work as it 
26 NA, Senior Inligtings Beampte and Bantoe Kommissaris, 
Bantu Affairs Commissioner's files (hereafter BAC), 0/3, BAC, 
Durban to the Chief Bantu Affairs Commissioner, 1960. 
27 KCAL, PNAAB, KCF 64, Roll 47, Monthly report, 20 July 
1962. 
28 NA, BAC, 0/3, BAC, Durban to the CBAC, 11 December 1959, 
"Proposed Umlazi township", pp 1-2. See also SAIRR, A survey of 
race relation§, 1961, p 179. 
29 KCAL, KCAV 987 -991, Interview with S B Bourquin by I 
Edwards, 10 September 1980. 
30 Ibid. 
129 
was intended to do. 
From May 1962 onwards, the City Engineer of Durban 
anticipated a monthly completion of 150 houses. In Umlazi 
township, specific criteria were used by the Bantu Admin-
istration and Development in allocating houses. However, the 
Bantu Affairs Commissioner (BAC) gave first preference to 
families displaced at Umlazi as ~ result of the 
construction.31 The BAC required at least 1 000 houses for 
that purpose. Placed second on the government priority list 
were those people displaced from Cato Manor who qualified for 
formal housing at Umlazi and were temporarily moved to 
KwaMashu. The third priority group were people who resided in 
Cato Manor whose shacks were destroyed and who were removed 
urgently under ministerial order and without anywhere to go. 
The last group given preference were those squatter families 
who were entitled to family housing in Durban and were 
squatting on municipal land and employed to the south of the 
imaginary line.32 The entire process failed to materialise 
because of differences which existed between the government 
and the local authorities over priority people to be relo-
cated. The government desired to reserve Umlazi for Zulu-
speakers only, thus perpetuating ethnic division among the 
African people. However, KwaMashu was to remain mixed. Heavily 
influenced by the ethnic zoning policy throughout the 1960s, 
the Chief Bantu Affairs Commissioner insisted that Umlazi 
should be a "homeland" township exclusively for the Zulu 
ethnic group.33 Such a policy guideline by the government 
partly attained its objectives in 1970 when Umlazi was finally 
31 KCAL, PNAAB, KCF 64, Roll 47, "Shack removals from Cato 
Manor: number of persons to be resettled at Umlazi township from 
KwaMashu and order of priority for settlement at Umlazi, 13 April 
1962". 
32 KCAL, KCF 64, Roll 47, BAC to the general secretary, the 
Natal Employers' Association, 11 January 1962. 
33 KCAL, PNAAB, KCF 24, Roll 7, BA 2/3/3, Part 1, department 
of Bantu administration, 15 November 1968. 
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handed over to the KwaZulu homeland government which, however, 
failed to implement it. For instance, in 1974, Africans living 
in the Western District of Durban were mixed ethnically. 34 
The following statistics are useful indicators of the position 
in one of the areas of Durban. 
Table A 
Africans living in the Western District, Durben, 127435 
Ethnic Group Male Female Children Total 
Zulu 10 655 6 898 14 450 32 003 
Xhosa 1 053 752 1 066 2 871 
Sotho 515 374 461 1 350 
Others 1 071 45 97 1 213 
Foreign 173 63 104 340 
Total 37 777 
By 1962, it had become evident that the Umlazi housing 
scheme, administered by the state, offered lower rentals 
compared to KwaMashu, and also had an added advantage in that 
residents became land as well as property owners. 36 KwaMashu 
residents were not entitled to land ownership since the 
township was within the boundary of a white city. 
The disparities between the two townships, apparent soon 
after the establishment of Umlazi, created great concern among 
employers of African labour. Workers employed in the northern 
areas of Durban and residing in KwaMashu began their movement 
to the south so that they could qualify for housing in Umlazi. 
34 In August 1973, the PNAAB was promulgated and divided 
into eight districts: Durban, Pinetown, Umlazi, Port shepstone, 
Lower Tugela, Inanda, Umzinto and Alfred. The Durban district was 
further sub-divided into two: the Central District, which 
consisted of the KwaMashu, Lamont and Chesterville townships, and 
the S.J Smith, Dalton, Jacobs, Thokoza and Glebe hostels; and the 
Western District, which comprised KwaNgendezi, KwaDabeka, 
Clermont, Ntuzuma and Kranskloof areas. See NA, PNAAB, 1/2/1/1/1, 
Bourquin, Present and future housing, 21 October 1974. 
35 NA, PNAAB, 1/2/1/1/1, Housing, buildings and sites: 
policy, director, Natal Chamber of Industries to the Hon M C 
Botha, MP, Minister of Bantu Administration and Development, 1 
October 1974. 
36 Ibid., The DCC to the Town Clerk, 23 May 1962. 
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In KwaMashu, four types of housing were constructed: the 
51/6 and 51/7 type houses (following the numbers of the plans 
drawn during the 1950s); K2D type houses; log cabins; and 
site-and-service houses. Those Africans who were well off and 
were able to construct their own houses, using the standards 
laid down by the City Council, were allocated a 4 500 square 
foot site for a site rental and rate repayment cost of almost 
£4 (R8) per month. 37 The construction of such houses was 
boosted with financial loans to the value of £250 (R500) 
coming from the Native Revenue Account. The second type of 
housing was the four-roomed detached bungalow which was built 
on 2 800 square foot sites. These were bought for £2 (R4) 
deposit and a monthly payment of £3.1.2 (R6,24), or rented for 
£3.2.4 (R6,48) per month.38 African residents considered such 
rentals high; it was more affordable for those workers who 
earned at least £15 (R30) per month or more. The high rental 
rate partly explains why by August 1961 the Council was owed 
R73 322 in arrear rentals by the residents of KwaMashu. 39 
In Umlazi, rentals were slightly cheaper than in 
KwaMashu. Inclusive of all services, the rentals for houses in 
Umlazi were R6,45 per house. 40 As for KwaMashu, the monthly 
rentals for each house with all service charges included was 
within the range of R11. Houses constructed in Umlazi 
township, therefore, remained cheaper and of better quality 
than those in KwaMashu. 
In Umlazi, the lowly paid workers were housed in two-
roomed, log cabins and provided with a site-and-service 
37 SAIRR, Natal Region, file, townships: KwaMashu, Natal 
Chamber of Industry, "Housing for the urban African population", 
26 September 1960. See also SAIRR, A survey of race relations, 
1961, p 180. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Ibid. 
4° KCAL, PNAAB, KCF 63, Roll 46, residential areas, 
department of Bantu administration to the Town Clerk, 15 August 
1966. 
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housing scheme development. The two-roomed houses, better 
known as K2D dwellings, were rented for R4 plus per month, or 
bought for a monthly payment of R3 plus a deposit of R4. 
Single-roomed log cabins, in KwaMashu neighbourhood units Two 
and Four, were rented for R2 per month. 41 
Hostel accommodation for both men and women was provided. 
Large dormitories were constructed, each accommodating a 
minimum of 32 single persons. Hostel residents were provided 
with a steel bed and mattress and full bed clothes; as from 
February 1962, 42 a rental of R0,15 per night was charged for 
casual accommodation, and an economical rental of R2 per month 
was charged for long-term residents. Employers of African 
labour were given an option, either to rent hostel 
accommodation for their workers and then deduct such rent from 
the workers' wages, or to provide their own accommodation in 
company compounds or barracks. 43 
A sizeable number of firms in Durban preferred African 
workers to live in company compounds on the factory site. By 
1970, for instance, the total number of people accommodated in 
municipal, government or private compounds and in domestic 
servant quarters was 61 000. 44 Firms in the forefront in 
providing their own compound accommodation included Coronation 
Brick, Defy, Hullett's Sugar Refinery, Kaffrarian Steam Mill, 
Lion Match, Union Whaling, South African Breweries and Union 
Flour Mills at Umbilo. In the Mobeni area, Universal Mills was 
the only firm with a compound. Other compounds were found in 
41 KCAL,PNAAB, KCF 23, Roll 6, Bantu administration, monthly 
reports. 
42 Ibid., Extract from Bantu administration, monthly report, 
5 December 1961, "casual accommodation at KwaMashu hostel". 
43 Discussion with S.B. Bourquin, UND, History department, 
6 October 1993. 
44 KCAL, PNAAB, KCF 64, Roll 47, residential areas: 
memorandum to assistant director (Bantu areas), 14 August 1970. 
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the Congella, Mayden Wharf and Jacobs areas. 45 These com-
pounds were, as noted by Van Onselen in a different context 
and place, "the colleges of exploitation", 46 as employers 
managed to control workers effectively and monitored their 
movements; workers did not lose working time since they lived 
in close proximity to their places of work. This type of 
accommodation was exploitative particularly among the 
dockworkers, who lived in barracks erected in the Point and 
Mayden Wharf areas. 47 Poor migrant workers were exploited in 
those barracks, which were erected in 1878 and 1903 
respectively. 48 Those barracks were close to the work-place 
which meant effective control and a reduction in transport 
costs, particularly for employers. Here also lay the 
contradictions within government policies: certainly the 
government was opposed to Africans continuing to live in the 
city but tolerated the compounds and hostels since there was a 
huge backlog in housing. 
By March 1962 the municipality had constructed 14 "better 
class" houses which were occupied by those Africans with a 
higher income and who had important positions in KwaMashu 
township.49 The 51/6 and 51/7 type houses built by then 
numbered 4 334 and 806 respectively. 50 The K2D type of houses 
45 Young, "Industrial geography", p 161, see ft 1. 
46 Van Onselen, Chibaro, p 157. 
47 KCAL, PNAAB, KCF 82, Roll 64, Natal Chamber of Indus-
tries, Public relations, "accommodation: stevedoring labour, 
general manager, Durban stevedoring labour supply company, 4 
April 1975", p 1. 
48 Ibid. See also Hemson, "Class consciousness and migrant 
workers'':"~? 33. 
49 KCAL, PNAAB, KCF 23, Roll 6, KwaMashu township to the 
Director, report for February 1962, township manager, 6 March 
1962. 
SO Ibid. 
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provided numbered 1 934, and the log cabins 2 501. 51 For 
those earning less, 85 block houses and 153 site-and-service 
stands were provided. The total number of houses provided in 
KwaMashu by March 1962 was 9 827. 52 The hostels accommodated 
10 944 single persons.53 Umlazi township, by that time, 
provided only 865 houses. 54 A large section of the population 
lived in the compounds, emergency camps and surrounding 
shantytowns. 
By 1970 the housing situation in Durban had slightly 
improved and about 60 percent of Durban' Africans had been 
relocated to new townships. In KwaMashu township, the local 
authorities provided family accommodation for 15 404 families 
and hostel accommodation for 18 900 single men. 55 The 
location of Lamont accommodated 2 763 families; the township 
was earmarked for Indian occupation as from 1980 onwards. 56 
Africans living there were to be relocated to Umlazi, KwaMashu 
or Ntuzuma townships, the latter planned for occupation by the 
early 1970s. Chesterville residential area which accommodated 
1 265 families in four-roomed apartments was also earmarked 
for white occupation.57 
The S.J. Smith hostel provided accommodation for 4 412 
single men, while the Dalton Road Hostel accommodated 1 452 
single men. The Dalton hostel was specifically reserved to 
accommodate security corps personnel and Africans employed in 
51 Ibid. 
52 Ibid. 
53 KCAL, KCF 23, Roll 6, Report for January 1963, KwaMashu 
township manager to the director, 11 February 1963. 
54 SAIRR, Survey of race relations, 1962, p 148. 
55 NA, PNAAB, 1/2/1/1/1, S Bourquin, "Present and future 
bantu housing development": To all board members, 21 October 
1974. 
56 Ibid. 
57 Ibid. 
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essential services. 58 At Jacobs, 886 single men were 
accommodated in the hostel, which catered for employees from 
the Durban harbour area where most of them, the togt workers, 
were employed, mainly on a shift basis. Other workers were 
accommodated in privately owned compounds. As for women, they 
were accommodated at Thokoza hostel. This hostel could take 
only 900 women, particularly those who worked in the central 
area of Durban.59 The total number of Africans residing in 
hostel accommodation, including the Glebe hostel, amounted to 
28 158. 60 The compounds absorbed a total number of 61 000 
persons. 61 The township of Umlazi offered family accom-
modation for not more than 16 000 families by 1970. 
During the 1970s, the government drastically reduced its 
funding for the construction of African urban housing. In 1971 
the government indicated that it was going to reduce the funds 
available for the development of African housing during the 
1972/3 fiscal year. During that period, Ntuzuma, a newly 
established township and located in the north of Durban and 
Umlazi, and the Umlazi hostel scheme, were in the process of 
development. The City Council, acting as an agent of the South 
African Bantu Trust, developed these areas. In response to 
cuts in government funding, the City Treasurer and Engineer 
were sanctioned by the Health and Housing Committee to 
negotiate with the Secretary for Bantu Administration and 
Development to reconsider the position. 62 The Secretary for 
58 Ibid. See also KCAL, KCAV 987-991, S. Bourquin by I. 
Edwards, 8 September 1980- 13 February 1981. Interview dated 6 
November 1980. 
59 NA, PNAAB, 1/2/1/1/1, Bourquin, "Present and future 
housing", 21 October 1974. 
60 KCAL, PNAAB, KCF 64, Roll 47, estimated population in 
Bantu residential areas as at 18 August 1970. 
61 Ibid. 
62 KCAL, PNAAB, KCF 80, Roll 62, Public relations, city 
engineer's department to the Town Clerk, 28 January 1972. 
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the BAD indicated that the total amount available for the 
housing projects was limited to R2,1 million.63 The City 
Council could only contribute R1,4 million through its Bantu 
Services Levy Fund. 64 The total available funds for the whole 
scheme thus amounted to R3,5 million, and yet the estimated 
amount required for the progress of the construction programme 
was R8,36 million.65 The shortfall was enormous, to the 
extent that concern was expressed by both the City Council and 
employer organisations. 
The desire to restrict government funding of urban 
African housing projects drew criticism from the Durban City 
Council and the Natal Chamber of Industries. The criticism was 
founded on the fact that government funding was withdrawn at 
the moment when the Umlazi Glebe hostel project was supposed 
to be well developed. Hostel accommodation in the Umlazi area 
was desperately needed, "in the face of an existing backlog of 
many thousands of housing units". 66 The Umlazi hostel project 
required a total amount of RS,S million to ensure that a 
hostel catering for 19 616 persons was completed. 67 After 
extensive negotiations between the City Council and the 
government, the overall funding was increased to RS 
million. 68 
In view of government funding problems for urban African 
housing, the promotion of site-and-service schemes in new 
areas that were ear-marked for development was suggested by 
63 Ibid. 
64 KCAL, PNAAB 1 KCF 80 1 Roll 62 1 The DCC minutes, 1 0 
February 1972. 
65 Ibid. 
66 Ibid. 
67 Ibid. 
68 Ibid., The DCC minutes, 13 April, 1972. 
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the Durban City Council. 69 Instead of utilising the RS 
million allocated to African housing, it was suggested that 
the amount available should be spent on providing initial 
services on site- and-service schemes. The services to be 
provided were roads, water, sewerage, street lighting, schools 
and shopping centres. The occupant of each site was allowed to 
erect his own shack "on the plot provided, on the 
understanding that within three years he erected a dwelling to 
standards specified by the municipal or government authority 
concerned". 70 Such a policy was accepted by both the 
municipality and the government. It is fascinating that during 
the 1950s, the government had insisted on site-and-service 
schemes developed "in an orderly and tidy manner ..• " 71 ; these 
were rejected by municipal officials on the basis that they 
were going to create further shantytowns. During the 1970s, 
the municipal officials accepted the original government 
proposals because there were no funds for any other course of 
action. The plan was approved by the Bantu Affairs Commis-
sioner in 1973.72 
The mid-1970s witnessed a slow change in the PNAAB's 
approach to providing housing. Housing schemes were launched 
in some parts of the Western and Central Districts of Durban. 
In 1974, KwaMakutha's 317 dilapidated houses were converted 
into hostel blocks to cater for 2 264 single men who worked in 
the Amanzimtoti industrial complex. 73 Further hostel 
accommodation was provided in Klaarwater township, where 1 008 
singlemen were housed. In 1974, however, it was projected that 
69 Ibid. 
70 Ibid. 
71 Edwards, "Mkhumbane our home", p 173. 
72 NA, PNAAB, 1/2/1/1/1, Bourquin, present and future 
housing, 21 October 1974. 
73 NA, PNAAB, 1/2/1/1/1, Bourquin, present and future Bantu 
housing, p 10 
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Klaarwater township would eventually be occupied by Indian and 
coloured residents, while Africans living there would be 
housed in the proposed KwaZulu township of KwaNgendezi in the 
Dassenhoek area. 74 KwaNgendezi was originally proclaimed a 
rural African township area on 18 September 1970. It had to be 
developed in order to cater for 16 748 Africans living in the 
Marianhill, Klaarwater and Mpumalanga areas, who desperately 
needed accommodation. 75 In 1974, the PNAAB offered to develop 
KwaNgendezi township on behalf of the South African Bantu 
Trust and that such development had to be on a site-and-
service basis. The new residents were allowed to erect their 
own dwellings with plans approved by the Board. However, 
residential occupation only took place in mid 1977, when 50 
residents from the Pinetown area were relocated to this newly 
founded township.76 
Further housing developments took place in the Clermont 
area, which was directly linked to the growth of New Germany 
and Westmead areas as major industrial complexes. No decent 
accommodation was provided for workers in those particular 
areas; in fact, squatter shanties had developed very rapidly 
and some landlords had constructed boarding houses (popularly 
known as "Kuswayo's shed") for renting purposes. Migrant 
workers recruited mainly by the Frame group of companies 
spent at least some weeks crowded with other 80 to 100 fellow 
workers in one of those sheds. For a space to sleep they had 
to pay 25 cents a day until they could find alternative 
accommodation. It was only the 1973 strikes which shocked the 
government and Frame in particular into the realisation that 
the housing situation needed urgent redress. In 1974, the 
Kranskloof hostel was constructed and was a joint venture 
74 Ibid, p 12. 
75 NA, PNAAB, Chief director's memo for the executive 
committee, 10 May 1974. 
76 P Morris, A history of black housing in South Africa 
(South Africa Foundation, 1981), p 105. 
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between the government and Frame group of companies. The 
hostels could accommodate only 12 000 workers, of which there 
were four male blocks and one female block. Plans were also 
put in place to accommodate married workers. In 1975, 
KwaDabeka township was thus erected to house married workers 
with permanent residential rights in Clermont. A site-and-
service scheme was launched also in KwaDabeka although with 
major constraints imposed on Africans when building houses. 
The land was very inexpensive (R100 a site) but construction 
had to.take place within three months. Houses had to have at 
least two bedrooms, dining room, bathroom and toilet and yet 
no building society funding was available to prospective 
residents since the land was in Kwazulu homeland. The end 
result was the construction of whatever structures residents 
could manage and hence the proliferation of shack structures 
in KwaDabeka. Given this situation, the PNAAB acknowledged its 
responsibility and the acute shortage of housing and "the 
tremendous need for suitable accommodation for many thousands 
of Bantu people living under very adverse circumstances 
throughout its area of jurisdiction". 77 
Squatters and shantytowns 
In 1974, the chief director of the PNAAB, S.B. Bourquin, 
pointed out that about 40 percent of Durban's Africans had 
nowhere to stay, and that the Board had to move very fast to 
address the housing backlog "before it was too late". 78 As a 
result of that shortage, squatter settlements sprouted 
throughout the surrounding environs of metropolitan Durban. 
The local authorities of Durban had managed to contain the 
situation in Cato Manor, with only nine shacks remaining to be 
demolished by 1966, but success in controlling squatter 
shantytowns was short-lived. Because of the seriousness of the 
77 NA, PNAAB, 1/2/1/1/1, present and future housing, 21 
October 1974 
78 Ibid. 
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unavailability of satisfactory housing for the African workers 
in Durban, the Deputy Minister of Bantu Affairs, Dr P. 
Koornhof, was compelled to tour the area in November 1968. 
After assessing the situation, the Deputy Minister commented 
that: 
... we cannot have another Cato Manor and we must 
solve the problems before they get very much 
worse ... It is not possible to separate such 
questions as labour and housing ... This is a matter 
of cooperation and the difficulty is not that of a 
political nature but it is a social, industrial and 
national problem ... 79 
It need scarcely be said that a significant number of Durban's 
African workers in the 1960s lived in the new townships. A 
sizeable number of employers of African labour reported that 
their employees who could afford decent accommodation were 
denied the right "simply through its non-availability and are 
obliged to live in squatter shacks". 80 Those workers who 
rented small rooms in the shacks paid as much as R13 per 
month. 81 In various instances, some of the workers used the 
"hot bunk" method whereby one single bed was shared by two 
people who worked on alternate shifts. 82 Such a position 
constituted a crisis point which deepened as more African 
mobile workers made their way into urban areas in the 1960s. 
The emergence of shantytowns on Durban's doorstep 
signalled a housing cr1s1s beyond control, with a conservative 
estimate of 150 000 people living in the shanties. 83 The 
79 NA, PNAAB, 1/2/1/1/1, Housing, buildings and sites: 
policy, 27 May 1974 to 15 April 1975, Box 2, director, Natal 
Chamber of Industries to the Honourable M.C. Botha MP, minister 
of BAD, 24 April 1974. 
80 Ibid. 
81 Ibid. 
82 Ibid. 
83 The Natal Mercury, 3 April, 1969. 
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shack dwellers, Durban's "secret people", 84 constituted 
another labour pool although they experienced backward and 
forward movements from one area to another. To t.hose people, 
the housing situation remained as critical as before with 
further promises of easing the shortage coming from the Deputy 
Minister of Bantu Affairs in the late 1960s.85 
Prior to the establishment of the Port Natal Affairs 
Administration Board on 1 August 1973, the housing situation 
continued to deteriorate. A disturbing fact was that African 
housing lagged behind, with an estimate of 250 000 squatters 
in Durban in 1971.86 The resulting deplorable conditions in 
the shanties, which were described in the newspapers, had 
become a matter of concern to local authorities. 87 Even the 
PNAAB, soon after it was launched, admitted that, 
As a result of insufficient funds and, to a large 
extent, lack of expertise and proper planning to 
provide suitable accommodation for Bantu employed in 
the areas of jurisdiction of many of the local 
authorities, the position has been allowed to 
deteriorate to such an extent that, should a super-
human effort not be made immediately, the Board as 
well as the state could quite easily find itself 
facing a situation far worse in all respects than 
the Cato Manor [riots of 1959].88 
In that regard, the Pinetown-New Germany and District 
Divisional Committee saw the labour unrest which rocked Durban 
in the 1970s as a by-product of unsatisfactory housing 
84 Ibid. 
85 NA, PNAAB, 1/2/1/1/1, director, Natal Chamber of Indus-
tries to the Honourable M.C. Botha. 
86 The Natal Mercury, 21 January 1971. 
87 See The Natal Mercury, 3 April 1969, 9 April 1969, 10 
April 1969 and 21 January 1971. 
88 NA, PNAAB, 1/2/1/1/1, Bourquin, present and future Bantu 
housing, 1974, p 2. 
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circumstances in which the African workers found 
themselves. 89 
Between 1974 and 1977, the PNAAB demolished shacks from 
central areas of Durban. Men with employment in Durban who 
were affected by those demolitions were either accommodated in 
hostels or given site-and-service stands at the Richmond Farm, 
Inanda and Folweni areas, while unemployed women and children 
were simply told to go back to "their place[s] of origin". 90 
Those actions by the Board failed to reduce the number of 
informal settlements - rather, shanties grew up around Durban. 
The most famous were Bekithemba and Malukazi near Umlazi, 
Richmond farm near KwaMashu, Lindelani and Bambai, Inanda, 
Clermont and Dassenhoek.9 1 By 1977 it was estimated that 
about 450 000 people lived in those shanties. By 1985 the 
number had reached the one million mark.92 In the 1970s, 
shack settlements threatened the existence of the apartheid 
city, with estimates of three million African residents living 
in squatter camps in and around Durban by the year 2000. 93 In 
fact, to date, shack settlements have become the order of the 
day in the peripheries of all South African cities. 
The future control of African townships 
In 1962, Durban's city fathers proposed that the government 
should take-over the administration of KwaMashu in order to 
relieve the Council financially. The future control of 
89 NA, PNAAB, 1/2/1/1/1, Natal chamber of industries to the. 
Honourable M C Botha, 24 April 1974. 
90 SPP Report, volume 4, Natal, p 202. 
91 SPP Report, volume 4, Natal, pp 198-208; and A. de V 
Minnaar, Squatters, violence and the future of the informal 
settlements in the greater Durban Region (Pretoria, HSRC 
Publications, 1992), pp 3-26. 
92 Minnaar, Squatters, violence and the future, p 21. 
93 Maylam, "The rise and decline of urban apartheid", p 81. 
The three million mark has not yet been reached. 
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KwaMashu township became a heated controversy during the 
1960s. Differences of opinion on the whole question of control 
of KwaMashu were expressed by Durban city councillors, welfare 
organisations, the South African Institute of Race Relations, 
the Black Sash and government officials. The Minister of Bantu 
Administration and Development, De Wet Nel, welcomed the idea 
of a take-over by the government, but with conditions 
attached. 94 The government insisted that the City Council 
must purchase a strip of land of 825 acres between KwaMashu 
township and Dalmeny. The area was meant to link the township 
with the reserve of Inanda, thereby paving the way for its 
eventual declaration as a homeland. Initially in the 1950s, 
Verwoerd's Department of Native Affairs had demanded that 
KwaMashu be situated very close to the African reserve areas 
of Inanda, Dalmeny and Released Area 33. 95 An area of 120 
acres was to be purchased for the sole purpose of developing 
" ... an 'umbilical cord' road which would connect the township 
to the city and a further 480 acres for the buffer areas 
required by the Group Areas Act".96 
Resistance to the take-over of KwaMashu came first from 
Durban councillor, J. Jenkins. She expressed concern over 
government policies towards African welfare, influx control 
and labour bureaux, policies which, she argued, would have 
swept away "the last remnants of autonomy in African 
affairs."97 Supporting the opposition to the take-over was 
the chairman of the Durban and District Joint Council of 
Europeans and Bantu who felt that the City Council had an 
obligation to look after its inhabitants irrespective of 
colour, race or gender. In a strongly worded letter to the 
Town Clerk, the chairman stated that people should not be 
94 The Daily News, 13 June 1962. 
95 Edwards, "Mkhumbane our home", p 169. 
96 Ibid., pp 169-170. 
9? The Natal Mercury, 14 June 1962. 
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excluded 
merely because the inhabitants are Africans, or 
because the City Council might otherwise be called 
upon to make a financial contribution to KwaMashu. 
It is Durban which benefits from the labour of the 
residents of KwaMashu ... and [it] should ... be 
responsible for their welfare. If through neglect of 
their health, illness or disease arise, it is Durban 
which will suffer through infection and through loss 
of working ability.98 
The South African Institute of Race Relations, Natal 
Region, 99 and the Black Sash100 also voiced their opposi-
tion to a government take-over of KwaMashu. The Black Sash was 
opposed on the basis that the emergence of "independent 
administrations would create conditions of irreparable chaos 
and discord." 101 
A considerable number of councillors in the City Council 
favoured the government take-over of KwaMashu on the basis 
that financial responsibilities and rental losses would be 
shifted to the government. The Mayor of Durban reported an 
annual loss of approximately R230 000 in arrear rentals and 
operational costs in the township. 102 Some residents of 
KwaMashu had embarked on a rent boycott from the time when 
they were relocated to the new township. 
Many residents could not afford the rentals of over R6 
per month. The City Council also argued that the control and 
administration of the two townships would be effective under 
98 KCAL, PNAAB, KCF 24, Roll 7, the Town Clerk to director, 
Bantu administration, 22 June 1962. 
99 Ibid., SA institute of race relations to the Town Clerk, 
20 August 1962. 
100 Ibid., the Black Sash to the Town Clerk, 28 June 1962. 
101 Ibid. 
102 d Ibi . , Bantu administration Committee, minutes, 24 
October 1963. 
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one authority. 103 However, in 1966, while the City Council 
and the government were still engaged in negotiations over the 
control of KwaMashu, the state, without notice, seriously cut 
its funding of African housing projects in the townships. 104 
The move by the government was strongly opposed by the Durban 
Chamber of Commerce, the Natal Chamber of Industries and the 
City Council. 105 Government actions led to protests from 
commerce, industry, and local authorities. Cuts in funding 
meant creating more problems for African housing, which was 
seriously lagging behind. Protests could no longer be ignored, 
and the municipality recommended to the Chief Bantu Affairs 
Commissioner (CBAC) that the take-over should be postponed 
until 1970. 106 On 26 August 1968, the Secretary for Bantu 
Administration and Development, after an intensive review of 
the reports of the Chief Bantu Affairs Commissioner for Natal, 
suspended the take-over of KwaMashu. 107 
The take-over of KwaMashu by the government remained an 
issue during the first half of the 1970s. From 1973 onwards, 
the township of KwaMashu was placed under the administration 
of the Port Natal Affairs Administration Board, in conjunction 
with the Durban City Council, and the largely toothless Urban 
Bantu Council. The Port Natal Affairs Administration Board 
controlled issues relating to leasehold rights, alterations to 
property, allocation of houses and visitors' and sub-tenants' 
permits. The take-over issue ceased to exist in April 1977 
when the township was finally incorporated into the homeland 
103 Ibid., Department of Bantu administration to the Town 
Clerk, 7 August 1962. See also SAIRR, Survey of race relations, 
1962, p 150. 
104 KCAL, PNAAB, KCF 80, Roll 62, the DCC, minutes, 10 
February 1972. 
1 OS Ibid. 
106 KCAL, PNAAB, KCF 24, Roll 7, Department of Bantu 
administration, 15 November 1968. 
107 Ibid. 
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of KwaZulu. 108 
By the 1970s, the development of formal housing in 
various African townships ceased owing to the shortage of 
funds, an event which had serious implications for both the 
urban working class and government policy of segregation. It 
was a period when influx control measures, which had been less 
than successful in any event, totally collapsed in Durban. 
Further migration resulted soon after KwaZulu gained self-
governing status, which facilitated greater movement from the 
surrounding reserves to Durban since "the tribal authorities 
had neither the means nor the incentives to enforce a system 
of control devised and administered by the Department of Bantu 
Administration and Development in the 1960s". 109 Moreover, 
the apartheid city, as already stated, was riddled with 
contradictions, clashes and struggles between the central 
state, local authorities and capital over the issue of African 
housing. 
Urban African community facilities 
The construction of African housing created a string of social 
demands - namely for transport, health services, recreation 
facilities, schools and welfare amenities. In KwaMashu 
township in 1961, two schools, twelve shops, two creches, a 
clinic, a swimming bath, three football fields and three all-
weather tennis courts were provided. Furthermore, there were 
seven lower primary, four higher primary and one post-primary 
school, two churches, a temporary beerhall and 22 
traders. 110 Undoubtedly, social services were provided, but 
the struggle over such services in general was not merely over 
their provision but over the very nature of what was provided. 
108 SAIRR, Natal Region, KwaMashu - a Black township, 
information sheet, February 1979. 
109 Hindson (et al), From violence to reconstruction, p 10. 
110 SAIRR, Survey of race relations, 1961, p 179. 
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For instance, schools were constructed for the African people 
under the Bantu Education system, but what came from the 
system itself is best captured by the phrase, "poisoned Black 
education" 111 - the phrase used by the former Director of 
Planning for the Department of Bantu Education, Dr Ken 
Hartshorne, to describe African education. On the whole, more 
and more students acquired the rudiments of that type of 
education in the expanded school system, however, as Mabin 
states, "imperfect their conditions and performance".1 12 
It was not long after the occupation of the new houses in 
the townships that voices of concern began to be heard. The 
site and service scheme and the log cabins provided in 
KwaMashu township were unsatisfactory. Commen~ing on such 
schemes, Bourquin recalls that, 
We did this by acquiring a large number of pre-
fabricated wooden hutments, erected in one corner of 
a site which was serviced with water and 
streets ... The occupants would then eventually 
develop a permanent home on these sites. The site 
and service scheme was condemned by the Urban Bantu 
Council (UBC) at KwaMashu itself - they regarded 
this as a festering sore. 113 
The log cabins which existed in KwaMashu neighbourhood units 
Two and Four were criticised by resident women as "not 
suitable for human habitation as they were worse than the 
slums in Cato Manor". 114 Certainly, some sections of the new 
townships experienced debilitating conditions. C.C. Majola, a 
resident committee member, noted that "conditions in KwaMashu 
111 The Citizen, 19 January 1978. 
112 Mabin, "The dynamics of urbanisation", p 34. 
113 KCAL, KCAV 174- 175, S B Bourquin by A Manson and D 
Collins, 18 October 1979. 
114 KCAL, PNAAB, KCF 30, Roll 13, 2, Publicity, propaganda 
and unrest - general correspondence BA 28/40, 1954- 1969, R G 
Wilson, township manager, KwaMashu to director, Bantu 
administration, S B Bourquin, 23 February 1962. See also KCF 23, 
Roll 6, KwaMashu residents' committee, 18 February 1962, memo-
grievances submitted by KwaMashu women. 
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were very poor, ... there was a feeling at one stage that we 
were like the Israelites of the Old Testament - it was better 
in Egypt than here". 11 5 In Umlazi township, water supplies 
closely resembled those which existed in the emergency camps. 
Communal taps in the streets were by 1966 still in use by 
sections of the resident community. However, a considerable 
number of houses had their own taps installed. 116 Pit 
latrines were utilised in Umlazi. The Department of Bantu 
Administration acknowledged that such a facility was "causing 
concern as the position has been reached where it is extremely 
difficult in many instances to find suitable places on the 
sites to dig the necessary new pits apart from the other 
unsatisfactory features of this type of latrine". 117 
The township residents challenged the City Council to 
remove water-meters since they had become a source of 
dissatisfaction. In 1966 the Voice of KwaMashu, an underground 
organ of the banned ANC, submitted a memorandum to the Mayor 
of Durban to consider water charges in the townships. 118 As 
noted by Edwards, "In the log cabin scheme, water and 
sanitation facilities were shared between two cabins, while in 
the site-and-service scheme full water-borne sanitation and 
water facilities were provided on each site". 119 The normal 
rate charged for water was 18 cents per 1000 gallons. 
Residents complained that sometimes they paid R2 per month on 
water alone; they called for a standardised system of water 
115 KCAL, KCAV 142, C.C. Majola by D. Collins and A. Manson, 
20 June 1979, p 5. 
11 6 KCAL, PNAAB, KCF 63, Roll 46, Department of Bantu 
administration to the Town Clerk, 15 August 1966. 
117 Ibid. 
118 KCAL, PNAAB, KCF 30, Roll 13, 2, the voice of KwaMashu 
to the mayor of Durban etc, 24 June 1966. 
11 9 Edwards, "Mkhumbane our home", p 182. 
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charges at a flat rate of 40 cents per month per 
household. 120 
The removal of waste from the townships came under severe 
public criticism in the 1960s. Refuse was sometimes collected 
only once a fortnight. Uncollected garbage lay in piles in the 
township streets and gave off an unpleasant smell. The reason 
for the inadequate collection of household refuse, according 
to the municipal officials, was the shortage of labour force 
in the cleansing services. However, the main reason was more a 
matter of finance than a shortage of labour. As for the labour 
force engaged in the service, most were unskilled and poorly 
paid and involved in a job with low status; they left the 
service at a high rate. 121 
With the development of formal housing in KwaMashu, 
transport agreements had to be finalised between the South 
African Railways, bus companies and the City Council. Railway 
service was provided. Furthermore, the Public Utility Bus 
Transport Company (PUTCO) was contracted to provide the 
necessary transport for the African workers. 122 While the 
provision of the railway and bus services marked a way 
forward, problems associated with fares and with the 
availability of buses during peak hours were raised by 
resident workers. 
In 1962 the residents of KwaMashu proposed that bus fares 
should be reduced from seven cents to five cents per journey 
to town. 123 The fares charged by PUTCO were considered high. 
Moreover, African workers who lived in KwaMashu but were 
employed to the south of the city incurred extra expenses from 
bus and rail termini to their places of employment. Workers 
120 KCAL, PNAAB, KCF 30, Roll 13, 2, the voice of KwaMashu, 
24 June 1966. 
121 Interview with Msomi, 16 October 1992. 
122 See Edwards, "Mkhumbane our home", p 186. 
123 KCAL, PNAAB, KCF 30, Roll 13, 2, memo: 11grievances 
submitted by KwaMashu women". 
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complained that those transport costs strained their budgets, 
unlike transport to and from Cato Manor shantytown. Cato Manor 
was very close to the city centre and industrial areas and 
most workers preferred to walk rather than to "waste" their 
hard-earned money. The distance between KwaMashu and places of 
work meant a further financial burden on workers. 
On 8 February 1962, KwaMashu women marched to the 
Township Manager's office to present their grievances. They 
demanded a "reduction of bus fares; that the stage system be 
introduced to enable passengers alighting or boarding buses 
along the route to pay less; that reduced fares for children 
be introduced". 124 The demand by resident women was 
supported by the banned Congress Alliance in a memorandum 
submitted to the KwaMashu Township Manager. 125 The Congress 
Alliance called for a reduction in bus fares to 4 cents. It 
also challenged the government and the municipality to 
consider subsidising the costs of transport.126 
During the 1960s, complaints about transport were 
expressed in each and every African township. In Chesterville, 
residents' complaints about the bus system were submitted by 
the banned Congress Alliance in 1962. 127 The residents com-
plained that buses failed to operate according to stipulated 
times. Moreover, passengers along the route were left behind 
because buses tended to wait until they were full at the main 
Chesterville terminus. Furthermore, there was an acute 
shortage of buses at the City terminus particularly during the 
124 Ibid. 
125 Ibid., Department of Bantu administration, S B Bourquin 
to the township manager, memorandum of grievances submitted to 
the KwaMashu township manager by the Congress Alliance, 14 
February 1962. 
126 Ibid. 
127 Ibid., Memorandum of grievances at Chesterville location 
submitted to the superintendent of the Chesterville location by 
the Congress Alliance, 14 February 1962. 
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peak hours that is, between 4 pm and 7 pm. 128 Maureen Mothwa 
remarks: 
Buses were there but few and they used to go at 
certain times. At Lamontville there was one morning 
bus which went as early as 5 am. If one would be 
left by that bus one would be late at work, and your 
money would be cut and have a bad record of late 
coming. In the evening, when going home if you were 
left by a bus you would become a victim of the 
tsotsis [robbers].129 
The provision of railway and bus services in the 
townships was viewed by the government as a major development 
for the African people. However, in line with government 
policies of apartheid, the National Transport Commission (NTC) 
made a recommendation to the Durban City Council to implement 
total segregation in the transport sector. 130 The directive 
by the NTC was rejected by the Council on the basis that "the 
City Council had always applied partial segregation ... (and) 
did not intend to implement full apartheid". 131 The City 
Council also rejected the idea on consideration of its 
financial implications. However, in 1968 the City Council 
reversed its earlier decision and passed by-laws which 
required total segregation in the transport service. Prior to 
this, in 1962, the Congress Alliance had submitted a memor-
andum to the City Council opposing any policy which segregated 
Africans on the basis of race and colour. 132 Generally the 
transport system was poor and the Chairman of the Ningizimu 
Urban Bantu Council, A.W.G. Champion, commented: 
While our transport is bad, those of us who have 
128 Ibid. 
129 Interview with M. Mothwa by J. Nala: 1973 research 
project, pp 3-4. 
130 NA, Durban city council, 3/DBN 1/1/2/14, 15 October 1953 
to 13 October 1976, minutes of council-in-committee, 1 June 1960. 
131 Ibid., p 2. 
132 KCAL, PNAAB, KCF 30, Roll 13, see memo by the Congress 
Alliance, 1962. 
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motor cars are being charged if found with their 
friends in their cars on suspicion that they are 
competing with taxis. This does not apply to other 
races. Traffic officers are very keen to stop Bantu 
cars while they allow other races' cars to pass 
on. 133 
In 1961 there were seven lower primary, four higher 
primary and one post-primary school in KwaMashu township. The 
City Council's initial plans were to construct one secondary 
and four primary schools in each respective neighbourhood 
unit. 134 The plans were sidelined while the City Council 
concentrated on the construction of houses. However, in 
response to the City Council's plans on schools, the 
government, in line with its Bantu Education system, insisted 
that schools had to be established. Although schools were 
established in all African townships during the 1960s and 
1970s, a general complaint was that there were too few of 
them. For instance, in 1975 the Chairman of the KwaMashu Urban 
Bantu Council, z. Dhlomo, submitted a memorandum to the 
Minister of the BAD, P. Janson, complaining that in KwaMashu 
only one high school and three secondary schools existed. 135 
That limited number of secondary.schools served more than 
22 000 families. 
African residents resented the compulsory school levy of 
twenty cents per month introduced in 1962 to assist in 
financing schools. By 1972 the school levy was increased to 30 
cents per month. 136 The school levy was imposed on African 
residents and they felt that they were nthe lowest paid 
133 KCAL, File 10, Bourquin papers, miscellaneous cuttings, 
reports and correspondence, KCM 55327, A.W.G. Champion - urban 
Bantu council - Ningizimu chairman to the Hon T.N.H. Janson, MP 
and deputy minister of Bantu administration and education, 14 
January 1975. 
134 Edwards, "Mkhumbane our home", p 187. 
l3S The Natal Mercury, 4 June 1975. 
136 KCAL, PNAAB, KCF 80, Roll 62, the DCC minutes, Bantu 
education, 13 April 1972, p 3. 
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section of the population, being treated unfairly as the only 
community required to pay such [a] levy". 137 The Congress 
Alliance called for the complete withdrawal of such a levy 
which was paid for the advancement of "Dr Verwoerd's poisonous 
Bantu education". 138 Furthermore, the Alliance condemned the 
Republic's Bantu Education system : 
We wish to place on record that we are opposed to 
the system of Bantu Education as we would be opposed 
to any other special system of education decided for 
any particular section of our population. We are 
satisfied that there should be one system of 
education for all and one standard of 
education. 139 
The use of a vernacular language, Zulu, as a medium of 
instruction from standard one to six was greatly resented by 
parents. 14° C.C. Majola explains : 
The underlying principle of Bantu Education was that 
of the medium of instruction which had to be the 
mother tongue and Zulu had not developed 
sufficiently to communicate, say a mathematical 
theory to a student in Zulu ... thus lowering the 
quality of education. You can't teach history in 
Zulu, actually all the science subjects cannot be 
taught in the vernaculars. 141 
137 KCAL, PNAAB, KCF 30, Roll 13, memorandum of grievances 
at Lamont location - submitted to the superintendent of the 
Lamontville location by the Congress Alliance, 14 February 1962. 
138 Ibid., Memorandum of grievances submitted to the 
KwaMashu township manager by the Congress Alliance, 14 February 
1962; and Bourquin to colonel Fraser, officer commanding, Natal 
Command, 3 August 1962 - "The voice of the African National 
Congress by the Durban regional committee of the ANC", 28/9 April 
1962. 
139 Ibid., Memo of grievances at Chesterville Location, 14 
February 1962. 
14° KCAL, File 10, KCM 55327, Champion to the Hon Janson, 14 
January 1975. See also NA, PNAAB, 1/2/1/1/BAB/1, Bantu advisory 
bodies, central, Box 79, 12 September 1973 to 31 July 1976, 
minutes of the KwaMashu UBC, 1 December 1975. 
141 KCAL, KCAV 142, C.C. Majola by D. Collins and A. Mason, 
20 June 1979, p 2. 
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By the 1970s, the absence of ade.quate classrooms in 
KwaMashu had reached critical proportions. In KwaMashu 
township, at least nine of its primary schools were heavily 
enrolled, with a shortage of classrooms for 2034 pupils. 142 
The crisis which faced those schools was countered by the 
adoption of the "platoon system under which two sets of 
children and teachers used the school premises at different 
hours". 143 The crisis in African education was caused by 
lack of adequate government funding. For instance, in 1972 the 
budget for African education amounted to R73 392 300 for the 
whole country including the bantustans, as compared to 
R395 061 000 for white education. 144 
Health facilities were also totally inadequate in the 
townships. In KwaMashu, for example, a small polyclinic was 
provided. Yet even that institution did not have ambulance 
services, was hard hit by the shortage of medical personnel 
and admitted a limited number of patients on a daily 
basis. 145 The nearest hospital for the African residents in 
the townships was the King Edward VIII hospital in Durban. 
Quite clearly, facilities were limited, and the City Council 
was mainly concerned about minimising costs. The residents 
complained about housing, rentals, education, community 
facilities, medical services, sanitation, refuse collection, 
burial fees and crime. One of the residents commented: "The 
very existence of a township like KwaMashu is itself a problem 
from which other problems flow". 146 
142 KCAL, PNAAB, KCF 80, Roll 62, the DCC, minutes, Bantu 
education, 13 April 1972, p 3. 
143 Ibid. 
144 Ibid., The DCC, minutes, "financing and costs of Bantu 
education", 10 May 1973. 
145 NA, PNAAB, 1/2/1/1/BAB/1, minutes of the KwaMashu UBC, 
23 February 1976. 
146 SAIRR, Natal region, KwaMashu - a Black township, 
February 1979. 
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Conclusion 
The cornerstone of spatial separation has been the African 
township which, by and large, failed to provide adequate 
shelter to its African underclasses. Needless to say the 
provision of housing in those townships fell far short of what 
was required and the immediate result was the proliferation of 
shanties around Durban and conditions of social hardship and 
instability. Although shack cities were not a financial burden 
on the city fathers, nonetheless they "posed enormous problems 
of social and political control". 147 
The main thrust of this chapter is to show that this kind 
of lifestyle impacts on workers and work organisations such as 
trade unions. An analysis, for instance, of the causes of the 
1973 Durban strikes and beyond should not only be searched 
purely from work-oriented problems and market forces and 
influences, but also from the residential areas where the 
general workers lived with their families. In other words, the 
totalising effects of the lack of adequate housing plus 
debilitating conditions in both townships and shanties were 
far-reaching and created discontent among workers, 
particularly during the 1970s. The townships, shanties, 
hostels and compounds, therefore, are not "total institutions 
where protest is vigorously repressed, but rather act as 
hothouses of discontent". 148 
147 Maylam, "Explaining the apartheid city", p 35, 
148 Stichter, Migrant labourers, p 174. 
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Chapter Six 
From Mainstream Politics to Township Politics: 
Resistance and Collaboration in Durban, 1960-1975 
Introduction 
The 1960s constituted a decade of political repression, state 
intervention in African life yet also an era of unprecedented 
economic growth. During that period, the apartheid state 
gained control of the situation of national unrest when it 
banned the African National Congress (ANC) and the Pan-
Africanist Congress (PAC), wh~ch led to their disorganisation 
and fragmentation. These organisations sank into dull 
passivity as the state assumed greater powers; in fact, the 
government had managed to contain African popular resistance 
and protest. Despite this, the underground African National 
Congress remained committed to the transformation of society 
through carefully monitored sabotage campaigns by its newly 
founded armed wing, Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK). However, between 
1961 and 1964, the ANC failed substantially to challenge the 
state and its fairly isolated sabotage campaigns declined 
almost to vanishing point. This failure marked the beginning 
of the era of fragmentation of existing political structures 
and a turn towards exile. It was also a period of a turn away 
from both industrial and "popular" politics. 
Owing to the suppression of African political 
organisations and the demise of the South African Congress of 
Trade Unions (SACTU) by mid 1965, community organisations 
fulfilled a key role in the struggle against apartheid. The 
African community no longer challenged the state directly, but 
indirectly, by attacking local government structures 
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established within the townships, such as Advisory Boards, 
Resident Committees and Urban Bantu Councils. These 
establishments were generally perceived as institutions of the 
oppressor, the apartheid state, and those who served on them 
were condemned as impimpis (sell-outs), stooges or 
collaborators. As rightly noted by R. Bloch and P. Wilkinson, 
such institutions were dominated by the "most reactionary 
elements" of the emerging African businessmen, mainly traders 
and "generally became the vehicles for the often narrow 
grievances and aspirations of a disconnected petty 
bourgeoisie". 1 Consequently, conflicts arose among a number of 
population elements: township residents, the rising African 
businessmen who dominated local state structures, and various 
groups dominant in civic politics. These conflicts marked a 
new dimension in African resistance politics: township based 
politics became dominant. 
This chapter is primarily concerned with struggles in the 
townships soon after the ban of African political 
organisations in 1960 up to the mid 1970s. It begins by 
examining the broader political context in which community 
politics was born. Essentially, it is about the "grassroots", 
which B. Bozzoli described as 
... a history [that] should resonate the lives of 
ordinary people rather than reflect the 
deliberations of the ruling classes or the 
theoretical concerns of structural abstractionism. 2 
It is about some struggles from below; it looks at how 
township people resisted and also collaborated with the 
apartheid state during the absence of political 
representatives. It does not, however, intend to present a 
"'politically correct history- a history of racial oppression 
1 R. Bloch and P. Wilkinson, "Urban control and the 
popular struggle: a survey of state urban policy, 1920-1970", 
Africa Perspective, XX (1982), p 18. 
2 B. Bozzoli, "History, experience and culture", in B. 
Bozzoli (ed), Town and countryside in the Transvaal: 
capitalist penetration and popular response (Johannesburg, 
Ravan Press, 1983), p 8. 
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and heroic struggle" 3 of Africans or, perhaps, that of the ANC 
but rather an analysis of how ordinary people responded to 
apartheid between 1960 and 1975. 
African political organisations and the crisis in 
Durban 
On 8 April 1960, the African National Congress and Pan-
Africanist Congress were banned. It was at this time that the 
popular struggle, particularly that waged by the ANC in 
Durban, which had flourished during and soon after the Cato 
Manor riots of 1959, suffered a severe blow. The 1959 riots 
had given the Congress Alliance the upper hand in rallying 
African mass support, especially from illicit entrepreneurs 
and women who were threatened by shack demolitions and 
relocations to new townships. However, the process of creating 
political consciousness among African workers and the 
community at large was weakened by the events that followed in 
1960. The massacre at Sharpeville on 21 March and the 
subsequent state bannings of the ANC and PAC led to the two 
organisations abandoning the policy of non-violence and 
resorting to the armed struggle. 
In 1960, the apartheid state in South Africa, which 
forced African political organisations to operate underground 
and to embark on the policy of sabotage, marked the beginning 
of a new era. The adoption of sabotage activities by the ANC 
arose out of a debate about the advantages and disadvantages 
of the armed struggle and/or non-violence as alternative ways 
to bring change within South Africa. Party cadres and Marxist 
and liberal scholars became involved in the armed struggle 
debate throughout the 1960s and 1970s. 4 This debate will not 
3 P. Maylam, "Tensions within the practice of history", 
South African Historical Journal, 33 (1995), p 11. 
4 For an in-depth debate on the armed struggle see for 
instance, C. Bundy, "Around which corner?: revolutionary 
theory and contemporary South Africa", Transformation, 1 
(1986); A. Leruno [M. Harmell], "Forms and methods of struggle 
-the South African democratic revolution", African Communist, 
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be elaborated on in this chapter since its major focus is on 
community politics. 
The "Year of Africa", 1960, was a year in which the 
slowly growing wave of African nationalism reached tidal 
proportions, with President de Gaulle of France granting 
independence to 14 French African colonies. It was during this 
period that African national consciousness in South Africa 
grew apace with the "winds of change ... blowing through this 
continent", and as H. Macmillan went on to explain, "whether 
we like it or not, this growth of national consciousness is a 
political fact". 5 
What is intriguing about African political struggles in 
Durban is that the roots of support for the ANC on the part of 
the people of Cato M~nor shantytown increased during "the 
destruction of [Cato Manor] and the early years of life in 
KwaMashu: that period immediately prior to and then the years 
after the ANC 'was banned".6 
At its annual conference in 1959, the ANC decided to 
launch an Anti-Pass Campaign. Demonstrations were to be held 
on 31 March, 15 April and 26 June 1960. 7 Should the government 
fail to respond to their demands, all Africans were-called 
upon to burn their passes in the "no bail, no defence, no fine 
campaign". 8 R. Sobukwe, the leader of the PAC, hijacked the 
9 (April/ May 1962); and H. Wolpe, Race, class and the 
apartheid state (Paris, UNESCO Press, 1988). 
5 The British Prime Minister, Harold Macmillan's address 
to Parliament in Cape Town in 1960 as cited in A.J.C. Daniel, 
"Radical resistance to minority rule in South Africa, 1906-
1965" (published PhD thesis, State University of New York at 
Buffalo, 1975), p 267; also cited inN. Mandela, Long walk to 
freedom: the autobiography of Nelson Mandela (London, Abacus, 
1994), p 279. 
6 Edwards, "Mkhumbane our home", p 196. 
7 R. Lambert, "Political unionism in South Africa: the 
South African congress of trade unions, 1955-1965" 
(unpublished PhD thesis, University of the Witwatersrand, 
1988), p 427. 
8 Ibid. 
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ANC programme of action and announced that supporters and the 
entire leadership of the PAC were to surrender voluntarily for 
arrest on 21 March 1960. 9 The ANC was invited to participate 
in the PAC's campaign but turned down the invitation. 
On Monday, 21 March 1960, 69 African supporters of the 
PAC were shot down by the South African police at Sharpeville. 
In reaction to the massacre, the President-General of the ANC, 
Chief A. Luthuli, called for a day of mourning, to be held on 
the following Monday. In Durban, the African people observed a 
day of mourning. Indian shops were closed; few workers 
reported to their workplaces, particularly in the Mobeni area 
where the South African Congress of Trade Unions (SACTU) had 
enormous support. 
Following the government's declaration of a State of 
Emergency, many leaders and supporters of the Anti-Pass 
Campaign were arrested on 30 March. This prompted further 
strikes and demonstrations, which rocked Durban for almost ten 
days. Cato Manor shantytown dwellers emerged once again and 
took centre-stage in demonstrations. The shantytown dwellers 
marched to the Bantu Affairs office where they demanded the 
release of their leaders. These residents were later joined by 
the residents of Clermont, S.J. Smith Hostel and 
Lamontville. 10 While the demonstrations were in process, the 
state responded on 8 April by an act of parliament, banning 
the ANC and PAC. The government's actions dampened the 
people's spirit; they lost hope in "freedom in our lifetime". 
Despite this setback, African political activities in Durban, 
expressed mainly through the ANC, continued underground in 
African townships. 
The months immediately following the declaration of t~e 
State of Emergency in the country saw ANC activities wane. 
Strikes and demonstrations were called for by the underground 
ANC, but very little support was forthcoming. For instance, on 
19 April 1960, the ANC called for a week-long stay-away which 
9 Mandela, Long walk to freedom, pp 279-280. 
10 Ilanga Lase Natal, 9 April 1960. 
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did not receive mass support. For the majority of people, 
continued open activities were no lo~ger feasible under the 
State of Emergency; they feared the state's repressive 
actions. New tactics had to be developed, as N. Mandela 
writes, 
We would not disband but carry on from underground. 
We would have to depart from the democratic 
procedures outlined in the ANC's constitution of 
holding conferences, branch meetings and public 
gatherings. New strategies had to be created for 
communication with unbanned Congress 
organisations. 11 
The ANC's organisational structure in Durban was re-
channelled through civic and trade union organisations. In 
KwaMashu, Chesterville, Umlazi and Lamontville, resident 
associations were formed. 12 In Cato Manor where there were 
some remaining shack dwellers, the Emergency Camp Welfare and 
Development Board (which functioned in the manner of an 
Advisory Board) elections were contested and won by Ruth 
Shabane, a well-known member of the ANC Women's League. 13 
Before 1949, the ANC was divided over the issue of whether or 
not to participate in "dummy" institutions like the Advisory 
Boards. In 1949, however, the ANC argued: 
It is essential to realise that mere membership or 
participation in the political, social, cultural or 
other institutions established by the oppressor does 
not necessarily imply collaboration with the 
oppressor. Collaboration must depend on the nature 
and function of the institution and also the 
activities of members within the institution. It is 
possible under certain conditions to use the 
institutions of the oppressor as an auxiliary force 
for the downfall of the ruling class. 14 
11 Mandela, Long walk to freedom, p 301. 
12 Ilanga Lase Natal, 19 November 1960. The newspaper did 
not state that Resident Associations were actually fronts for 
the ANC but simply mentioned officials of those associations 
who apparently were well-known members of the banned ANC. 
13 Tlanga Lase Natal, 12 March 1960. 
14 As cited in G. Baines, "The contradictions of community 
politics: the African petty bourgeoisie and the new Brighton 
advisory board, c.1917-1952", Journal of African History, 35 
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Up to the time of its banning, the ANC granted "its members 
freedom of choice, and active members of Congress [were} to be 
found on the statutory bodies". 15 However, after 1960, a 
complete boycott of government institutions like Advisory 
Boards was put in place though some branches chose to ignore 
the directive. Instead, the banned ANC established its own 
Residents Associations in the townships with the dual purpose 
of consolidating its membership and of "keeping open the lines 
of communication by which grievances could be aired to the 
authorities". 16 An official of the banned ANC stated: 
Our object then was to organise, to raise the 
different branches of the African National Congress 
so as to keep the organisation alive, that it should 
not die, so that we could carry on the objects of 
the organisation, which we did before it was 
banned. 17 
Reference will be made later to these associations. 
The other platform utilised by the ANC was SACTU, which 
was not banned. Various trade unions affiliated to SACTU 
provided a forum for ANC activities to take place. It was 
speculated that the General Workers' Union in Durban was the 
ANC in disguise. 18 The union's meetings were addressed by 
prominent ANC members and "symbols associated with the ANC 
were adapted by the union, the salute ... resembled that of the 
ANC and a new cry, 'Amandla Ngawethu '(power is ours), 
replaced 'Mayibuye i Afrika' (come Africa)". 19 A sizeable 
number of meetings of that particular nature took place in 
(1994), p 94. 
15 L. Kuper, An African bourgeoisie: race, class, and 
politics in South Africa (New Haven, Yale University Press, 
1965), pp 328-329. 
16 E. Feit, Urban revolt in South Africa, 1960-1964 
(Evanston, North-Western University Press, 1971), p 104. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Feit, Urban revolt in South Africa, 1960 -1964, p 163. 
19 Ibid. 
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Durban, organised by SACTU. For example, in 1961, V. Mini, an 
underground organiser for the ANC, called for a bus boycott, 
or a stay-at-home strike, for June 26, which was observed and 
indeed became violent. Incidents of the stoning and burning of 
buses were reported. 20 Another union meeting worth citing was 
the one addressed in Durban by G. Mbhele, organising secretary 
of the banned ANC. At that meeting, Mbhele read a message from 
Chief Luthuli and went on to call the people to "smash and 
render unworkable Bantu Authorities both in rural and in urban 
areas". 21 
The ANC's sabotage campaigns 
In another development, Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK), the military 
wing of the Congress Alliance, was formed in 1961. It was 
believed at that time that the pre-1960 forms of resistance 
were no longer applicable to the new situation. In his remarks 
on the birth of MK, B. Turck stated: 
... Even mass action seemed impossible because of the 
repression - we had to show that we could hit back -
that it's possible. There comes a certain point 
where repression is so overwhelming that the masses 
are in danger of demoralisation ... Inflict a blow on 
the tyrant and show him he's vulnerable. The morale 
of the people will rise and they will get the 
message and begin to inflict blows. 22 
The regional command of MK in Durban consisted of the 
entire leadership of SACTU, the Communist Party and members of 
the unions affiliated to SACTu. 23 Meetings of Umkhonto were 
conducted in B. Nair's office at SACTU headquarters. 24 Local 
20 New Age, 2 February 1961; See Feit, Urban revolt, p 
164. 
21 New Age, 26 October 1961. 
22 Interview with Ben Turok as cited in Lambert, "Politi-
cal unionism", pp 446-7. 
23 Tom Lodge, Black politics in South Africa since 1945 
(Johannesburg, Ravan Press, 1990 ed), p 235. 
24 See Bruno Mtolo, Umkhonto we Sizwe: the road to the 
left (Durban, Drakensberg Press, 1966). 
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cells were established in November 1961 under the leadership 
of c. Ndhlovu, B. Nair, M.P. Naicker and M. D. Naicker. 25 
From that time, the regional commander of Umkhonto in Durban 
was C. Ndhlovu, who by 1962 had established sections in 
Durban, KwaMashu, Clerwood and Hammarsdale. 26 
The established cells in the townships embarked on 
political "study groups" - whereby they were "to learn and 
teach politics [by] a secret method so that each and every one 
would in the future be in a position to teach others". 27 Such 
study groups were part and parcel of the Mandela Plan (M 
Plan). TheM Plan, as noted in the Congress Voice, the 
underground news sheet of the Congress Alliance, was meant to 
ensure that" ... members [should be] aware of the immense task 
facing them and the grave responsibilities resting upon them. 
To start a house-to-house propaganda campaign for the purpose 
of raising the political consciousness of the masses ... ". 28 
The M Plan was strenuously implemented in Lamontville township 
where "people ... were already schooled in Congress 
politics". 29 S.K. Ngubese, an ANC Lamontville branch chairman 
in the 1960s, recalls: 
Mandela's plan ... came about during the banning of 
public meetings where people found standing in the 
streets could not exceed the number of four. So it 
was at this stage that Nelson Mandela decided that 
three would constitute a meeting and the three would 
go out and organise three others ... The number grew. 
By the end of the day, you have spoken to more than 
1000 people. That is what they called M Plan, so if 
there was any message to be conveyed to Africans 
then it would be conveyed that way by dedicated 
people who would work the whole day, holding 
meetings of threes, right round. People of 
2S Feit, Urban revolt, pp 93-4. 
26 The Natal Mercury, 14 February 1964 
revolt, p 93. 
27 Feit, Urban revolt, p 223. 
and Feit, Urban 
28 Congress Voice, volume 11, 2 (May 1960). 
29 Killie Campbell Africana Library (hereafter KCAL), KCAV 
184 and 185, S.K. Ngubese by A. Mason and D. Collins, 28 
November 1979, p 7. 
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Lamontville knew about this, but this was not just 
told to everybody.30 
State repression during the State of Emergency created an 
impression among Africans that the popular struggles of the 
late 1950s were over. Even SACTU, which had continued 
organising at factory level during the State of Emergency, 
felt that the existing political climate was no longer 
conducive to proper worker organisation. Because of this view, 
SACTU's educational programmes undertaken by factory leaders 
were "moved into the townships, where shop stewards themselves 
ran the classes at factory level. The shop stewards met 
together in the townships because it was safer".31 Despite 
state bannings, arrests and detention of SACTU members and 
officials who were linked to underground activities of the 
ANC, the union movement survived the Emergency still 
intact. 32 
While unions organised and recruited workers to join MK, 
the beginning of sabotage campaigns in Durban brought about 
new hope. As a SACTU organiser recounted: 
There was generally speaking a new confidence, 
despite the repression of the state. People were 
tremendously inspired. We always had messages 
conveyed to us. They always said, tell the boys that 
30 Ibid. 
31 Lambert, "Political unionism", p 451. 
32 For those SACTU members who were banned between 1960 
and 1965, a short list could be helpful. The names were: 
Elizabeth Abrahams (1964), Phyllis Altman (1963), Moses Bhengu 
(1964), Nontembu Lucy Dlamini (1963), John Ferris (1964), 
Melville Fletcher (1961), John Gaetsewe (1964), Leon Levy 
(1962), Elijah Loza (1963, 1968, 1976-77, died in detention), 
Moses Mabhida (1963), July Makaringe (1963), Lot Malane 
(1963), Zolile Malind (1960 -1973), Livingstone Mancoko 
(1963), Shanti Naidoo (1963), Billy Nair (1961), Muzuvikile 
Ndhlovu (1963), Lawrence Ndzanga (1963, died in detention in 
1975), Rose Schlachter (1963), M.W. Shope (1962), Archibald 
Sibeko (1960), Miriam Sithole (1963), Daniel Tloome (1963), 
and.Shadreck Tole (1963). For a comprehensive list, see Dudley 
Horner (et al), The Wiehahn Commission: a summary (Workshop 
Organised by the Southern African Labour and Development 
Research Unit [SADRU] and editors of the SALB, May 1979), pp 
77-9. 
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they are doing a damn good piece of work ... Once the 
lights went off in Durban for about 15 minutes. We 
had hit three important power lines leading from the 
Umgeni power station ... People sent messages, 'Give 
it to them.' They were inspired- the state had gone 
too far, workers needed a boost to their morale. 
These responses made us realise that our actions 
were really an expression of the will of the people 
at that time. You had to understand the period and 
ordinary workers' feelings ... 33 
Sabotage activities by MK cadres were widely reported in 
and around Durban. In December 1961, an increasing number of 
bomb attacks and the burning of sugarcane plantations were 
reported. 34 These actions marked the beginning of a sabotage 
campaign that lasted for almost three years. The sabotage 
activities which took place in December 1961 were masterminded 
by members of the Natal Regional Committee, B. Mtolo, R. 
Kasrils, D. Ndawonde and S.E. Mtshali.35 During this period, 
S. Mbanjwa, a recruiting organiser of MK, an official of SACTU 
and a member of the underground Communist Party, was chosen to 
lead Umkhonto's Natal Regional Committee. In January 1963, J. 
Mpanza, an MK cadre, bombed the offices of the Nationalist 
newspaper in Durban, Die Nataller. 36 Municipal beerhalls, the 
long-standing enemy of women in Cato Manor, became targets as 
well. In February 1963, a bomb exploded at the Bell Street 
beerhall, injuring three people.37 Furthermore, houses 
belonging to residents defined as government stooges or 
33 Interview of Unnamed Activist, 19 May 1986 as cited in 
Lambert, "Political unionism", p 452. 
34 Ilanga Lase Natal, 30 December 1961; and R. Kasrils, 
Armed and dangerous: my undercover struggle against apgrtheid 
(Oxford, Heinemann, 1993), pp 51-54. Kasrils notes: "We had 
been training these units in the use of home-made petrol 
bombs, and unleashed an offensive against goods trains, 
government offices and the large sugar-cane estates and wattle 
plantations". p 51. 
35 Kasrils, Armed and dangerous, p 58; and Mtolo, Umkhonto 
we Sizwe, p 19. 
36 Daniel, "Radical resistance", p 354. 
37 Ilanga lase Natal, 16 February 1963. 
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collaborators were bombed. On 12 December 1962, three houses 
belonging to c. Mbutho, L.S. Makhwaza and w. Dladla, all 
members of the KwaMashu Residents Committee, were bombed. 38 
Attacks of that nature, as Feit writes, 
were designed to intimidate those who were in any 
way collaborating with the government - not only 
informers and policemen but also representatives of 
chiefs or members of Advisory Boards ... Those who 
were suspected of collaboration were identified, 
often in ANC leaflets or in graffiti scrawled or 
painted on the walls of washrooms and other public 
buildings . 39 
Throughout 1963, the Durban branch of Umkhonto remained 
active in sabotage activities, despite an increased informer 
network. In 1963, a railway line was blown up, and a bomb 
exploded at the Bantu Affairs Commissioner's office. 
The reasons for the discontinuation of campaigns 
By the beginning of 1964, the activities of MK in Durban had 
declined. Through a network of African informers, the police 
had been able to penetrate the ANC underground structures and 
activities. Even before the state banned the ANC and PAC, 
African informers existed in townships and shantytowns in and 
around Durban. Reverend T.W.S. Mthembu of Durban, a Lutheran 
pastor, born around 1915, recruited informers on behalf of the 
government. 40 The new recruits were encouraged to join the 
ANC or any African political organisation so that information 
could be obtained. Cases in point were M. Mavundla and C. B. 
Makatini, who were recruited by Reverend Mthembu. 41 Mavundla 
and Makatini were "urged •.. to join the ANC, so that we may get 
38 KCAL, PNAAB, KCF 30, Roll 13, D.H. Cockburn, deputy 
township manager, KwaMashu to the director, 14 December 1962. 
See also Ilanga Lase Natal, 22 December 1962. 
39 Feit, Urban revolt, pp 193-4. 
40 Natal Archives (hereafter NA), BAC, P/2/M, Reverend 
T.W.S. Mtembu to the senior information officer, 30 March 
1958. 
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all the truths". 42 Because of the money paid to informers by 
the state, many Africans were willing to give information on 
what was going on in the townships with regard to underground 
activities of the ANC. 
In 1960, G. Kumalo, a Durban resident musician, requested 
the government to pay him at least £1000 in order to enable 
him to launch a Music Peace Campaign. 43 In his correspondence 
with the Chief Native Commissioner in November 1960, Kumalo 
wrote: 
... I can see terrible things taking place in this 
country if the present spirit of racial prejudice is 
not overcome, and a spirit of racial goodwill and 
harmonious co-operation introduced in our everyday 
lives ... I appeal for £1000 to launch out the Music 
Peace Campaign against the underground resistance 
and defian~f campaign ... They must be exposed and 
destroyed. 
He did not, however, receive the money he had requested. 
In Durban, a considerable number of individuals were 
employed by the state as informers, for instance the case of 
T.J.B. Kunene who indicated to the government information 
officer his willingness to work as an informer. 45 Another 
person employed by the state to tap information was P.M. 
Khaula. 46 Some arrested MK cadres showed their readiness to 
divulge information about the underground activities of the 
ANC. Bruno Mtolo was a classic example in Durban. Mtolo was 
involved actively in MK's sabotage campaigns from 1961 till 
the time of his arrest in August 1963. Mtolo even went beyond 
giving evidence at crucial trials and revealing information 
about the underground ANC and MK activities: he wrote a book 
42 Ibid. 
43 NA, BAC, P/2/K, G. Kumalo to the CNC, 15 August 1960. 
44 Ibid., Kumalo to the CNC, 23 November 1960. 
45 NA, BAC, P/2/K, T.J.B. Kunene to the information 
officer, 24 February 1961. 
46 NA, BAC, P/2/K, P.M. Khaula to the BAD, 28 July 1960. 
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in which he excoriated the ANC leadership. 47 
During the period when the ANC was banned, it did not 
cease to function as a political organisation. Between 1961 
and 1964, the ANC continued to articulate the people's 
grievances through underground activities; underground ANC 
officials wrote a number of memoranda to various location 
superintendents - the representatives of the apartheid 
structures. Memoranda to location superintendents of 
Chesterville, Lamontville, KwaMashu and Cato Manor were dumped 
at their offices by underground Congress Alliance members. 48 
The superintendents did not respond to the memoranda, instead 
they forwarded them to the police. The issues raised in the 
memoranda ranged from housing, destruction of the people's 
shacks, rentals, education, community facilities, medical 
services, sanitation, and wages for the African workers, to 
politics in the townships. When the police uncovered the 
underground activities of the ANC in 1963, in particular of 
Durban's MK regional commanders: c. Ndhlovu, B. Nair, R. 
Kasrils and S.E. Mtshali, the organisation adopted a national 
strategic turn to exile. 49 
While the sabotage campaigns carried out between 1961 and 
1964 failed to "go very far towards fulfilling its aims", 50 
this did not mean the end of the struggle in the African 
townships. The ANC continued to function in the guise of a 
variety of civic organisations and trade unions affiliated to 
SACTU. A new dimension in African politics then emerged in the 
townships: community based politics became dominant during the 
47 See Mtolo, Umkhonto we Sizwe. 
48 See KCAL, KCF 30, Roll 13, Memorandum of grievances at 
Chesterville location submitted to the superintendent of the 
Chesterville location by the Congress Alliance, 14 February 
1962; Memo ... to the superintendent of the Lamontville 
location, 14 February 1962; Memo ... to the superintendent of 
Cato Manor, 14 February 1962; and Memo ... of grievances 
submitted to the KwaMashu township manager by the Congress 
Alliance, 14 January 1962. 
49 The Natal Mercury, 21 January 1964. 
50 Lodge, Black politics, p 235. 
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period under investigation. 
Creating political communities 
Before the Urban Bantu Councils Act of 1961 was passed in 
parliament, some form of machinery existed for consultation 
between a local authority and the African people in the 
shantytowns and townships. The Advisory Boards were 
constituted under Section 21 of the Bantu (Urban Areas) 
Consolidation Act of 1945, but such bodies "were purely 
advisory, except that it was a statutory obligation for a 
local authority to consult them on all matters of concern to 
[Africans] in urban areas. They enjoyed no executive 
powers''. 51 Each Advisory Board had three elected and two 
nominated members. In Durban, there were seven Advisory Boards 
established in 1937 in compliance with the provisions of the 
Bantu Areas Act. Of these seven, three were for the family 
townships of Lamont, Chesterville and Baumannville, and four 
for the male hostels of S.J. Smith, Dalton Road, Somsteu Road, 
and Jacobs. In Cato Manor, an Emergency Camp Welfare and 
Development Board was established. 52 
The establishment of African townships saw the 
transformation of Advisory Boards into Residents Committees 
with similar powers and functions. Through the Urban Bantu 
Councils Act of 1961, Residents Committees were to be replaced 
by Urban Bantu Councils, but these only came into being in 
1968. Such structures were opposed totally by the ANC. The ANC 
called on all African people 
... to fight the government policies of apartheid and 
oppression - not [to] co-operate with the 
Nationalist government policies of Bantu Authorities 
and Urban Bantu Councils ... Urban Bantu councils 
give us power to oppress ourselves, fight one 
another, leaving the government at peace. Under the 
UBC Act, we shall oppress our people with pass laws, 
rentals, influx control, water metering and school 
51 NA, PNAAB, 1/2/1/1/BAB/1, Bantu advisory bodies, 
central, 12 September 1973 to 31 July 1976, urban Bantu 
councils, 9 February 1976. 
52 Kuper, An African bourgeoisie, p 330. 
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levy which is paid for Dr Verwoerd's poisonous Bantu 
education. 53 
The ANC recognised neither the Residents Committees nor the 
Urban Bantu Councils established later. Instead they launched 
people's Residents Associations, albeit as disguised community 
vigilante organisations such as the Isolomuzi (Vigilante 
Committee). A group of ANC members and trade unionists, 
disillusioned with the Residents Committee's collaborative 
action, launched the KwaMashu Residents Association (KRA) as 
an alternative form of community organisation. The KRA 
officials were elected by township residents at informal 
meetings since it was an unregistered association. In 1960, H. 
Msomi was in the chair. 54 Soon after its inauguration, the 
KRA called for the disbandment of the KwaMashu Residents 
Committee, the official organisation recognised by the 
municipal authorities. 
The Residents Committee members, among others, were 
C.D.S. Mbutho, L.S. Makhuvaza, w. Dladla and S.Z. Conca. These 
members were urged on various occasions to resign from the 
committee since it was regarded as an extension of apartheid 
policies and had no credibility as far as representing the 
interests of the community were concerned. 
From 1962 onwards, the leadership of the KRA, headed by 
F.T.R. Dhlamini and c. Ndhlovu,55 launched a fully-fledged 
campaign against members of the Residents Committee. The 
Residents Committee members were depicted as "sell-outs" -
"Wilson's useless boys" (R.G. Wilson was the KwaMashu township 
manager during the 1960s).56 These were the people, as Kuper 
53 KCAL, PNAAB, KCF 30, Roll 13, Bourquin to colonel 
Fraser, officer commanding, Natal Command, 3 May 1962, "The 
voice of the ANC", 28/9 April 1962. 
54 Ilanga Lase Natal, 19 November 1960. 
55 KCAL, PNAAB, KCF 30, Roll 13, E.G. Jakins, Assistant 
Dir (Bantu areas) to director, Bantu administration, 29 August 
1962. 
56 Ilanga Lase Natal, 17 February and 16 June 1962. 
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noted, "whose livelihood might be jeopardized by a refusal to 
serve on the statutory bodies". 57 Some of the committee 
members were "civil servants and traders in municipal 
institutions". 58 Others were prominent figures of the 
community who accepted nominations because they enjoyed 
special privileges offered by the local authorities, which 
ranged from access to township housing to licences to trade, 
to being owners of eating houses. As noted earlier, houses 
belonging to these committee members were bombed. 
Bombing campaigns were waged not only against committee 
members but also against anyone who co-operated with 
government officials. One such victim was the Reverend Mthembu 
who, in September 1960, was found hanging from a tree with 
some planted documents in his possession - "What is 
Communism?" and "South Africa's Siege".59 
An increasing number of terror campaigns within African 
townships, particularly in KwaMashu, compelled E.G. Jakins, 
the Assistant Director (Bantu Areas), Durban, to write : 
It appears that the number of agitators pursuing 
their activities in locations on a full-time basis, 
particularly at KwaMashu, is increasing by reason of 
the fact that they are able to register as being 
employed by various bodies and persons which have no 
recognised lawful status or business and for whom 
they either do not actually work at all or only 
perform token duties for an hour or two per week. 
For instance, Curnick Ndhlovu is registered as being 
in the employ of some Railway Workers' Union and 
spends all his time in furthering the aims and 
objects of the KwaMashu Residents' Association which 
is merely a nom de plume for the banned ANC. 60 
The continued campaign against Residents Committee members led 
to the resignation of s.z. Conco from the Committee. In his 
57 Kuper, An African bourgeoisie, p 328. 
58 Ibid. 
59 Ilanqa Lase Nat~l, 10 September 1960. Underground 
Congress members forced Mthembu to commit suicide or it is 
possible that they hanged him. 
6° KCAL, PNAAB, KCF 30, Roll 13, E.G. Jakins to director, 
29 August 1962. 
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letter of resignation, Conco denounced what he termed "the 
role of 'boy' to KwaMuhle officials" and further indicated 
that "KwaMashu residents have lost the confidence in 
the ... Residents Committee".61 Tension and conflict remained 
the order of the day, particularly between the two resident 
organisations. 
One interesting point about the members of the Residents 
Committee was that a sizeable number of them were either 
prominent or aspiring business people. For instance, the 
Committee members who were elected to office in 1964, namely 
H.C. Sibisi, C.D.S. Mbutho and W. Mhlongo, were business 
leaders. These people were elected by a small minority of 
township residents who owned houses and were opposed to the 
banned ANC's Residents Association. For such individuals, the 
Residents Committee was a necessary entity in protecting their 
own business interests. The same individuals were instrumental 
in launching the Natal and Zululand African Chamber of 
Commerce in December 1964. This new organisation was founded 
by S.Z. Conco, a former Residents Committee member, H.C. 
Sibisi and J. Mnguni.62 
By 1966, a pro-apartheid business organisation called The 
Africa Foundation of South Africa was established in KwaMashu 
and Umlazi. T.D. Zulu and A.P. Ngcobo spearheaded its 
formation in the townships. 63 The government played an 
indirect role in the formation of the Foundation and was in 
agreement with the principles of the organisation; the 
government, however, promised to support financially the new 
organisation. In response to these government actions, the KRA 
denounced officials of the Africa Foundation, mounted attacks 
on them and called for a boycott of their businesses. The 
national president and founder of The Africa Foundation of 
South Africa was Bishop W.G. Dimba, a controversial figure of 
~ Ilanga Lase Natal, 16 June 1962. 
62 Ilanga Lase Natal, 31 October and 26 December 1964; and 
see also 11 May 1963. 
63 Ilanga Lase Natal, 3 September and 8 October 1966. 
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the Federation of Bantu Churches, an umbrella body of united 
African churches in Natal;64 he formed The Africa Foundation 
together with P.T. Makhene, the vice-president, L.N. Ndaba, 
the secretary-general and B. Nxumalo, a member of the steering 
committee. 65 Basically, the organisation was "aimed at 
propagating ideas on territorial separate development which 
must lead to ethnic autonomous republics of southern 
Africa". 66 As stated in Africa South, the mouthpiece of the 
Africa Foundation that used the same name as the liberal/left-
wing journal of the time, the aim was: "an alternate which 
offers a fair deal to all racial groups and that alt~rnate is 
territorial apartheid on confederation and common market of 
southern Africa".67 
In 1968, Dimba and his executive committee members formed 
the Zulu National Party with branches in Umlazi, KwaMashu, 
Durban Central and Lamontville. 68 It was during this same 
period that a spate of pro-apartheid parties, opposed to the 
ANC, PAC and SACP, were formed and which received financial 
help from the government. It was the government that 
encouraged and provided money to individuals like Dimba in 
order to form opposition parties that could counter the banned 
African political organisations, in particular the ANC. The 
Swazi, Venda, Tswana, Sotho and Ndebele National parties were 
64 For a in-depth account of Bishop W.G. Dimba, see Paul 
la Hausse, "So who was Elias Kuzwayo? nationalism, 
collaboration and the picaresque in Natal", in P. Bonner (et 
al), Apartheid's genesis, 1935- 1962 (Johannesburg, 
Witwatersrand Press, 1993), pp 215-217. 
65 Africi South, volume 1, No 1 (December 1966). 
66 La Hausse, "So Who Was Elias Kuzwayo?", p 216. 
67 Africa South, vol 1, no 1 (December 1966), p 4. 
68 Africa South, vol 2, No 2 (1967), pp 2-3. The members 
of the various branches were: Umlazi, P.P.S. Zulu, D. Mnyende, 
J.M. Maphumzana and R. Mhlongo; Durban Central, A.M. Mpangose; 
KwaMashu, Dr P.W. Tusini; and Lamontville, E. Mduli and F. 
Ngwenya. 
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launched in their respective bantustans. 69 Amidst this kind 
of development, Dimba called upon all Africans to join any one 
of the parties. As P.la Hausse notes: " ... not only was Dimba 
a stooge but he was ... at some stage on the payroll of the 
state. Apparently Dimba's partner, L. Ndaba, derived part of 
his income from the Bureau of State Security". 70 The Africa 
Foundation organisation supported fully the idea of separate 
development and the creation of bantustans and was hence in 
total conflict with members of the KRA. 71 
The KRA derived much of its support mainly from the anti-
government section of the community, which comprised the ANC 
membership, workers and members of the Zulu Hlanganani Co-
operative and Buying Club. The Club consisted of small-scale 
traders and also former shack-shop owners. 72 These traders 
had prospered in Cato Manor but the relocation to KwaMashu 
resulted in many of them being denied trading licences. The 
blame for that was levelled against Residents Committee 
members who made attempts to monopolise the new market through 
their positions as officially recognised municipal 
representatives of the African residents. The spokesperson for 
the Zulu Hlanganani trading society, J. Mabaso, lambasted the 
municipal authorities and the Residents Committee members for 
denying members of his association trading licences. 73 
At several meetings of the KwaMashu Residents 
Association, the interests of small-scale traders and business 
persons were raised. In a bid to secure trading licences, in 
1964 the Zulu Hlanganani Society renamed itself the KwaMashu 
Bantu Investment Company. 74 The "newly" inaugurated company, 
69 Ibid. I p 21 . 
70 La Hausse, "So who was Elias Kuzwayo?", p 217. 
71 See also G. Mare, An appetite for power: Buthelezi's 
Inkatha and South Africa (Johannesburg, Ravan Press, 1987). 
72 Ilanga Lase Natal, 12 August 1961. 
73 Ibid. 
74 Ibid., 21 March 1964. 
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through its secretary, J. Manyoni, challenged the Durban 
municipality to stop harassing and arresting traders in 
KwaMashu who did not possess the necessary licences. The 
municipality insisted, however, that all traders must have the 
required licences if they were to avoid arrest. In contrast, 
KwaMashu Residents Committee members and well-known political 
personality and businessman A.W.G. Champion, the chairman of 
the Combined Residents Committee, intensified their campaign 
ac;1ainst "illegal" trading in KwaMashu, S.J. Smith Hostel, 
Chesterville and Lamontville.75 
Champion who, since his early years had made attempts to 
enrich himself through politics and business ventures, 
believed that capital could be generated within African 
townships, where minimal competition was expected. 76 Champion 
was intolerant of Indian capital and competition within 
African townships, and also - especially - competition from 
Africans who were unlicensed. In 1963, he complained to T. 
Huntley, the Deputy Manager of KwaMashu township, that his 
' business enterprises had "lost hundreds of rands through 
illegal shops ... - many of these shops ... [were] backed by 
Indians". 77 Some Africans were involved in joint business 
ventures with Indian entrepreneurs while others used their 
names to register and administer Indian-owned businesses in 
townships, from which they received a monthly income. No 
wonder that to Champion the policy of separate development 
provided the necessary shelter for capital accumulation. He 
supported the creation of bantustans: "The beauty of this 
policy to me is our obtaining a way to build up industries in 
the area where we live. It may prove to be a blessing in 
disguise to us. Apartheid is no doubt to the advantage of the 
75 See Ilanga Lase Natal, 13 April 1963. 
76 For a detailed study on the early history of Champion, 
see S. Marks, The ambiguities of dependence in South Africa: 
class, nationalism, and the state in twentieth-century Natal 
(Johannesburg, Ravan Press, 1986), pp 74-109. 
77 Ilanga Lase Natal, 13 April 1963; see also Ilanga Lase 
Natal, 9 January 1965. 
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African businessman ...... 78 
A considerable number of the people who participated in 
the Residents Committees during the 1960s were mainly 
interested in enhancing their business and trading privileges. 
During the 1970s, the pro-apartheid business class forged ties 
with bantustan authorities and through that kind of alliance, 
a complex patronage system was developed. With the formation 
of Inkatha by Chief M.G. Buthelezi in 1975, African 
businessmen who in the past had supported the bantustan 
system, tended to identify themselves with Inkatha and the 
KwaZulu government authorities. In fact, most of them became 
Inkatha officials and members. 79 To these African 
businessmen, Inkatha was the only vehicle through which they 
could exercise power and protect their economic interests. 
Their role in the Urban Bantu Councils (UBCs), which came into 
existence in 1968, was legitimised by Inkatha, which went 
along with the policy of separate development though at times 
a strong critic of the government. 
By contrast, during the 1970s an acute conflict emerged 
between Chief Buthelezi and the Inyanda Traders Association, a 
pro-government organisation comprising big African 
businessmen, some of whom participated in Residents Committee 
structures. The Inyanda Association, founded in 1965, 
contested vigorously the idea of starting· companies (big white 
chain stores in joint ownership with African aspirant 
entrepreneurs) in the bantustans. Buthelezi supported the 
formation of such companies and strongly warned the Inyanda 
traders "not to attempt to create a split between the 
78 Kuper, An African bourgeoisie , p 285. See also 
University of Natal, Natal Room, Papers SI, Ari Sitas, "Durban 
unrest notes", 1985; and for interesting information on 
Champion's business ventures, see M.W. Swanson (ed), The views 
of Mahlathi, writings of A.W.G. Champion, a black South 
African (Pietermaritzburg, University of Natal Press, 1982), 
see especially section five, pp 163- 174. 
79 See KCAL, KCAV 168 and 169, C.D.S. Mbutho by A. Mason 
and D. Collins, 25 October 1979 and 1 November 1979, pp 53-4. 
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government [KwaZulu] and African traders ... ".80 The conflict 
escalated until 1976 and, finally, the Inyanda traders had no 
option but to join Inkatha. As for the conflict between 
Buthelezi and the Inyanda Traders Association, it was quite 
clear that Buthelezi managed to manipulate events in the 
region; he was also able to demonstrate his capacity to direct 
political events in the region to his advantage. 
Chief Buthelezi and his Inkatha Party's politics in 
KwaZulu-Natal have always been controversial. 81 He has been 
controversial in the sense that he rejected the preferences of 
the South African state to go for "independence", but often 
collaborated with the state to gain patronage and increase the 
territory of KwaZulu. S. Marks uses the notion of "ambiguity" 
to characterise such strategies adopted by Chief Buthelezi. 82 
Certainly, Chief Buthelezi was, to use Marks' words once 
again, " ... a man who embodie[d] in his contradictory position 
all the ambiguities of a Solomon, a Dube, a Champion" and 
"constantly face[d] the state with his contradictory presence 
both as critic and collaborator extraordinary". 83 
Between 1961 and 1968, Chesterville and Lamontville 
residents were represented through the Durban Joint Residents 
Committee. For a number of years, Champion played a 
significant role as the chairman of the Joint Residents 
Committee. However, the majority of African residents were 
opposed to such Committees, whose members they labelled as 
impimpis (sell-outs). 84 An interesting scenario developed in 
the two townships: all Residents Committee members were 
elected on a party basis. Champion founded and led the 
Imbokodo (grinding stone) Party, while A.R. Ntuli and S. Duma 
80 G. Mare as cited in Sitas, "Durban unrest notes". 
81 For a comprehensive study on Chief Buthelezi and his 
Inkatha Party, see, for instance, Mare, An appetite for power: 
Buthelezi's Inkatha and South Africa. 
82 Marks, The ambiguities of dependence, p 124. 
83 Ibid, pp 116, 123. 
84 Ilanga Lase Natal, 7 March.1964. 
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led the Izikhumba (skins) Party, which comprised mainly the 
ANC and defunct SACTU members.85 Although the banned ANC had 
called for a complete boycott of Residents Committee 
structures in the early 1960s, local underground branches in 
Lamontville and Chesterville defied the order and decided to 
contest elections. These were the two parties which contested 
the Advisory Board elections. From 1965 to 1967, Champion•s 
Imbokodo Party was defeated in the elections by the Izikhumba 
Party. 86 Imbokodo recorded one of its heaviest defeats in the 
Residents Committee elections in 1967, when it polled only 146 
as against 1062 of the Izikhumba Party. 87 Although some 
residents of Chesterville and Lamontville were totally against 
Resident Committee politics, the Izikhumba Party, which was 
founded to challenge Champion's participation in apartheid 
structures, enjoyed an enormous base among resident supporters 
of the banned ANC. Perhaps this shows how the underground lost 
control of its branches and members in the 1960s. Underground 
branches took their own decisions and, more importantly, the 
struggle against apartheid was waged by ordinary people -
workers, women, youth and community leaders. 
By 1968, a new development emerged as far as African 
representation at community level was concerned. The Residents 
Committee structures were terminated, thus paving the way for 
the establishment of the Urban Bantu Councils. The termination 
was partly because of lack of interest among African residents 
in such structures and also resistance from the Residents 
Association members. Under the provisions of the UBC Act of 
1961, the Durban City Council established the KwaMashu UBC, 
which catered for KwaMashu residents and the Ningizimu UBC, 
which represented the interests of residents in Chesterville, 
S.J. Smith, Dalton Road, Jacobs, Lamontville and Umlazi Glebe 
85 !lang a Lase Natal, 25 September 1965. 
86 Ilanga Las~ Natal, 1 October 1966; and 30 September 
1967. 
87 I lang a Lase Natal, 30 September 1967. 
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hostels. 88 Each of the UBCs comprised eleven wards, with a 
nineteen-member council. Of the nineteen, thirteen were 
elected by the township residents and the remaining six were 
appointed by the urban representatives of the African 
chiefs. 89 In order to control Africans living in townships, 
the government pressed chiefs to appoint their representatives 
in urban areas who could use their power and influence. These 
representatives were paid by the government and their main 
role was to solve problems or, at least, intervene whenever 
there was a problem in the township which threatened peace and 
stability. 
In the UBC elections that took place in March 1968, H.C. 
Sibisi won convincingly, to become the first chairperson of 
the KwaMashu UBc.90 Of humble origin, Sibisi was born in 1904 
in the Paulpietersburg district of Northern Natal, to parents 
who were poor labour tenants on a farm. 91 Sibisi was educated 
at Adams Mission, where he qualified as an agricultural 
demonstrator. While working in Swaziland and then later in the 
Ndwedwe reserve in Natal, Sibisi conceived the idea of 
entering into a private trading business. During the 1940s he 
settled in Clermont township where he interacted with 
Champion and prominent ANC members of the Youth League. In 
1948 Sibisi was elected chairman of the local Isolomuzi. 92 
88 City of Durban, Mayor's minute, 30 September 1968, pp 
18-20. 
89 b I id., p 20. 
90 Ilanga Lase Natal, 30 March 1968. Edwards claims that 
Sibisi was the first vice-chairperson of the KwaMashu UBC 
under the chairmanship of Prince Sithela Zulu. However, all my 
sources indicate the contrary. In fact, Sibisi was the first 
chairperson in 1968 and Prince Sithela Zulu became the 
chairperson only in 1969. See Edwards as cited below. 
91 I. Edwards, "'I am a nobody, but in another country we 
would be the George Washingtons': leadership, ethnicity, 
nationalism and class in the career of Henry Caleb Sibisi, 
1945-1980" (Paper presented at the conference on regionalism 
and restructuring in Natal, University of Natal, Durban, 
January 1988), pp 1-2. 
92 Paul la Hausse, "So who was Elias Kuzwayo?", p 215. 
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During this period, Sibisi made various attempts to raise 
capital through the establishment of the Clermont Bantu Bus 
Company, the Clermont Bantu Improvement Co-operative (which 
sought to acquire land in Clermont) and the Vukuzake Clermont 
Co-operative (a co-operative dominated entirely by women, one 
which specialised in market gardening and home crafts). 93 All 
such ventures failed. 
While living in Cato Manor, Sibisi became involved in 
shady deals - selling shares in non-existent companies - and 
provided information to the South African Police and S.B. 
Bourquin, Manager of the Department of Bantu Affairs, about 
leading ANC activists in Cato Manor.94 In 1957, soon after 
the installation of Mangosuthu Gatsha Buthelezi as chief, 
Sibisi became involved in the revival of the Inkatha movement 
of the early 1920s. Because of his clashes with Buthelezi and 
the various members of the Bantu Affairs Commission and the 
Department of Native Affairs over the issue, the revival idea 
collapsed. It was during that period that Sibisi was allocated 
a house in KwaMashu "E" Section and was also granted a trading 
licence. His life was mainly dominated by cheating, as I. 
Edwards notes: 
In fact Sibisi had, from his arrival in KwaMashu, 
established a range of highly lucrative ventures, 
which ranged from the selling of shares in non-
existent companies, through fraudulent dealings in 
Burial Clubs, to the selling of marriage 
certificates to those legally allowed to either rent 
or purchase a house in Durban, but who were not 
legally married ... In addition, having made friends 
with the then township manager, Mr R.G. Wilson, who 
was notorious for being extremely dictatorial, hence 
his Zulu name Mbati, the stinging nettle, Sibisi was 
well placed to again operate as a 'bush lawyer' ... 
Throughout the 1960s, Sibisi's shops, first at 'E' 
Section and then at 'C' Section, were always in 
financial difficulties. However, it was quickly 
established that Sibisi was 'nothing short of a 
thief. ' 95 
93 Ibid. 
94 Edwards, "I am a nobody", p 11. 
95 Ibid., pp 12-13. 
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The recognition of the power and influence of chiefs by 
the Durban municipality, especially in its area of 
jurisdiction, led Sibisi to proclaim himself as a member of 
the structures of chieftainship so that he could serve on the 
Paramount Chief's Council (see below). The Durban municipality 
relied on the influence of the Zulu paramountcy, particularly 
during those days of trouble. During the Defiance Campaign 
era, for example, the Paramount Chief was invited to Durban to 
encourage the non-involvement of the Zulu people in the 
campaign, and in 1973, during the Durban strikes, King G. 
Zwelethini was called to intervene in the labour disputes that 
rocked the entire metropolitan Durban area. From the late 
1950s, the Durban authorities established a Paramount Chief's 
Council, the Ibandla Lenkosi, on which Sibisi served as a 
member. 96 The Durban municipality utilised such a council 
" ... to bolster up their own administration within Durban 11 • 97 
Furthermore, in 1973, Sibisi and other UBC councillors 
pressurised the Port Natal Administration Affairs Board 
(PNAAB) to change their status to that of tribal chiefs to 
enable them to bring perpetrators of crime to justice through 
tribal courts. 98 The idea was totally rejected by the PNAAB 
officials. 
Related to Sibisi's election as the first chairperson of 
the KwaMashu UBC was the announcement of other councillors, 
which led to a demonstration by women. Women from 11 B11 Section 
of the township demonstrated at the Township Manager's office 
to express their dissatisfaction over the election of c. 
Majola (a pro-government businessman and previously a member 
of the Residents Committee) over their favourite D.C. Mtshali, 
a popular ANC member and respected community leader. The women 
accused the Township Manager of deliberately "cooking" the 
96 Ibid., p 13. 
97 Ibid. 
98 NA, PNAAB, 1/2/1/1/BAB/1, Minutes of the KwaMashu UBC, 
3 December 1973, executive committee agenda, status of urban 
Bantu councillors, 14 May 1974. 
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results to enable his 11 stooge" Majola to become a member of 
the UBC. 99 The elections were highly politicised, with some 
members being elected to office on ethnic grounds. For 
instance, M.M. Pamha and H. Mdingi, both Xhosas and members of 
the Xhosa National Unity, were elected to office on ethnic 
tickets. 1 00 
The KwaMashu UBC consisted mainly of business persons and 
traders. 101 The same could be said of the Ningizimu 
UBC. 102 This corresponds to a general pattern most fully 
analyzed by Kuper whereby the selection of leaders for both 
the Location Advisory Boards and the African political parties 
of the 1940s and 1950s was done in terms of occupation and 
education. 103 
The first KwaMashu UBC meetings were mainly concerned 
with business issues in the township. In July 1968, the 
KwaMashu UBC set up a commission of enquiry to investigate the 
allegations that most shops in the township were Indian-
owned.104 The commission resolved that African townships 
were "no-go" areas for Indian capitalists. The KwaMashu UBC 
and particularly the KwaMashu Licensed Traders Association, 
99 Ibid. 
100 Ibid., 18 May 1968. 
101 The members of the KwaMashu UBC were: F. Biyela, z. 
Dhlomo, M.V. Duma, M.B. Legwate, c.c. Majola, K. Makhanya, G. 
Maphumulo, C.D. Mbutho, M.W. Mhlongo, E. Mkhwanazi, W.T. 
Msomo, G. Mzimela, M.P. Ngidi, M. Pamha, S. Shange, H.C. 
Sibisi and Mutwana S. Zulu. See KCAL, Bourquin Papers, File 8, 
KCM 55309- 55313, urban Bantu councils, minutes and agendas, 
city of Durban, KwaMashu UBC, 10 April 1968. 
102 The members of the Ningizimu UBC were: M.W. Zikaka 
(chairm~n), H.S. Msimang (vice-chairman), A.W.G. Champion, Rev 
A. Dhlamini, M. Kweshube, M.P. Magudelela, M.F. Magwaza, 
Mkhize, W. Msane, P.V. Mthembu, M.M. Mwelase, F.J. Ngobese, 
Mrs E. Ntuli, M.J. Shezi, M.H. Shinga and Muntwana Sithela 
Zulu. See KCAL, Bourquin Papers, File 8, Minutes of Ningizimu 
UBC, 2 April 1968; and also City of Durban, Mayor's minute, 
1969, p 20. 
103 Kuper, An African bourgeoisie, p 99. 
104 Ilanga Lase Natal, 20 July 1968. 
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under the chairmanship of A. Africa, took exceptional interest 
in ensuring that the resolution passed by the enquiry was 
implemented. 
Apart from showing interest in business issues, the 
KwaMashu and Ningizimu UBCs raised a number of grievances with 
the local authorities. On various occasions, the issue of 
additional security personnel, particularly at Dalton Road 
Hostel, was raised. 105 Concern over the residents' security 
emanated from an unprecedented spate of criminal activities 
within the townships. Both UBCs highlighted the plight of 
persons such as widows, the problems facing institutions such 
as cemeteries and schools, and the socio-political problems of 
inadequate accommodation, the absence of proper health 
facilities, and arrests and detentions of the African 
people. 106 However, in spite of their representations, the 
UBCs failed to proselytise the people's Residents Associations 
and other dominant classes of the African petty bourgeoisie, 
including the professionals and intellectuals. 
In September 1973, the Umlazi Residents Association 
(URA), an informal body exactly like the KwaMashu Residents 
Association, was formed. 107 URA was established by members 
of the banned ANC and fellow trade unionists who had survived 
the repression of the 1960s. Soon after its establishment, 
dubbed "the voice of the people", an attack was launched 
against the UBC councillors, who were described as "too busy 
to listen to the people". 108 Even Councillor c.c. Majola of 
the KwaMashu UBC admitted that although URA was inaugurated in 
105 NA, PNAAB, 1/2/1/1/BAB/1, Minutes of the Ningizimu 
UBC, 20 November 1973. 
106 Ibid., Minutes of the KwaMashu UBC, 20 November 1973; 
Minutes of the Ningizimu UBC, 22 January 1974; B. Huntley, 
Manager, central district to the chief director, PNAAB, 22 
March 1974; and Minutes of the KwaMashu UBC, 23 February 1976. 
107 IIE, The January strikes (Durban, IIE in Conjunction 
with Ravan Press, 1974), See the section on community affairs, 
Umlazi; and see also Interview with J. Msomi, 16 october 1992. 
108 Ibid. 
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a "clandestine manner, residents [were] frustrated by the fact 
that councillors [could not] communicate with [the] KwaZulu 
governmenttt. 109 A simmering spirit of discontent with the 
UBCs from the late 1960s existed in the townships, and the 
KwaMashu UBC noted with regret: "Many people had already made 
known their unwillingness to co-operate with the councillors. 
They claim that the council was a toothless body with no 
executive powers. They therefore see no reason why it should 
exist". 110 Throughout the 1970s, the UBCs were challenged, 
ostensibly by the various Residents Associations and other 
related organisations. 
More significantly, the 1970s witnessed a new shift 
towards political struggle, which was expressed through the 
emergence of the black consciousness movement in African 
schools and universities and the creation of a new force in 
Durban, especially from early 1973 onwards - the independent 
African trade union movement. These emergent forces culminated 
in mass political activities - the outbreak of the 1973 Durban 
strikes, the creation of African trade unions, and the 1976 
Soweto uprisings, apparently an expression of student 
opposition to Afrikaans as a medium of instruction but 
essentially a rejection of the whole apartheid system. 111 
The African struggle entered into a new and momentous phase. 
Conclusion 
Central to the analysis in this chapter has been an attempt to 
demonstrate the varying content of opposition and 
collaboration with the apartheid state and its structures. 
Undoubtedly, during the 1960s, when mass political 
organisations and activities were suppressed, politics shifted 
109 NA, PNAAB, 1/2/1/1/BAB/1, Minutes of the KwaMashu UBC, 
9 December 1974. 
110 Ibid., Minutes of the KwaMashu UBC, 24 November 1975. 
111 For an in-depth study on the Soweto uprisings see, for 
instance, B. Magubane, South Africa: from Soweto to Uitenhage 
(New Jersey, Africa World Press), pp 41-51. 
186 
from the broad national struggle to civic politics at the 
community level. The struggle against apartheid was now waged 
by the underground political organisations (mainly township-
based associations) where former ANC people were in the 
leading positions. The banned ANC remained in the background, 
making statements from the exile, continued with illegal 
meetings and leaflet distributions, and conducted sporadic 
acts of sabotage. An intriguing phenomenon, co-existing with 
the underground activities of the ANC, is the existence of 
emerging African businessmen - the businessmen-cum-councillors 
- whose survival depended on the apartheid state structures. 
Because of their narrow and selfish economic interests, this 
class of African people collaborated politically with the 
state, especially in the Residents Committees and Urban 
Councils. Consequently, their relations with the African 
community at large created tension. It was that accumulated 
tension and other socio-economic problems that led to the 
events of the 1970s and beyond. 
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Chapter Seven 
Struggles in the Shadows: Covert Forms of Resistance 
and Survival Strategies Among African Workers, 1960s-
1970s 
Introduction 
During the 1970s, Durban's African workers challenged capital 
through strike action (an important aspect that will be 
examined in chapter eight). This particular type of worker 
struggle has received considerable attention from historians. 
There is a tendency in many writers' works to confine worker 
"consciousness" to the analysis of trade union consciousness, 
strikes and class consciousness. Over the last fifteen years 
or so labour historians have concentrated only on 
relationships between workers, employers and the state, and 
popular factory struggles. Such a trend has been perpetuated 
by scholars because of the accessibility of data on overt 
forms of consciousness such as strikes, boycotts, unionisation 
and open political militancy. 
This chapter is important in that it examines the period 
when the South African Congress of Trade Unions (SACTU) 
declined in the mid-1960s, which effectively crippled African 
unionism for almost ten years. During that period, South 
African industrial relations enjoyed "peace" which was 
disturbed by nothing more than the hidden forms of worker 
responses. Of significance to this chapter is the view that 
the history of informal worker resistance, in particular in 
industrial establishments during the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s, 
is not documented. Most historians who have written about 
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informal worker resistance have confined their works mainly to 
the mining industry. 1 
The most important exception to the above lack of 
interest in covert resistance is c. van Onselen's book, 
Chibaro, which, twenty-one years after its publication, 
remains the finest work on hidden struggles. 2 Because of the 
ever-widening gap between studies on overt and covert forms of 
worker militancy, this chapter will try to examine those 
"hidden forms of consciousness" (drawing heavily on the work 
of Van Onselen} which trade unions and political party 
structures could hardly offer. To understand worker conscious-
ness, it is necessary to penetrate worker reaction arising 
from a particular situation in which the individual finds 
himself enmeshed. Yet, despite Van Onselen's work, informal 
worker resistance in South Africa's industrial workplace 
remains largely silent. It is in this context that this 
chapter is part of a continuing effort to break that silence. 
Hopefully, other historians will be taking the same road. 
Hidden responses: an overview 
As industry expanded in Durban, employers patterned their work 
forces and recruitment practices, structured their work 
opportunities and managed their establishments in ways that 
compelled African workers to accept the new challenges of 
formal wage labour. Both the state and capital instituted ways 
and methods of ensuring both the availability of labour and 
the active involvement of African workers in longer periods of 
continuous employment. 
1 See, for instance, T.Dunbar Moodie, Going for gold: men, 
mines and migration (Johannesburg, WUP, 1994); P. Warwick, Black 
people and the South African war (Cambridge, CUP, 1983); S. 
Moroney, "The development of the compound as mechanism of worker 
control, 1900-1912", South African Labour Bulletin, vol 4, no 3 
(1978}; and C.van Oneselen, Studies in the social and economic 
history of the Witwatersrand, 1886-1914, 2 vols (Johannesburg, 
Ravan Press, 1982). 
2 c. van Onselen, Chibaro (London, Pluto, 1976). 
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While industrial capitalists required a work pace that 
was sufficient to accumulate profit, that work pace was 
"constantly challenged, defended and reshaped" by the 
workers. 3 From the early 1880s, African workers have responded 
to capitalism in various ways and patterned their struggles 
according to their traditional work culture; they had their 
own notions of work, time, and leisure. 4 In recent times there 
have been a number of works which focus on the importance of 
culture in understanding worker resistance, or in which 
culture is recognised as a major factor. Certainly some forms 
of struggle were embedded in culture but that does not suggest 
that they were caused by culture. B. Bozzoli identifies songs, 
phrases, motifs and flags as obvious symbols of resistance5 or 
what T. Lodge calls an "accumulated heritage of resistance". 6 
Slogans such as "Amandla Ngawethu", "Hebo Usuthu", and phrases 
such as "Sengoba Simunye", were often chanted and expressed by 
3 P. Harries, Work, culture and identity: migrant labourers 
in Mozambique and South Africa, 1860 - 1910 (Johannesburg, 
Witwatersrand University Press, 1994), p 41. 
4 Ibid, p 228 and also chapter five. For an intensive study 
on struggles expressed in cultural terms and social networks, 
see, for instance, K.E. Atkins, The moon is dead! give us our 
money: cultural origins of an African work ethic, Natal, South 
Africa, 1843- 1900 (Portsmouth, Heinemann, 1993), especially 
chapters 3 and 6; D. Moodie, "The moral economy of the black 
miners' strike of 1946" ~' vol 13, no 1 (1986); and D. Moodie, 
"Social existence and practice of personal integrity: narratives 
of resistance on the South African gold mines", African Studies, 
so, 1 & 2 (1991). 
5 B. Bozzoli (ed), Town and countryside in the Transvaal 
(Johannesburg, Ravan Press, 1983), p 32. The term resistance is 
used in this chapter to refer to hidden and silent actions 
developed by ordinary workers in an attempt to survive and as a 
way of expressing their discontent over wages paid by employers. 
This sort of resistance or struggle takes an individual form 
which denotes that African workers were not passive entities of 
the capitalist system. 
6 Lodge as cited in Bozzoli, Town and countryside, p 32. 
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Durban workers. 7 A popular song in Durban, for instance, that 
criticised employers for exploiting African workers was sung: 
"We have donated our blood long. We have donated our energy 
long. We now say our energy must be paid for. Our energy must 
be paid for".a This song became popular in the 1970s and was 
sung by rank-and-file workers during union meetings. These 
songs have been important in highlighting some of the salient 
features of workers' cultural expressions during the period. 
From such a perspective, a number of scholars have examined 
such notions, especially on the gold mines, among migrant 
workers. D. Moodie's studies on the moral economy constructed 
by African workers on the gold mines are useful for an 
understanding of such notions.9 
The struggles of African workers against capital and the 
state can be understood in many ways. A student of African 
labour history who seeks to understand worker consciousness 
should search not only for dramatic responses but also for 
what R. Cohen calls "hidden forms of consciousness ... a 
bedrock, grass roots, genuine sorts of consciousness". 10 
These disguised forms of struggle have always been difficult 
to detect by employers, for they tend to be hidden and silent 
rather than dramatic and articulate. Van Onselen's argument 
that African workers developed strategies of confronting poor 
wages and debilitating work conditions in the shadows - "in 
7 The slogans "Amandla Ngawethu" and "Sengoba Simunye" meant 
"power is ours" and "we will conquer as one" respectively. "Hebo 
Usuthu" is a traditional Zulu war song. The theme of unity is 
consciously expressed in the slogans and these express the 
workers' feelings and frustrations and, more importantly, they 
also furthered the workers' struggle beyond the use of the strike 
weapon. 
8 Interview with J. Msomi, 16 October 1992. See also 
Jabulani Gwala's papers. Author's personal collection. 
9 See Moodie, "The moral economy of the Black miners' 
strike"; and Moodie, Going for gold. 
10 R. Cohen, "Resistance and hidden forms of consciousness", 
RAPE, 19 (1980), p 21. 
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the nooks and crannies of the day-to-day work situation" 11 -
has relevance to our understanding of the dynamics of African 
awareness in Durban. It is undeniable that the capitalist form 
of accumulation calls into being open and explicit class 
struggle between labour and capital, but that does not negate 
the fact that individual or covert forms of struggle are 
vital, as are worker reactions to that process. 
A brief consideration of the patterns of resistance of 
workers of the southern Africa region is necessary at this 
stage. It is important to realise that the southern African 
examples provide a useful background to worker struggles and 
covert forms of protest in other coercive economies. Van 
Onselen's remarks about Rhodesian (now Zimbabwe) mine workers' 
labour protest and action could be broadened to embrace our 
understanding of everyday forms of consciousness and 
resistance to exploitation, be it in the mines or industry. 
Occasionally the workers' experiences on the mines were 
reinforced through the transfer of "beliefs and practices 
founded on village society" to new industrial settings. Van 
Onselen writes: 
Retiring workers would inform those in the villages 
of their experiences and this would in turn affect 
the labour flows in subsequent seasons ... returning 
parties took considerable care to warn new workers 
of bad employers and in case they missed anybody 
making their way to Rhodesia, they took the 
precaution of pegging notices to various trees en 
route. Sometimes written in Swahili, these notes, 
addressed to Africans in general or individual 
workers in particular, warned of mines to be 
especially avoided ... The African names (for mines) 
were (also) rich in meaning ... The total absence of 
generosity in food and wages at the Ayrshire mine 
was reflected in the name Chimpadzi - meaning small 
portion ... And while Chayamatako -"hit on the but-
tocks" - was hardly a name to make the Masterpiece 
mine popular, the fact that the Celtic mine was 
known as Sigebenga (a murderer or cruel person) made 
certain that the manager there was never plagued 
11 Van Onselen, Chibaro, p 239. 
192 
with work-seekers. 12 
Quota restrictions, time and efficiency bargaining, job-
hopping, go-slows, deliberate wastefulness, the destruction of 
mine property and equipment, and loafing became common 
characteristics of early mining compounds in southern Africa. 
The nature of such protests can be equated to slave resistance 
in the southern United States where" ... ordinary loafing and 
mindless labour went with deliberate wastefulness, slow-downs, 
feigned illness, self-inflicted injuries, and the well-known 
abuse of livestock and equipment". 13 Sabotage and theft were 
common in mines throughout the southern African region. 
African workers slowed down the production process to reduce 
the level of their exploitation or to "jinx" the machinery to 
show its limitations as a substitute for labour-power. Mining 
property was frequently destroyed, compound huts were set on 
fire, and cattle belonging to the company maimed. 14 
The hidden forms of protest practised by miners (with 
distinctive characteristics) were also used by the industrial 
workers. Similar cases documented below from the industrial 
workers of Durban should not be seen as something new in the 
worker struggle for survival in a coercive economy. Here, 
however, it must be stressed that there are a number of ways 
of looking at the various categories examined below. 
Terrains of struggle 
African workers have a long history of resistance and this has 
been manifested in their resistance to state labour control 
mechanisms during the 1960s and 1970s. 15 Those mechanisms of 
control proved unworkable. African workers utilised a loophole 
12 Ibid, pp 234-35. 
13 See, for instance, E.D. Genovese, The political economy 
of slavery (New York, Pantheon Press, 1967), p 74. 
14 Van Onselen, Chibaro, pp 237-242. 
15 see, for instance, Chapter Three. 
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in Section 10 of the Urban Areas Act.of 1945 which gave them 
the right to remain in proclaimed areas for 72 hours without 
permission. Pretending to be visiting relatives, they never 
returned to their respective reserves after the expiry of the 
72 hour provision. In Durban the provision that individuals 
could remain in proclaimed areas was extended to seven days in 
1962. 16 That extension made it easier for African work-
seekers from the surrounding reserves to undo the system. 
While the state used tough control measures to try to regulate 
the flow of workers into white urban areas, its inability to 
control this movement revealed a distinctive form of 
resistance by African workers. The relaxation of state labour 
control mechanisms during the late 1970s should be viewed as a 
victory for the resistance movement rather than reforms 
initiated by the state. 
Theft 
Court cases of theft by Durban workers were chronicled in the 
Ilanga Lase Natal newspaper. Theft has long been a powerful 
form of response to exploitation. K. Marx called this form of 
response "the earliest, crudest, and .•. most primitive form 
of protest". 17 In classical Marxist terms, such activities 
represent a clear case of "false consciousness" which would 
have to be stripped away to allow a "true" political 
consciousness to ~merge. Although it might have been a "blunt 
and stupid form of protest", Engels admits that "many workers 
doubtless sympathised privately" with this kind of resistance 
to the exploitation of labour power by capitalists. 18 It 
cannot be denied that theft is a form of resistance and has 
been used world-wide by all workers who faced the challenges 
16 Ilanga Lase Natal, 22 September 1962. 
17 K. Marx, Collected works, volume 4, (Moscow, Progress 
Publishers, 1975), pp 502-3. 
18 F. Engels, The condition of the working class in England 
(Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1958), p 243. 
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of capital accumulation. But, as Engels further noted: 
The workers soon realised that crime did not help 
matters. The criminal could protest against the 
existing order of society only simply as one 
individual; the whole might of society was brought 
to bear upon each criminal, and crushed him with its 
immense superiority.19 
Theft as an individual form of struggle has always given way 
to collective organisation that is more directly in conflict 
with capital. Why then study theft and other individualised 
forms of struggle? W.B. Freund states that: "it is precisely 
at the points when and where working-class organisation has 
failed that a study of theft may prove to be of most 
interest."2° Furthermore, Freund saw theft as providing "an 
effective vehicle of protest when and where conventional forms 
fail. Far from being crude or fruitless, theft can be an 
effective economic response by proletarians to the totalising 
surplus demands of corporate capital". 21 Namibian mine 
workers, for instance, made a distinction between "theft" from 
colleagues and "taking" from the company. 22 The same workers 
also argued that their wages were deliberately set low because 
the management assumed that they would steal. Commenting on 
the issue of theft, one of the workers noted, "I am just 
paying myself", while another said: "This is in fact our money 
which was withheld by the Boss".23 
The large number of convictions for theft of Africans in 
Durban magistrates' courts shows the extent of such individual 
forms of resistance. Theft, however, is not always resistance; 
19 Ibid.,, p 240. 
20 W. Freund, "Theft and social protest among the tin miners 
of northern Nigeria", in D. Crummey (ed), Banditry, rebellion and 
social protest in Africa (London, James Currey, 1986), p 49. 
21 Ibid. 
22 R. J. Gordon, Mines, masters and migrants: life in a 
Namibian mine compound (Johannesburg, Ravan Press, 1977), p 4. 
23 Ibid. 
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it is often greed and even more often a way of survival. On 2 
January 1960, for example, M. Dhladhla was sentenced to an 
effective four months in prison and in addition was whipped 
four times with a sjambok for stealing from his Indian 
employer. 24 In another related case, D. Mcakumbana, a Durban 
court interpreter, stole an exhibit of £487 (R 974) and was 
sentenced to one year in prison. 25 Undoubtedly, theft was a 
high risk form of resistance: being caught meant not only 
dismissal but also jail or whipping or both. Occasionally 
employers complained of items missing from shops that would 
have been pilfered through back doors and sold in townships. 
As P.M. Faya remembers: "Clothes, eatable goods and anything 
that could be taken from industries and shops were stolen and 
sold during the weekends in the townships .... This was the 
only way to survive".26 
Daily, theft took place which was directed at creating a 
balance between the ever-rising cost of living and African 
wages. In a society in which inequalities were rampant, theft 
offered a viable path of redress and redistribution or, at 
least, a way in which profits were shared. Small items wrapped 
in paper were thrown in dustbins and collected after working 
hours. Several metres of cloth at a time were stolen from 
Frame's textile industry through the connivance of security 
guards and workers. Security guards pretended to be searching 
workers when in fact they had concluded prior agreements to 
share the spoils.27 
Domestic workers in Durban stole small items which would 
not be noticed by their employers. Foodstuffs such as rice, 
sugar and salt were packed in boxes and collected by relatives 
24 Ilanga Lase Natal, 2 January 1960. 
25 Ilanga Lase Natal, 25 February 1961. 
26 Interview with P.M. Fay a, KwaMashu, 1 September 1992. 
27 Interview with P.M. Fay a, 1 September 1992. 
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over weekends. 28 In Umlazi township, cases of domestic 
workers who disappeared from their employers after looting 
household goods and money were frequent in the 1960s. 29 Cohen 
writes: "In white settler societies any club room conversation 
will reveal the elaborate charades domestic workers play with 
their employers - watering down the gin, removing the mark on 
the bottle, putting flour into the sugar and rice, etc". 30 E. 
Preston-Whyte's study of African women in domestic employment 
has shown that theft of household items took place. 31 A major 
proportion of domestic workers were Zionists who relied on 
" ... confession of misdemeanours". She further argued that to 
the Zionists, "the relief of forgiveness and the blessing of 
pastor or prophet are extremely important to emotional well-
being and stability''. 32 On Sundays, confessions of stolen 
items from employers were made to the prophet and such 
followers were told not to do it again. Van Onselen's studies 
have shown as well that both male and female domestic servants 
were involved in petty theft, regularly taking foodstuff, 
clothing or alcohol from their masters and mistresses. 33 
Despite Zionist teachings of the good and bad, the process 
continued, with more confessions being made. Worker theft, 
28 Interview with Judith Msomi, 16 October 1992. 
29 Ilanga Lase Natal, 3 October 1964. 
3° Cohen, "Resistance and hidden forms of consciousness", pp 
20-1. See also C. van Onselen, Studies in the social and economic 
history of the Witwatersrand, 2, New Nineveh (Johannesburg, Ravan 
Press, 1982), p 43. Van Onselen also notes that " ... household 
disinfectant or fly poison were added to the tea or coffee of 
white women who had insulted, assaulted or dismissed 
'houseboys'". 
31 See E.M. Preston-Whyte, "Between two worlds: a study of 
the working life, social ties and interpersonal relationships of 
African women migrants in domestic service in Durban" 
(unpublished PhD, University of Natal, Durban, 1969). 
32 Ibid., p 346. 
33 Van Onselen, Studies in the social and economic history 
of the Witwatersrand, 2, New Nineveh, p 42. 
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undoubtedly, has at one level remained a way of labour 
protest; a way of survival; and a way of wage supplementation. 
Boycotting of employers 
Exploitative employers such as the Frame Group were avoided at 
all costs by work-seekers. Vacancies reported by the Labour 
Bureau offices sometimes remained unfilled for a considerable 
number of months. Despite the unemployment situation, the 
KwaMashu Township Manager's monthly reports indicated that 
African work-seekers refused to be employed by certain 
employers. For instance, from March to November 1970, the 
total number of reported unfilled vacancies at KwaMashu labour 
bureaux was 283. 34 In 1975 the total number of reported men 
and women's unfilled vacancies from all labour bureau offices 
in Durban had soared to 5 979 and 1 558 respectively. 35 
Employers of domestic labour in the Central District of 
Durban complained of the shortage of women workers. In August 
1973 there were 84 unfilled vacancies in the domestic labour 
market whereas in April 1974, the number had risen to 305. 36 
While the number of unfilled vacancies in domestic employment 
increased every year, women were ordered out of the urban area 
at the rate of over 3 000 per year.37 Super-exploitation of 
women, which took place through poor wages, was countered by 
boycotting the domestic industry as a whole. 
34 Killie Campbell Africana Library (hereafter KCAL), Port 
Natal Administration Board (hereafter PNAB), KCF 24, Roll 7, 
Township manager's monthly general reports, KwaMashu, R.G. 
Wilson, memos to the director, March to November 1970. 
35 Natal Archives (hereafter NA), PNAAB, 1/2/1/1/9, Labour, 
1 October 1975 to 31 January 1976, G.F. Baker, manager, central 
district to the chief director, 26 November 1975. See all reports 
from various Labour Officers, 1975. 
36 NA, PNAAB, 1/2/1/1/9, Labour, 1 April 1974 to 31 May 
1976, volume 8, Box 49, Department of Bantu administration, memo 
from C/O (LIA) to chief director, 9 April 1974 
37 Ibid. 
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Sabotage activities 
During the 1960s, some African workers were engaged in 
sabotage. Industrial machinery was deliberately destroyed, 
while buildings and farm fields were set on fire. In November 
1961, a living room at the King Edward VIII Hospital was set 
on fire by two African nurses. 38 Their major complaints were 
those of poor wages and food, poor living conditions and 
mistreatment of nurses by white matrons. 39 
Sabotage activities took place in Durban during the early 
1960s. Workers set fire to sugar-cane plantations in and 
around Durban. 40 On these white-owned plantations, the class 
struggle was both silent and open. The employers of African 
agricultural labour had always minimised expenditure on 
labourers, which left them amongst the most poorly-paid 
workers. Sabotage was one of their few alternatives. 
Go-slows and absenteeism 
Sometimes the plantation workers in and around Durban resorted 
to non-cooperation with their supervisors, particularly during 
the harvest period. The Maputans employed by the Natal farmers 
were well known for slowing down the rhythm of plantation 
work. They deserted work towards harvest time, which compelled 
William Campbell to write: "It was an unbearable evil, 
frequently 30 or 40 or more [Maputans] will [sic] leave in a 
night without notice .... They kept their engagements at 
first, but soon found it was easy to abscond". 41 Such forms 
of passive resistance led to the decline of Natal's 
agricultural production. 
A considerable number of working days were lost when 
38 Ilanga Lase Natal, 18 November 1961. 
39 See the strike that followed the sabotage, SAIRR, Survey 
of raee relations, 1961. 
40 Ilanga Lase Natal, 30 December 1961. 
41 Harries, Work, culture and identity, p 43. 
199 
workers deliberately avoided going to work. Absenteeism was 
rife in many industries and the Frame Group, in particular, 
complained that a large section of its work force did not 
report for duty. Some workers at the garment factories 
inflicted injuries on their hands during the "cut and trim" 
process in order to avoid work. Others pretended to be ill; of 
these, the weekly average ranged between 40 and 70. In one 
week, ending 29 April 1978, 489 out of a total workforce of 3 
630 were reported absent. 42 Of these, 46 workers were ill; 43 
the remaining 443 workers merely abstained from going to work. 
The most affected department at Frametex was the Suzler Number 
nine section which recorded 58 and 70 absentees for the weeks 
ending 24 June and 1 July 1978 respectively. 44 
As a response to absenteeism, the Natal Chamber of 
Industries (NCI) formed a sub-committee of its Labour Affairs 
Division in 1971 to investigate the problem and suggest 
possible remedies. 45 Absenteeism tended to be rife in what 
the Natal Chamber of Industries termed 11 a labour hungry 
environment". 46 The withdrawal of labour-power by African 
workers in industry was not understood by the NCI. They 
speculated that it was a direct consequence of the "shortage 
of housing for Bantu workers who return to their homes over 
weekends and are often absent on Mondays due to the distances 
which they have to travel home". 47 While distance may have 
been a possible explanation for absenteeism on Mondays, it 
42 Frame Labour Officer, Weekly absentees list, 29 April 
1978. (All minutes of the Committee in the 1970s are with the 
author. They were given to the author by Jabulani Gwala, the 
leader of the South African Clothing and Textile Workers Union). 
43 Ibid. 
44 Labour Officer, Frametex, 24 June 1978 and 1 July 1978. 
45 KCAL, PNAB, KCF 80, Roll 62, Natal Chamber of Industries, 
Labour Affairs Division, minutes, 20 July 1971. 
46 Ibid. 
47 b 3 I id., p . 
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could not be a sound reason for workers to absent themselves 
for the other working days of the week. Workers have always 
expressed their grievances or dissatisfaction in disguised 
ways, including absenteeism or restriction of output or labour 
turnover. 
The practice of workers claiming to have been admitted to 
hospitals or consulting private doctors was widespread, for 
example, among workers of the Port Natal Administration Board. 
Several cases were reported to S.B. Bourquin, the Chief 
Director of the Board, of workers who took self-proclaimed 
"off-duties" -"laziness and disobedience" 48 - and claimed to 
have been consulting doctors. 49 Various case studies of the 
employees of the Board may be enlightening. 
S. Sithole, an employee of the Board, was reported on 
several occasions in 1975 for not reporting for duty. He was 
absent from work for two months in the same year, only to 
return in January 1976. Sithole's main excuse was that of 
continuous illness. He claimed to have been consulting a 
doctor for two months. It was discovered after consultations 
with his doctor that he was supposed to report for duty a 
month earlier. Sithole's services were terminated on the basis 
that he was dishonest and that wages were paid continuously on 
the understanding that he was ill.so It was divulged by one 
of the employees that Sithole was in fact employed on part-
time basis at the Dunlop rubber company. 
Other cases of workers who failed to report for duty for 
an extended period were recorded at the KwaMashu Works Depot 
of the PNAAB. The records of employees M. Biyela, A. Khuzwayo 
48 NA, PNAAB, Strictly confidential files (hereafter SCF), 
Department of Business Undertakings to the chief director, 3 
November 1975~ See the case of M. Mpongese (files may not be 
quoted at this stage, they contain sensitive material of the 
1970s). 
49 NA, PNAAB, SCF, Department of Business Undertakings to 
the chief director, 21 January 1976. See the case of s. Sithole. 
SO Ibid. 
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and F.A. Ndimande showed constant absence from work. 51 In 
January 1975, Biyela worked for only three days during which 
he collected two pairs of overalls and disappeared. As for 
Khuzwayo, he absconded for the whole year, the last day for 
reporting for duty being in February 1974. In a similar case, 
Ndimande was absent from work for almost three months. 52 In 
other similar cases, workers, for instance S. Mkhungo, had a 
record number of more than 73 days of sick leave within two 
years of service.53 
Resignations 
During the 1970s, high labour turnover among textile workers 
was a common phenomenon. For example, at Hammarsdale Textile 
company, a record of 60 percent labour turnover was 
experienced.54 In 1974, at Pinetex Textiles, it was reported 
that there was a 45 percent labour turnover.55 Frame Textiles 
also experienced about 55 percent labour turnover in the form 
of resignations and dismissals. 56 
Because of the widespread nature of labour turnover in 
various industrial establishments, it is hardly possible to 
isolate it from other forms of response, whether such response 
was initiated by workers or management. Commenting on worker 
resignations and dismissals, L. Schlemmer and C. Rawlins 
51 NA, SCF, T.H. Ellis to control officer (staff), 20 
February 1975. 
52 Ibid. 
53 NA, SCF, Ellis to the director of administration, 14 May 
1975. 
54 Discussion with David Remson, UNO, History Department, 22 
June 1994. 
55 University of the Witwatersrand (hereafter UW), William 
Cullen library, HLP, SACTWU, NUTW, G 45.12.1, Wiseman Mbali 
versus state, p 137. 
56 Interview with J. Gwala, Bolton hall, SACTWU offices, 27 
September 1993. 
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wrote: 
Management may initiate a termination by dismissal 
or workers may do so by resigning or desertion, but 
these actions represent different sides of the same 
coin of conflict. Thus, for example, a refusal by 
management to negotiate a grievance may result in a 
worker resigning because he sees himself as having 
no other alternative. On the other hand, a worker's 
failure to co-operate or make concessions may lead 
to a situation when management has no alternative 
but to dismiss. Then again, a worker may even delib-
erately provoke a dismissal either because of his 
own or manaqement's desire not to compromise or 
negotiate. 57 
Resignations tended to be the initiative of the employees 
and an indicator of the African labour force's attitude 
towards what R. Allen called ''the demeanour and disposition of 
employees" in industrial settings. 58 Of course, several 
factors account for resignations of African employees. Allen's 
study on the timber industry has shown that drivers, for 
instance, took up employment in that specific industry as a 
stepping-stone to employment opportunities in other indus-
tries. 59 Since drivers were skilled operators ''with a 
licence", they used their special status and competitiveness 
to job hop from one employer to another. 60 Recounting his 
experiences of the 1970s, D. Hemson opined that some African 
workers took the first employment opportunity with the hope of 
changing it as soon as they found better employers. 61 
Resignations were also often a by-product of low wages 
and wage-related complaints such as the payment of wages on 
57 L. Schlemmer and c. Rawlins, Black workers who leave 
(Durban, University of Natal, CASS, 1977), p 11. 
58 R.D.J. Allen, Ambivalence and commitment in work; labour 
turnover and the stability of African employees in a Transvaal 
border industry ( Durban, UND, CASS, 1978), p 44. 
59 Ibid. ,p 40. 
60 Ibid. 
61 Discussions with David Hemson, UND, History Department, 
22 June 1994. 
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different days of the month and changes in monthly wage 
packages, especially when wages decreased. 62 Racist 
statements and attacks by white supervisors on African 
workmates caused great resentment which led, to some extent, 
to resignations. As one worker recalled: "For any minor 
mistake you may be sworn at and then kicked. I cannot do that 
even to my child".63 This appears to be an integral aspect of 
labour discipline during this phase of industrial development 
in South Africa. High labour turnover was also partially a 
result of what could be termed "poor or inefficient 
administration, or disorganised work-procedures, in the 
employment situations".64 
Working the system 
There is enough evidence to demonstrate that workers developed 
other sophisticated ways of "beating the system". Slow-downs 
were common and some workers refused to do certain tasks 
"because it was a hard job11 .65 Others adopted the strategy of 
"wandering around" or "loafing" as a way of wasting time. M.E. 
Zulu, a former employee of the Board based at Congella 
Brewery, was well known for "causing trouble" and "loafing 
around" the Brewery grounds. 66 The practice of "loafing" on 
the job, though not always the case, was another way of 
avoiding work and that in itself was a conscious form of 
protest against poor wages and conditions of service. Despite 
the existence of factory indunas, supervisors and foremen in 
62 Schlemmer and Rawlins, Black workers who leave, p 64. 
63 Ibid. I p 65. 
64 Allen, Ambivalenc§ and commitment in work, p 44. 
65 NA, SCF, Department of Business Undertakings to the chief 
director, 3 November 1975. See the case of Mpongese when he also 
refused to stack empty crates. 
66 NA, SCF, General manager, Congella brewery to the chief 
director, 18 September 1975. 
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various establishments, workers deliberately wasted time in 
toilets. At Frametex company, this was a common practice and 
later led to the removal of toilet doors, particularly in mill 
number eleven, by the management.67 Because of the absence of 
a smoking lounge in the same mill, workers walked at a pace 
which suited them to mill number nine where the facility was 
available. 68 
Apart from moonlighting (avoiding work or pacing it to 
suit themselves), African workers engaged in part-time jobs 
during self-proclaimed off-duties as a way of raising money. 
This device is best illustrated by the case of G. Nxumalo, a 
former cinema doorman or usher employed by the PNAAB. 69 
Occasionally, Nxumalo absented himself from work without 
permission, especially in 1975. On two occasions, Nxumalo was 
caught officiating at soccer matches at KwaMashu Soccer 
Stadium while supposedly on duty. On 12 July 1975, Nxumalo was 
warned by A. Cameron, the supervisor, not to officiate as a 
linesman during a soccer match at the stadium since he was the 
only usher on duty. In response Nxumalo indicated that he had 
made arrangements with another official to replace him as a 
linesman, but was later seen by Cameron at the stadium. 70 
Once again, on 6 September 1975, Nxumalo took an unofficial 
half-day's leave and officiated as a linesman at the stadium. 
He was caught by Cameron and was dismissed for misconduct on 
31 October 1975. 71 
Certainly, the tactic undertaken by Nxumalo involved 
67 Minutes of meeting of the Frametex works/liaison 
committee, 4 October 1977. See also minutes of meeting ... , 6 June 
1978. 
68 Minutes of meeting of the Frametex works committee, 6 
June 1978. 
69 NA, SCF, Manager, central district, G.F. Baker to the 
chief director, 15 October 1975. 
70 Ibid. 
71 Ibid. 
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risks of detection by officials. Nonetheless, other workers 
managed evasively and passively to "work the system" 
unobserved. As with Nxumalo, and similar cases recorded by the 
Board officials, African workers developed strategies which 
were aimed at .supplementing their wages by involvement in 
part-time jobs. Most reactions of this nature to exploitation 
were rather silent and in most cases it was very difficult to 
detect and control this form of protest. There were many days 
when African workers avoided work, embarked on go-slows and 
were "disobedient" - behaviour which capital interpreted as 
"laziness of [the] Zulu labourer". 72 
A sizeable number of workers resorted to "wastefulness" -
as in the case of D. Mbambo, who was caught several times 
spilling beer all over the yard at Congella brewery. 73 Many 
more found it expedient to direct their frustrations by simply 
"over-supplying" orders. In March 1973, P. Shangase of the 
PNAAB over-supplied an order for packed "Bantu" beer, and the 
management took it as a mistake. 74 In this, and similar 
cases, the supplier would be given some money privately. It 
was a series of over-supplies which prompted the Board to 
conclude that "Shangase .. be transferred to KwaMashu Labour 
Bureau ... [due to his] . . . dereliction of duty ... ". 75 
Drunkenness 
With regard to reported "drunkenness" at places of work, 
employers associated it with "laziness of [the] Zulu 
labourer", while for workers it represented a means of 
72 See NA, PNAAB, 1/2/1/1/9, Labour, 1 October 1975 - 31 
January 1976, G.F. Baker, manager, central district to the chief 
director, 26 November, 1975. 
73 NA, SCF, General manager, Department of Business 
Undertakings to the chief director, 21 October 1975. 
74 NA, SCF, G.F. Baker, acting manager, central district to 
the chief director, 17 May 1974. 
75 Ibid. 
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"ironing out emotional peaks and troughs". 76 Cases of workers 
coming drunk to work and drinking over lunch-time are well 
documented by the PNAAB; the phenomenon will be illustrated by 
a few cases cited below. Such actions could not be understood 
by employers but for workers it was another form of relaxation 
from unrewarding and tiring work. Psychological adjustment or 
escapism, such as drunkenness, is a powerful form of 
resistance at the work place itself. C. Ambler and J. Crush 
noted that drunkenness is a " ... set of cultural and social 
responses to the harsh experiences of industrial employment, 
urban residence, impoverishment, and racial segregation". 77 
Ambler and Crush are of the opinion that the inter-
pretation of beer drinking among Africans has been expressed 
by and large within a white colonial discourse. 78 In 
contrast, they view drinking " ... not simply as a weapon of 
domination but also as a relatively autonomous form of 
cultural expression, and thus a potent form of resistance". 79 
It was Van Onselen's pioneering essay, "Randlords and Rotgut", 
that marked a complete break with earlier assumptions about 
the use of alcohol in southern Africa. 80 According to Van 
Onselen, liquor drew men to the gold mines and helped mining 
capitalists to secure a cheap labour force and hold them there 
by meeting their consumer needs.81 As long as mine 
productivity was maintained, alcohol was tolerated by the 
76 Cohen, "Resistance and hidden forms of consciousness", p 
19. 
77 c. Ambler and J. Crush, "Alcohol in southern African 
labour history", in J. Crush and C. Ambler ( eds), Liquor and 
labour in southern Africa (Pietermaritzburg, University of Natal 
Press, 1992), p 2. 
78 Ibid. I p 11 . 
79 Ibid. 
80 See Van Onselen, Studies in the social and economic 
history of the Witwatersrand, 1886-1914, 1, New Babylon. 
81 Ibid., p 95. 
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mining authorities, but as soon as drunkenness seriously 
hampered production it became the worst enemy of mine 
employers. The officials of the National Union of Mine Workers 
in the 1980s carne out strongly against drunkenness as 
retarding worker solidarity or as a form of insulation from 
"rational" resistance. 82 Also condemning widespread 
drunkenness among workers were the radical youth of the 1970s 
who saw it as a betrayal of the liberation rnovernent. 83 
Despite such wide-ranging condemnation of alcohol use, workers 
found it a means of escape and relief from their tiring work 
or, say lack of acculturation to the harsh terms of industrial 
discipline. 
One of the most fascinating examples of a worker who was 
always drunk and gave his employers "headaches" was z. 
Ngerna. 84 Ngerna worked at the KwaMashu Maintenance Depot of 
the PNAB from the early 1970s. On several occasions, it was 
alleged, Ngerna reported for duty drunk and was "unwilling to 
do work ... [he] refused to carry out instructions given to him 
by both European and Bantu supervisory staff". 85 On 10 
December 1974, he was drunk to the extent that he could not 
perform his duties and as a result was given a half-day off. 
For three days in a week, Ngerna reported for duty drunk and 
was sent horne. During the same month, he refused to accompany 
a gang~ of workers who were assigned to cut grass in the 
township. The reason for his refusal was that that "work was 
beyond him ... a stomach complaint made it difficult for him 
to carry out his work". 86 Furthermore, from 18 December 
82 D. Moodie, "Alcohol and resistance on the South African 
gold mines, 1903-1962", in Crush and Ambler, Liquor and labour 
in southern Africa, p 163. 
83 Ibid., p 179. 
84 NA, SCF, Ellis to the director of administration, 18 
February 1975. 
85 Ibid. 
86 Ibid. 
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onwards, Ngema was assigned light duties of sweeping at the 
Depot but only worked for a few hours and then disappeared 
from work. As a result of his actions, he was dismissed by the 
Board in February 1975. This particular case shows another 
form of resistance by workers: drunkenness went hand in hand 
with poor performance at work, with refusal, in some 
instances, to perform duties and the denial of labour-power to 
the employer. The latter is clearly illustrated in the case of 
Ngema when he was given off-days on several occasions due to 
his state of drunkenness. 
Drunkenness was widely reported by the PNAAB officials. 
It was rife among Maintenance Service workers, 87 and Brewery 
workers, to mention but two. 88 Ijuba beer tended to be used 
as a means of courage-gathering to resist instructions from 
supervisors. Refusal to carry out certain duties becomes in 
itself a form of resistance. Such resistance can be 
illustrated by the case of M. Sibisi, who worked at the 
Leicester Road Depot of the PNAAB.89 Sibisi was on record for 
constantly refusing to carry out instructions from his African 
supervisor, Tabete. He was transferred to the refuse removal 
gang to prove his willingness to work because he had, as the 
management put it, "become insolent to seniors and ... [was] 
having a bad influence on the rest of the task force". 90 
Sibisi continued with his resistance and when requested by the 
management to terminate his services, he agreed. It was only 
established that Sibisi had been offered another job in the 
textile industry a week before he agreed to terminate his 
87 NA, SCF, Control officer, (Technical and Building 
Services) to director of administration, 13 November 1974. See 
the case of M.M. Mkwayana. 
88 NA, SCF, Ellis to director of administration, 18 February 
1975. 
89 NA, SCF, Ellis, Assistant director, Technical and 
Building Services to director of administration (staff section), 
19 May 1975. 
90 Ibid. 
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services. 
Women and resistance 
Many labour historians have tended to undermine the role 
played by women in South Africa's economy. Most of these 
historians have, however, as S.B. Stichter noted, paid 
insufficient attention to women's hidden resistance and 
concentrated mainly on "writing about male labourers". 91 From 
the 1970s onwards, women historians have challenged this male-
dominated and gender insensitive type of history and became 
"more interested in how women have constructed their own 
autonomous cultures [of resistance], they also began to 
suggest new ways of integrating gender into working-class 
history". 92 
Undoubtedly, women's struggles, just like men's, were 
varied and ranged from hidden and silent to open forms of 
response. A close examination of the textile industry reveals 
that women workers were involved in sexual activities with 
foremen or supervisors in order to get promotion or wage 
increments or to prevent dismissal. Although it sounds as if 
the women workers took the initiative to involve their 
supervisors in sexual activities, in fact sexual favours were 
usually demanded by those in power. Most women workers who 
participated in such activities were forced by circumstances 
which were beyond their control. One of the duties of the 
supervisors was to recommend wage increments to specific 
workers who had excelled in their work. As M. Mothwa recalls: 
Some of us saw it necessary to fall in love with 
these foremen so as to get a fair treatment and 
better pay ... It was because a woman would not love 
him for the sake of loving, they were forced to do 
it, like going to bed with these foremen in order to 
91 S.B. Stichter, Migrant labourers (Cambridge, CUP, 1985), 
p 164. 
92 See this rich and insightful book by I. Berger, Threads 
of solidarity: women in South African industry, 1900-1980 
(London, James Currey, 1992), p 8. 
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secure their jobs.93 
Mothwa's sentiments reflect a particular recognition that 
sexual harassment was and still is a problem for labouring 
women in all industrial establishments and various places of 
work. It is a pointer to men's abuse of power by making sexual 
demands on working women.94 Obviously this practice was not 
condoned by management. For those women who resisted sexual 
advances of foremen, they were "never promoted and did not get 
good reports for wage increments". 95 In some cases, women 
complained to management about sexual harassment but, as Msomi 
said, "it was difficult to prove except in one case where a 
supervisor was dismissed after women gave evidence against 
him". 96 Justifying feminist outcry against sexual harassment, 
M. Bularzik opens her analysis thus: 
As in many forms of violence against women, the 
assertion of power and dominance is often more 
important than the sexual interaction. Sexual 
demands in the workplace ... become even more 
coercive because a woman's economic livelihood may 
be at stake. 97 
While the practice itself constituted women's sexual 
exploitation by men, it could also be interpreted as women's 
way of working the system in order to get much-needed wage 
increments. 
At Frame, for instance, where women worked alongside men, 
93 Interview with Maureen Mothwa by Junerose Nala: 1973 
Research Project by Dr D. Hemson. Interview translated by Peace 
Cele, 19 October 1993. 
94 See Berger, Threads of solidarity. She gives an 
interesting account of how shop stewards at a Dunlop chemical 
factory in Durban successfully laid a trap for a training officer 
who was requiring sexual favours as a condition of employment 
(p.3). 
95 Interview with Msomi, 16 october 1992. 
96 Ibid. 
97 See M. Bularzik, "Sexual harassment at the work-place: 
historical notes", Radical America, 12 (1978), pp 25-6. 
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they frequently received lower wages for the same work. In the 
textile agreement prior to 1973 there was a wage differential 
of about a third between women and men doing the same work. 
While poverty level wages were paid to both men and women, it 
was women who bore the main burden and it was their labour 
which increasingly became central to production. However, the 
sexual line of division was between weavers and spinners; 
women being regarded as more nimble in handling spinning 
operations. In their continued struggle against exploitation, 
another manifestation of women's ability to raise money was 
the adoption of the tactic of selling food to workmates during 
lunchtime at the expense of factory canteens. 
The consequence of large numbers of female employees at 
Frame's textiles was the frequent excuse by women who avoided 
work, that their children were sick. Women's actions in this 
regard were not without justification because they were 
exploited in various ways. During the 1960s and 1970s, Frame 
was well known for subjecting women to degrading and 
exploitative conditions. Pregnant women were discharged and 
denied maternity leave (a fairly common practice in most 
labour sections of South Africa at the time). 98 Their re-
employment depended on the available vacancies. As a result of 
this unjust labour practice, many women workers at Frame 
refused to divulge their pregnancies, as the Frametex Liaison 
Works Committee minutes show: 
Many girls were afraid to reveal their pregnancies 
as they were not sure that they will be able to be 
re-engaged after being away from pregnancy leave. It 
was the policy of the Company to advise a female 
when she left whether she will be suitable for re-
employment or not. However, an ex-employee would 
only be re-engaged provided there were vacancies in 
their departments.99 
After giving birth, women reported to work within a week and 
the reason advanced for the absence was illness: women's 
98 Minutes of the Frametex meeting ... , 2 August 1977. 
99 Minutes of the Frametex meeting ... ,14 November 1978. 
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workmates notified the relevant supervisor to that effect 
during the period of absenteeism in order to avoid her 
dismissal. 
Another tactic developed by women in the textile 
industries was the avoidance of heavy work on the grounds that 
they were women. Some women who were called upon to do heavy 
tasks found ways of avoiding such jobs. M. Mothwa explained 
such a situation: 
I used to work harder 1 for example, taking blankets 
out of the machines to somewhere to be weighed. They 
were heavy without anyone to help ... From the 
storeroom, we had to ... take the yarn 
ourselves ... It was heavy. Some women fell in love 
with men in order to be helped. 100 
Because of the meagre wages paid to their husbands, women 
who were excluded from formal employment often engaged in 
other activities such as the sale of beer, food and sex. 
Writing about women on the Zambian Copperbelt, S. Stichter 
notes: 
The commercialisation of services such as food, beer 
and sex has been for many women quite a successful 
way to get access to the collective pay check, both 
in Zambia and throughout Africa. And on the 
Copperbelt in the 1940s even adultery paid: women 
were in such high demand that married women 
sometimes sold sexual favours on the side in order 
to get a little extra cash. 101 
The problems faced by working women are not unique to 
South Africa alone, but are world-wide. For instance, in 
Zimbabwe, "the sex for job" issue became widespread during the 
1980s, and compelled the government to enact a law prohibiting 
such a practice. 
Conclusion 
Cognisance of the passive forms of protest are fundamental to 
an understanding of the material history of the African 
100 Interview with Maureen Mothwa: 1973 Research Project. 
101 Stichter, Migrant labourers, p 167. 
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working class under capitalism. Such struggles, though 
confined to the individual consciousness and without many 
publicised victories and concessions won, nonetheless have 
their own impact. The hidden forms of resistance will always 
remain a "bedrock" and a "genuine" form of consciousness. This 
chapter has focused on one of the less obvious themes of 
African labour studies. The intention of the chapter was not 
only to show the continuity of African resistance to 
exploitation during the apartheid era, but to serve as a 
reminder to historians, writers and scholars of different 
persuasions that various modes of struggle were utilised 
during the 1960s and early 1970s. The fact that the apartheid 
state policies of the 1960s virtually abolished the legal 
rights of the African people to political and trade union 
activities does not negate the argument that covert forms of 
struggle continued unabated. However, the coming of 
independent trade unions in the 1970s (discussed in Chapters 8 
to 11) gave a voice to workers' demands. Thus, although there 
were unions in the period from 1973 onwards, informal 
resistance has remained in place and can be regarded as a 
common practice in most labour establishments. 
PART TWO 
The Rise of African Independent Trade Unions 
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Chapter Eight 
The 1973 Durban Strikes 
Introduction 
African workers in South Africa, particularly in the 1960s and 
1970s, were governed by a wide range of oppressive legislation 
designed to paralyse them. The most important laws in this 
respect were the Suppression of Communism Act of 1950 and the 
Bantu Labour (Settlement of Disputes) Act of 1953, which, 
respectively, restricted trade union activity and stipulated 
heavy penalties for striking workers. Such restrictive laws 
were meant to intimidate African workers not to challenge the 
established accumulation order. But the capitalist form of 
accumulation in South Africa tends to bring into being open 
and explicit class struggle between labour and capital, 
particularly in the workplace. African workers' struggles have 
always varied in form and hence have ranged from hidden to 
open forms of resistance. One viable form of struggle has been 
the strike. 
Strike actions by African workers in the 1970s challenged 
the whole oppressive system of poor wages, pass laws, 
residential segregation, the denial of political and trade 
union rights and the Bantu Education system under which all 
Africans suffered - men, women and children. The wave of 
strikes of 1973 is very important in that it assumed a new and 
distinctive character not possessed by any of the previous 
general strikes called by the nationalist leaders of the 
1950s. It was spontaneous, and it shook the apartheid state 
which had enjoyed relative industrial "peace" since the 
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banning of the ANC and PAC in 1960. It also set the scene for 
what was to come. Furthermore, the 1973 strike which was to 
change the face of labour relations throughout South Africa 
happened in Natal and not in the Transvaal - the industrial 
heartland of the country. 
Workers and strikes 
Strikes, even if they end disastrously, function to raise 
worker consciousness, broaden solidarity amongst workers and 
extend the level of understanding of the moral economy or the 
unethical justification for exploitation. 1 Commenting on the 
1973 mass strikes in Durban, B. Magubane writes: 
Mass strikes in South Africa represent high points 
in the class struggle. Even the accommodation of the 
white workers to the status quo was not a given. It 
took place after violent and bitter struggles 
organised by the white workers against capitalist 
intentions to deprive them of their livelihood. 2 
In the early twentieth-century, the battle lines were clearly 
drawn between white labour and mining capitalists, with 
employers opposed to trade unions for white miners. However, 
white workers embarked on strike action and were able to 
1 See, for instance T.D. Moodie, "The moral economy of the 
black miners' strike of 1946", Journal of Southern African 
Studies, vol 13, no 1 (1986); and V.I. Lenin, What is to be Done? 
in Collected Works, volume 5 (London, Lawrence and Wishart, 
1961), pp 375- 408. Lenin did not give unqualified support to 
strikes. He stated that unless worker action has a political 
dimension, it is limited. He was not only interested in political 
strikes but in the relationship between economic and political 
strikes; the one feeding on the other. His main argument is that 
strikes bring forward the issue of workers' control of society 
and socialism. He was clear that the trade unions had to fight 
for reforms; the question was how these reforms were fought for -
to increase the workers' self-confidence or to strengthen 
illusions in capitalist reform. Arguably, successful strike 
action in South Africa over the past 15 years has led, at one 
level, to a tacit acceptance of the capitalist ethic. Forcing the 
state and capital into reform has been in the long-term interests 
of capital. 
2 B. Magubane, South Africa: from Soweto to Uitenhage (New 
Jersey, Africa World Press, 1989), p21. 
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assert themselves against the harsh treatment of their bosses. 
For instance, on the eve of the First World War, white mine-
workers were involved in a massive and bloody strike which 
resulted in the recognition of their trade unions by the 
Chamber of Mines. The white miners fought to defend their 
privileges against the tendency of employers to reduce their 
position and to substitute cheap labour for their more 
expensive labour. 
The African working class (like white workers) had also 
to stand up against exploitation, and their strike action 
ushered in an era of intensive industrial unrest in all the 
metropolitan areas. The strikes also saw the advent of an 
unprecedented growth of the independent African trade union 
movement, which forced the state to institute legislation 
that, for the first time, allowed African workers to be 
recognised as "employees''. African trade unions were legally 
recognised, as was their right to strike. 3 
Under the Industrial Conciliation Act (ICA) of 1924, 
African workers had not been regarded as "employees" in terms 
of its provisions. Consequently, African workers were 
automatically excluded from any participation in the crucial 
machinery of industrial relations in the country. They were 
subjected to discrimination under the Industrial Conciliation 
Act, which enforced the colour bar by simply defining an 
"employee" as anyone who was not a "native"; coloured and 
Indian workers were also included in the definition. Since 
Africans were not defined as "employees", their trade unions 
could not be registered. Although unregistered African trade 
unions were in fact never made illegal, they were excluded 
from participation in the industrial labour machinery which 
was a preserve of whites, coloureds and Asians. The fact that 
such unions could not be registered was an obvious discrimina-
tion which cried out to be challenged. 
3 Such changes took place soon after the release of the 
Wiehahn and Riekert Commission Reports in 1979. 
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By the beginning of the 1970s, there was a gathering 
momentum of labour unrest in Durban, largely influenced by the 
activities of the newly established General Workers' Factory 
Benefit Fund (GWFBF), the University of Natal Students' Wages 
Commission, and also the re-emergence and regrouping of former 
SACTU officials who had survived the 1960s. The Wages 
Commission was formally established at the University of Natal 
by white students in order to help African workers by 
presenting evidence to the Wage Board, encouraging working 
class organisation and campaigning for higher wages. They also 
launched a local newspaper. Printed in Zulu, 
Isisebenzi/Industrial Worker provided key information on the 
poverty datum line and it carried strike news on any industry 
that was affected. On 8 June 1971, about 10 000 pamphlets were 
distributed in Durban by the Wages Commission, soliciting 
support from workers for a meeting to protest against the Wage 
Board's recommendation for unskilled workers in Durban, and 
pressurising for a wage of at least R7,97 a week. 4 A sizeable 
number of workers attended the meeting and made a demand of 
R20 a week. The following day, at the McWillaw Iron and Steel 
Foundry, about 200 African workers went on strike, demanding 
higher wages. They used the pamphlets which were distributed 
by the Wages Commission to bargain for higher wages. The 
management of the steel foundry first fired all the workers 
but later re-employed some, although refusing to rehire the 
leaders of the strike. 5 
While the struggle for wages continued in Durban, the 
issue of worker organisation became central, especially among 
the officials of the Garment Workers' Union of Natal and the 
Furniture Union. These two unions represented Indian workers 
and were led by H. Bolton (a famous, key figure among Durban 
4 D. Hemson, "Class consciousness and migrant workers: 
dockworkers of Durban" ·(University of Warwick, Ph.D, 1979), p 
552. 
5 See The Natal Mercury, 10, 11 and 16 June 1971; and The 
Daily News, 10 and 17 June 1971. 
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trade unionists and general secretary of the registered TWIU, 
GWIU and FAWU in 1970), who offered assistance and guidance in 
the establishment of the Benefit Fund on 9 September 1972 to 
provide medical and death benefits for workers and their 
families, particularly those of the clothing and furniture 
industries.6 
By the time the Durban strikes broke out, the Benefit 
Fund had recruited thousands of African and Indian workers 
from different industries and organised workers' committees, 
which in a few cases were recognised under the law in various 
industries, as a form of protection for its representatives. 
Another development in 1972 was an attempt by trade union 
officials of the 1950s and 1960s to revive the South African 
Congress of Trade Unions (SACTU). 7 Its decline has been a 
subject of intense debate among scholars such as R. Lambert, 
S. Friedman, J. Baskin, E. Feit and E. Webster.a Central to 
the debate was SACTU-ANC relations from the late 1950s to 
1960, during which period the federation was intact and 
strong. Despite the divergent views on the decline of SACTU, 
scholars are agreed that between 1960 and 1965, about 160 
SACTU officials were banned. 9 By mid-1965, SACTU had 
6 SALB, "Report on the General Workers' Factory Benefit 
Fund", SALB, 1,3 (July 1976), p 52. See also Friedman, Building 
tomorrow today, p 43. 
7 E. Webster, Cast in a racial mould (Johannesburg, Ravan 
Press, 1985), p 132. 
8 See R. Lambert, "Political unionism and working class 
hegemony: perspectives on the south African Congress of Trade 
Unions", Labour, Capital and Society, vel 18, no 2 (1985); S. 
Friedman, Building tomorrow today: African workers in trade 
unions, 1970-84 (Johannesburg, Ravan Press, 1987); J. Baskin, 
Striking back: a history of COSATU (Johannesburg, Ravan Press, 
1991); E. Feit, Workers without weapons (Hamden, Archon, 1975); 
and E. Webster and R. Lambert, "The re-emergence of political 
unionism in contemporary South Africa?", in w. Cobbett and R. 
Cohen (eds), Popular struggles in South Africa (London, Onyx 
Press, 1988) . 
9 see, for example, T. Lodge, Black politics in South Africa 
since 1945 (Johannesburg, Ravan Press, 1990 ed), p 197 
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completely faded away with many of its leaders in exile. It 
was only in the early 1970s that attempts were made within the 
country to revive the organisation. The impact of the revived 
SACTU was not, however, as much as had been expected, since 
the activists had been absorbed into the General Factory 
Workers' Benefit Fund. 
The South African Students' Organisation (SASO)(formed in 
July 1969 with the sole purpose of conscientising the African 
communities) and the Black Consciousness Movement were 
involved in worker education and organisation, processes which 
were realised through the distribution of pamphlets to 
workers. As the history of these organisations is well-
documented, it is not necessary to examine them here. 10 At 
its conference in July 1972, SASO instructed its organiser to 
consider the viability of establishing a Black Workers' 
Council to enable " ... workers to negotiate in a united voice 
for those conditions regarded as essential to their 
survival". 11 Thus the role of the Workers' Council was 
... to serve the needs and aspirations of [African] 
workers, to conscientise them about their role ... to 
run clinics for leadership, in-service training and 
to imbue them with pride and self-confidence as 
people and about their potential as workers. 12 
In order to realise its objects, SASO formally launched the 
Black Workers' Project (BWP) in 1972. However, very little was 
achieved and neither SASO nor the BWP politically influenced 
the outbreak of the 1973 Durban strikes. 
Like any other organisation labelled as communist by the 
state, the BWP experienced state hostility and harassment. On 
10 See, for example, G. Gerhart, Black power in South Africa 
(Berkeley, University of California Press, 1978); S. Biko, I 
write what I like (London, Heinemann, 1979); and Reader's Digest, 
Illustrated history of South Africa: the real story (Cape Town, 
The Reader's Digest Association, 1992 ed). 
11 See R. Toli, "The origins of the Durban strikes, 1973" 
(University of Durban- Westville, MA, 1991), p 219. 
12 Ibid. 
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5 February 1973, the Minister of Labour, M. Viljoen, accused 
the BWP of being "one of the instigators" of the 1973 strike, 
indicating that letters were posted to various organisations 
in 1972 for distribution to the workers so as to advise them 
not to be "pushed around by whites" . 13 This kind of 
accusation was used by the state as justification for the 
arrest of five members of the Black Peoples' Convention and 
SASO for distributing pamphlets to African workers at the 
Warwick Avenue bus terminus in early February 1973. 14 
The stirrings of discontent continued. In Durban, the 
dockworkers went out on strike on 23 October 1972 and demanded 
R18 a week, "voluntary overtime, shorter working hours, and 
complained that their living conditions were ... unhygienic". 15 
Some of the complaints advanced were that, since there were no 
payslips, workers felt cheated by the company through unknown 
deductions for income tax and compound fees. Workers rejected 
indunas as their representatives and some complained of the 
lack of bunks in the compounds, since most of them slept on 
the cold floor. The food was bad and beer sold in the 
compounds was diluted with water. 16 
On the second day of the dockworkers strike, Dreyer, the 
Compound Manager, warned them to return to work or risk losing 
their jobs. The police were called in and workers had no 
choice but to return to work. Commenting on the strike, the 
Wages Commission noted that: "Force has resolved the issues 
for the present. The underlying causes remain - workers 
dissatisfied with very real conditions: long hours, low wages, 
13 South African Observer, 18, 1 (March 1973), p 9. For 
debates in the Parliament over these issues, see House of 
Assembly Debates, 19 April 1972. 
14 The Sunday Tribune, 4 February 1973 and The Star, 7 
February 1973. 
15 Hems on, "Class consciousness and migrant workers", p 648. 
16 Ibid. 
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hard and dangerous work, and separation from families". 17 
The dockworkers' strike of 1972 failed to achieve the 
desired wage increments or to redress workers' varied 
grievances and demands. Various lessons were learnt from the 
dockworkers' strike, namely that mass united action was 
possible and that worker representatives should not be elected 
in order to avoid victimisation of particular identified 
individuals. Workers were, therefore, prepared to speak with 
one voice. 
Coronation Brick and beyond 
From 9 January to 31 March 1973, Durban was rocked by a series 
of strikes. Usuthu, "a Zulu war cry which originated as a 
reference to raided cattle, in a homestead of the Zulu prince 
Cetshwayo ka Mpande more than 140 years ago" 18; Filumuntu ufe 
usadikiza, "Man is dead, but his spirit lives" 19 : these were 
the slogans which the Coronation Brick workers chanted as they 
entered the football stadium in Durban on 9 January 1973. At 
about 3 am, the Coronation Brick workers at the Number One and 
Avoca plants marched in two columns towards the stadium, 
thereby beginning what is popularly known as the Durban 
Strikes. About 2 000 workers participated, demanding a minimum 
wage of R30 per week. After two days of negotiations, workers 
accepted a R2 rise and a new minimum wage of R11,50 per week. 
The news of the Coronation strike spread throughout Durban and 
the whole country, with newspapers documenting as much as 
possible about the striking workers (quite a significant 
change in attitude by the press). This reporting marked a 
17 The Wages Commission Statement as cited in Hemson, "Class 
consciousness and migrant workers", p 651. 
18 J. Guy, The destruction of the Zulu Kingdom ( London, 
Longman, 1979), p 246. See also IIE, The Durban strikes, 1973, 
pp 96-7. 
19 See for instance, !IE, The Durban strikes, 1973 ( Durban, 
I IE, 19 7 4) , p 1 0. 
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significant change in the attitude of the press. Indeed, the 
press's general sympathy towards strikers was precisely 
because workers "had real grievances" which needed to be 
"brought to the notice of the public and the employers". 20 
The Coronation Brick strike ignited unrest throughout the 
province of Natal. Mostly, when workers initially began to 
strike they rejected the idea of electing representatives for 
fear of victimisation. However, Durban workers enjoyed the 
support of their traditional leaders only on rare occasions, 
especially King G. Zwelithini, which gave the strikers' cause 
some legitimacy. The King became involved in the dispute at 
Coronation and offered to negotiate with management on behalf 
of workers. His involvement gave hope to workers although 
nothing favourable came out of his deliberations with 
management. 21 This was the first and possibly the only time 
such support from the Zulu king could be recorded. 
Strike surveys show that as one factory returned to work, 
another came out on strike; the main issue in each of the 
strikes was the same - the demand for higher wages. The 
momentum of the strike wave failed to decline, even as 
thousands of armed police were flown in from Pretoria and 
other cities. The heavy police presence did not incite 
violence and in most cases the police hardly intervened 
actively in the strikes. It is possible that the police 
adopted such an attitude in order to avoid confrontation with 
workers as had occurred in the past and which could have led 
to general unrest. But as a result, the police presence failed 
to deter workers from striking. 
Most important were the strikes in the textile industry, 
particularly those involving the most exploited, poorly paid 
textile workers from the Frame Group of companies. From 25 
January the strikes spread from mill to mill and the whole 
empire stretching from Pinetown to the Mobeni area was 
20 IIE, The Durban strikes, p 44. 
21 Ibid, see pp 10, 12- 13. 
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affected. Within weeks, thousands of workers from various 
industrial establishments also downed tools. The first three 
months of 1973 saw 61 410 workers on strike 22 and by the end 
of the year, about 100 000 African and Indian workers were in-
volved. 23 
The outbreak of strikes in Durban took the apartheid 
state by complete surprise. It was clear that the decade of 
"law and order" of the 1960s, the widely acclaimed era of 
industrial peace, was over. The state implicated employers in 
the problem of failing to blame "agitators" and 
"intimidators". 24 The state further implicated employers for 
failing to improve workers' wages and living conditions. In 
turn, employers of African labour pointed fingers at the 
state's labour policies and in particular at the Wage Board. 
The accusations and counter-accusations did little to explain 
what could have precipitated a strike wave of such magnitude 
in Durban in 1973. 
Numerous works have been produced in an attempt to 
explain the causes of the 1973 Durban strikes. M. Boulanger 
singles out low wages, the job colour bar and the total 
absence of legal machinery for representation on the part of 
African workers. 25 The Institute for Industrial Education 
(IIE) came to the conclusion in their work The Durban Strikes 
that: 
The strikes were a series of spontaneous actions by 
workers which spread by imitation, and the spread 
was 'multiplied' by the fact that three quite 
independent factors happened to coincide. The second 
factor was the existence in Durban, strategically 
placed in each of the major industrial areas, of a 
22 House of Assembly Debates, 24 April 1973, col 691-98. See 
also the figures provided by the SAIRR, Survey of race relations, 
1973. 
23 SAIRR, Survey of race relations, 1973. 
24 See IIE, The Durban strikes, 1973, p 91. 
25 M. Boulanger, "Black workers and strikes in South 
Africa", Race, XV, 3 (1974). 
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number of factories belonging to one organisation 
characterised by particularly low wages and bad 
labour relations - the Frame group. The third factor 
was the rising transport costs and the rumoured 
train boycott. What precisely sparked off the strike 
is not clear - however, once the strikes did occur, 
the sight of large crowds of workers out on strike 
encouraged workers in neighbouring factories, ~nd 
the strike sp~ead geographically road by road. 6 
The study, however, fails to explain the reasons for the out-
break, that is, why they first occurred at Coronation Brick. 
The idea of a "spontaneous strike" embarked upon by workers 
was clearly a problem to the authors. In their attempt to 
avoid spontaneity, they emphasized three major players during 
the strike: small groups of agitators, activists and influen-
tial persons. The authors assert: 
The spread of spontaneous action of this kind will 
almost certainly depend upon and be influenced by 
pre-existing informal communication networks such as 
friendship groups, 'homeboy' groups, groups of 
people who 'habitually commute together' and so 
on. 27 
E. Webster criticises the authors for their failure "to 
explore further these central insights into spontaneous mass 
action and the reader is left with the actual dynamics of 
conflict in particular factories unexplained and 
unexplored". 28 He also noted that, 
The omission is the result of the authors' political 
objective in writing the book, i.e., to explore the 
dominant managerial and state ideology that the 
strike was the result of 'agitators' . 29 
The authors of the book were also criticised by J. Maree who 
noted: 
... The sad omission of The Durban Strikes is a study 
of the leadership and organizational patterns that 
26 IIE, The Durban strikes, pp 99-100. 
27 Ibid., pp 91-2. 
28 Webster, Cast in a racial mould, p 132. 
29 Ibid. 
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most probably existed during the strikes. 30 
David Hemson believes that the 1973 strikes were guided by an 
underground ANC and SACTU leadership structure "which 
exist[ed] as the groupings of workers acting consciously, 
illegally and secretly to carry forward working class 
struggles". 31 He further states: 
While the mass strikes were undoubtedly sponta-
neous, ... they were not unorganised, although this 
organisation was not merely a series of heightened 
social interactions nor a result of communication 
between social groupings in bus queues, but 
collective action by workers guided by working class 
leadership. 32 
Justifying his claims, Hemson draws examples from the dock-
workers' strike of 1972, in which an anonymous letter 
expressing the workers' demands was addressed to the Wage 
Board. 33 Similarly, letters stipulating workers' demands were 
clipped on the noticeboards, giving ultimatums to managers to 
respond; " ... petitions [were] organised, and secret strike 
committees [w~re] set up".34 Recounting his experiences of 
the 1973 strike, Hemson believes that people such as W. Mbali, 
an underground leader, and B.B. Cele, an established community 
figure and leader, who played a significant role in igniting 
the Durban strikes.35 Such a view is suggested by scattered 
evidence coming from the Natal Chamber of Industries' report 
30 J. Maree, "Seeing strikes in perspective: review article 
of the Durban strikes, 1973, South African Labour Bulletin, 
volume 2, No. 9 & 10 (May- June 1976), p 99. 
31 D. Hemson, "Trade unionism and the struggle for liber-
ation in South Africa', Capital and Class, Nos 4-6 (1978), p 22. 
32 b I id., pp 22-3. 
33 b I id., p 23. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Discussions with D. Hemson, 24 October 1994. 
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in which Pinetown strike leaders were identified. 36 In a 
report to the NCI, the names of strike leaders were given as: 
P. Masondo, J. Mavundla, P. Ntwaniza, E. Sithole, J. Cele, M. 
Mtolo and G. Mtetwa.37 
K. Luckhardt and B. Wall also acknowledge that worker 
action was spontaneous, but claim that it was organised by 
underground union leaders.38 They wrote: 
[I]t is important to point out that while the 
strikes were undoubtedly spontaneous, they were not 
unorganized. Such a large scale interruption of 
production could occur only if workers had their own 
underground organisation that made decisions and 
refused to expose individual leaders to a hostile 
regime. In the context of apartheid repression, open 
and legal trade unions cannot act as the vanguard of 
proletarian action; rather, the underground must 
play that role, while that underground machinery 
itself emerges from the close comradeship and class 
consciousness that emanates from the daily routines 
of social production.39 
At Coronation, N. Zulu emerged as a leader40 and at Frame's 
textile empire, workers such as I. Shongwe, R. Manyathi and s. 
Ngubane were underground leaders who played an important role 
in the organisation of workers during the strike. 41 In 
Umlazi, news of a strike was heard a day before the Coronation 
one. As E. Nyawo remembers: 
In Umlazi, we had an underground organisation which 
comprised the ANC activists, trade unionists like 
Ntuli and other community leaders. This organisation 
was opposed to Urban Bantu Council structures or any 
36 KCAL, PNAAB, KCF 82, Roll 64, Natal Chamber of Indus-
tries, Public Relations, File 4, 19 November 1973 - 14 October 
1974, File 3/8, 5 February 1973. 
37 Ibid., Report by M/0, Pinetown. 
38 K. Luckhardt and B. Wall, Organise or starve (London, 
Lawrence and Wishart, 1980}, p 453. 
39 Ibid. 
40 Ibid, p 1 3 . 
41 Interview with J. Gwala, 27 September 1993. 
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apartheid structure and it was believed then that 
members of the newly formed Umlazi Residents 
Association were the ones behind this 
organisation ... In January 1973, members of the 
Umlazi Residents Association organised workers and 
notices of an impending strike action were placed on 
bus and train stops a day before the Coronation 
strike. It is possible that these people were behind 
the whole strike action.42 
Perhaps a much broader perspective on an underground network 
that played an important role in the outbreak and during the 
strikes will be brought out in Hemson's book. 43 What is very 
clear from the 1973 strikes however is that workers refused to 
elect representatives and none of the underground leaders in 
Natal came out, but rather workers insisted on speaking with 
one voice. In fact, from the available evidence individual, 
underground leaders from different firms led and organised 
workers during the strikes 
More recently, R. Toli's work makes an invaluable 
contribution to our understanding of the 1973 strikes. 44 Toli 
draws attention to the long and short-term causes of the 
strikes, particularly at the Coronation Brick company which 
ignited the 1973. strike wave. The central thrust of Toli's 
thesis is firstly, the fact of poor wages and the management's 
rejection of wage increments, and, secondly the job colour bar 
which excluded some African workers from skilled jobs and 
hence from higher wages. Thirdly, Toli identifies certain 
42 Interview with E. Nyawo, Umlazi, 30 July 1992. 
43 See forthcoming book on 1973 Durban strikes by Dr David 
Hemson. Hemson at that time was a Research Officer for the 
Textile Workers Industrial Union (TWIU) and later banned in 1974 
for his participation in the 1973 strikes. It is unfortunate that 
the Natal Chamber of Industries, when disbanding in 1977, 
destroyed all their documents. In fact, the NCI officials 
deliberately destroyed all confidential material contained in 
their library which could have been of vital importance to this 
particular study. The "underground leaders" referred to in this 
study include both those Congress leaders who were still within 
the country and the rising leaders of informal networks without 
any necessary connection to the prior resistance. 
44 Toli, "The origins of the Durban strikes, 1973". 
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influences and networks of communication that developed before 
the general strike, such as the activities of the Black 
Consciousness Movement, the General Workers' Factory Benefit 
Fund (GWFBF), the Students' Wages Commission and the 
dockworkers' strike of 1972. 
All the above works neglect the very fundamental causes 
which are derived from the residential areas, hostels and 
informal settlements where the general workers lived with 
their families. The 1973 conflict did not arise purely from 
work-oriented problems, market forces and influences, and net-
works of communication. It was also a conflict that emerged 
from the discontent created within African residential areas. 
The townships, hostels and compounds were not "total 
institutions where protest is vigorously repressed, but rather 
act as hothouses of discontent'' 45 and this was carried over 
to the workplace. 
In a symposium organised by the South Africa Institute of 
Personnel Management in March 1973, Chief M.G. Buthelezi 
summarised the causes of the Durban strikes. Quoting Buthelezi 
on worker issues seem strange in the 1990s, but in the 1970s 
it was not that out of place since he enjoyed much worker 
support and was still in favour with the banned ANC. Buthelezi 
stated: 
... Can anyone tell me that against this background 
it is all a surprise that Africans in Durban went on 
strike? ... There has been inflation in this country 
for some .time and the cost of living has gone up all 
the time ... Africans, poor as they are, are always 
placed in townships as far away from their places of 
employment as possible ... Black workers need the 
security that all workers have ... Black workers 
would like to have their children educated on the 
same basis as White children ... Black workers would 
like to enjoy normal family lives and not lead an 
abnormal loveless life as 'bachelors' in the 
hostels ... South Africa cannot afford to sit down 
and maintain conditions for workers which border on 
45 S.B. Stichter, Migrant labourers (Cambridge, OUP, 1985), 
p 174. 
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semi-slavery. 46 
It is thus clear that the causes of the outbreak of the 
1973 strikes cannot be simply attributed to activities of 
"outside agitators", as government officials claimed; nor can 
blame be laid on "younger Bantu workers without family 
responsibility", as the Durban Chamber of Commerce's Non-
European Affairs Standing Committee and the Economic Advisory 
Committee noted. 47 Studies undertaken by the Institute of 
Social Research (ISR) at the University of Natal, 48 and the 
South African Institute of Race Relations, 49 failed to find 
any evidence of the so-called outside agitators or of large-
scale intimidation. Even the police found no evidence to 
substantiate the state claims.50 On the contrary it seems as 
if the Durban strikes were organised by an underground 
movement. 
Professor Schlemmer's remarks on the Durban strike 
validate such claims: 
There was, well before the strikes, a core of 
people, not outsiders or politically orientated 
intellectuals, within the industrial employee group, 
who act[ed] as a nucleus around which labour action 
could grow ... Informal patterns of communication in 
friendship groups, drinking groups, groups sharing 
transportation facilities, and other social networks 
would have been sufficient to set in motion a 
widening process of mutual encouragement and 
46 M.G. Buthelezi, "The reasons behind the Durban strikes 
and the aspirations and needs of the Black workers", S .A. 
Institute of Personnel Management, Strikes -the lessons from 
Natal (IPM, Symposium held in Johannesburg on the 14th March, on 
how to avoid and deal with strikes, 1973), pp 3-5. 
47 KCAL, PNAAB, KCF 80, Roll 62, DCC, Minutes of a special 
committee of the Non-European Affairs Standing Committee and the 
Economic Advisory Committee, 8 February 1973. 
48 University of Natal, Institute of Social Research, "The 
Durban strikes" (UND, ISR, 1973). 
49 SAIRR, Survey of race relations, 1973; and SAIRR, Labour 
organisation and the Black worker, 1974. 
5° Friedman, Building tomorrow today, p 50. 
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support. 51 
Professor Schlemmer's study suggests the existence of social 
pre-conditions which are easily traceable. Such issues.are 
important if we are to understand the 1973 strikes. J. Msomi, 
recounting her experiences of the early 1970s, stated: 
Many of us lived in shacks, we did not have proper 
accommodation, no water, no electricity and the 
sanitation was very, very poor. The wages in the 
textile industry were bad. In 1972, I was paid RS 
per week and I was expected to survive on that and 
in addition my two children ... When we went on 
strike in 1973, each and every worker demanded 
higher wages, but of course there were too many 
grievances to be addressed. Things such as 
accommodation, education for our children, 
transport, racism and so on, were our 
grievances ... 52 
Given the situation which faced African workers at the 
time, it only required a precipitating factor such as the 
failure to be awarded an increment or, say, the rumoured 16 
percent increase in rail fares, to ignite latent frustrations 
into a strike. Once the Coronation Brick workers began their 
strike, the process snowballed as more African workers saw the 
relevance of strike action to their own particular situations. 
Yet behind the outbreak of the strike wave of 1973 was the 
existence of underground leaders in a number of factories who 
guided and "refused to expose individual leaders to a hostile 
regime". 53 It appears, however, that there were at least two 
kinds of leaders: the informal group leaders who defended the 
wages of workers against management action, were established 
51 SAIRR, Labour organisation and the Black worker, p 9. 
52 Interview with Judith Msomi, Bolton Hall, Workers' 
College, 16 October 1992. Judith was part of the shop stewards 
and trade unionists at the Workers College, who were undertaking 
a trade union course in 1992. I became involved in the course as 
a private tutor while Professor Jeff Guy provided some lectures. 
I interviewed quite a number of those students. My profound 
thanks to Professor Guy who introduced those students to me while 
conducting my research in 1992. 
53 Luckhardt and Wall, Organise or starve, p 453. 
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figures, and shaded into the new union leadership, and the 
small clusters of ex-ANC, SACP and SACTU leaders who met on 
the basis of friendship and shared interests. 
Philip Frame and the strike wave in textiles 
In February 1973, newspapers monitoring labour unrest in 
Durban boldly printed: "Tycoon Frame gets the blame: Amazing 
career of man who got rich on cheap labour"54 and "Philip 
Frame asks: Must I take all the blame7"55 This was enough to 
capture people's attention. In an interview with the Rand 
Daily Mail, P. Frame admitted underpaying his workers, saying, 
"I certainly share the collective responsibility or guilt". 56 
Labour conditions in the Frame textile mills were 
extremely exploitative, particularly for migrant women. In 
1973 the Frame company employed just over 22 000 workers in 
factories operating in South Africa (mainly in Durban), 
Zimbabwe, Zambia and Malawi, more than half of whom were 
women. Such women were subjected to terrible working 
conditions and it is thus not surprising that those employed 
in the textile industry tended to be very militant in their 
approach to labour struggles. In 1973 they participated fully 
with men in the strikes. 
By 1973, some workers at one of Frame's textile companies 
had not received an increase in 14 years. 57 0. Zuma recalls 
the working conditions at Frame: 
The working conditions were terrible in Natal and in 
South Africa as a whole. But at Frame it was worse 
because this company had a feeling that it was 
helping poor people, so there was no need of 
improving conditions of work ... Wages were low, 
ranging from R5,65 per week ... Nothing was provided 
54 The Sunday Times, 11 February 1973. 
55 The Rand Daily Mail, 13 February 1973. 
56 Ibid. 
57 Labour History Group, Durban strikes, (Cape Town, July 
1987), p 15. 
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for workers like transport, food, accommodation ... 
Many women [werel forced to co-habit with men for 
accommodation ... sa 
When the strike broke out at Frame, women took a leading 
role. Management needed to redress the grievances of the 
workers, for, as one worker shouted during the strike period: 
"We are not children, ... we are asking for the managers to 
listen to our problems, then we will go back to work". 59 The 
following report is also informative of conditions: 
In the Frame factories, prospective female employees 
who survive a mandatory pregnancy test are then 
subjected to the continual watchful eye of factory 
doctors instructed to watch for signs of impending 
motherhood. Until early 1980 the Frame factories 
terminated the services of pregnant women, but since 
then an altered policy ostensibly provides for 
reemployment eight weeks after confinement. Women 
workers allege, however, that supervisors retain the 
arbitrary power to determine whether a woman will be 
reinstated. Those allowed to return are required to 
undergo a 'retraining' period during which time they 
are excluded from bonuses and overtime work. 
Instances of coercive intrusion by capital into 
workers' personal lives appear to be not uncommon in 
South Africa. In one engineering factory it was 
discovered in 1970 that African women were being 
forced to take the pill daily under a nurse's 
supervision. 5° 
The working conditions experienced by workers at Frame 
demanded militant action as a way of achieving a wage 
increment. The textile workers had made it clear that: 
We are not children who make a noise for no reason. 
We are men and women who want to see if tomorrow can 
be better than today because today is a struggle 
which is very heavy and we would like to have hope 
for the future.6 1 
58 Interview with Obed Zuma, 18 August 1993: 1973 Research 
Project. 
59 As cited in Friedman, Building tomorrow today, p 46. 
60 As cited in Stichter, Migrant labourers, p 177. 
61 D. Horner, "Recent Durban strikes", Race Relations News, 
volume 35, No 3 (March 1973), p 1. 
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Frame, like other employers, initially attempted to implement 
the advice distributed by the Durban Chamber of Commerce to 
its members on how to deal with strikes. The ten points were: 
1. Notify the Department of Labour (telephone 
number 28371). 
2. Advise your workers that you will consider their 
demands on condition that they return to work. 
3. Advise the workers that there will be no pay for the 
time they are on strike. 
4. If you consider that your present rates of pay are 
fully justifiable stand by these and in no 
circumstances move from that stand. 
5. If you feel that an increase in minimum wages is 
necessary determine this increase and tell them of 
your decision. Thereafter stand by your decision. 
6. Do not attempt to bargain as this will only en-
courage the Bantu to escalate his demands. Action 
must be positive, definite and final. 
7. Grant increases of a definite amount in preference 
to percentages on earnings. Percentages are not 
easily understood by the Bantu and across-the-board 
increases are of greater benefit to the lowest 
workers. 
8. Do everything possible to avoid violence but if this 
should arise, call the police immediately. 
9. Handle the press carefully - they may not trespass 
on your premises but it is usually wise to give them 
reasonable and accurate information. 
10. Stoppages to date have been mainly good natured and 
the tactful police action has contributed greatly to 
this. Make every effort to keep it this way. 62 
Frame failed to withstand pressure and finally awarded 
increases to the striking workers. 
The results and significance of the 1973 strikes 
Clear to all employers of African labour was the fact that 
minimum wages of below R10 per week were a recipe for disaster 
since, as rightly noted by Prime Minister J. Vorster, African 
62 KCAL, PNAB, KCF 80, Roll 62, The Durban Chamber of 
Commerce, 9 February 1973. 
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workers were "human beings with souls". 63 Vorster was 
sympathetic to African strikers and blamed employers for only 
"see[ing] in their workers a unit producing for them so many 
hours of service a day" 64 without any consideration of their 
poor wages. The 1973 strikes immediately, as the statement of 
the Federation of South African Trade Unions reads, "prompted 
agonized soul-searching which was to go on for years - until, 
in fact, the 1976 Soweto unrest switched the focus to agonized 
soul searching about township unrest".65 
The situation of African workers employed by British com-
panies in South Africa also came under public scrutiny after 
the release of a series of reports by the local and inter-
national press. Articles by A. Raphael of The Guardian forced 
the British government to institute a full-scale enquiry by a 
Parliamentary Select Committee into wages paid to African 
workers in South Africa. 66 British companies in South Africa 
were found to be among the worst exploiters of African labour. 
The first "Code of Conduct" was recommended for subsidiary 
companies in South Africa. However, the "Code of Conduct" was 
heavily criticised by the emerging African trade union 
movement as a 
... means by which the capitalist class tries to 
substitute its own programme of improvements for the 
programme of social transformation demanded by 
workers. All the Codes of Conduct that exist have 
been drawn up by governments or groups of 
employers ... In reality, there is not the slightest 
63 See, for instance SA Parliamentary Debate, col.346, 9 
February 1973; and also !IE, The Durban strikes, p 106. 
64 Ibid. 
65 University of Witwatersrand (hereafter UW), William 
Cullen Library (hereafter WCL), Historical and Literary Papers 
(hereafter HLP), FOSATU, AH 1999/C 3.12.3.18: C 3.5.4, Strikes: 
political implications of industrial unrest, p 5. 
66 See UW, WCL, HLP, SACTWU, AH 2196/ H 23.3.1, Profiteering 
from cheap labour: wages paid by British companies in South 
Africa (London, South African Labour Education Project, August 
1980). 
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guarantee that even the wages proposed by the EEC 
Code of Conduct will be paid by all British 
employers in South Africa.67 
Despite such criticism, the increases which, ranged between 
RO,SO and R2,07 per week, were awarded to workers in 1973 are 
a pointer to the effectiveness of strike actions or work 
stoppages. 68 
As a result of the strikes, the government and company 
managements had to look for ways of dealing with the new 
situation. The strikes brought about the formation of illegal 
independent African trade unions. However, the Benefit Fund 
had earlier laid the foundation for worker organisation in 
Durban through its various activities. Furthermore, the 
Benefit Fund had a vision of being a "stepping stone to trade 
unionism proper, hiving off sections of its members into 
industrial unions when sufficient membership in that 
particular sector had been achieved".69 It was in this 
climate that the first independent trade unions were formed. 
In April and September 1973, the Metal and Allied Workers 
Union (MAWU) and the National Union of Textile Workers (NUTW) 
were formed respectively. 70 The Furniture and Timber Workers 
Union (FTWU), the Chemical Workers Industrial Union (CWIU) and 
the Transport and General Workers Union (TGWU) were 
established in 1974. 71 Durban had taken the lead in the 
67 Ibid., pp 7-8. See also UW, WCL, HLP, SACTWU, H 23.2, EEC 
Code of Conduct, 1973. 
68 SAIRR, A view of the 1973 strikes, 20 November 1973 -see 
summary of strikes. 
69 P. Bonner, "Focus of FOSATU", ~' volume 5, no 1 
(1979), p 6. 
70 See S. Meer, "Community and unions in Natal: Part one 
from the 1973 strikes to independent trade unions", SALB, volume 
13, no 3 (1988), p 79; G. Wood, "The 1973 Durban strikes: of 
local and national significance", Contree, number 31 (1992), p 
23; and also Chapter Ten in this thesis. 
71 Ibid. 
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formation of independent trade unions, which eventually were 
to be established nationally. Quite clearly, the 1973 strikes 
had created the necessary conditions under which African trade 
unions could be formed; in fact, the strike wave had set in 
motion the process. As independent trade unions were formed, 
it became apparent that there was need for a co-ordinating 
body. This led to the formation of Natal's Trade Union 
Advisory and Co-ordinating Council (TUACC) in 1975. This was 
the link with the KwaZulu government to support industrial 
organisation. In 1979, however, TUACC joined with other 
independent unions to form a national co-ordinating body, the 
Federation of South African Trade Unions (FOSATU). 
In response to those developments, the government, 
surprisingly, amended the labour laws as a way of facilitating 
new channels of communication between African workers and 
their respective employers. The Bantu Labour (Settlement of 
Disputes) Act of 1953 was amended in 1973 in response to the 
new climate of militancy from African workers. The Act was 
renamed the Bantu Labour Relations Regulations Act of 1973. 
The amended Act gave birth to three kinds of committee for 
representing African workers at the company level: works 
committees, which had existed in a different form under a 
previous Act; co-ordinating works committees, which were 
supposed to co-ordinate various activities and represent 
African workers in industries, or at any work place where 
there was more than one works committee; and finally, liaison 
committees. 
While the intention of the 1973 Act was to prevent the 
African work force from striking through the establishment of 
a number of liaison committees, labour unrest continued 
throughout the second half of 1973 and thereafter. Table A 
presents statistics to substantiate such claims in this 
reg.ard. 72 
72 UW, WCL, HLP, SACTWU, H 23.3.2, Rodney Stares, Black 
trade unions in South Africa: the responsibilities of Briti§h 
companies (Christian Concern for southern Africa, 1977), p18; and 
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TABLE A 
Number of strikes reported in Durban, 1973-1975 
1973 1974 1975 
Unlawful strikes 252 194 123 
Persons involved 73 399 38 961 12 451 
Number of strikes 
involving African 246 189 119 
workers 
67 338 37 724 1 1 847 
Number of African 
workers involved 
From mid-1973, however, strikes decreased in militancy but 
there was an increasing struggle for union organisation. The 
result was that the government was again forced to review the 
Bantu Labour Relations Act, which led to a new Act in 1977. 
In August 1977, the amended Bantu Labour Relations 
Regulations Act came into effect. The attempt at control-
through-reform continued, culminating in the release of the 
Wiehahn Commission Report in 1979. This report recommended the 
official recognition of African trade unions rather than 
continuing to "bleed the unions to death" as was done in the 
past. 73 The government accepted the major recommendations of 
the Wiehahn Commission, and the Industrial Conciliation Act 
was amended to extend the definition of "employee" to include 
African workers. African trade unions were granted legal 
recognition and that in itself marked the beginning of a new 
chapter in the labour history of South Africa. It made the 
struggle worthwhile for the African workers of South Africa, 
and of Durban in particular. 
see also SAIRR, Survey of race relations, 1973, p 302. 
73 UW, WCL, HLP, FOSATU, C 3.15.4, Nicholas Wiehahn and the 
end of classical labour ideology: the commission and its 
aftermath, p 12; see also Friedman, Building tomorrow today, 
Chapter 6, pp 149-179. 
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Conclusion 
The 1973 strikes were unique in that their outbreak was 
spontaneous; they were guided by workers themselves or by an 
internal and underground leadership. Workers refused to elect 
a leadership - one that had to negotiate with employers - thus 
avoiding state victimisation and employer co-option. Workers 
broke the "silence", and shook the apartheid state which had 
enjoyed relative industrial "peace" soon after it banned the 
ANC and PAC and had assumed greater powers in the 1960s. SACTU 
had collapsed in the mid 1960s and left a vacuum in the 
organisation of African workers. Most unregistered African 
unions disappeared and worker action in factories had 
declined; in fact, there were very few strikes reported in the 
1960s. In 1962 and 1963, only sixteen and seventeen strikes 
were reported respectively, while between 1955 and 1960 an 
average of 76 strikes a year were recorded. 74 This decline in 
strike action was to remain the pattern until the early 1970s. 
However, with the outbreak of the Durban strikes workers won 
wage increments without being involved in protracted wage 
negotiations. In addition, the explosion of industrial unrest 
beginning in Durban ignited a series of responses which, for 
almost two decades, the apartheid state was unable to control. 
1973 saw not only a resurgence of strike action, but also 
marked the birth of a new brand of independent African trade 
union movement which forced the state to institute reforms and 
contributed to the eventual collapse of the apartheid state. 
74 UW, WCL, SACTWU, B 2.1, P. Bonner, "Lecture delivered to 
the inaugural congress of FOSATU: the history of labour 
organisation in South Africa", April 1979, p 5. 
Workers in Action: 1973 Durban Strikes 
(Photographs in their order) 
1. Durban City engineers workers marching in the streets 
2. Coronation workers at the Sports ground 
3. Frame's textile workers outside the mills 
4. Coronation workers marching in the streets 
5. Durban City engineers workers marching and escorted by the 
police 
6. Durban's acting mayor addressing engineers workers 
7. Frame's textile workers on strike 
8. White volunteers unloading vegetables at the market during 
the strikes 
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Chapter Nine 
The State's New Industrial Relations System and 
African Workers of Durban, 1973-1979 
Introduction 
By the beginning of the 1970s, South Africa's industrial 
relations had been structured along racial lines: while white, 
coloured and Indian trade unions were recognised, African 
unions were wholly excluded. African workers were, however, 
represented by the State Labour Department officials and/or by 
registered unions on some Industrial Councils where wage rates 
and conditions were negotiated. That was in spite of the fact 
that the government had introduced works committees for 
Africans in 1953 (under the Bantu Labour (Settlement of 
Disputes) Act of 1953) as substitutes for unions. Trade unions 
were viewed by the state as unsuitable, even dangerous, forms 
of worker collectives for Africans and hence the establishment 
of works committees. In 1953, it was envisaged by the Minister 
of Labour, B. Schoeman, that if such works committees were 
effective and successful, "trade unions for Africans would die 
a natural death". 1 However, the establishment of works 
committees was hardly a success: by 1973, only 24 statutory 
works committees existed throughout the country. 2 By November 
1 P. Bonner and E. Webster, "Background", ~, 5, 2 
(1979), p 4. 
2 D. Horner, "African labour representation and the draft 
bill to amend the Bantu Labour Relations Regulation Act" ~' 
2, 9 & 10 ( May/June 1976), p 15; R. Southall, Imperialism or 
solidarity?: International labour and South African trade 
unions (Cape Town, UCT Press, 1995), p 56; and J. Maree, "The 
emergence, struggles and achievements of Black trade unions in 
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1972, only four works committees were registered in the 
Durban-Pinetown-Inanda industrial complex, an area where there 
were approximately 500 employers. 3 It was only after the 
Durban strikes of 1973 that the 1953 Act was amended to 
provide new channels of communication between African workers 
and employers. These channels were meant to be complementary 
to the works committees and together they marked the birth of 
liaison committees. Of particular significance in the 1973 Act 
was the right of African workers to strike. The ulterior 
motive behind the establishment of liaison committees by the 
state - not only to block the formation of African trade 
unions, but also to obstruct the development of the works 
committees of the 1970s - created suspicion and distrust among 
African workers. This chapter is about the new industrial 
relations system established between 1973 and 1979 and the 
response of Durban's African workers (from a few selected case 
studies) to the new dispensation. 
The state's new approach to industrial relations in 
the 1970s 
Faced with a new climate of worker militancy, the government 
an~ company managements had to look for ways of dealing with 
the situation. In response to the waves of strikes beginning 
in Durban in 1973, the government amended the labour laws to 
facilitate new channels of communication between labour and 
capital, and also to extend control over African labour. The 
amended Bantu Labour Regulations Act of 1973 was meant to 
counter African trade unionism through a system of management 
dominated in-plant committees, which had de facto negotiating 
powers, serving only as forums for consultation. The amended 
Act gave birth to three kinds of committees for representing 
South Africa from 1973 to 1984", Labour, Capital and Society, 
18, 2 (1985), p 286. 
3 KCAL, PNAAB, KCF 80, Roll 62, Representation through 
Bantu works committees? by L.D. Thorne, Director, Natal 
Employers' Association, 28 November 1972, p 9. 
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African workers at the company level: works committees, which 
had existed in the previous Act but were snubbed as "tea and 
toilet committees" by African workers 4; co-ordinating works 
committees, which were supposed to co-ordinate various 
activities and represent African workers in industries, or at 
any work-place where there was more than one works committee; 
and finally, liaison committees. 
The functions of a liaison committee, as gazetted by the 
government in 1973, were: 
To consider matters which are of mutual interest to 
the employer and his employees and to make to the 
employer such recommendations concerning conditions 
of employment of such employees or any other matter 
affecting their interests. 5 
A liaison committee was established through the initiative of 
the employer and half the members plus the chairperson of the 
committee were appointed by the employer while the remaining 
members were elected by those workers. Liaison committees made 
recommendations to employers on conditions of employment but 
were not empowered to negotiate agreements on wages and 
working conditions with employers.6 
In the case of works committees, all their members were 
elected by workers and were only established in industries 
where no liaison committees existed. Because works committees 
comprised only African workers, a considerable number of 
workers had confidence in them and thus viewed them as their 
representative bodies. 7 The functions of a works committee 
were: 
4 Friedman, Building tomorrow tod~y, p 54. 
5 Government Gaz~tte, number 3963, section 3 (4 July 
1973). 
6 J.G.B. Maree, "An analysis of the independent trade 
unions in South Africa in the 1970s" (unpublished Ph D, 
University of Cape Town, 1986), p 116. 
7 L.C.G. Douwes Dekker, J. Kane-Berman and H. Nxasana, 
"An assessment of existing forms of labour organisation: work 
committees, liaison committees and trade unions", in SAIRR, 
Labour organisation and the African worker (Johannesburg, 
SAIRR, 1975), p 36. 
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To communicate the wishes, aspirations and 
requirements of the employees in the 
establishment ... to their employer and to represent 
the said employees in any negotiations with their 
employer concerning their conditions of employment 
or any other matter affecting their interests. 8 
The 1973 Act was silent, however, on wage negotiations, which 
led J. Bloch, a lawyer, to write, 
While negotiations are thus provided for, no 
specific mention is made of agreements. Further, no 
provision exists entitling or indeed obliging such a 
committee to have a constitution. Without such a 
constitution it cannot be said that a committee has 
been authorised by each and every employee to act on 
his behalf and so bind himself. 9 
Perhaps the intention of the government was to weaken works 
committees so that they would be unable to negotiate binding 
agreements with employers. 
The right to strike, although enshrined in the 1973 Act, 
was extremely limited. Accordingly, the Trade Union Council of 
South Africa (TUCSA) commented that: "the conditions under 
which African workers legally have the right to strike are 
severely circumscribed, and ... considerable procedures 
allowing for a 'cooling-off' period have to be followed". 10 
In any case, legal strikes could not take place as long as 
there was a wage determination by the Wage Board or, say, in 
an essential service industry or where an unresolved dispute 
had been notified to the Minister of Labour for a Wage Board 
recommendation. 11 Moreover, the legality of strike action 
failed to protect strikers from being dismissed. The Act 
8 Government Gazette, number 3963, section 4 (4 July 
1973). 
9 J. Bloch, "The legislative framework of collective 
bargaining in South Africa" (unpublished LLM thesis, 
University of London, 1977), p 27. See as cited in uw, WCL, 
HLP, SACTWU, H 23.3.2, Rodney Stares, Bla9k trade unions in 
South Africa, p 16. 
10 TUCSA, Trade union directory (Johannesburg, 1975), p 
45. 
11 Maree, "An Analysis of the independent trade unions", p 
118. 
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stipulated heavy penalties for employers who victimised their 
workers on the basis of their participation in the election or 
activities of a liaison or works committee. In theory, the Act 
provided some form of protection to workers but in practice 
"victimisations were widespread and prosecutions rare". 12 In 
1974, for instance, at Pilkingtons glass plant, African 
workers who had complied with all the procedural requirements 
to legalise strike action were simply classified by the 
government as deserters and dismissed en masse by the 
employer. 13 Thus the Tongaat Group of companies commented 
that "instances of failure to pursue and resolve allegations 
of victimisation have probably done more to destroy confidence 
and acceptance of the system than any other single 
consideration". 14 
The number of Africans involved in industrial disputes 
between 1973 and 1976 never fell below 30 000 per year with a 
peak of 100 000 in 1973, while those involved between the 1963 
and 1972 strikes had decreased considerably to approximately 
10 000 per year. 15 In addition to industrial disputes, the 
country was to witness a new wave of urban unrest in 1976, 
which involved workers in August and September in a series of 
stay-aways. The government was further alarmed with those 
stay-aways which, for instance, had records of 300 000 workers 
being involved in Johannesburg, about 30 000 in Durban and 
200 000 in the Cape Peninsula. 16 The government felt 
considerable unease, as P. Bonner puts it, 
After the urban uprisings of 1976 - the threat of 
the politicisation of strike action was much feared 
if no effective trade union rights were to be 
granted - a prospect all too real, as the 'class of 
12 UW, WCL, HLP, SACTWU, Stares, Black trade unions, p 17. 
13 University of Natal, Natal Room (hereafter NR), David 
Hemson Papers, Trade Unions in South Africa, p 2. 
14 Quoted in Stares, Black trade unions, p 17. 
15 Bonner and Webster, "Background", p 5. 
16 See, for instance, Maree, "An analysis of the 
independent trade unions", p 122. 
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76' began entering the factories. 17 
Perhaps the urban uprisings were not much of a factor in 
convincing the government to change legislation. M. Lipton 
believes that it was a combination of factors: the refusal of 
African trade unions to accept liaison committees as an 
alternative to trade union rights, mounting international 
pressure, support from progressive employers, and the liberal 
press and lobbies. 18 These factors led the government once 
again to review the Bantu Labour Relations Act, which 
culminated in the amended Act of 1977 and the appointment of 
the Wiehahn Commission (discussed below). 
In August 1977, this amended Act came into effect and was 
in reality more anti-labour than both the 1953 and 1973 Acts. 
The Act allowed both liaison and works committees to be 
established at any workplace provided that all interested 
parties were in agreement to such structures. It gave higher 
status to liaison committees and downgraded works committees. 
Increased bargaining powers were given to liaison committees 
so that they "would become the principal piece of machinery 
through which representation would be facilitated". 19 Liaison 
committees could now "negotiate and enter into agreements with 
the employer in relation to the wages or the conditions of 
employment ... ". 20 As for works committees, their role was 
relegated to one of making recommendations to liaison 
committees. Furthermore, the Act stipulated that more than one 
liaison committee could be established in any industry and 
such committees could be linked together by a co-ordinating 
liaison committee, which had the power to negotiate with 
employers. Despite this increased muscle for liaison 
committees, by 1979 not even a single agreement had been 
17 P. Bonner, "Independent trade unions since Wiehahn", 
SALB, volume 8, no.4 (1983), p 17. 
18 M. Lipton, Capitalism and apartheig (Cape Town, David 
Philip, 1986), p 341. 
19 Bonner and Webster, "Background", p 5. 
20 Government Gazette, number 5613, section 7 (2) of 1977. 
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negotiated between a liaison committee or co-ordinating 
liaison committee and employers. 21 
The Act also contained provisions which amounted to the 
exclusion of African trade unions from participation in the 
process of wage negotiations. While the government made 
attempts to develop liaison committees that were more 
acceptable to African workers~ it further undermined the 
position of African trade unions.22 It is clear that the 
government's intention in establishing those committees was an 
attempt to extend control through reformist moves and the aim 
in mind was still that African trade unions should "die a 
natural death". 23 In June 1977, the government appointed a 
Commission of Inquiry into Labour Legislation under the 
chairmanship of Nicholas Wiehahn (professor at the Institute 
of Labour Relations of the University of South Africa). 
The Commission's terms of reference were: 
The adjustment of the existing system for the 
regulation of labour relations in South Africa with 
the object of making it provide more effectively for 
the needs of our changing times; the adjustment, if 
necessary, of the existing machinery for the 
prevention and settlement of disputes which changing 
needs may require; the elimination of bottle-necks 
and other problems which are at present being 
experienced within the entire sphere of labour; and 
the methods and means by which a foundation for the 
creation and expansion of sound labour relations may 
be laid for the future of South Africa. 24 
Two months later, Prime Minister P.W. Botha, announced a 
second Commission of Inquiry into Legislation affecting the 
Utilisation of Manpower. The chairman and sole member of the 
21 Maree, "An analysis of the independent trade unions", p 
120. 
22 See OW, WCL, HLP, FOSATU, C3.15.4, Nicholas Wiehahn and 
the end of classical labour ideology: the commission and its 
aftermath. 
23 See footnote number one. 
24 Southern African Labour and Development Research Unit, 
"The Wiehahn Commission: a summary", in The Wiehahn and 
Riekert Reports (May 1979), pp 13-52; and also Bonner and 
Webster, "Background", pp 1-2. 
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Commission was Dr P. Riekert (economic advisor to the Prime 
Minister), who was tasked to investigate the regulation and 
utilisation of African labour in other departments, falling 
outside the ambit of the Departments of Labour and Mines. 25 
The Wiehahn Commission released its report in 1979 and it 
must have come as some surprise to government because it 
recommended the official recognition of African trade unions 
rather than continuing to "bleed the unions to death" as had 
been done in the past. 26 The government had no option but to 
accept the major recommendations of the Wiehahn Commission, 
and the Industrial Conciliation Act was amended to extend the 
definition of "employee" to include African workers. 27 The 
government's acceptance of what clearly amounted to a total 
back tracking on previous policy was because it had equated 
the de-racialisation of labour law as the end of apartheid in 
labour relations. This was a well-calculated move to depict 
South Africa as conceding to pressures from within and without 
and thus to provide a rationale for continued overseas 
investment in South Africa. However, even after Wiehahn, South 
Africa's industrial relations were not stable: successive 
drafts on the Industrial Conciliation legislation were tabled 
in parliament to address various concerns of both worker 
organisations and employers. It was only after the 
promulgation of the Labour Relations Act in 1981 that South 
Africa's industrial relations began to take a new shape; in 
fact, real collective bargaining between the new independent 
African trade union movement and management began to take 
place, though hesitantly. Nevertheless, African trade unions 
25 For details on this Commission, see Chapter Three of 
this thesis. 
26 UW, WCL, HLP, FOSATU, C 3.15.4, Nicholas Wiehahn and 
the end of classical labour ideology: the commission and its 
aftermath, p 12. 
27 For a detailed study on the recommendations, see, for 
instance, SALB, "The Wiehahn and Riekert Reports", in SALB, 
volume 5, no 4 (1979); and UW, WCL, HLP, FOSATU, C 3.15.4, 
Nicholas Wiehahn and the end of classical labour ideology: the 
commission and its aftermath. 
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were granted full legal recognition and thus a new chapter in 
the labour history of South Africa began. 
Employers' attitude between 1973 and 1979 
Before the Wiehahn Commission, liaison committees mushroomed 
throughout the country. In 1973 there were a mere 773, in 1976 
they had increased to 2 382 (see table below). Given a choice 
between liaison and works committees, employers preferred to 
establish the former, because employers had more control and 
say in them. 
Table A 
Liaison and works committees established, 1973-197728 
at 31 December Liaison Works No of workers Co-ordinating 
represented works 
1973 773 125 312 541 3 
1974 1 482 207 521 624 4 
1975 2 042 287 617 579 5 
1976 2 382 299 5 
1977 2 503 301 
Because of the large number of liaison committees established, 
it was often thought by labour that employers were against the 
emerging independent but illegal African unions. 29 It has 
been argued that employers were assisted by the state to crush 
emerging unions, of which J. Maree identified four means of 
doing so: 
Legislation to assist management to try to undermine 
African trade unions; the adoption of policies and 
practices by the Labour Department that were 
specifically aimed against the advancement of 
African unions; harassment of union leaders and 
members by the security police; and outright 
repression of the unions by banning their 
leaders. 30 
28 UW, WCL, HLP, SACTWU, Stares, Black trade unions, p 18; 
Maree, "An analysis of the independent trade unions", p 119; 
and SAIRR, Survey of race relations, 1973, p 302. 
29 Maree, "An analysis of the independent trade unions", 
pp 115, 118; and Bonner and Webster, "Background", p 4. 
30 Maree, "An analysis of the independent trade unions", p 
115 
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Obviously, until Wiehahn, the state never favoured the 
development of African unions, fearing their politicisation. 
However, not all employers agreed with state policy of 
"bleeding African trade unions to death",31 as will be 
discussed below. 
Employers of African labour in Durban were quite clear on 
their views with regard to African trade unionism even before 
the 1973 Act came into effect. As early as May 1960, Assocom's 
Committee on Non-European Affairs issued a statement: 
" ... trade unions should with the affluxion of time and with 
suitable safeguards become representative of workers of all 
races".32 In a meeting convened in September 1972, Assocom 
members expressed reservations about the use of works 
committees because "they did relate only to a particular firm, 
and had no standing with regards to an industry as a 
whole". 33 A. Adler, Assocom's committee member, commented: 
"Firms who adopted the works committee system were being 
accused of paternalism - there was an increasing demand for 
direct power representation, and this was a coming 
movement". 34 The 1972 Assocom meeting ended with a call on 
the government to amend the Industrial Conciliation Act "so as 
to allow Bantu workers to participate in trade unions in some 
manner, and to be represented where applicable on Industrial 
Councils". 35 
On 12 October 1972, the Durban Chamber of Commerce 
convened a meeting to consider "the problem of African trade 
31 Quoted also in D.W. F. Bendix, "The new industrial 
relations system in South Africa", in B.U. Lombard (ed), 1M 
challenge of the new industrial relations dispensation in 
South Africa (Pretoria, UNISA, 1979), p 86. 
32 KCAL, PNAAB, KCF 80, Roll 62, Public Relations, Durban 
Chamber of Commerce, Extract from minutes of meeting of 
Assocom's non-European affairs committee, 7 September 1972. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Ibid. 
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unions and of employee representation generally". 36 Wide-
ranging views were expressed: some more progressive (and 
economically minded) members appealed for the legalisation of 
African trade unions. Others, for instance, A. Adams and B. 
Jackson, thought that government action was correct. Jackson 
said that "the main problem which would be encountered if 
Bantu trade unions were established was that these would be 
used for political purposes since the Bantu were not yet 
generally sufficiently industrially oriented", 37 and that 
"the establishment of [works] committees was a better answer 
for the employer than the establishment of trade unions in 
respect of a group which was not yet socially ready to take 
proper advantage of such organisation". 38 But the general 
feeling among members of the Durban Chamber of Commerce was 
that recognition of African trade unions was urgently 
required "in order to prevent unrest and dissatisfaction". 39 
That African trade unions were the only legitimate 
representatives of African labour was recognised by the Natal 
Employers' ~ssociation, writing in 1972 about the equivalent 
process of nineteenth century Europe: 
We believe that this article, with its message that 
trade unionism is a humanitarian movement based 
four-square on the principles of justice and equity, 
is more meaningful in the present situation than at 
any other time in the history of South Africa . 
... One of the most effective means of achieving 
these ends is to remind the working men of the 
history of trade unionism, of its great achievements 
and the bitter struggles that were fought and won 
before the rule of industrial tyranny was effaced 
and collective bargaining installed in its place. 
Trade unionism did not spring from the wickedness 
and malice of the workers .... On the contrary, it 
sprang from the social conscience and 
humanitarianism of those who were determined to 
challenge the ruthless greed and inhumanity of the 
36 KCAL, PNAAB, Durban Chamber of Commerce, minutes, 12 
October 1972. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Ibid. 
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early Victorian industrialist. In the forefront of 
the giants who fought the battle was Robert Owen, 
paradoxically a wealthy industrialist but a man with 
conscience. The struggle went on for years, but in 
the end Owen and labour won.40 
On 28 November 1972, the Natal Employers' Association 
organised a conference on "Industrial representation of the 
Bantu", at the Blue Water hotel in Durban. 41 It was opened by 
the mayor of Durban, councillor R. Williams, whose speech 
appealed to the government to consider removing barriers on 
African representation in industry: 
It is my considered opinion that South Africa is 
indeed fortunate in its reserve of manpower, but the 
restrictions which prevent the full use of this 
reserve is holding back the economic development of 
this country, and it is essential that these 
restrictions should be removed as soon as 
possible. 42 
H.B. Edelstein, president of the Natal Employers' Association, 
agreed whole-heartedly: 
We are all deeply concerned with the future economic 
well-being of South Africa, and the social and other 
consequences which both cause and spring from this. 
In this context it is no more than realism to 
acknowledge the contribution being made by the Bantu 
to our economy .... If we agree on the contribution 
being made by the Bantu worker, his permanence in 
the framework of industry and commerce, and the 
enhanced contribution which should emanate from him 
in the future, then we are brought logically to 
consider the position of his relationship to 
employers and other employees, his rights as a human 
being and worker, and the best means of his 
representation for industrial peace and the most 
rapid promotion of the total economic welfare. 43 
In 1973, soon after the outbreak of the Durban strikes, 
4° KCAL, PNAAB, KCF 79, Roll 61, Public Relations, Natal 
Employers' Association, March 1972. 
41 KCAL, PNAAB, KCF 80, Roll 62, Extract of Natal 
Employers' Association: Conference on industrial 
representation of the Bantu, 28 November 1972. 
42 Ibid. 
43 Ibid. 
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the Durban Chamber of Commerce warned the Minister of Labour 
what the non-recognition of African trade unions could lead 
to: 
Although ... government authorities did not recognise 
the existence of Bantu trade unions, these were not 
illegal and that employers might be forced to accord 
some recognition to such trade unions on a practical 
basis if approached with the demand for 
negotiation. 44 
In their deliberations, members of the Durban Chamber of 
Commerce resolved that the government had to be "pressed to 
introduce legislation at an early stage to recognise and 
control such unions in order to ensure their orderly 
introduction". 45 Early 1974, the Durban Chamber of Commerce 
went further: 
A possible de facto situation could arise where, 
despite the establishment of liaison or works 
committees, employers would find themselves obliged 
to accept either Bantu trade unions or Bantu 
homeland authorities as negotiating bodies for 
African labour. 46 
Later that year, the Chamber established a sub-committee 
on labour relations, "to investigate the implications of 
African trade unionism in depth and to make recommendations 
regarding the policy thereon which should be adopted by the 
Chamber". 47 In view of government policy, which remained 
implacably opposed to legalisation of African trade unions, 
the main object of the sub-committee was to provide a well-
considered recommendation. 
[It] was ... necessary to ... keep abreast of 
developments relating to the growth of African trade 
44 KCAL, PNAAB, The Durban Chamber of Commerce, minutes, 
13 September 1973. 
45 Ibid. 
46 KCAL, PNAAB, The Durban Chamber of Commerce, minutes, 
14 February 1974. 
47 KCAL, PNAAB, The Durban Chamber of Commerce, minutes, 
report and recommendations of the labour relations sub-
committee on matters pertaining to African trade unions, 12 
September 1974 
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unionism, to be able to assess their effect on 
employers and on the economy generally, and to be in 
a position if necessary to exert pressure for change 
along desirable lines.~8 
The Minister of Labour was adamantly opposed to this action by 
the Durban Chamber, and warned that any agreement reached 
between employers and African trade unions would be declared 
"null and void as being an evasion of the statutory 
negotiation procedures ... "; and that tough action would be 
taken against employers who contravened government policy on 
labour relations. 49 The sub-committee was consequently forced 
to tell the Chamber not to make any more public statements 
because "it would be wrong for the Chamber to encourage its 
members deliberately to place themselves in direct conflict 
with government policy in regard to the recognition of, and 
negotiation with African unions". 50 
Soon after the sub-committee had reported, the Durban 
Chamber endorsed the works and/or liaison committees required 
by the government but indicated that they had to "become 
effective bodies capable of negotiating conditions of service 
for Africans and capable of effective communication and 
consultation between management and employees". 51 But the 
Chamber went further indicating that it "would like to see the 
works committee system developing into a forum for collective 
bargaining". 52 The development of African trade unions was 
seen as "inevitable" and a situation where unions would 
negotiate conditions of employment generally while works 
committees would deal with domestic issues at the plant level 
was envisaged. The Chamber thus came out strongly in favour of 
recognising African trade unions while making all possible 
attempts not to create conflict with the government. It noted: 
48 Ibid. 
49 Ibid. 
50 Ibid. 
51 Ibid. 
52 Ibid. 
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"In instances where African trade unions already exist and 
enjoy the obvious support of employees the Chamber advises 
employers to maintain contact and dialogue with the union 
organisation concerned".53 After the 1973 Durban strikes, the 
Chamber was eager to recognise African trade unions in order 
to avoid similar disruptions taking place. Indeed, it had 
become obvious in the 1970s that the economy of the country 
was largely dependent on African workers and hence the 
legalisation of their unions was a necessity if employers had 
to attain industrial peace. The Chamber believed that the 
recognition of African trade unions meant their incorporation 
into the established industrial relations system where certain 
rules and strike procedures had to be followed. 
These sentiments were also shared by the Natal Chamber of 
Industries, which expressed strong reservation about the lack 
of effectiveness of works and/or liaison committees in 
resolving industrial-related disputes. In its memorandum to 
the government dated 10 November 1974, the Natal Chamber of 
Industries wrote: 
Employers have reservations about the ability of 
regional Bantu labour committees to play a 
meaningful role in the settlement of disputes 
primarily because of the apparent lack of status of 
the majority of current members of those committees. 
It would appear that African employees likewise have 
reservations against these committees possibly 
because of the fact that ministerial appointees are 
involved. The Bantu Labour Officer, being a state 
official, is viewed with some suspicion by Black 
workers .. ". Black members of liaison committees do 
not necessarily have the support of the general 
worker. 54 
In 1975 a report that: 
The fact that labour unrest sparked by necessity, or 
the aspirations, of workers has not repeated itself 
53 Ibid. 
54 KCAL, PNAAB, KCF 80, Natal Chamber of Industries, 
Extract: "Memorandum reflecting the proposals of the NCI 
relative to amendments to the Bantu Labour Relations 
Regulation Act, 1953 and aimed at achieving greater 
participation by Blacks in negotiating wages and conditions of 
employment and in settling disputes". 
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this year is no ground for complacent self-
congratulations, but should rather be welcomed as 
giving us further time, the commodity of which we 
are so desperately short, to improve these very 
communications and joint consultation channels. 55 
There is no doubt from these public statements that many 
employers of African labour did not support industrial labour 
relations system established in 1973. Others desired to see 
independent African trade unions become part of multi-racial 
industry unions, where it was probable that the balance of 
power would remain with the "old guard" registered trade union 
officials. Still others thought that this course of action 
would be too dangerous politically and preferred to develop 
the works committees' African membership under employer 
tutelage to the stage where approved individuals could be 
promoted to the ranks of the registered union officialdom. 
By 1977 the issue of labour relations in South Africa had 
become a priority for the government owing on the one hand to 
the rising demands of the African working class for trade 
union rights and on the other from employer pressure for well 
regulated labour relations. Government responses varied 
between schemes for reform to intensified repression of 
political and trade union activities. For capital, the 
government was offering either the recognition of African 
trade unions or rooting out completely any working class 
organisation in industry. Quite clearly, there was a 
contradiction between the discourse of recognition and the 
practice of non-recognition and reliance on repression by 
employers. By 1979, after Wiehahn, Africa trade unions had 
gained recognition: the trade union position had succeeded. In 
fact, the government had finally succumbed to mounting 
pressure from employers and working-class action, particularly 
in the 1970s, as well as international pressure. 
55 NA, PNAAB, Labour, 1/2/1/1/2/27, Liaison Committees, 
Staff Advisory Bodies, 7 April 1974- 30 July 1976, Natal 
Employers' Association, 20 May 1975. 
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The unions' and workers' strategies 
In 1970, A. Grobbelaar, the general secretary of the Trade 
Union Council of South Africa (TUSCA), warned of a bloody 
industrial strike surpassing that of 1922 if African unions 
were not legally recognised: 
There is 'no valid reason why Bantu trade union 
leaders and officials could not ... be trained in a 
manner which will ensure industrial peace ... If this 
is not done, a trade union movement which will 
probably not be to our liking is almost certain to 
emerge. 56 
Three years later the strike wave that shocked government and 
employers caused African workers to flock to join the new 
independent trade union movement. Alarmed by this sudden rush 
to join unregistered unions, the government introduced plant-
based committees as a further control mechanism. But were 
those committees acceptable to African unions and workers? 
Douwes-Dekker's study of worker preferences between works 
and liaison committees revealed that the majority of African 
workers opted for the former. This was especially so in 
Durban; in October 1973, at the Raleigh Cycles plant, 720 
workers (against 40) voted in favour of a works committee; in 
February 1974, at Western Biscuits company, 240 workers were 
in favour of a works committee while 40 opted for a liaison 
committee. At Van Leer Packaging, workers voted unanimously 
for a works committee.57 
In general, however, workers preferred the independent 
trade unions which were now emerging on a large scale. These 
were preferred largely on the basis that they provided vital 
benefit schemes. But, as H. Nxasana, from the Institute for 
Industrial Education, indicated, "some workers felt that the 
works committees could be used as a stepping stone towards 
56 A. Grobbelaar, The trade union movement in South Africa 
- its past, present and future directions (Johannesburg, 
TUCSA, 1970), pp 9-10. 
57 Douwes Dekker (et al), "An assessment of existing forms 
of labour organisation", p 36 
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forming a trade union". 58 "A works committee was better in 
the sense that we nominated our own people, real trade union 
leaders, unlike liaison committees which comprised many sell-
outs, indunas, favoured by employers".59 Or, as C. Khumalo 
reflected, 
Works committees were better compared to liaison 
committees. At least, in works committees we had 
more say, particularly at Frame where Jabu Gwala and 
Cele were leading figures in those committees. After 
all, our leaders were members of the National Union 
of Textile Workers .... We could always speak with 
one voice either in liaison or works committees. 60 
On what might the choice have been based? 
With the rapid growth of African unions in the 1970s, 
many of them at first rejected liaison committees but later 
realised that these could be useful and encouraged 
participation in works committees by voting in their members 
to such structures. Such a strategy was central to the 
survival of African unions, for instance, the National Union 
of Textile Workers (NUTW), in the 1970s. As said before, some 
employers favoured the establishment of liaison committees, 
over which they had a greater control. Various attempts were 
made by Frame, for example, to promote the establishment of 
liaison and, to a lesser extent, works committees. The NUTW 
experienced management hostility at different textile 
factories. By 1974, at Wentex, Frametex, Hammarsdale, Dane and 
S.A Fabrics (members of the Natal Chamber of Industries), 
liaison committees were launched to resist the NUTW as a form 
of worker representation. 61 Generally, the Trade Union 
Advisory Coordinating Council (TUACC)-affiliated unions were 
opposed to liaison committees and occasionally boycotted the 
elections of such committees. 
58 Ibid, p 48. 
59 Interview with Moses Biyela, 16 May 1993. 
60 Interview with c. Khumalo, 10 September 1993. 
61 UW, WCL, HLP, SACTWU, NUTW, Staff meeting minutes, 11 
March 1974 
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At the Natal Cotton and Woollen Mills (NCWM), about 650 
workers were employed, of whom half were African members of 
the NUTW and 150 were Indian members of the Textile Workers 
Industrial Union and the rest were not unionised.62 The 
personnel manager, C.J. Steenkamp, was not in favour of trade 
unions; he preferred a liaison committee. He dismissed workers 
who were members of the NUTW as part of his tactics to 
intimidate workers from joining trade unions and in just three 
months, 20 long-serving workers lost their jobs. In this 
particular company, the NUTW had consistently boycotted 
liaison committees but later realised that its strategy was 
not going to bring about the recognition of the union. During 
early 1975, the NUTW decided not to boycott liaison committees 
but rather to participate in these structures. 63 
Faced with the existence of the liaison committees at 
Frametex, Pinetex and Seltex/Nortex, the NUTW fostered good 
relations with members of those committees, and eventually had 
some influence in them. This facilitated the union's ability 
to focus on workers' grievances.64 By 1978 the NUTW members 
at Frametex had completely taken over all elected liaison 
committee posts. 65 A similar situation occurred at Feltex in 
1975, when the NUTW members won all elected liaison committee 
posts. 66 
As already explained, African workers generally resisted 
liaison committees, and favoured trade unions. The Port Natal 
62 NUTW, "The Natal Cotton and Woollen Mills 
confrontation", SALB, volume 3, no 7 (1977), p 8. 
63 Interview with Jabulani Gwala, Bolton Hall, SACTWU 
offices, 27 September 1993. Gwala was a prominent member of 
the Frametex works/liaison committee during the 1970s. 
64 OW, WCL, HLP, SACTWU, NUTW, Report to BEC meeting, 11 
October 1975. 
65 See minutes of a special meeting of the Frametex 
Committee, 14 March 1978. Members of the Committee were: 
Jabulani Gwala, A. Mthembu, D.R. Dhlamini, M.D. Cele, Q. 
Sikobi, M.B. Mbele, P.Z. Khanyile, M. Radebe, A.S. Bhengu and 
three women, F.O. Gumede, S.D. Mavimbela and L.L. Gqwani. 
66 uw, we~, HLP, SACTWU, minutes of meeting, June 1975. 
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Affairs Administration Board (PNAAB) complained about the 
general indifference of African workers towards liaison 
committees, 67 and up to the beginning of 1975, the Board 
continuously reported lack of interest among African workers 
in participating in liaison committee structures.68 Several 
reports of various districts of the PNAAB indicated that, 
" ... the response was equally disappointing and the labourers 
had to be asked to find persons sufficiently interested to 
accept nominations"69; "the response ... to nominations was 
very poor". 70 However, as mentioned above, when their use 
could be demonstrated, many African workers changed their 
strategies from confrontation to involvement in those 
structures. 
As far as the PNAAB is concerned, in August 1973, it 
established works committees (dubbed Bantu works advisory 
committees), comprising six African workers elected by their 
workmates and two representatives from the Board, and a co-
ordinating committee, of which two members were directly 
appointed by the Board. 71 The works committees were launched 
in the Board's Administration and Business Undertakings 
Departments, the Central and Western Districts, North and 
South Coast Districts, 72 and their functions were, as defined 
by the PNAAB: 
To provide a recognised and direct channel of 
communication and consultation between the Bantu 
employees and the respective Heads of Departments, 
67 NA, PNAAB, 1/2/1/1/2/27, Staff Advisory Boards, liaison 
committees, 7 April 1974 - 30 July 1976. 
68 See, for instance, NA, PNAAB, Executive Committee 
minutes, 4 May 1976. 
69 NA, PNAAB, Department of Business Undertakings, May 
1976. 
70 NA, PNAAB, Western District Bantu Works Committee, May 
1976. 
71 NA, PNAAB, Bantu Works Advisory Committees, 21 June 
1974. 
72 Ibid. 
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and, via the Co-ordinating Committee, a channel of 
communication and consultation between such Bantu 
employees and the Chief Director and the Board ... To 
provide a means whereby matters concerning the 
welfare, interests, and remuneration of the Bantu 
employees can be discussed by their representatives 
elected by them ... To improve working conditions of 
the Bantu employees ... [and the] prevention of waste 
of effort and materials and to reduce or rliminate 
absenteeism and the misuse of sick leave. 3 
From 1 August 1974, six members of each respective works 
committee of the PNAAB were elected and functioned on an ad 
hoc basis. Those elected to office in the Central District 
were O.O.B. Dlamini (chairman) and c. Pitson (vice-
chairman).74 At the end of their first meeting, members of 
the Central District Works Committee listed a number of 
grievances that were presented to the Co-ordinating Committee: 
these were an unsatisfactory holiday bonus, poor wages, 
unavailability of loans for houses and inadequate 
accommodation. The chairman and vice-chairman of the Co-
ordinating Committee were P.J. Retief and R.C. Throssell 
respectively. 75 Other members of the committee comprised 
mainly chairpersons of various works committees. 76 
In August 1975, the PNAAB discussed the establishment of 
liaison committees "on which management will be 
represented". 77 Works committees were to retain their main 
functions and become, as P.J. Neethling, the Director of 
Business Undertakings, noted, "the official mouthpiece of the 
workers". 78 Liaison committees, it was envisaged, would 
73 Ibid., p4. 
74 NA, PNAAB, Minutes of the meeting of the PNAAB Ad Hoc 
Bantu Works Advisory Committee, 21 August 1974. 
75 NA, PNAAB, Minutes of meeting, 21 January 1975. 
76 Ibid. 
77 NA, PNAAB, Department of Business Undertakings, 
Director, P.J. Neethling to Chief Director, Bourquin, 11 
August 1975. 
78 Ibid. 
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consist of the Director of Business Undertakings, General 
Manager, Principal Assistant (Administration), and the 
Assistant Director (Personnel) as chairperson, and as well as 
four representatives of the works committees. However, such 
liaison committees only came into existence in June 1976. 
In a meeting held by the Central District Works 
Committee on 9 September 1975, it was noted: 
The Chief Director be advised that, we, ... members 
of the Central District Bantu Works Committee have 
been ... perturbed that our deliberations appear to 
have little effect and we have no opportunity of 
meeting the Chief Director and his executive and 
also that the Chief Director be advised that workers 
of the Board appear to be losing faith in us 
individually and as a works committee. 79 
The major complaint was that general labourers were not 
eligible to join the pension fund. Another grievance was that 
of the many deductions from wages of Africans employed in the 
Department of Business Undertakings at the end of September 
1974, which were done without notice or explanation. The chief 
director, however, instructed the control officer (staff) to 
"immediately pay {wages deducted] as soon as possible so as to 
avoid unnecessary unrest".so 
Towards the end of 1975 and at the beginning of 1976, 
elections were held by the PNAAB for Bantu works advisory 
committees. The response was generally low and little interest 
was shown by African workers, particularly in the South Coast 
and Western Districts, and in the Departments of Business 
Undertakings and Administration.81 In the South Coast, only 
one candidate , D.O. Bhengu, volunteered for the works 
committee, while none in the Department of Business 
Undertakings volunteered. The Director of the Department of 
Business Undertakings wrote: "The response in this Department 
79 NA, PNAAB, G.F. Baker, Manager, Central District to the 
Chief Director, 18 September 1975. 
80 NA, PNAAB, 1/2/1/1/2/26, Bantu Building Workers, T. M. 
Ellis, Control Officer to Director of Finance, 3 October 1975. 
81 NA, PNAAB, Executive Committee Meeting, 4 May 1976. 
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was equally disappointing and the labourers had to be asked to 
find persons sufficiently interested to accept 
nominations". 82 In the Western Districts and in the 
Department of Administration, no nominations at all were 
received by the closing dates,83 and considerable canvassing 
took place to convince African workers to join the works 
committee. It was reported by the Manager of the Western 
District that only "after considerable delay two nominations 
were received, namely M. Sheyi and J. Duma". 84 Quite clearly, 
as the Director of Administration wrote, "The general 
consensus of opinion among works committees is that the 
present basis is impractical from the point of view of 
communication with the Board and its officials". 85 
Undoubtedly, works committees were ineffective but were more 
liked than liaison committees. 
On 21 May 1976, liaison committees were launched at the 
PNAAB because works committees could no longer function in its 
area of jurisdiction. 86 Elections were called for the first 
liaison committee members while others were appointed by the 
Board. 87 The election of the liaison committee members was 
marked by indifference from African workers. As J. Shabangu 
recounted: 
Some workers called those who wanted to be elected 
in those liaison committees Bourquin's impimpis 
(sell-outs) since some of them were indunas who used 
to get some favours from authorities. Some of those 
elected received two votes others five .... Workers 
were simply not interested in those liaison 
structures. However, some workers maintained that 
liaison committees were the only way out of this 
82 NA, PNAAB, Department of Business Undertakings, 4 May 
1976. 
83 Ibid. 
84 Ibid. 
85 Ibid. 
86 NA, PNAAB, Board minutes, 21 May 1976. 
87 NA, PNAAB, L.H.J. van Rensburg, Director, Technical and 
Building Services to the Chief Director, 30 July 1976. 
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mess in which we found ourselves. 88 
By contrast, trade unions were undoubtedly preferred by 
workers and in 1976, a considerable number had flocked to join 
the Black Allied Workers Union (BAWU), established also in the 
early 1970s.89 BAWU influenced its members not to participate 
in Board structures as they promoted the racially 
discriminatory laws of the government. BAWU also won over a 
large following in 1976, particularly from the PNAAB and the 
Durban City Council. Part of the success may have been 
attributed to the successful challenge of BAWU to the Durban 
City Council to pay K.L. Mdunyelwa, a union member, all his 
wages for the period between 30 December 1975 and 29 January 
1976, during which time he was admitted to hospital. 90 
Other workers of the PNAAB, as A.M. Zulu recalls, 
... had an idea of forming their own trade union 
since BAWU was rather too radical. We had major 
differences with BAWU, particularly when they 
refused to register in 1979 or participate in any 
form of liaison committee system when some FOSATU-
aligned unions were doing so. Many of us decided to 
participate and nominate our members to liaison 
committees as a way forward for workers.9 1 
Before Wiehahn, the government moved swiftly to grant limited 
bargaining rights to factory workers and by enabling liaison 
committees to negotiate binding wage agreements. For the 
PNAAB, the chief director insisted that heads of departments 
should ensure that such liaison committees were viable and 
also acceptable to workers. 92 There was general agreement 
among African workers that shop-floor structures should be 
strengthened if they had to win major concessions from 
88 Interview with J. Shabangu, KwaMashu, 10 October 1993. 
89 NA, PNAAB, 1/2/1/1/2/23, Trade unions, 2 October 1975-
30 July 1976. 
1977. 
90 Ibid. 
91 Interview with A.M. Zulu, KwaMashu, 12 October 1994. 
92 NA, PNAAB, Memo to all Heads of Departments, 20 August 
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employers. J. Zikhali, one of the members of the Central 
District Works Committee in 1976, explained the situation very 
well. "Liaison committees", he said, 
were forced on us once again by the government in 
1977. We had no choice at all, either we 
participated in them or nobody would listen to our 
problems. Employers, for example the PNAAB, always 
said that that is what the government wants us to 
do. But the PNAAB was a better devil because they 
listened to our problems although not all of them. 
In 1974 and 1977 we were given about 10 per cent 
increments after we raised concern. Not too bad 
after all for an employer like the PNAAB. 93 
By 1979 as a result of the Wiehahn Commission's 
recommendations, the Industrial Conciliation Act was amended 
and conceded to African unions a legal recognition - a reality 
that African workers had thought would never exist during 
their life time. However, the Act retained the committee 
system (dubbed works councils) but these councils were 
expanded to include other workers to make them multi-racial. 
Such committees were to be established where there were no 
unions. Undoubtedly, the retention of liaison committees was 
welcomed by the Frame Group, which continued to utilise such 
structures and consistently refused to recognise the National 
Union of Textile Workers up to early 1985 (see Chapter Ten). 
As B. Smith, one of the directors of the Frame Group, remarked 
in 1983, "management would continue to use the works council 
members as a means of communication, education and 
guidance"94 and that "he had been impressed with the positive 
discussions held in the past and hoped that [such an] avenue 
would remain open". 95 The Frame Group had remained hostile to 
African trade unions and was an exceptional company in their 
low wages. It was precisely because of the Frame Group's 
attitude towards the NUTW that the period between 1980 and 
1985 was dominated by work stoppages and continual Industrial 
93 Interview with J. Zikhali, Umlazi, 21 August 1994. 
94 UW, WCL, SACTWU, G45.3, Minutes of meetings between 
management and workers' representatives, 27 September 1983. 
95 UW, WCL, SACTWU, Minutes of meeting, 5 February 1980. 
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and Supreme Court hearings, which eventually culminated in the 
granting of recognition to the NUTW by the Frame Group in 
August 198596 - an issue that will be discussed in Chapter 
Ten. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has attempted to elucidate some of the 
complexities that developed in South Africa's industrial 
relations between 1973 and 1979. Quite clearly, the pre-1979 
industrial relations systems were racially discriminatory. 
However, not all employers of African labour agreed with 
government policies: mixed feelings were expressed by various 
employers over the new industrial relations system instituted 
in 1973. In the context of complicated industrial relations, 
there emerged a new blend of African trade unionism - a 
subject of discussion in the following chapters. 
In 1979, the Wiehahn Commission recommended that the 
emergent independent trade unions be drawn into a unitary 
system of collective bargaining which although allowing their 
existence, also extended government control on them. Capital 
pressed for reforms in the labour market to safeguard its 
interests while government preferred control rather than 
reform. In a nutshell, the Wiehahn Commission's 
recommendations should be seen as government tightening 
control over African labour. As rightly noted by Lipton, 
There [were] also uncertainties and fears about the 
risks and consequences of reform and about the 
likely black reaction ... These uncertainties and 
fears account for the characteristic 'two-track' 
policy of the Nationalists: striking out on a new 
route, but keeping in reserve remnants of the old, 
so that if it does not work, they will have a line 
96 See, for example, UW, WCL, SACTWU, G 45.12.9, In the 
Supreme Court of South Africa, Natal Provincial Division, Case 
number M 2459/83; G 45.12.8, Factories, Frame and Disputes, 
1983, In the Industrial Court of South Africa, Pinetown, 10 
November 1983; and J. Maree and s. Godfrey, "Trends towards 
corporatism in South Africa: industrial relations and 
industrial strategy in the textile industry", in A. van der 
Merwe (ed), Industrial sociology: A South African perspective 
(Johannesburg, Lexicon, 1995), p 92. 
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of retreat. 97 
97 Lipton, Capitalism and apartheid, p 385. 
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Chapter Ten 
The National Union of Textile Workers, 1973-1985 
Introduction 
In the aftermath of the 1973 Durban strikes, African workers 
flocked to join the new independent trade union movement which 
had emerged. 1 The textile workers had been at the centre of 
these strikes, particularly those employed by the Frame Group. 
Durban was central to worker struggles during the 1970s, which 
spilt over to the rest of the country. During that period, 
Durban was vital to the national economy, " ... contain[ing] the 
largest concentration of manufacturing industry outside the 
PWV area". 2 It was in Durban that worker struggles became 
widespread, and the city became a " •.. stimulus to there-
emergence of independent trade unions with majority African 
membership". 3 
This chapter focuses on the rise of independent African 
trade unions with particular reference to the formation and 
organisation of the National Union of Textile Workers (NUTW), 
which was centred in Durban. It should be emphasised that 
worker struggles at that time marked a turning point both in 
the labour movement and in the history of South Africa. This 
1 The label "independent trade unions" was used during 
the 1970s and 1980s to.distinguish African unions, with mainly 
African members, from African unions affiliated to the former 
white trade union federation, Trade Union Council of South 
Africa (TUCSA) and to distinguish them from SACTU. 
2 G. Kraak, Breaking the chains: labour in South Africa 
in the 1970s and 1980s (London, Pluto Press, 1993), p 128. 
3 Ibid. 
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chapter is divided into two parts: part one deals with the 
period between 1973 and 1979 when independent African unions 
were unregistered and part two examines the early-Wiehahn era 
(marked by a period of growth in union membership and 
successful recognition campaigns) up to 1985. 
Part One: Formation and Organisation, 1973-1979 
Origins of the NUTW 
The NUTW was one of the first independent unions to be formed 
soon after the 1973 strikes. The origins of this union can be 
traced before the strike wave of 1973. It was H. Bolton who 
committed herself to organising the unorganised African 
workers during the early 1970s. Bolton was a veteran Durban-
based official of the Trade Union Council of South Africa 
(TUCSA) and interested mainly in the struggles of Indian 
workers in the industry in Durban. During the early 1970s, she 
was the general secretary of the Natal branches of the 
registered Textile Workers' Industrial Union (TWIU), Garment 
Workers' Industrial Union (GWIU) and the Furniture and Allied 
Workers' Union (FAWU), all TUCSA-affiliated unions. 4 She began 
the process of employing young white academics in a bid to 
revive and organise registered unions in Natal. In April 1970 
R. Lambert was employed as an assistant secretary of FAWU and 
D. Hemson became the national organiser of TWIU in June 1972. 5 
While organising Indian workers at one of the factories, 
Lambert was challenged by A. Mcwabe, former SACTU trade 
unionist, to do something for African workers. During that 
period D. Hemson, Bolton, Lambert, H. Cheadle and Mcwabe 
convened a meeting to discuss the organisation of African 
workers. It was from that meeting that the idea of launching a 
4 Natal Room (hereafter NR), David Hemson Collection and 
Papers (hereafter DHCP), Extract from J. Maree, The National 
Union of Textile Workers, 1973 -1979. 
5 UW, WCL, HLP, SACTWU, The emergence and development of 
FOSATU (Natal), 1972- 1979, p 2. 
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Benefit Fund for African workers was proposed. On 9 September 
1972, when the General Factory Workers' Benefit Fund (GFWBF) 
was officially launched, it had about 1 000 African members.6 
Dominant among the new recruits were the textile workers, who 
later experienced the largest number of, and the lengthiest, 
strikes during 1973. 
Soon after the strikes, African workers from various 
industries joined the Benefit Fund in large numbers. They 
asked to be organised into trade unions representing their 
particular fields of work. One of the long-term objects of the 
General Factory Workers' Benefit Fund was to be a stepping 
stone to trade unionism proper, organising sections of its 
members into industrial unions when sufficient membership in 
any particular industry was achieved. In fact, the Benefit 
Fund soon changed from its original function of providing 
funeral benefits for its members, to a more direct one of 
organising African workers into trade unions. This change was 
necessitated by the rapid growth in Benefit Fund's membership 
which, in the aftermath of the strikes, stood at 60 000. 7 Such 
a process, according to P. Bonner, was accelerated by the 
Durban strikes of 1973, '' ... precipitating the formation of 
unions much earlier than might otherwise have been the case". 8 
Because of large numbers of new members in the Benefit Fund, 
members were organised according to their industry and hence 
the first independent African trade unions were established in 
the metal, clothing, textile, chemical, furniture and 
transport industry. 9 The formation of those industrial unions 
was precipitated in part by the Registrar of Benefit Funds who 
refused to give registration to the Benefit Fund and, in fact, 
6 UW, WCL, HLP, SACTWU, GFWBF minutes, 17 June 1972 . See 
also GFWBF report to TUACC by D. Hemson, June 1974; and Maree, 
"An analysis of the independent trade unions", p 142. 
7 Friedman, Building tomorrow today, p 43. 
8 P. Bonner, The history of labour organisation in South 
Africa (Durban, FOSATU, 1980), pp 22-3. 
9 Webster, Cast in a racial mould, p 132. 
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ordered the Benefit Fund to wind up operations in 1975. 
Also important for the development of African independent 
trade unions was the Central Administration Services Committee 
(CAS) that was launched in March 1973 in Durban by H. Bolton, 
as an internal infrastructure of the unions. 10 The 
committee's role was to raise funds and provide an institu-
tional base for the launching of African unions. The CAS's 
role was thus: 
... to draw all the registered unions in Bolton Hall 
[named after Jimmy Bolton and a trade union centre 
that housed registered Textile, Garment and 
Furniture unions] into a concerted drive to form 
parallel-type unions to the registered ones .... The 
unions involved were ... {the] Garment, Furniture, 
Textile and Motor Assemblies. BF, Urban Training 
Project and Wages Commission representatives sat on 
CAS also. 11 
However, some registered unions like the Garment Workers' 
Union did not support the idea of establishing African trade 
unions fearing competition and also pressure from the security 
police. Bolton who had been in the forefront organising 
African workers was forced to resign at the end of 1973 from 
the Garment Workers' Union because, as some officials argued, 
any attempt to organise African workers "was not worth the 
trouble". 12 However, Bolton may not have been forced to 
resign because of African workers not being worth the trouble 
(although this may have been expressed by an individual 
official) but because of conservative tendencies accelerated 
by security police pressure. 
Another significant development which aided the rise of 
African independent trade unions in Durban was the 
establishment of the University of Natal Students' Wages 
Commission in mid-1971 (discussed in Chapter 8). It was the 
white radicalised students who played a prominent role in the 
10 uw, WCL, HLP, SACTWU, The emergence and development of 
FOSATU, p 3. 
11 b 4 I id., p . 
12 SALB, "Too late for consultation: the Garment Workers' 
Union capitulates", SALB, vol 1 (1975), p 3. 
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establishmen of independent African trade unions. Indeed, the 
initiative f r forming unions primarily came from 
intellectual outside the ranks of the African working class 
in conjuncti n with former SACTU trade unionists. The approach 
of white stu ents was, as Maree noted, that "they, as white 
students, could make their resources available to black 
workers instead of offering all their skills to management as 
white students usually do in the end". 13 Completely excluded 
from the Black Consciousness Movement, white students turned 
their energies to establishing African unions that were 
independent from the BC movement. For instance, African unions 
such as the NUTW and CWIU 14 emerged from white-led service 
organisations like the University of Natal Students' Wages 
Commission and from the Benefit Fund, CAS, and other 
organisations which, by the end of 1973, had a number of 
African union officials playing a crucial role. These 
organisations were established by students and academics from 
the University of Natal, former SACTU organisers and as well 
as TUCSA organisers, who believed firmly in organising African 
workers. In these unions, whites were included as officials 
and membership was open to all racial groups. Indeed, as will 
be seen later, three of the ten founding members of the NUTW 
were white. 15 
The organisation of African textile workers was also 
initiated by the registered Textile Workers Industrial Union 
(TWIU) before and during the 1973 strike wave. Before the 
launching of the NUTW, the TWIU, through D. Hemson, managed to 
organise the unorganised African workers in the textile 
industry although it catered mainly for the Indian and 
coloured working class. The union tried to incorporate 
Africans in its ranks by supporting the establishment of a 
13 Maree, "An analysis of the independent trade unions", p 
143. 
14 See also Chapter 11 dealing with the Chemical Workers 
Industrial Union. 
15 See footnote number 23. 
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parallel, unregistered independent African trade union. Soon 
after the February 1973 strikes, the TWIU negotiated wage 
increments for both Indian and African workers at Smith and 
Nephew and Consolidated Textile Mills. 16 In August 1973, 
representations were made to the industrial council and the 
TUCSA Annual Conference by TWIU on behalf of 500 striking 
African workers at Frame's Wentex Mill in Jacobs. The dispute 
was over a five percent wage increment. All striking workers 
were fired and the company re-employed some workers, rejecting 
others whom they considered as "troublemakers, including nine 
works committee members". 17 A donation of R3 500 was given to 
dismissed workers by TUCSA. 18 Furthermore, TUCSA appealed to 
the Minister of Labour to have dismissed workers reinstated; 
the appeal was not successful. Thus, some form of organisation 
was already provided to African textile workers well before 
the inauguration of NUTW in September 1973. 
Even after the formation of NUTW, the TWIU continued to 
play a significant role in the organisation of African 
workers. For some time both NUTW and TWIU worked together and 
shared the same offices and organisation, but they later 
developed strong rivalry over membership and policies. 19 The 
conflict between the two unions eventually led to a split and 
also to competition for union members. 
In June 1973, a meeting was called by the Benefit Fund 
organisers to consider the formation of a union of all textile 
workers. A caretaker committee was appointed, represented by 
members selected from different textile factories. On 5 
August, the committee prepared a memorandum that was submitted 
to Chief M.G. Buthelezi (who enjoyed much worker support at 
16 Natal Room, DHCP, The National Union of Textile 
Workers, p 1. 
17 d Ibi ., p 2. 
18 Ibid. 
19 UW, WCL, HLP, SACTWU, F49.2, Textile Workers' 
Industrial Union, 1973-1988, correspondence: relationship 
between NUTW and TWIU. The issue is discussed later in the 
chapter, see pp 293-298. 
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the time because of his criticism against low wages20 and 
possibly his ties with the ANC), which called on his 
intervention to enable workers to "have the freedom to 
organise themselves [and] hold meetings in Clermont". 21 
Furthermore, the committee asked Chief Buthelezi's government 
to assist workers form a Rent Control Board responsible for 
establishing maximum room rentals for workers staying in 
Clermont township. The committee also decided that 20 cents be 
paid as the weekly subscription and that such an amount was to 
provide members with all the benefits they had enjoyed in the 
Benefit Fund. All Benefit Fund green card-holders who were 
textile workers had to be reissued with a new blue card for 
the textile union.22 On 23 September 1973, the NUTW was 
born. 23 
Recruitment and organisation 
During the first months of its existence, NUTW experienced 
membership growth in the greater Durban area. The largest 
membership was concentrated in the textile industries, where 
working conditions and wages were appalling. As already 
stated, initial recruitment had started with the Benefit Fund, 
and by the end of October 1973, the union had a total 
20 See, f.or instance, SA Institute of Personnel 
Management, Strikes - the lessons from Natal, 1973, pp 3-5; 
and IIE, The Durban strikes, p 19. 
21 UW, WCL, SACTWU, NUTW, D 15, Notice to all members, nd, 
p 1 . 
22 Ibid. 
23 See UW, WCL, HLP, SACTWU, The National Union of Textile 
Workers: A history of NUTW- the first ten years, 1. The 
founding members of the NUTW were: H. Nxasana, H. Cheadle, I. 
Shongwe, Junerose Nala, H. Khahlede, C. Mbali, T. Khumalo, S. 
Ngubane, P. Sewnath and the typist/administrator, Jeanette 
Murphy (nee J. Cunningham-Brown). See minutes of meeting of 
the NUTW, 30 September 1973 and also The Textile Forum, March 
1974. J. Copelyn was not present at the launch of the NUTW and 
only participated as an official after the banning of key 
organisers in February 1974. 
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membership of almost 1 500.24 New members were recruited from 
Smith and Nephew, S.A. Fabrics, Dano Textiles, Nortex, Seltex, 
Frametex, Afritex, Pinetex and Ropes and Mattings. 25 It was 
from those mills that the shop-stewards were elected. By June 
1974, the NUTW had signed up 5 000 members. 26 Membership 
initially increased rapidly~ especially soon after the January 
1974 strikes in the textile industry, but dropped from late 
1974 to early 1975 during the textile recession. 
More important to the NUTW in 1974 was the recognition 
agreement signed on 19 July with the Smith and Nephew 
company. 27 Smith and Nephew was one of the British companies 
in South Africa that was being investigated by the British 
Parliamentary Commission. The Commission investigated the 
wages paid to African workers, employment benefits and 
education and training. One of the recommendations formulated 
by the British government for subsidiary companies in South 
Africa was that, " ... there is nothing to prevent a company 
from recognizing and negotiating with a trade union represen-
ting African workers". 28 The agreement was important in that 
the NUTW was granted the right to organise its members at the 
company during non-working hours and at least three hours 
every Wednesday during lunchtime. Shop stewards representing 
the union were elected in all departments of the company. 
24 UW, WCL, HLP, SACTWU, D 13.2, Natal, 1973 -1987 ; and G 
106.5, membership figures. 
25 NR, DHCP, The NUTW, p 2; and SACTWU, minutes of meeting 
of the NUTW, 30 September 1974. 
26 UW, WCL, HLP, SACTWU, The emergence and development of 
FOSATU, p 7; and NUTW, report to the 1 st TUACC council, 16 
June 1974. 
27 UW, WCL, HLP, SACTWU, Profile of the NUTW, 1982; and 
The NUTW: the first ten years, p 4.; NR, DHCP, The NUTW, 3. 
See the original agreement document between the NUTW and Smith 
and Nephew in UW, SACTWU, G116.2, agreements; S. Friedman, 
Building tomorrow today: African workers in trade unions. 
1970-1984 (Johannesburg, Ravan Press, 1987), pp 94-96. 
28 See M. Legassick, "The record of British firms in South 
Africa in the context of the political economy", SALB, vol. 2, 
no.1 (May/ June, 1975), p 75. 
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Commenting on the recognition agreement of 1974, John Copelyn 
stated: "The serious benefits of that Agreement were really 
substantial organisational gains for workers". 29 
By 1979 the union had a paid-up membership of 5 50030 
and had signed a number of recognition agreements with various 
companies such as South African Fabrics, David Whitehead and 
Sons, Hammarsdale Clothing, and Furpile and Progress Knitting 
Mills. 31 As part of the NUTW's strategy, it first organised 
in companies which had a reputation for being good employers, 
and concentrated especially on international subsidiary 
companies. Recruitment in such companies started outside the 
factory gates and once the union was assured of 25 percent 
membership, the management was approached for union access to 
its members. In some cases where management proved hostile to 
union access, the recruitment drive was intensified through 
secret shop stewards within the company. 32 The union also 
utilised general meetings to recruit new members. During 
meetings, the union emphasised those issues which appealed to 
workers such as piece rates, wage rates and conditions of 
service. 33 Such strategies worked in favour of the union 
membership drive. 
From late 1974 to the beginning of 1975, the NUTW's paid-
up membership declined. This was at a time when the textile 
29 h NR, DHCP, T e NUTW, p 4. 
30 uw, WCL, HLP, SACTWU, The emergence and development of 
FOSATU, p 7; and profile of the NUTW, 1982, p 16. 
31 UW, WCL, HLP, SACTWU, Profile of the NUTW, p 19. By 
1982 in Natal province, the NUTW had signed no fewer than 19 
recognition agreements. Some of the companies beyond the 
Durban boundaries which signed the recognition agreements with 
the NUTW were Mooi River Textiles, Herbox Textiles, Gelvinor 
Textiles and Brailey Linnofra International. See also NR, 
DHCP, NUTW - History, growth and objectives by J. Copelyn, 
September 1984, p 5. 
32 Interview with Jabulani Gwala, Bolton Hall, SACTWU 
Offices, 27 September 1993. 
33 NR, DHCP, NUTW - History, growth and objectives, p 2. 
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industry was hard hit by the economic recession, 34 brought 
about by the importation of cheap material from the Far East, 
especially from Japan. 35 By the end of 1975, almost 10 000 
textile workers in the country had been retrenched and the 
textile industry was utilising about 60 percent or less of its 
plant capacity. 36 Of the 10 000 retrenched, about 5 500 
workers were from the greater Durban area. In response to the 
economic crisis of 1975, the government imposed tough duties 
on a variety of imported textile products. 37 Various textile 
industries retrenched their workers during the recession 
period and some of their targets were workers who were 
identified as union members or what management termed 
"troublesome" workers. 38 At Nortex, Ropes and Matting, 
Wentex, S.A. Fabrics and Dano Textiles, retrenchments were 
effected. 39 As a result of such problems, the union movement 
was weakened and a sharp drop in membership was experienced. 
The greatest challenge which faced the union, then, was to 
make substantial economic gains if it was to do more than 
remain with only a small, committed number of union members. 
NUTW membership subscriptions dropped significantly as 
the number of union members declined. In 1974, the union 
subscriptions collected averaged R1 437 per month especially 
between July and September. 4° From October 1974 to July 1975, 
34 uw, WCL, HLP, SACTWU, The emergence and development of 
FOSATU, p 10; and Maree, "An analysis of the independent trade 
unions". 
35 See Maree, "An analysis of the independent trade 
unions"; and NR, DHCP, The NUTW, p 6. 
36 SAIRR,' Survey of race relations, 1974, p 265; and 
Survey of race relations, 1975, p 177. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Interview with Judith Msomi, Bolton Hall, Workers' 
College, 16 October 1992. 
39 UW, WCL, HLP, SACTWU, NUTW, Report to TUACC council 
meeting, 6 April 1975. 
40 uw, WCL, NUTW, Financial statements, 31 July 1974 and 
14 September 1974. 
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the average dropped to R1 108 per month. 41 Because of the 
economic recession in 1975, union subscriptions further 
declined heavily particularly from mid-1975. From September to 
December 1975, the collected subscriptions amounted to R501 
per month while in 1976 the average was R430 per month. 42 
However, such sharp drops cannot be explained solely in terms 
of the economic recession. There were other important factors 
which inhibited workers from joining or participating in trade 
union activities during this period. 
As previously stated, one of the reasons why employers of 
African labour preferred migrant labour from far-away areas 
was that it had a reputation for being docile and subservient 
and was therefore less likely to be influenced by "communistic 
trade unions". 43 This idea was challenged during the 1973 
Durban strikes, which showed the unity of the African working 
class, both migrant and urban workers. In fact, the migrant 
labour system was challenged not only by the mass strikes of 
1973 but also by the huge entry of migrant workers into trade 
unions. Ironically, during the 1970s, the system itself 
created conditions conducive to such workers joining the 
unions. As A. Sitas argued, "migrants were ... combined the 
moment they entered the hostel [or factory]. People from the 
same region, or clansmen would immediately organise the 
newcomers' life on group lines." 44 He designated such 
cultural formations, "defensive combinations", which 
consequently provided a base for collective mobilisation of 
41 UW, WCL, NUTW, Financial statements, 31 July 1975. In 
late 1975, however, NUTW had the highest paid-up membership of 
33 per cent as compared to other unions like the Chemical 
Workers Industrial Union with 31 per cent. See, for instance, 
Friedman, Building tomorrow today, p 136. 
42 uw, WCL, NUTW, Financial statements, September 1975-
February 1976, April - June 1976, August -December 1976. See 
also NR, DHCP, The NUTW, p 6. 
43 See Chapter 3, pp 56-66. 
44 A. Sitas, "Moral formations and struggles amongst 
migrant workers on the East Rand", Labour, Capital and 
Society, 18, 2 (1985), p 383. 
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migrant workers. A proportion of organisers and shop stewards 
interviewed by Sitas pointed out that 
Migrants are keener union members than permanent 
people. A couple said that there wasn't any real 
difference between migrants and permanent people, 
that migrants responded sooner because of their work 
conditions but then permanent people followed 
suit. 45 
A survey conducted by E. Webster and J. Kuzwayo in 1975, 
came to the conclusion that about 58 percent of African 
workers joined unions in order to defend their rights at the 
workplace. 46 African workers wanted unions to play a 
meaningful role in their day-to-day lives, and to improve 
their wages and working conditions. From the survey, three 
broad answers were given as to why Africans failed to join the 
unions that were formed in Durban during that time. 
Fear of victimisation is another thing. Many people 
feel there is still a storm to fall on the trade 
unions - to be safe one has to keep off entirely and 
if you are found discussing such matters [you] can 
be called to book by either the management or 
police. Secondly, respondents mentioned unfavourable 
experience with the union in the past due to 
leadership splits, corruption or simply lack of 
effectiveness due to failure to win recognition. 
Thirdly, a feeling that the state and employers are 
too powerful and would not allow unions to become 
viable, so why bother to join them. 47 
The survey showed that a significant proportion of workers 
failed to join unions because of fear of being victimised by 
their employers and the police. 48 Cases in point being the 
1974 state prosecutions of union organisers like W. Mbali of 
the NUTW. African workers were also concerned about the' 
unions' effectiveness in solving their problems. During the 
45 Ibid., p 391. 
46 See E. Webster and J. Kuzwayo, "Consciousness and the 
problem of collective action - a preliminary case-study of a 
random sample of African workers in Durban" (Paper housed in 
the NR, DHCP, nd). 
47 Ibid. 
48 b I id., p 11. 
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1970s, some successes were recorded in terms of wage 
increments but, on the whole, failures outweighed successes. 
Unions' failures in that respect contributed to the withdrawal 
of some members and the subsequent decline in membership. 
Another contributing factor was the banning of union 
leaders. On 31 January 1974, D. Davis of the Benefit Fund and 
a Metal Union organiser was banned and prohibited from 
carrying out any duties in any union. 49 Further state 
bannings followed. In February 1974, a number of textile 
organisers including H. Cheadle, J. Murphy and D. Hemson were 
banned. 50 Another setback was experienced when Chief 
Buthelezi accused TUACC in general and MAWU specifically, 
particularly A. Mthethwa of stirring opposition among the 
workers to himself. 51 Arising out of that charge was the 
dismissal of B. Dladla, the Community Affairs Minister of the 
KwaZulu government, who had played an important role during 
the 1973 and January 1974 strikes. During the Frametex strikes 
in January 1974, B. Dladla successfully led about 5 000 
striking workers and intervened on their behalf in their 
demand that the management of the company negotiate with the 
NUTW, which represented the majority of workers. 52 Frame 
offered wage increases and the workers returned to work. It 
was that incident which led to the dismissal of Dladla by 
Chief Buthelezi. Dladla had gained popularity among African 
workers in Durban and was viewed by Buthelezi as a potential 
threat to his leadership. Furthermore, the opposition from 
Buthelezi to Dladla's growing popularity among the workers 
also included a range of issues such as Dladla's attitude 
towards sanctions and the Bantu Investment Corporation. 
During and soon after the Durban strikes of 1973, Chief 
Buthelezi had supported African workers' demands for higher 
49 Webster, Cast in a racial mould, p 133. 
50 UW, WCL, HLP, SACTWU, The NUTW - the first ten years, 
3. 
51 Ibid. 
52 NR, DHCP, The NUTW, p 5. 
p 
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wages and called upon the South African government to 
recognise African trade unions. In contrast, in 1976, the 
Kwazulu government emphasised that " ... trade unions are not 
recognised by the KwaZulu government ... and [that] trade unions 
do not form part of such lines of communication."53 Perhaps 
this sudden change of attitude towards trade unions was caused 
by the dismissal of the pro-union councillor, Dladla, who had 
gained huge support among African worker~, and also pressure 
from the central government not to recognise independent trade 
unions. 54 
In April 1974 the state prosecuted the NUTW organiser, 
Wiseman Mbali, for inciting workers to strike. 55 State 
bannings continued in May 1976 with the detention of J. Nala 
and 0. Zuma, both officials of the NUTw.56 They were detained 
under Section 6 of the Terrorism Act for "furthering the aims 
of an illegal strike, following a very bitter two weeks strike 
by workers at Natal Cotton and Woollen Mills".57 State ban-
nings and detentions deprived the union movement of ex-
perienced leadership but that did not lead to the demise of 
the union since it had a strong shop floor structure. The NUTW 
did not depend solely on its top leadership strata, as shop 
stewards were elected in various factories and were 
responsible for recruiting new members; they also collected 
union subscriptions and handled some workers' complaints. In 
July 1974, the NUTW recognised that: f!Factory organisation 
53 UW, WCL, HLP, SACTWU, NUTW, Director of Works, KwaZulu, 
to trade unions, Durban, circular Number 5 of 1976. 
54 On government's attitude towards African trade unions, 
see Chapter 9. 
55 The case is well-documented in UW, WCL, HLP, SACTWU, 
NUTW, G 45.12.1, State versus c. Mbali ; and see also SALB, 2, 
3 (1975). 
56 See SALB, "Profiles of J. Nala and o. Zumau in SALB, 
volume 2, Numbers 9 & 10 (May-June 1976), pp 117-118. 
57 Ibid., p 117. see the details of the strike in SALB, 
volume 3, Number 7 ( June-July 1977); and also in Maree, "An 
analysis of the independent trade unions", pp 186-190. 
285 
inside the factory is the only way for us to proceed further 
than we did." 58 Indeed, that was a powerful strategy which 
brought the union organisation closer to workers. Some of the 
tasks undertaken by the shop stewards were: 
... to convene meetings, before and after shop 
stewards' meetings, of the workers in their 
departments to learn of problems and to report back 
on shop stewards' discussions and decisions; to 
enrol new members; ... to collect the members' 
subscriptions each week ···t to raise complaints of 
workers with management ... ~9 
Such organisational methods utilised by the NUTW were later 
adopted by unions affiliated to the Trade Union Advisory Co-
ordinating Council (TUACC) in 1977, which gave primacy to the 
shop stewards in union growth. 
Internal conflicts within the NUTW also contributed to 
the decline in membership. In January 1975, three union 
organisers who advocated the Black Consciousness ideology were 
dismissed from the NUTW over differences in policy. 60 These 
Black Consciousness organisers wanted the expulsion of white 
organisers from the union movement and argued that the union's 
decline was caused by "whites who were dominating" union 
affairs. 61 Unfortunately for the Black Consciousness 
organisers, the white organisers enjoyed the support of the 
African workers and the NUTW stood firm on a non-racial union 
policy and rejected outright the call of the three Black 
Consciousness organisers to expel all white organisers. The 
Branch Executive Committee accordingly decided to dismiss the 
three organisers. Shortly afterwards, another organiser, T. 
Khumalo, also called for the expulsion of white organisers. 
Khumalo had just lost his post as an organiser at the Jacobs 
SS UW, WCL, HLP, SACTWU, NUTW, minutes of staff meeting, 
15 July 1974. 
59 NR, DHCP, The NUTW, p 9. 
60 See UW, WCL, HLP, SACTWU, The emergence and development 
of FOSATU, p 11 and NR, DHCP, The NUTW, p 10. 
61 Ibid. 
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office because of poor organisational skills. 62 He attributed 
the loss of his job to the dominance of white intellectuals in 
the union. However, the issues in dispute appeared to be the 
wages of organisers, white control, and the relationship 
between the unions and the BC organisations. Khumalo, it was 
widely regarded, lost his position because of a sharp personal 
dispute with Copelyn after the banning of the white trade 
unionists. In March 1976 in an attempt to resolve the 
conflict, Khumalo was transferred from the NUTW to the 
Transport and General Workers' Union (TGWU). 63 The conflict 
was resolved but the NUTW lost a number of factories and 
members where Khumalo had worked as organiser. On the whole, 
the union emphasised its stand on non-racialism although there 
had been some discomfort at the loss of important organisers 
who had disputes with the incoming white officials. 
By 1979 membership of the NUTW was again picking up and 
stood at 5 500. The union was now concentrating on major 
textile industries such as Smith and Nephew, Frametex, 
Consolidated Woolwashing and Processing Mills (CWPM) and South 
Africa Fabrics, where there was effective union organisation. 
But union organisation was also extended to other smaller 
factories. At major textile industries, shop stewards were 
properly constituted and functioned well. Elected liaison 
committee posts in those industrial establishments were domi-
nated by union officials who were highly respected by the rank 
and file of workers. For instance, at Frametex, J. Gwala, the 
chairperson of the shop stewards committee, and S. Cele 
62 UW, WCL, HLP, SACTWU, The emergence and development of 
FOSATU, p 11; and NR, DHCP, The NUTW, p 12. In the available 
documents, it is indicated that Khumalo was unable to write 
reports for presentation to the BEC. He failed to write even a 
single report till the time of his forced retirement from the 
NUTW. Many union officials were not literate and unable to 
write reports for the BECs; this did not necessarily affect 
their ability to organise under difficult circumstances. The 
history of the NUTW, of course, was likely to have been 
written by a white official with considerable post-school 
education. 
63 Ibid. 
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commanded respect among African workers. 64 Even during the 
1979 Frame strike, about 500 workers refused to be addressed 
by A. Frame and, instead, were addressed by J. Gwala. 65 He 
persuaded workers to return to work and guaranteed that a wage 
increase that was supposed to be effected within six months 
would be effected within two months. Frame also undertook not 
to dismiss any of the striking workers and the strike came to 
an end.66 Clearly, the NUTW had by 1979 successfully managed 
to place factory issues in the hands of shop stewards. 
As a result of the Wiehahn Commission's recommendations 
in 1979, a new beginning was created whereby African trade 
unions could be registered. As already explained in Chapter 
Nine, the government finally bowed to mounting pressures from 
employers and working-class action, particularly in the 1970s 
and as well as the international community. Because of the 
changed labour conditions, new strategies had to be for-
mulated. The Wiehahn Report envisaged reforms as the only way 
of ensuring effective control over the growth of African 
unions. In fact, according to the Report, African unions were 
not subjected to any form of "discipline and control" but 
rather enjoyed more substantial freedom than registered 
unions. 67 The rapid growth of independent African trade 
unionism, and the industrial militancy which had rocked Durban 
since the strike wave of 1973, made the state fear a possible 
re-unification of banned political organisations and the trade 
union movement, as had happened during the 1950s and early 
1960s. The government saw control through reform as an answer 
to the labour problems of the 1970s. Unregistered African 
trade unions were to be granted legal recognition, and 
64 Interview with Msomi, 16 October 1992; and see also the 
tribute to S. ·cele soon after his assassination in 1980 during 
the Frame strikes. Textile Forum, June 1980 
65 For the strike·details see The Rand Daily Mail, 3 July 
1979 and also Gwala's notes on the 1979 strike. Notes are 
author's personal collection from J. Gwala. 
66 Gwala's notes on the 1979 strike. 
67 The Wiehahn Commission Report, para. 3.35.5. 
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accorded the same privileges as their white, Indian and 
coloured counterparts. However, Wiehahn recommended a formal 
ban on any form of political trade unionism or affiliation. 68 
Such sophisticated strategies failed to attain the state's 
desired results of, at the least, dampening down the labour 
militancy of the 1970s. On the contrary, major conflicts were 
to break out between workers and employers. 
Part Two: Union Growth, 1980-85 
Recruitment and organisation: focus on shop stewards 
In 1980, the NUTW with its 5 500 members was registered under 
the Industrial Conciliation Act of 1979 and soon began 
recruiting a significant number of "coloured", African and 
Indian members. Because of its non-racial policy, membership 
growth was experienced in the greater Durban area. By October 
1981, about 5 971 members made use of a stop-order facility 
while 8 856 were registered members compared to the 5 500 of 
1979; 69 by December that year, the number had grown to 9 350 
paid-up and 12 600 signed-up members. 70 The union was also 
recognised in 16 factories where the total membership was 
8 490 out of an eligible workforce of about 11 050. 71 The 
NUTW's growth continued in 1982 and 1983: in 1982, the union 
had 11 880 paid-up and 15 130 signed-up members, while in 1983 
signed-up members more than doubled to 35 000. 72 In 1982, the 
union had managed to organise workers in 21 factories, 17 of 
68 Ibid. 
69 UW, WCL, SACTWU, D 13.2.1.4, Report to the NEC of the 
NUTW (Natal Branch), October 1981. 
70 NUTW, "Industrial councils -new dimensions to the 
struggle in the textile industry", SALB, 7, numbers 4&5 
(1982), p 98. 
71 NUTW, History, growth and objectives, September 1984, p 
5. 
72 FOSATU annual year report, 1982, p 2; and FOSATU annual 
year report, 1983, p 6. 
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which recognised it. 73 By the end of 1983, the union had 
managed to organise workers in 46 factories and had signed 
about 36 recognition agreements. 74 What was unique for the 
time was the number of recognition agreements the union 
managed to sign. The really rapid increase in membership 
appeared between 1983 and 1984. 
One of the reasons for this rapid expansion in membership 
was the union strategy of concentrating on Natal where wages 
and working conditions were poor as compared to the Orange 
Free State, Northern Cape and Northern Transvaal. Also of 
significance was the NUTW's strategy of first organising those 
factories which did not have a reputation for hostility to 
African unions. A number of firms with national and 
international links were targeted and only once they had been 
organised did the union then re-direct its energy towards 
organising those firms which were defined as less 
"enlightened", such as, for example the Frame Group. 75 
The strategy of organising better companies first is 
a sound one, in that conditions in these companies 
may then be held out as example to workers in a less 
'fortunate' position. Also, the fact that 
recognition has been gained in leading companies may 
pressurise other employers into following suit. 76 
The period between 1980 and early 1984 saw signed-up 
membership of independent unions rising from 70 000 to 
300 000. 77 During that period, the NUTW had increased its 
membership from about 5 500 in 1979 to nearly 42 000 in early 
73 UW, WCL, SACTWU, B3.1.2, Central Committee Meetings, 
1981-82, Report on the Natal region of FOSATU to the FOSATU 
central committee, 16 and 17 October 1982, p 1. 
74 FOSATU Annual year report, 1982. 
75 Profile of the NUTW, p 17. 
76 Profile of the NUTW, p 17. 
77 Maree, "The emergence, struggles and achievements of 
Black trade unions", p 297. 
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1984. 78 
Central to its recruitment policy was the union's 
continuing emphasis on the plant-level shop steward committees 
and on strong shop floor representation. In September 1981, 
the NUTW circulated a pamphlet "Why our union needs shop 
stewards" to all its branches and members in which the main 
functions of shop stewards were outlined: 
To organise workers in their sections of the factory 
[which] includes recruiting new members, holding 
worker meetings and developing a spirit of unity 
among members at the factory. To take up worker 
grievances [and] to lead worker struggles at the 
plant over unfair dismissals, unfair treatment of 
workers and other abuses of management powers. To 
provide the central leadership core in all union 
negotiations with management over wages and 
conditions at the factory.79 
By October 1982, the union had 153 elected shop stewards 
formally recognised in 17 firms in the Natal region. 80 Of the 
153 shop stewards, 118 were from the greater Durban area. 
Because of its dramatic growth in membership and in the number 
of shop stewards, the NUTW decided in 1982 to divide the 
region into two main branches: the Natal Coastal (better known 
as the greater Durban branch) and the Natal Midlands. 81 The 
greater Durban branch comprised central Durban, Pinetown, 
Hammarsdale and Tongaat, and it also established a shop 
steward council. The branch had a majority membership in 
eleven factories of which seven had officially recognised shop 
78 uw, WCL, SACTWU, Central committee meetings, 1981- 1982 
and 1984-1985. 
79 UW, WCL, SACTWU, NUTW, Why our union needs shop 
stewards, September 1981. 
80 UW, SACTWU, B3.1.2, Central committee·meetings, Report 
on the Natal Region of FOSATU, 16 and 17 October 1982. The 
number of shop stewards had decreased in 1982 as compared to 
the 1981 figure of 164 in 16 factories. The reason was that 
the NUTW embarked on a process of cutting down the number of 
shop stewards in some factories where there were too many. 
81 Ibid. 
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stewards. 82 
Despite the emphasis placed by the NUTW on the role of 
the shop stewards, the greater Durban branch complained that 
there were too many and that "the majority of whom are very 
weak and inactive".83 As a result, the NUTW intensified the 
ongoing process of education and training of shop stewards. A 
number of training seminars were held as part of the FOSATU 
education programme between 1981 and 1985. 84 In August 1982, 
the greater Durban branch's senior shop stewards were trained 
for four days to enable them" ... [to] carry out more 
organising functions in the factories''. 8S Furthermore, the 
union negotiated with management to have more rights granted 
to shop stewards at the factory level; shop stewards were to 
be allowed, in principle, access to telephone facilities and 
more time off to enable them to conduct union work. 86 In 
1983, the union managed to negotiate the employment of two 
full-time shop stewards at the firm David Whitehead and Sons, 
who were paid by the company to perform only shop steward 
duties. 87 Also in 1983, the greater Durban branch signed 
about 11 shop steward recognition agreements with various 
factories. 88 
In 1984, more seminars for shop stewards were conducted 
in order to solve what the greater Durban branch termed 
82 UW, WCL, SACTWU, 013.2.1.4, Natal Coastal branch report 
to NEC meeting, May 1982. 
83 Ibid. 
84 See, for instance, UW, WCL, SACTWU, NUTW organiser, A. 
Erwin to R. Mackie, Director, Extra-Mural Studies, University 
of Natal, Durban, 15 October 1981; and D 13.2.1.4, Natal 
Coastal branch reports, 1982-1985. 
85 UW, WCL, SACTWU, Natal Coastal branch report to NEC, 
14/15 August 1982. 
86 Ibid. 
87 uw, WCL, SACTWU,D13.2.1.4, Natal Coastal branch report, 
March 1984. 
88 uw, WCL, SACTWU, Natal Coastal branch report, September 
1983. 
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"problems of inexperience[d] worker leadership" at the factory 
floor. 89 It was also agreed during that year that all NUTW 
branches immediately "start education seminars for shop 
stewards in each factory ... focusing on grievance and 
discipline procedures".90 By 1985, the greater Durban branch 
had well-organised and trained shop stewards who were 
officially recognised in 14 factories.9 1 It was precisely 
because of these developments that the greater Durban branch 
had managed to obtain a 75,5 percent membership in those 
factories (see Table A below).92 
Table A 
NUTW: The Greater Durban (Natal Coastal) Branch, April 1985 
Organised Factories 
Smith and Nephew 
SA Fabrics 
David Whitehead and Sons 
Ninian and Lester 
James. North 
Fabrina Fabrics 
Universal Lace 
Lanter Nonwovens 
Bonar Staflex 
Isipingo Textile 
Umbrella Industry 
Regina Carpets 
Len Savoury 
CPC 
Total Workforce 
800 
240 
2000 
400 
260 
222 
210 
70 
75 
315 
200 
22 
428 
67 
Union Membership 
630 
183 
1349 
320 
235 
215 
198 
65 
68 
219 
190 
20 
250 
64 
In these 14 factories, the NUTW signed recognition agreements 
which, at least, provided them with the following: stop 
orders, access to premises, access to notice boards, shop 
stewards recognition, grievance procedure, disciplinary 
procedure and job grading. Undoubtedly, by 1985, the NUTW had 
grown to become one of the strongest non-racial trade unions 
in the textile and clothing industry with a membership of 
89 UW, WCL, SACTWU, D7.3.1.2.4, Notes of organiser 
seminar, 3-5 July 1984, p 2. 
90 Ibid. 
91 UW, WCL, SACTWU, D13.2.1.2, NUTW branches; Natal 
Coastal branch, NEC report, 12-14 April 1985. 
92 Ibid. 
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almost 60 000 in the Natal region. This was quite an 
achievement; the union relied on mass action, direct 
negotiations to win wage increases and recognition agreements. 
Agreements signed with companies contained substantive 
factory-based issues such as grievance, dismissal and 
retrenchment procedures, which related directly to workers' 
interests. More importantly, the union's organisational 
strength in the 1980s plus competent and committed leadership 
enabled it to counter the harsh period of economic recession 
and so won the confidence of workers. What strengthened the 
union also was its willingness to make use of the official 
dispute machinery in solving industrial disputes (discussed 
below). Not the least of contributory factors was the union's 
commitment to strong shop floor organisation and its non-
political alliance stand. It was precisely because of some of 
these reasons that the union was able to register meaningful 
gains in the 1980s (see below). 
NUTW and industrial councils 
Industrial councils were regional or national industrial 
bargaining bodies which were established by the 1924 
Industrial Conciliation Act. Between 1980 and 1982, the NUTW 
was opposed to participation in the industrial councils' 
bargaining structures and preferred to operate mainly at the 
plant level where the union could sign substantive agreements 
with employers and secure bargaining rights.93 This was 
understandable in that industrial councils, during the pre-
Wiehahn era, had been mainly dominated by employer 
representatives and registered unions in which African workers 
were excluded from the bargaining process. Indeed, as Southall 
notes, 
The resistance by emergent unions to [industrial 
councils] and their bid to shift bargaining to 
factory level therefore embodied a fundamental 
challenge to established modalities, simply because 
it required management to deal more directly with 
labour than any time since the passage of the 
93 See Friedman, Building tomorrow today, p 303. 
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original ICA in 1924.94 
Industrial councils, the NUTW wrote, were "inappropriate 
vehicles for industrial bargaining" since the bargaining 
process took place only at a regional or national industrial 
leve1. 95 The NUTW was convinced during that time that 
industrial councils were established to cater for the 
interests of employers and of established unions, which it 
described as "unrepresentative, undemocratic and 
cumbersome". 96 It also felt that since the constitutions of 
industrial councils were largely unrepresentative, the 
independent unions were not going to exert any substantial 
influence at all in those structures. Furthermore, the 
divergent views of independent and established unions made it 
impossible for them to speak with one voice on such councils. 
The NUTW was, however, in principle, not totally opposed 
to industry level bargaining provided its principles were not 
undermined. Some of its basic requirements for an effective 
bargaining process at any level were: 
Equality of parties in negotiations; parties to be 
representative but independent; simple, short 
negotiation procedures; level of negotiation to be 
determined by the representativeness of the parties; 
all aspects of labour relations and conditions of 
employment to be negotiable; negotiations to be open 
and based on knowledge of company policies and 
finances; agreements to be monitored by the parties 
themselves; [and, lastly], worker control over 
contributory benefit schemes. 97 
Provided those basic principles were adhered to, the NUTW 
would be happy to participate in any industrial council 
bargaining forum. However, as the union stated, hardly any 
clause in the industrial council constitution mentioned 
"worker rights to meet on factory premises, no shop steward 
function [was] defined, no right of inspection by union 
94 Southall, Imperialism or solidarity?, p 69. 
9S NUTW, "Industrial councils", p 96. 
96 UW, WCL, SACTWU, Profile of the NUTW, p 14. 
97 Ibid. 
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representatives, nor any other of the collective bargaining 
rights fought for in 'Recognition Agreements' at house level 
particularly by FOSATU unions". 98 The NUTW further objected 
that: 
Agreements are policed not by union stewards but by 
council inspectors; breaches of council agreements 
are criminal offenses entitling the state to 
'neutrally' regulate them by prosecutions or non-
intervention .... In general the industrial council 
system has tended to create self-generating 
bureaucracies which have effectively forced 
participating unions to move to the sidelines for 
the entire ~eriod of agreement which often means 2 
to 3 years. 9 
Because of these shortcomings, the NUTW formulated its own 
policies: the organisation of workers at each factory; the 
signing of recognition agreements with individual employers, 
the establishment of democratic regional councils, which were 
intended to negotiate minimum protective measures for all 
workers; and the supplementation of regional agreements by 
plant level bargaining on wages and conditions of employment 
in individual factories. 100 
In response to increasing pressure on employers to 
recognise the NUTW at individual factories, the Textile, Yarn 
and Fabric Manufacturers' Association (TYFMA) was formed in 
July 1981. 101 The association comprised most of the major 
textile manufacturers such as the Frame Group, David Whitehead 
and Sons, Hebox Textiles, Gelvena Textiles, Natal Thread, 
Progress Knitting, Braitex and Industex, to mention a few, and 
was specifically created to contain the threat posed by 
unions. 
The TYFMA comprised 44 members employing about 40 000 
98 NUTW, ''Industrial councils", p 96. 
gg Ibid, p 97. 
100 UW, WCL, SACTWU, Profile of the NUTW, p 15. 
101 NUTW, "Industrial councils", p 94; NUTW, History, 
growth and objectives, p 5; and UW, WCL, SACTWU, G45.12.9, In 
the supreme court of South Africa, Natal Provincial Division, 
case number M2459/83, p 8. 
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textile workers countrywide. 102 The Frame Group was one of 
the biggest employers in the TYFMA and the Natal Chamber of 
Industries was the secretariat of the association. 103 S. 
Lurie, manager at the Frame Group, was the chairperson of the 
association. In the first meeting held in July 1981 between 
the TYFMA and NUTW, Lurie indicated that employers did not 
intend to negotiate separate recognition agreements with the 
union at the plant level but rather through the employers' 
association. 104 Lurie also noted that the association was 
committed to the establishment of an industrial council that 
covered all areas of the textile industry previously excluded 
by other industrial councils. 105 At the end of the meeting, 
a proposed new policy for employers was clearly spelt out: 
NUTW and all other registered trade unions in the 
industry would be recognised by TYFMA at industry 
level and would be invited to participate on a 
national industrial council. Stop order facilities 
would be granted to all such unions irrespective of 
how few members they had in any establishment and 
accordingly more than one union could operate in the 
same factory at the same time. The union should 
abandon all arrangements made with individual 
members of TYFMA for house recognition and have such 
arrangements replaced by industry bargaining. 106 
The association's proposed policy would only be implemented if 
the union made an undertaking to confine all negotiations to 
an industrial level and operate through an industrial council. 
The association managed to push the advantage provided by the 
apartheid state of repressive labour laws and policies to the 
limit. However, other anti-apartheid and liberal employers 
within the association were not happy with such proposals. The 
102 UW, WCL, SACTWU, In the Supreme Court of South Africa, 
Case M2459/83, p 8. 
103 Ibid.; and NUTW, "Industrial councils", p 98. 
104 uw, WCL, SACTWU, In the supreme court of SA, case 
M2459/83, p 8. 
105 Ibid. 
106 Ibid.; NUTW, History, growth and objectives, p 5; and 
NUTW, "Industrial councils", p 99. 
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NUTW, however, rejected all the TYFMA's proposals but agreed 
to hold further discussions. Meanwhile in a "private and 
confidential" memorandum to all its members, the TYFMA advised 
them to resist the NUTW "even to the point of facing strikes 
in order to force the union to reorientate itself". 107 
However, further meetings were held between August and October 
1981 during which period the union pressed for gentlemen's 
agreements with individual factories, binding and enforceable 
agreements at the plant level. 108 The TYFMA rejected such 
agreements and proposed that all agreements should be 
enforceable by law. Another contentious issue was whether the 
union should be granted recognition and facilities in a 
factory where it did not have a majority membership. The NUTW 
felt that there should be one union per factory and that 
recognition and facilities should be granted to the union with 
a majority membership. 109 The TYFMA accepted this proposal. 
By the end of 1981, negotiations between the NUTW and 
TYFMA had collapsed when employers insisted that all factory 
negotiations and agreements be nullified pending the 
establishment of an industrial council for the industry. 110 
The clash between the NUTW and TYFMA caused division among 
members of the association: some employers signed factory 
recognition agreements with the NUTW while others, like the 
Frame Group in particular, resisted. 
From 1982 onwards, the NUTW reviewed its position with 
regard to industrial council participation. 111 It was only 
after August 1982 that FOSATU encouraged its affiliates to 
utilise industrial councils ''so long as participation on 
councils conceded neither factory level bargaining and shop 
107 UW, WCL, SACTWU, In the supreme court of SA, case 
M2459/83, p 10; and NUTW, History, growth and objectives, p 5. 
108 uw, WCL, SACTWU, In the supreme court of SA, case 
M2459/83, p 9. 
109 Ibid, p 10. 
110 Ibid. 
111 See Friedman, Building tomorrow today, p 304. 
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stewards' rights nor advantages to sitting minority 
unions". 112 After long soul-searching, the NUTW agreed to 
participate in these centralised bargaining structures. 
On 26 July 1983, the NUTW applied to become a member of 
the industrial council for the Natal clothing industry, during 
which time it had started organising workers in the clothing 
and knitting industry in the greater Durban area and Natal in 
general. 113 The Natal-based Garment Workers' Industrial 
Union objected to NUTW's application for an exemption from the 
closed shop and prohibition on deductions clauses as contained 
in the constitution of the industrial council. On 3 November, 
the industrial council turned down the NUTW's request on 
exemptions, a decision that was welcomed by GWIU. 114 A 
conflict also arose between the two unions over membership at 
the James North company of the greater Durban area. 
On 1 February 1984, a ballot was conducted to determine 
the union with a majority membership and the NUTW won with an 
84 per cent majority. 115 Once the NUTW had proved beyond 
reasonable doubt that it was a major role-player in the 
knitting and clothing industry, members of the industrial 
council were prepared to accept the NUTW. By mid-1984, the 
NUTW was admitted as a member to the industrial council for 
the clothing industry {Natal) and exemptions were granted. 
In 1984, the NUTW was also faced with two options, either 
to participate in a new industrial council solely for the 
Hammarsdale area or to join the existing one for Durban and 
its surrounding areas. At Hammarsdale, the union was actively 
organised with a total membership of 6 730 out of the eligible 
112 Southall, Imperialism or solidarity?, p 72. 
113 UW, WCL, SACTWU, D11.2.1, Industrial council for the 
clothing industry {Natal): In the industrial court of SA, 
1984, p 1; and see also Maree, "Trends towards corporatism in 
SA", p 92. 
114 uw, WCL, SACTWU, In the industrial court of SA, 1984, 
p 3. 
115 Ibid, p 4. 
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workforce of 10 000. 116 However, the clothing factories in 
the area were covered by the unskilled wage determinations 
(determined by the Wage Board) which made it difficult for the 
union to enter into wage negotiations with employers. Of the 
two options, the NUTW chose the latter: 
The present council covers the majority of the 
clothing industry in Natal and therefore our joining 
the council would be meaning that whatever gains are 
there for the majority will be applicable for 
Hammarsdale as well. The existing council has a 
close-shop clause and the only way of challenginq 
that at this time is to go into the council ... 11 T 
By mid-1984, the NUTW had secured membership in the textile 
industrial council covering Durban and its surrounding areas. 
By 1985, however, many independent unions had joined 
industrial councils, and by using those bargaining structures, 
were able to extract meaningful gains. 
Recognition struggles at Frame's textiles 
The Frame Group is (and has been) the largest textile 
manufacturer and employer in South Africa: in 1980, it 
employed about 35 000 workers on its various mills in the 
country. 118 During the early 1970s, the Frame Group 
established relations with the Textile workers' Industrial 
Union (TWIU) (a registered trade union) whose membership was 
dominated mainly by Indian workers and consistently refused to 
recognise independent African trade unions. For 12 years, the 
Frame Group resisted recognising the NUTW at its mills, and 
this became one of the greatest struggles in the textile 
industry. The NUTW could not claim to be a major 
representative of all textile workers without resolving the 
recognition dispute with the Frame Group, a key company in the 
South African textile industry. 
116 UW, WCL, SACTWU, NUTW correspondence, 1983-4: M. 
Sineke, branch secretary to all BEC and NEC members and NUTW 
organisers, p 1. 
117 Ibid. 
118 UW, WCL, SACTWU, D 7.4, Report on disputes, p 8. 
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From 1973 onwards, there were a number of clashes between 
the NUTW and the Frame Group over recruitment and recognition 
agreements at its mills. Frame dismissed workers who were 
involved in independent union activities on the factory floor. 
It searched workers for union membership cards or application 
forms, and workers were required to surrender newspapers 
and/or any other literature in their possession to the 
security office. 119 In June 1981, these company policies led 
to a protest by workers and the union. The company refused to 
give in, arguing that "sooner or later hand collections and 
changes of money would take place and thereafter insurance 
companies ... would be having a field day in the canteen ... which 
the company was not prepared to accept". 120 
Between July 1981 and August 1982, the NUTW withdrew from 
negotiations with the Frame Group and directed its energy 
towards those firms that were willing to enter into an 
agreement with the union. By August 1982, the NUTW had signed 
about 17 recognition agreements in the Natal region. 121 At 
that stage the Frame Group which had already established 
relations with the TWIU in the early 1970s granted it stop 
order facilities, particularly at the Nortex, Seltex and NKM 
mills. 122 A. Frame himself justified the company's 
recognition of the TWIU to its liaison committee members by 
the fact that the union had 70 percent membership at Nortex 
and 80 percent at both the Seltex and NKM mills. 123 The NUTW 
objected to the recognition agreement and its relations with 
the TWIU further deteriorated. Earlier, in 1980, the two 
119 uw, WCL, SACTWU, In the supreme court of SA, case 
number 2459/83, p 12. 
120 Ibid, p 1 3. 
121 Profile of the NUTW, p 19. 
122 UW, WCL, SACTWU, 013.2.1.4, Natal Coastal branch 
report, 14/15 August 1982, p 8; and In the supreme court of 
SA, case number M2459/83, p 13. 
123 Minutes of the meeting of the Frametex liaison 
committee, 16 March 1983, pp 2-3. 
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unions had clashed over the employment of J. Dubazane, who had 
been dismissed as an organiser for the NUTW and accused of 
being a police informer. 124 The NUTW wrote, "Numerous proofs 
were produced in this regard including correspondence from a 
security policeman; him being observed in conversation with 
the security police without any explanation ... ". 125 In spite 
of these circumstances which led to his dismissal, the TWIU 
employed Dubazane as its Natal regional director. Those 
actions of the TWIU, plus its opposition to the NUTW's 
applications on various industrial councils, further alienated 
the two unions from each other. It is in this context that the 
NUTW rejected Frame's idea of granting stop order facilities 
to, and the recognition of, the TWIU. The NUTW regarded the 
recognition of the TWIU by Frame as an orchestrated ploy to 
undermine its power base at the company. 
On 1 October 1982, in a meeting between the NUTW 
officials and Frame it was agreed that the recognition of the 
TWIU and stop order facilities granted to it at the Frametex 
mill be nullified. Frame remained a consistent supporter of 
the TWIU but this time he had to back down after the NUTW 
produced documentary evidence showing its signed-up membership 
at the company, and how his labour officers intimidated 
workers who were members of the union. Further agreements were 
made: 
Frame would recognise as the sole collective 
bargaining representative of its weekly-paid 
employees that union which demonstrated itself to 
have the support of a majority of such employees by 
way of a clerical check of stop order forms given 
under the hand of the employees as authorization for 
the deduction of membership dues from their weekly 
wages. 126 
It was also agreed that stop order facilities would be granted 
124 UW, WCL, SACTWU, 07.4, Report on disputes, p 5. 
125 Ibid, pp 5-6 
126 UW, WCL, SACTWU, G45.12.8, Factories, Frame and 
disputes: In the industrial court of SA, Pinetown, 10 November 
1983, p 3. 
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' to a union with a majority membership at the Frametex mill and 
both the NUTW and TWIU were allowed to canvass for members 
without interference from management. Frame only agreed to 
these changes because he was convinced by E. Ashwell, labour 
officer at Frametex, that the TWIU had "an equal strength at 
Frametex" and was likely to win a majority in a secret 
ballot. 127 
In December 1982, the NUTW had managed to recruit about 
1 792 workers at Frametex and submitted stop order forms: by 
March 1983, the number had increased to 2 429. 128 However, 
Ashwell rejected about three-quarters of the stop order forms 
on the grounds that they were improperly signed. Frame 
realised the implications of that action and quickly informed 
the NUTW to re-submit those forms for verification by another 
labour officer. About 792 forms were rejected and returned and 
the rest were accepted. In a liaison committee meeting on 16 
March 1983, Frame explained why a considerable number of stop 
order forms for the NUTW had been rejected: 
A number of forms could not be accepted as they were 
not signed properly or the members had already 
terminated their services. It was also found that a 
great number of employees signed for both unions. 
Employees signed for both unions so that they would 
no longer be harassed by union representatives and 
not because they want to be represented by both 
unions ... This fight between brother and brother 
could have serious repercussions if allowed to get 
out of hand. 129 
In March 1983, about 1 637 stop order forms for the NUTW were 
accepted. Alarmed by this rapid membership growth of the NUTW 
at Frametex, the Frame Group, through its labour officers, 
called a meeting of supervisors and informed them that the 
company was officially recognising the TWIU once again. 
127 UW, WCL, SACTWU, G 45.12.8, Factories, Frame and 
disputes: In the industrial court of SA, Pinetown, 10 November 
1983, p 34. 
128 Ibid, p 5; and also in the industrial court of SA, 
case number M2459/83, p 24. 
129 Minutes of meeting of the Frametex liaison committee, 
16 March 1983, p 2. 
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Supervisors were given blank application forms of the TWIU for 
distribution among workers. 130 Such actions by management 
led the NUTW to write, 
The Frame Group has actively bulldozed its workers 
into joining the TWIU. They have threatened workers 
with retrenchments and /or dismissal if they do not 
join TWIU. They have allowed TWIU officials free 
access to company premises to recruit workers; used 
their own supervisory staff and labour officers to 
recruit members of that union during working 
hours ... 131 
Once official recognition was granted to the TWIU, the NUTW 
petitioned the industrial court to have that decision 
nullified in order to "stop a range of unfair labour 
practices" at Frametex. 132 The NUTW regarded the recruitment 
of TWIU members by management as completely "unacceptable and 
incompatible with the policy of the companies and the 
unions''. 133 In 1983, the NUTW went to court six times 
against the Frame Group's recognition of the TWIU. The first 
court action was successful and the Frame Group was ordered to 
stop union dues deductions. But after a month, the Frame Group 
reinstated deductions and the NUTW had to once again appeal to 
the industrial court - a process that went on throughout the 
year. 
There were some significant developments that took place 
between August and December 1983. The restraining order 
granted by the Supreme Court on the Frame Group not to 
recognise the TWIU expired in August and Frame was quick to 
reinstate the recognition. 134 The NUTW applied to the court 
130 UW, WCL, SACTWU, In the industrial court of SA, case 
number M2459/83, p 28; and G45.12.8, Factories, Frame and 
disputes, 10 November 1983, p 8. 
131 UW, WCL, SACTWU, D7.4, Report on disputes, p 9. 
132 FOSATU report, 1983, p 18; see also Friedman, Building 
tomorrow today, pp 340-41. 
133 Minutes of a labour committee at Frametex, 27 April 
1983, p 2. 
134 UW, WCL, SACTWU, Natal Coastal branch report, 
September 1983, p 4. 
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to have the order extended but was unsuccessful. It was only 
after a month that the order was reinforced. The Frame Group 
had to make an outside court settlement with the NUTW over 
recognition of the TWIU. The company agreed not to recognise 
the TWIU pending the conciliation board's decision on the 
matter. In December, the NUTW brought two court cases against 
the Frame Group: the first case was over retrenchments of 10 
NUTW members at Frametex and, secondly, over continuous 
deductions of stop orders from 19 Pinetex workers who had 
resigned from the TWIU. 135 In both cases, the NUTW won: the 
industrial court ordered the company to reinstate those 10 
workers and stop order deductions were discontinued. 136 
In 1984, relations between the NUTW and Frame Group were 
further strained owing to retrenchments at Frametex. The NUTW 
took the Frame Group on several occasions to the industrial 
court for unfairly retrenching its members. 137 Early in 
1985, the NUTW appealed to the Natal Supreme Court to have its 
workers reinstated by the Frame Group. The court ruled in 
favour of the NUTW and also granted it a court order 
preventing the Minister of Manpower "from stopping 
retrenchment cases from [not] being looked at as unfair labour 
practices". 138 
Towards the end of 1984, the NUTW had successfully 
recruited about 2 800 members at Frametex and discussions on 
recognition agreement were resumed, which led the NUTW to 
write: 
After a decade of fiercely anti-union activity the 
Group has, however, finally got to the stage where 
it appears committed to recognising the union .... It 
is our expectation that the next few months will see 
135 The Textile Worker, volume 2, number 2 (December 
1983), p 5; and Institute for Industrial Relations (IIR), 
Industrial relations in South Africa, review, 1983, p 60. 
136 The Textile Worker, volume 3, number 1 (1984), p 2; 
and IIR, Industrial relations, 1983, p 60. 
137 See, for instance, The Textile Worker, volume 3, 
number 1 (1984); and volume 3, number 2 (1984). 
138 The Textile Worker, volume 4, number 1 (1985), p 6. 
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the finalising of a detailed recognition agreement 
which is at present under negotiation. 139 
It was only in August 1985 that the NUTW was finally granted 
recognition by the Frame Group, marking an end to 12 years of 
struggle and conflict between the two adversaries. 
The cotton dust campaign 
The health and safety of union members at work have been one 
of the major concerns of the NUTW in the 1980s. Apart from 
concentrating on traditional areas of concern such as wages, 
retrenchments and unfair dismissals, the union began to look 
to other areas where it sought to promote the interests of its 
members. Indeed, in South Africa, workers have been exposed to 
a range of occupational health and safety hazards. The NUTW's 
major concern has been cotton dust, which gave rise to chronic 
lung disease, asthma and other disorders. 
In the 1980s, the union's policy was directed at the 
prevention of occupational health hazards caused by cotton 
dust and it argued that employers had a duty to safeguard 
health and ensure workers's safety, particularly from this 
distinctly harmful lung disease. The NUTW was perhaps the 
first independent African trade union in South Africa to 
highlight the dangers of cotton dust. The union brought a 
greater awareness to shop floor workers and others that their 
place of work has been the cause of ill health and that 
employers had an obligation to safeguard the workers's health. 
It is precisely because of this that the union's cotton dust 
campaign is examined here in this chapter. 
In 1982, the NUTW launched a "brown lung campaign", the 
first of its kind in South Africa. The campaign was aimed 
firstly at educating both employers and employees about the 
health hazards of cotton dust and, secondly, to assist union 
139 UW, WCL, SACTWU, 07.3.1.1, Education project: NUTW by 
John Copelyn, 1985, pp 2-3. 
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members who had been affected to obtain compensation. 140 The 
NUTW, in line with FOSATU's health and safety campaign, 
commissioned Dr Neil White of the Health Care Trust, to write 
a booklet entitled "Cotton Dust Kills" for distribution among 
textile workers. 141 N. White was also appointed to carry out 
medical check-ups on NUTW members. 
The campaign was first launched at the Braitex firm in 
the Transvaal and tests were conducted on Sundays and soon 
after the first shift of the week. Initially, management at 
the Braitex factory resisted the idea, but later agreed. Two 
workers of the total 80 tested at Braitex factory were 
infected. In response to that outcome, the NUTW formulated 
some policies: 
Annual lung function tests by a union approved 
doctor; constant measuring of dust levels; efficient 
exhaust ventilators; respirators where necessary; 
cleaning must be done by vacuum cleaners and not by 
sweepers and compressed air; those workers that have 
brown lung or could suffer from it must not be 
dismissed and must be moved to dust free parts of 
the factory. 142 
By the end of 1983, about 1 661 workers employed in five 
major firms in the greater Durban area had been tested and of 
those 108 (6,5 percent) responded positively. 143 Transfers 
within departments were immediately implemented on those 
infected and the NUTW forwarded about 22 compensation claims 
under the Workmen's Compensation Act. 144 However, only one 
claim was successful (being the second claim for brown lung 
infection to be compensated in South Africa). 
In 1984, the NUTW established a post at its headquarters 
140 UW, WCL, SACTWU, D14.5, NUTW, Story on cotton dust, p 
1; The Textile Worker, volume 4, number 1 (1985), p 4; and 
FOSATU report, 1983, p 21. 
141 uw, WCL, SACTWU, D14.5, Story on cotton dust, p 1. 
142 Ibid, p 2. 
143 FOSATU report, 1983, p 22. 
144 Ibid. 
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in Durban for a full-time industrial health officer and FOSATU 
provided funds to purchase the necessary equipment. Commenting 
on the creation of the post, Dr M. Colvin wrote: 
As the trade union movement increases in size and 
sophistication industrial health and safety issues 
will be taken up more and more by the unions. 
Unfortunately, although the workplace is obviously 
an important source of ill-health, there are very 
few people working in this area in South Africa. As 
a result the field of occupational health is 
relatively new and its scope and possibilities have 
not been defined. Clearly the approach and work of 
the health officer will be directed by the union in 
accordance with its policies and strategy.145 
In January 1985, Colvin was appointed as the industrial health 
officer for the NUTW. 
The brown lung campaign, however, met with resistance 
from the Textile Federation (a body representing textile 
employers). In 1984, the Textile Federation, together with 
officials from the Ministry of Manpower, held a meeting to 
discuss the brown lung issue. The meeting ended with a call on 
employers "not ... to survey cotton dust levels and workers' 
health in the textile industry". 146 The director of the 
Textile Federation, J. Shlagman, warned the NUTW to withdraw 
its campaigns. Instead, the union responded by launching a 
campaign at the Frame Group's mil+s in the New Germany area. 
The results indicated that about 30 of 2 000 workers tested at 
the company were permanently disabled by the disease. 147 
However, a small number of people infected by the disease were 
compensated by the company. For instance, M. Maseko of Braitex 
was granted a monthly pension of R197,00. 148 
In 1985, the NUTW launched campaigns at the SA Fabrics 
factories. At the SA Fabrics factory, urine tests were 
conducted, particularly on those workers who handled dyes and 
145 UW, WCL, SACTWU, NUTW correspondence: Mark Colvin to 
John Copelyn, 22 August 1984. 
146 The Textile Worker, volume 4, number 1 (1985), p 4. 
147 Ibid. 
148 Ibid. 
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chemicals. Management refused to sign an agreement which 
compelled the company not to use dye containing dangerous 
chemicals. 149 However, the NUTW intensified its campaign in 
1987 when the International Textile, Garment and Leather 
Workers' Federation provided some funds specifically for the 
campaign; in fact, the initial years had laid down the 
foundation for a sound health and safety policy within the 
trade union movement. 
Industrial action during the early-Wiehahn era 
There have been few sites of more frequent strike action by 
African workers in South Africa than at the Frame Group's 
mills, partic~larly at the New Germany complex. Between 1973 
and 1985, Frame's textile workers were involved in three major 
strikes: January 1973, January 1974 and May 1980. The NUTW was 
most influential in the May 1980 strike which took place over 
ten days. By 1979, the union had managed to recruit workers 
rapidly and established a shop steward committee at the 
Nortex, Seltex and NKM mills. At the Frametex and Pinetex 
mills, union members played an important role in the liaison 
committee which they had dominated in 1978; in fact, by 1980, 
of the total 18 liaison committee members at the Frame Group, 
15 were NUTW shop stewards. 150 The May 1980 strike has been 
regarded by the union and workers as a key struggle in the 
textile industry during the early-Wiehahn era, surpassing all 
previous strike action since 1973. 151 
The May 1980 strike was an explosion of militancy among 
the weavers, who had constituted themselves as the power-base 
149 UW, WCL, SACTWU, 013.2.1.4, Report to the BEC, SA 
Fabrics, 28 August 1985, p 2. 
150 Briefing on textile strikes, Alec Erwin, 10 June 1980, 
p 6. 
151 Generally between 1980 and 1985, strike action 
increased and the number of applications for conciliation 
boards and the use of industrial courts by trade unions 
increased. For some figures of these issues, see Friedman, 
Building tomorrow today, p 352. 
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of the NUTW at Frametex. The conflict that took place was 
initially centred on the incentive bonus scheme operating for 
most weavers but when the rest of the labour force joined, the 
poverty level wages became the focal point of the strike. 152 
Generally speaking, workers at the Frame Group have 
historically embarked on strike action precisely because of 
the issue of take-home pay or what J. Mawbey summarised as: 
Poverty wages subject to continual erosion by rising 
costs; constant pressure for higher levels of 
productivity while wages remain static over long periods; 
harsh and arbitrary shop-floor discipline required to 
hold thousands of workers in submission under these 
conditions; repression of independent worker organisation 
to ensure that this low wage policy can be 
maintained. 153 
In January 1979, after sixteen months of negotiation with 
the liaison committee, Frame's workers were awarded a 10 
percent increase. The increase was rejected by the liaison 
committee members and they instead demanded a 25 percent 
increase. After a deadlock in negotiations between liaison 
committee members and management, the weavers, without notice, 
went on strike on 29 July 1979. The strike was important for 
the NUTW in that it boosted union membership at the Frame 
Group. The union's shop stewards had managed to negotiate with 
management to concede to the demand of workers - that the 
increase of 10 percent be paid from September 1979 instead of 
January 1980 as initially proposed by management. The shop 
stewards also convinced management to reinstate three 
dismissed workers. The union took advantage of the situation 
at the Frame Group; it called general meetings of shift 
workers and involved them in union activities and 
education. 154 
Three weeks before the May 1980 strike, shop stewards 
152 For a full discussion on this strike, see J. Mawbey, 
"The 1980 cotton workers strike", SALB, vol.6, no. 5 (1980); 
and Natal Labour Research Committee (NLRC), "Control over a 
workforce- the Frame case", ~' vol. 6, no. 5 (1980). 
153 Mawbey, "The 1980 cotton workers strike", p 4. 
154 Gwala' Papers, "The May 1980 strike", p 18. 
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called for a meeting with management to discuss the issue of 
wages and employment of impimpis (spies) at Frametex. 155 
However, management refused to meet them. In a liaison 
committee meeting on 6 May, the issue of an employed Security 
Branch agent was discussed and members of the liaison 
committee warned that "they would kill the culprit before 
reporting the matter". 156 The Frame Group dismissed the 
agent but the company was by now deeply concerned by the 
growing strength of the NUTW. The concessions that were made 
in 1979 and early May 1980 were clear victories for the union. 
When workers demanded a 25 percent increase in May, the Frame 
Group was prepared to risk a strike rather than to give in to 
their demands, arguing that it was better to confront the 
growing strength of the union sooner rather than later. 157 
The significance of this strike to the union lay in its 
end results. Although the union lost S. Cele (a shop steward 
and liaison committee member at the Frametex) who was shot 
dead by an unknown gunman on 18 July 1980, the end result was 
encouraging for the union. About 298 workers who were charged 
for illegal striking and represented by the union had their 
charges withdrawn by the state. 158 The Frame Group were also 
forced to award workers with a 10 percent increase in July and 
with a further 15 percent in September 1980. Furthermore, the 
company also announced that the January 1981 increases would 
be 20 percent for women and 17,5 percent for men. 159 It was 
the first time that such huge increments had been granted by 
the Frame Group. However, to compensate for the wage 
increments, the company introduced a number of measures 
designed to increase productivity in the mills. The number of 
155 NLRC, "Control over a workforce", p 21; and Gwala's 
Papers, "The May 1980 strike", p 20. 
156 
1980. 
Minutes of the Frametex liaison committee, 6 May 
157 Gwala's Papers, "The May 1980 strike", p 21. 
158 Ibid, p 56. 
159 Ibid.; and NLRC, "Control over a workforce", p 25. 
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looms per worker were increased from ten to fifteen, 
particularly in mill number nine while in other mills looms 
were increased from four to eight. 160 
Perhaps more significant to the union, was Frame's 
agreement, for the first time, to talk to the NUTW officials 
in October 1980. Although the meeting did not bring anything 
tangible or formalise a working relationship with the NUTW, it 
was nevertheless "a reflection of the impact of the strike 
that after seven years of sustained hostility the bosses felt 
the need to look more carefully at the union". 161 
Between 1981 and 1985, the NUTW had a relatively high 
record of industrial action, particularly during the recession 
which hit the economy in 1982 and 1983. In 1981, the union 
embarked on three strikes in the greater Durban area and the 
demands ranged from wages, reinstatement of dismissed workers 
to removal of sex discrimination in wages. The following table 
provides a brief overview of action engaged in by the union at 
various companies. 
Year 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
Table B 
Strike action by the NUTW, 1981-1985 
Number of 
Countrywide 
strikes 
5 
10 
18 
3 
3 
Greater Durban area 
3 
6 
10 
2 
1 
The NUTW was engaged in more strikes in 1982 and 1983 than in 
other years. However, these strikes have to be seen in the 
context of what was happening in the country. In 1982, South 
Africa experienced about 394 strikes and work stoppages while 
in 1983 the number dropped slightly to 336. 162 
160 Gwala's Papers, "The May 1980 strike", p 56. 
161 Ibid, p 57. 
162 SAIRR, Survey of race relations, 1989-90, p 369; and 
TUCSA Directory, 1983/4 and information sheet, December/ 
January 1984. 
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During the brief recession of 1982-83, the NUTW was 
involved in a number of strikes because of retrenchments that 
were taking place but on the contrary it emerged from that 
period with a large membership. The major reasons for strike 
action were basically over wages, retrenchments and delayed 
recognition agreements. In companies where the union was 
recognised, it adhered to agreed procedures of resolving a 
dispute. In 1984, the NUTW utilised the courts to resolve some 
conflicts since courts were empowered, under South African 
law, to determine unfair labour practices. Under the Labour 
Relations Amendment Act of 1982, the court could hear 
victimisation cases and grant restraining or status quo orders 
(requiring conflicting parties to restore a situation to what 
it was before the dispute) to aggrieved parties. Such a 
mechanism was utilised by the NUTW rather than risk dismissal 
of its members. As discussed earlier, the NUTW approached the 
court several times seeking restraining orders against the 
Frame Group. Between 1984 and 1985, the NUTW was involved in 
fewer strikes, possibly because of its utilisation of 
collective bargaining structures and of the official dispute 
settling machinery, which proved to be viable alternatives. 
This was quite contrary to developments in the country where 
in 1984 the number of strikes and work stoppages increased to 
469. 163 With the passage of time, the NUTW leadership had 
developed a number of strategies of dealing with employers and 
tried by all possible means to avoid strikes fearing worker 
dismissals by management, preferring instead to utilise the 
official dispute procedure or, at least, resort to legal 
action and asserting unfair labour practices through the 
Industrial Court. 
NUTW and politics 
The NUTW was one of the leading unions within the FOSATU 
alliance and, as such, subscribed to FOSATU ideology and 
policy, which clearly called for non-racialism and shop floor 
163 SAIRR, Survey of race relations, 1989-90, p 369. 
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democracy. But was it possible for independent trade unions to 
confine their activities to only bread-and-butter issues given 
the nature of South African society? It was hardly possible to 
divorce politics from purely bread-and-butter issues even in 
the 1970s and early 1980s. 
The African independent trade unions of the 1970s 
emphasised the establishment of an independent worker 
position, fearing state repression if they became involved in 
the political struggle. Yet at their union meetings, officials 
and workers chanted "Amandla Ngawethu" (power is ours). One of 
the closing salutations used by the NUTW in the paper, Textile 
Forum, was "Amandla Ngawethu". 164 Even the least political 
unionists spoke against the state and chanted anti-apartheid 
slogans during union protest meetings during the 1976 state 
bannings of the NUTW officials. However, the NUTW did not want 
to be aligned to any political organisation, whether inside or 
outside the country. 
In any event, the NUTW eschewed any form of political 
involvement with the banned nationalist movements, 
particularly the ANC. 165 The trade union movement was to 
remain independent and workers believed that the task of the 
unions was to address day-to-day issues in the factory rather 
than to concentrate on national political problems. 166 The 
politics of the factory became dominant in the 1970s although 
this did not negate the fact that workers were politically 
conscious. Workers emphasised that the mistakes of SACTU 
should not be repeated if unions were to survive and, hence, 
"working class factory consciousness" took precedence. 167 
164 See for instance, Textile Forum, 14 December 1978. 
165 E. Webster, "A profile of unregistered union members 
in Durban", in J. Maree (ed), The independent trade unions, 
1974 -1984 (Johannesburg, Ravan Press, 1987), p 28. 
166 Ibid., p 29. 
167 H. Benyon, Working for Ford as cited in Webster, .,A 
profile of um;egistered union members", p 29. Benyon states 
that: "A factory class consciousness understands class 
relationships in terms of their direct manifestation in 
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Even during the 1976 Soweto uprisings, the NUTW refrained from 
participating directly in the unrest, fearing government 
repression if it were to be involved in a politically inspired 
strike. 168 As one of the NUTW shop stewards stated in the 
1970s, 
A working class movement should not be deeply 
involved with a political movement. As workers 
we can participate in issues in the community, 
but not as a workers' movement. Some issues 
like rents we cannot avoid, but we must draw 
some lessons from the past, from the older 
unions like SACTU. Through deep political 
involvement, factory issues get left behind and 
too much time is spent over political 
issues. 169 
On several occasions, the NUTW made it clear that it had 
no factional political affiliations but stood for a just 
society. Because most of its members were African workers, the 
leaders of the NUTW believed that social justice could be 
attained through equitable living and working conditions for 
all workers irrespective of colour, race or gender. 
Even in 1982 when the debate over the relationship 
between trade unions and politics was re-opened within the 
FOSATU alliance, the NUTW refused to participate or affiliate 
to any political or community organisation. 170 J. Foster's 
conflict between the bosses and the workers within the 
factory. It is rooted in the work-place where struggles are 
fought over the control of the job and the 'right' of managers 
and workers. Inasmuch as it concerns itself with exploitation 
and power it contains definite political elements. But it is a 
politics of the factory.", p 98. 
168 See Webster, "Stay-aways and the Black working class: 
evaluating a strategy'', Labour, Capital and Society, xiv, 1 
(April 1981). 
169 Survey conducted by the Natal Project, Working class 
history in the community and Labour Research Unit, UNO, 
Sociology Department, October 1986. 
17° For an interesting debate on political unionism, see 
J. Baskin, A history of COSATU (Johannesburg, Ravan Press, 
1991); Friedman, Building tomorrow today; R. Lambert and E. 
Webster, "The re-emergence of political unionism in 
contemporary South Africa?", in w. Cobbett and R. Cohen (eds), 
Popular struggles in South Africa (London, 1988); and P. 
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(General Secretary of FOSATU) call for union members to get 
involved in community and political organisations was ignored 
by the NUTW. 171 In 1983, when the United Democratic Front 
was formed, there was a general debate on whether or not trade 
unions should affiliate to it. The NUTW's response was, as J. 
Gwala stated, 
A big no, but we were not really against the 
establishment of the UDF. We did not want to divide 
our members over political matters and it was a 
general agreement within our union that each member 
was free to join any political party or participate 
in community organisations. 172 
Even with the formation of the Congress of South African Trade 
Unions (COSATU) in 1985, the NUTW remained one of those unions 
that constituted the independent worker, "apolitical" bloc 
within the federation. 
Conclusion 
Between 1973 and 1985, the NUTW grew from a small union of the 
textile workers of Durban to become the strongest, non-racial, 
national trade union. What strengthened it was its 
organisational strategies: the development of strong shop 
steward structures, building strong plant-based organisation 
and the signing of recognition agreements with individual 
employers in order to secure collective bargaining rights and 
plant-level organisation. Furthermore, in the 1980s, the union 
was able to survive and gain a considerable membership through 
its willingness to participate in the industrial councils; it 
also explored official collective bargaining structures as 
provided by the Wiehahn reforms and utilised the courts where 
necessary. Indeed, those strategies worked in favour of the 
Eidelberg, "The unions and the African National Congress", 
South African Historical Journal, 28 (1993). 
171 See J. Foster, "The workers' struggle- where does 
FOSATU stand?", South African Labour Bulletin, volume 7, 
number 8 (July 1982). 
172 Interview with Jabulani Gwala, Bolton Hall, 27 
September 1993. 
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NUTW, and were later adopted by many COSATU unions after 1985. 
Also strengthening its position in industry was the 
NUTW's policy towards political organisations. The union tried 
by all possible means to avoid any alignments with political 
movements, in particular the ANC and UDF; in fact, there was a 
dramatic shift from the broad trade union movement approach 
adopted by SACTU in the late 1950s and the early 1960s when it 
became a member of the Congress Alliance. The NUTW had managed 
successfully to organise itself from the bottom up, industry 
by industry and developed a strong shop floor structure that 
was to be adopted by a number of unions in the textile and 
clothing industries. 
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Chapter Eleven 
The Chemical Workers' Industrial Union, 1973-
1985 
Introduction 
The emergence of independent, non-racial trade unions, it has 
been argued in the previous chapter, began in the aftermath of 
the 1973 Durban strikes. The new unions, for instance the 
National Union of Textile Workers of Durban adopted a 
survivalist strategy whereby it concentrated on immediate 
economic gains of workers and, while building up the union at 
the factory level, distanced itself from broader political 
struggles and avoided any confrontation with the apartheid 
state. Indeed, this strategy worked in favour of workers and 
produced a worker-controlled union, which survived the state 
repression of the 1970s and 1980s. This chapter continues to 
examine one of the independent unions which adopted similar 
strategies and managed to build a non-racial, worker-based 
trade union - the Chemical Workers' Industrial Union (CWIU) of 
Durban. 
Some important yardsticks by which the influence of 
emerging independent African trade unions of the 1970s can be 
measured are the rate of growth in membership, recognition 
agreements signed and the attainment of better working 
conditions. Applying these to the period from 1974 to 1985, 
one can see that the CWIU was relatively small and weak during 
its initial six years of existence. It was only after 1980 
that there was an upswing in membership and recognition 
agreements signed. The membership growth in the 1980s was 
triggered partly by the economic recession (and also general 
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trade union developments like the emergence of FOSATU), which 
gave African workers an incentive to join in·times of 
recession because they knew that its efforts to improve their 
wages and conditions and its fight against retrenchments were 
likely to succeed. But perhaps more significant in the growth 
of this trade union were its recruitment strategies, policies 
and organisational structures. Also of importance in the early 
1980s were the Wiehahn reforms, which had made union 
organisation both possible and necessary. 
During the mid-1970s, the CWIU was poorly organised and 
had a weak shop floor structure. The organisation of chemical 
workers into a trade union was difficult to achieve because of 
the nature and small size of the industry. Its annual signed-
up membership never exceeded 3 000 between 1974 and 1979. 1 
However, the pattern of CWIU's union membership began to 
change significantly thereafter and by 1985 there were 6 230 
signed-up members in the greater Durban area. 2 This high rate 
of growth is particularly significant in the light of the 
union's long struggle to build up its membership base and win 
recognition agreements within the chemical industry. Perhaps 
the CWIU's success in the 1980s was due in part to the strong 
leadership skills of the general secretary, R. Crompton, who 
provided direction and strengthened its position to become a 
strong, national and non-racial trade union. 
This chapter's aim, therefore, is to provide an analysis 
of the growing CWIU, focusing on its origins, organisation, 
policies, recruitment strategies, recognition campaigns and 
/ 
worker struggles as they emerged in the 1970s and 1980s. 
Origins of the CWIU 
Independent trade unions born in the 1970s have generally 
linked their origins to the strike wave of 1973. It was at 
1 SALDRU, Trade unions in South Africa, 1970-1980: A 
directory and statistics, Working paper no 45 (Cape Town, CUP, 
1982), p 12. 
2 UW, WCL, SACTWU, Other unions, F6.6, Chemical Workers 
Industrial Union, A brief history, 31 March 1986. 
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this time that there was an explosion in trade union 
membership, particularly among independent unions. The CWIU 
was officially launched on 24 November 1974 in Durban and grew 
directly from the Benefit Fund (BF), which had started 
organising workers at African Explosives and Chemical 
Industries (AE&CI) (a locally-owned company) in 1973. 3 This 
chemical plant was the biggest in the Durban region and 
employed about 1 500 workers. The BF had focused its attention 
on AE&CI and acquired a mass membership by popularising worker 
grievances relating to pensions/gratuities and wages. When 
other unions in the textile and metal industries were 
established in 1973, workers at the AE&CI plant were 
instructed by the BF to organise themselves and constitute a 
majority in order to establish a trade union. In taking this 
step, the BF had hoped that the chemical workers would 
eventually form a formidable union. 0. Badsha, who was to 
become the first general secretary of the CWIU in 1975, began 
organising workers in the chemical industry, particularly in 
Merebank, Jacobs, Pinetown and Dalbridge. 4 Recruitment was not 
only done in specialised chemicals but also within the broader 
industry which included soaps and candles, oil refining, 
pharmaceuticals and plastics, perfume and paints. 5 Badsha made 
substantial progress with his task in the following months as 
a result of the brief upsurge of enthusiasm among African 
workers for union organisation in the aftermath of the Durban 
strikes. 
By August 1974, a total of 900 workers had been recruited 
from various factories in the greater Durban area with the 
majority from AE&CI (626), Chrome Chemicals (111) and Natal 
3 Maree, "An analysis of the independent trade unions", p 
245. 
4 UW, WCL, SACTWU, F6.6, CWIU, A brief history, p 1. See 
also E. Webster, "A profile of unregistered union members in 
Durban", SALB, volume , pp 45-6; and Maree, "An analysis of 
the independent trade unions", p 245. 
5 Webster, "A profile of unregistered union members in 
Durban", p 46. 
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Contact Packers (80). 6 By November of that year, membership 
had increased to 1 020, and this eventually led to the 
formation of the CWIU. Only about half of the registered 
members were paid-up; for some, the decision whether to pay 
union dues or not was likely to be determined by how 
successful the union proved in solving their work-related 
problems. As rightly noted by D. Dlamini, one of the CWIU 
organisers in the 1970s: 
We can not blame workers for our own mistakes. we 
simply failed to put our house in order. In 1974 and 
1975, many of our members did not pay their 
membership fees because we did not deliver the 
required results ... One can rightly call the initial 
stage of recruitment [a partial] failure. 7 
Recruitment and organisation 
The five years between 1974 and 1979 have been described by 
the CWIU as "bitter years". 8 Considerable efforts were made to 
recruit chemical workers but were not successful and the union 
failed to make any substantial gains in its paid-up 
membership. Although the data below (see Table A) shows that 
there was an overall increase in general union membership 
during that period, the CWIU's recruiting strategies failed to 
boost its membership to any significant extent. The general 
assumption among CWIU officials was that the union would have 
no difficulty recruiting members, given the worker militancy 
of the time. But, as already explained, by November 1974, the 
union had a signed-up membership of 1 020 of which only 600 
were paid-up. 9 Although this number increased to 900 the 
following year, the signed-up membership increasing to 
6 uw, WCL, CWIU, Statistics on membership; and Maree, "An 
analysis of the independent trade unions", p 246. 
7 Interview with D. Dlamini, KwaMashu Township, K 
Section, 27 September 1994. 
8 UW, WCL, SACTWU, CWIU, A brief history, p 1. 
9 Ibid. 
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2 300, 10 the union attributed its failure as follows: 
Our new born union found [itself] in a very hostile 
environment [plus the attitude of management]. In 
[February] 1974 four leaders were banned and in 
November 1976 a further eight union officials were 
banned. The wave of worker militancy began to drop 
off. By 1977 our organising strategy of recruiting 
broadly changed to careful, in-depth organising in a 
few factories ... By 1980 our membership had dwindled 
to 460 paid-up members. 11 
Although Table A shows that in 1975 membership more than 
doubled to 2 300, paid-up membership declined from 900 in 1975 
to 580 in 1976, reaching its lowest in 1979 with only 430. 
Blame was also laid on the state's industrial relations 
system which, in the opinion of union officials, encouraged 
employers to treat embryonic unions with hostility or 
indifference. Further criticisms were that employers failed or 
refused to recognise the CWIU for the purpose of negotiation, 
or that they even tried to undermine the union's influence by 
establishing rival liaison committees. The CWIU further 
complained that demands for union recognition and negotiating 
rights were brushed aside by employers who sheltered behind 
the government's policy towards African trade unions. 12 But 
blame must also be shared by the union's poor organisational 
strategies. The situation can best be captured in the words of 
S. Khumalo, the CWIU organiser at Colgate-Palmolive: 
246. 
2. 
We started going out and looking for a trade union. 
Fortunately a fellow worker found a union, which is 
the Chemical Workers Industrial Union. We as workers 
went out in search of the union, the union didn't 
come to us. From there I spread the rumour in the 
company to the workers ... 13 
The CWIU's union membership growth is given below. 
10 Maree, "An analysis of the independent trade unions'', 
11 uw, WCL, SACTWU, CWIU, A brief history, p 1. 
12 uw, WCL, SACTWU, CWIU, Union members and statistics. 
13 CWIU, "Workers' struggle at Colgate", SALB, volume 6, 
no 8 (1981), pp 25-26. 
p 
p 
CWIU's Union 
Year 
Nov 1974 
Dec 1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
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Table A 
Membership, 1974-1985 14 
Signed-up Members 
Countrywide Greater 
1 020 
2 300 
2 900 
3 000 
2 750 
2 640 
3 600 
5 200 
6 257 
13 572 
20 736 
3 000 
2 820 
3 100 
3 440 
4 610 
6 230 
Durban Area 
As the above shows, the optimum years for the union were 1984 
and 1985 when membership stood at 13 572 and 20 736 
respectively. Nonetheless, despite the limited paid-up 
membership growth between 1974 and 1980, the union established 
three main branches in the Durban region: Jacobs, Pinetown and 
Dalbridge (Gale Street). Jacobs accounted for nearly half the 
membership of the union. In line with other Trade Union 
Advisory Coordinating Council-affiliated unions like the NUTW, 
shop stewards were elected in individual firms and reported to 
their respective branches. In 1976, the CWIU had 48 elected 
shop stewards and two organisers in the greater Durban area. 
According to E. Webster, the CWIU had a far better ratio of 
paid-up members to shop stewards than that of the NUTW; on 
average each steward represented some 19 members. 15 The 
branch exe~utive which comprised mainly shop stewards, met 
regularly to discuss issues relating directly to employment, 
recruitment and organisation. Meetings also afforded shop 
stewards the opportunity to meet full-time union officials and 
to discuss matters of common concern. 
14 UW, WCL, SACTWU, CWIU, F6.6, A brief history, p 1; 
FOSATU Annual Report, 1980; and also SALDRU, Trade unions in 
South Africa, p 12. 
15 Webster, "A profile of unregistered trade unions", p 
47. For other unions such as the NUTW and MAWU, the ratios of 
paid-up members to shop stewards were 25:1 and 21:1 
respectively. 
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Despite financial problems the union had four paid 
officials. Shop stewards recruited members from their 
workplaces and paid, an annual per capita subscription of 
R10,40 to head office. Branches had to submit quarterly 
reports to head office concerning membership, funds and other 
work-related issues. 16 
Because of poor administration at the head office, union 
funds were abused and there was a general slackness in 
honouring union rules. At the beginning of 1976, the 
secretary, 0. Badsha, resigned citing personal reasons and J. 
Mawbey, managing editor of the South African Labour Bulletin, 
was employed on a part-time basis. 17 Mawbey soon discovered 
that petty embezzlement of union funds had taken place and one 
of the organisers was dismissed. 18 Indeed, he discovered that 
about R350 had gone missing from the union. It was quite clear 
to Mawbey that union organisers and the executive lacked 
knowledge of book-keeping and general administrative 
techniques. 
The problems were indicative of the need to adopt new 
strategies. The appointment of Mawbey along with the competent 
assistance of J. Copelyn and M. Dlamini from the Institute of 
Industrial Education, rescued the union from total collapse. 
Although Mawbey was handicapped by his part-time position, his 
guidance eventually gave the union new direction. As discussed 
in the previous chapter, some TUACC (and later FOSATU) unions 
were founded by radical white students and academics and 
African workers. However, there were many white intellectuals 
than black in the union, a prime exception being C. Ramaphosa. 
Most black intellectuals did not see the unions as prime site 
for their activity. Among the eight founding members of the 
CWIU was R. Crompton, who played an important role as the 
16 UW, WCL, SACTWU, CWIU, Head office report, March 1980. 
17 UW, WCL, SACTWU, CWIU, History of the CWIU, p 3 and 
also Maree, "An analysis of the independent trade unions", p 
253. 
18 Ibid. 
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general secretary. Despite its anti-racial and class position, 
the union was unable to capture the support of white workers 
(with the exception of officials) and membership profile 
remained mainly African and Indian. 
Since its inception, the CWIU had recruited mainly in 
those factories which were regarded as progressive. The 
failure of this strategy resulted in a broadening of the 
organisation to include all the chemical plants in the greater 
Durban area. Despite this strategy, by 1979, the union 
remained very small; paid-up membership had declined to 430. 
What worsened the situation was that all union subscriptions 
were made laboriously by hand, receipted, entered into the 
workers' membership card, and carried to the union office. 
This was no mean feat for workers, many of whom had little 
schooling. 
In 1980, the union's paid-up membership slightly improved 
to 460, and from this time the union began to expand beyond 
the Durban region; new branches were formed in Northern Natal, 
Eastern and Western Cape and the Transvaal. In 1981 even those 
branches in the greater Durban area whose existence had been 
precarious for the previous seven years began to enjoy a new 
surge in recruitment. By 1982, the greater Durban area had 
3 100 members and with over 100 elected shop stewards. 
Organisation in this area was spearheaded by the Jacobs, 
Dalbridge (Gale Street) and Pinetown branches. Recruitment was 
targeted mainly at AE&CI's Kynoch plant, Plascon and Unilever. 
By December 1982, the greater Durban branches were actively 
organised in 21 factories and had been granted official 
recognition in 8.19 
Between 1981 and 1985, membership throughout South Africa 
steadily grew to 20 736, while in the greater Durban area it 
increased to 6 230 (see Table A). The number of branches 
increased from three in 1975 to nine in 1982. By 1984, the 
19 UW, WCL, SACTWU, B3.1.2, Report on the Natal region, 
16-17 October; and FOSATU, Annual report, 1982, p 2. By that 
year, the union was actively organised in 45 factories 
countrywide and had been granted official recognition in 13. 
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union was officially recognised in 16 factories and had signed 
11 formal agreements with employers in the greater Durban 
area. 20 Union growth was also visible through the increase of 
shop stewards whose number in 1985 had risen to 138. 
Furthermore, growth can be matched with an increase in the 
number of recognition agreements signed with employers. 
Perhaps a contributing factor in the 1980s was the leadership 
skills of R. Crompton (general secretary), ably assisted by C. 
Makgaleng (president and senior shop steward at Union Liquid 
Air), T. Mkaliphi (vice-president and senior shop steward at 
Plascon Paints) and R. Mofokeng (national treasurer and senior 
shop steward at PG Glass).2 1 
Thus generally, the union performed better in the 1980s 
than it had in the 1970s and was also able to establish new 
branches beyond the greater Durban area, more particularly in 
the Transvaal where it became involved in major worker 
struggles at Colgate-Palmolive (discussed later in this 
chapter). One issue that worked in its favour was the victory 
in 1981 at Colgate-Palmolive where a sizeable number of 
workers joined the union soon after it secured recognition 
after months of confrontation. Perhaps the union's success at 
Colgate-Palmolive paved the way for sound industrial relations 
between Durban's chemical bosses and African workers and their 
unions. The victory virtually compelled a small but 
influential group of chemical employers to negotiate and 
recognise the union in the 1980s. The union was also 
strengthened by its merger with the Glass and Allied Workers 
Union in 1982, which boosted its membership. 22 Of further 
great importance was the growth in membership between 1982 and 
20 UW, WCL,CWIU, A history of the Chemical Workers 
Industrial Union, 1974-1984 (Durban, FOSATU, 1984), pp 11-12; 
and Maree, "An analysis of the independent trade unions", p 
264. At national level, the union was officially recognised in 
41 factories and had signed 21 formal agreements with 
employers. 
21 UW, WCL, SACTWU, CWIU, A brief history, p 2. 
22 Ibid. 
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1983 which coincided with a period of recession. The union 
survived the recession with a reasonably large membership (see 
Table A) and enjoyed considerable moral support from the 
International Federation of Chemical, Energy and General 
Workers Union, to which it was affiliated. 23 
Recognition Campaigns and Worker Struggles 
Difficult years of growth, 1974-1976 
As said earlier, soon after its inauguration, the CWIU sought 
recognition at those companies which were thought to be 
progressive. In its initial three years, the union organised 
in a few selected foreign and locally-owned, factories in the 
greater Durban area: Chrome Chemicals, AE&CI, Quality Products 
and Natal Chemical Syndicate. It was at these firms that the 
union initially rejected participation in liaison committee 
structures, seeking instead official recognition. However, all 
of the employers in these firms were openly hostile to the 
CWIU and the process of attaining recognition was long and 
painful. Between 1974 and 1979, the union was defeated in all 
its attempts to gain recognition, although it made some gains 
particularly as regards better working conditions, wages and 
dismissal procedures. As shown in the following selected case 
studies, the union lacked organisational strategies and was 
consequently unable to challenge employers or even to sustain 
its membership. 
Chrome Chemicals 
Chrome Chemicals is a jointly foreign-owned company (British 
and German-owned) in which the new union believed official 
recognition would be easily achieved. Based in Merebank, 
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Chrome Chemicals employed about 160 workers in 1974. 24 This 
small labour force was exposed to dangerous chrome dust, and 
"in a number of older workers the membrane at the back of 
their noses had been eaten away by continued exposure"25 
because of the absence of protection. These unhealthy 
conditions provided an environment which the CWIU believed 
workers would rally to the union. 
Initially the union managed to recruit about 130 o£ the 
160 workers and in September 1974, a fully representative shop 
steward committee was launched. 26 In October, union officials 
approached the management of Chrome Chemicals for recognition 
of the shop steward committee as the only legitimate 
representative of the workers. Management rejected the 
proposal outright, suggesting instead that union members in 
the factory should contest elections for the liaison 
committee. 27 The union turned down the proposal. 
The CWIU then tried to deal with the problem of 
representation by seeking international support. Letters were 
addressed to the German Bayer AG head office, the German Trade 
Union Federation and German government representatives in 
South Africa. But no satisfactory response was received. 28 
Then in order to highlight its problems with Chrome Chemicals, 
the union exposed the unsafe working conditions to the local 
press. The company was quick to introduce safer, more modern 
technology which was labour-saving, but also announced large-
scale retrenchments by the end of 1975. The company also 
24 R. Joshi, "Chrome Chemicals", SALB, vel 2, no 1 (1975), 
p 34. 
25 J. Mawbey, "Factory struggles in the chemical 
industry", SALB, vol.4, no.8 (1979), p 76. 
26 Joshi, "Chrome Chemicals", p 34; Mawbey, "Factory 
struggles in the chemical industry", p 76; and Maree, "An 
analysis", p 250. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Mawbey, "Factory struggles", p 78. The CWIU was not 
aware of the fact that the company was jointly owned and hence 
the CWIU only sought support from the Germans. 
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indicated that only those "unionised" workers with a minimum 
Standard 8 qualification and non-unionised members were to be 
retained. 29 Th,is was a strategic move by the company in order 
to discourage workers from union activities. It was quite 
clear to management that all unskilled and semi-skilled 
workers did not have the minimum qualifications required. 
Management was also aware of the fact that older and less 
educated workers were not interested in joining the union. 
These steps weakened the union because most of its members 
were not prepared to risk their jobs by union membership and 
they withdrew their support. By the end of 1975, the union's 
support base had declined and it withdrew from the company. 
African Explosives & Chemical Industries (AE&CI) 
By July 1974, the union recruited 625 workers at the AE&CI, a 
locally-owned company in Durban.3° Negotiations for 
recognition between union officials and company personnel 
officer were initiated. But on 12 August, the personnel 
officer was instructed by top management to cease all 
negotiations with the union. The union responded by writing to 
the company chairman, H. Oppenheimer, urging union 
recognition. Oppehheimer accepted the union's demands and made 
recommendations, which led to the resumption of talks between 
management and CWIU officials.31 However, the union was not 
recognised because the company took advantage of the labour 
repressive conditions under apartheid and hardened opposition 
to recognition of institutions representing African workers. 
As a result, a grievance procedure was established whereby 
workers' grievances could be directly discussed with senior 
management officials. This meant that union officials lost 
contact with ordinary workers since workers spoke directly to 
management if they encountered problems at the workplace. 
29 Ibid, p 79. 
30 Maree, "An analysis", p 247. 
31 Maree, "An analysis", pp 247-8; and CWIU, Letter to 
Harry Oppenheimer, October 1974. 
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In 1975, AE&CI developed a highly bureaucratic system of 
employee representation. At departmental levels, works and 
joint management representative committees were established, 
while at the factory level a liaison committee comprising 
representatives from all departments was created. As far as 
the works committees were concerned their role tended to be 
formal, "concentrating largely on hygiene issues". 32 Wages 
and conditions of service were negotiated at company level by 
a multiracial body called the federal consultative council 
comprising worker representatives from liaison committees of 
three major plants, and representatives from both management 
and registered trade unions who were participants in the 
central industrial council for the explosives and allied 
industries. 33 As the CWIU was an unregistered and 
unrecognised trade union, it could not participate in any of 
these structures. Furthermore, these structures were informal 
company arrangements not statutory bodies. As a result, union 
officials were placed in a position where, on a number of 
occasions, they had to consult liaison committee members to 
receive information on decisions made by management concerning 
workers' problems. Initially, the union had a negative 
attitude towards the liaison committees and did not want to 
contest liaison committee elections. 
By the end of 1975, union organisation at the factory had 
totally collapsed. But the CWIU's failure at AE&CI was also 
the result of its poor recruiting strategies. Of significance 
as well were large scale distances to cover from the office to 
AE&CI in Umbogentwini and, apparently a chaotic union regime. 
In a study conducted by F.W. Horwitz at the company in 1980, 
of the 63 percent of workers interviewed, about 60 percent 
indicated that they were not aware of the purposes of a trade 
union although "workers with higher levels of education 
32 F.W. Horwitz, "Workers' participation in management 
decision making: research findings in a South African 
context", Industrial Relations Journal of South Africa, vol 2, 
no 4 (1982), p 14. 
33 Ibid. 
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believe(d] more strongly in the ability of trade unions to 
improve their lot, than in the case of less educate~ 
workers". 34 Horwitz's findings also revealed that longer-
serving workers tended to be less optimistic about the 
benefits of trade unions, unlike newly recruited workers. 
Although there was general lack of confidence in 
departmental committees at the company, particularly among the 
younger generation or among shorter serving workers, the CWIU 
failed to provide the necessary education to motivate workers 
to join the union. The CWIU worked on the wrong assumption 
that since the period was marked by widespread militancy, 
workers were likely to join in numbers. By the end of 1976, as 
Horwitz wrote, "there was very little, if any Black trade 
union activity in AE&CI factories", 35 and there was no choice 
except to withdraw. 
Quality Products and Natal and Soap Industries 
Another humiliating defeat was experienced at Quality Products 
and at Natal Oil and Soap Industries of Durban, subsidiaries 
of the Danish East Asiatic Company, at which the CWIU failed 
once again to mobilise enough membership for it to be 
recognised. The union began organising workers in November 
1974 and managed to recruit only 68 of the total 250 workers 
at Quality Products and as few as 21 of the 340 workers at 
Natal Oil and Soap Industries.36 The management of the two 
companies indicated that they would recognise the union only 
if it obtained 50 percent majority membership taken together. 
But by July 1975, union membership at Quality Products and 
Natal Oil and Soap Industries still only stood at 130 and 33 
respectively.37 At the beginning of 1976, the union abandoned 
the two companies after its membership declined to 30 and 11 
34 Ibid, p 17. 
35 Ibid, p 15. 
36 Maree, "An analysis", p 251. 
37 Ibid, p 252. 
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respectively.38 
NCS Plastics 
As a result of the failures in the above mentioned companies, 
the CWIU tried a new strategy in early 1976 of mobilising 
around the election of works committees. As discussed in 
Chapter 9, the CWIU, like other independent trade unions, had 
previously shunned liaison committees and after failing to 
achieve a single recognition deal it decided to participate in 
the establishment of works committees in an attempt to provide 
some form of protection to its members. Generally workers 
preferred the works committees to the liaison committees and 
occasionally boycotted the elections of the latter at the 
company level. "As members of a works committee, shop stewards 
would have the protection against victimisation under the 
Act". 39 The economic recession of 1976 had led to 
retrenchments and dismissals and the union wanted to protect 
its shop stewards from possible victimisation by employers. 
The new strategy was implemented at NCS Plastics, a Durban-
based and South African-owned company that manufactured 
plastic sheeting, bags and resins used in fibreglass. 40 The 
company operated two major factories: the "South" (plastics) 
and the "North" (resins). 
Once the union started recruiting at NCS Plastics, 
workers from the "South" factory elected a works committee, 
which comprised union members. In the "North" factory however, 
management established a liaison committee and quickly awarded 
a five cents an hour wage increase requested by the liaison 
committee in an "attempt to bolster the image of the liaison 
committee over the works committee''. 41 In contrast, no 
increase was awarded to the "South" factory workers on the 
3B CWIU, Membership and growth, June 1976. 
39 Mawbey, "Factory struggles", p 80. 
40 Ibid. 
41 Ibid, p 81. 
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grounds that the works committee members failed to negotiate 
for an increase with management. Furthermore, management tried 
to undermine the works committee by stipulating that they 
would open lines of communication only with the chairman of 
the committee. Thus although management allowed the works 
committee to function, limited progress was made in terms of 
worker grievances, and worker representatives were easily 
victimised. Towards the end of 1976, membership at NCS 
Plastics had declined·to such an extent that the union was 
forced to abandon its recruiting drive at the company. 
The period between 1974 and early 1976 was by no means a 
glorious one for the union. Indeed, this initial phase of 
union organisation was marked by mixed fortunes: membership 
growth in the greater Durban area increased from 1 020 in 1974 
to 2 900 in 1976 although paid-up membership declined from 600 
to 580 respectively. Furthermore, although a number of 
companies, both local and foreign, refused to recognise the 
union but, as a result of its activities, responded to threats 
it posed by initiating workplace improvements. A number of 
employers in Durban like the SA Fabrics used this strategy of 
deliberately isolating workers from the union by making some 
strategic concessions. Employers had the benefit of the latest 
"human relations' thinking of Europe and America and used 
these personnel techniques to confuse the workers and thwart 
the unions. However, these techniques were not a lasting 
guarantee against unionisation, but they were used to the full 
along with the advantages enjoyed by employers in an 
authoritarian industrial relations system. 
This early phase was, however, marked by 
maladministration, embezzlement of union funds and lack of 
experienced leadership. From mid-1976 onwards, the union 
changed its organisational strategies, brought in experienced 
and talented officials such as Mawbey, Copelyn and Dlamini to 
reorganise its three Durban branches so that they could be 
accountable to the rank and file. 
1976 and Beyond 
Revert ex 
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Between 1976 and 1979, the CWIU continued its strategy of shop 
floor organisation but this time in different firms. Despite 
its failure to attain any recognition agreements, the union 
targeted Revertex, a British subsidiary, based in the Durban 
area. In the early 1970s, Revertex had invested about 
R3 million in a newly reconstituted leather sheeting plant in 
the Jacobs area, 42 and in 1976 it employed about 110 African 
and 20 white workers. 43 In that year the African workers 
started organising themselves; they elected a shop steward 
committee, which pressed the company to establish a works 
committee. Although in the past works committees failed to 
gain any benefits for the workers because of resistance from 
companies, unionised workers at Revertex insisted that they 
preferred a works committee rather than a liaison committee. 
"The works committee ... functioned as a platform for the union 
shop stewards to introduce the workers' demands for the 
recognition of their union". 44 The works committee was mainly 
dominated by union shop stewards. 
Although the union started organising at Revertex in July 
1976, it only demanded recognition at a meeting held on 26 
October 1978 between works committee members and 
management. 45 Because of insufficient membership, the union 
deliberately delayed its recognition campaign until it had 
recruited more than 70 percent of the labour force. The 
production director of the company, Derek Jones, was then told 
by works committee members that the union had a majority 
42 UW, WCL, SACTWU, CWIU, F6.3.4, The CWIU at Revertex 
South Africa, 26 October 1979, p 1. 
43 Ibid. 
44 Ibid. 
45 CWIU, The campaign for recognition Revertex, 28 April 
19791 p 1 • 
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membership of 75 percent and hence could be recognised. 46 
Jones informed them that the company would investigate the 
position, but nothing materialised. The general strategy of 
the company was to stop the union momentum, delay, cause 
confusion by offering every alternative to recognition, pass 
the buck, and paralyse union initiatives. Further enquiries on 
16 November 1978 were ignored by company officials, and thus 
began one of the union's longest campaigns for recognition. 
In a memorandum of 28 November 1978, the works committee 
questioned the company's willingness to recognise the union 
and its policy with regard to the European Economic Community 
(EEC) Code of Conduct. 47 The Code had been adopted in 1977 by 
nine member countries which called for fair employment 
practices among foreign-based companies operating in South 
Africa. It called upon those companies to pay wages that were 
above the PDL, remove discrimination, provide for African job 
advancement and to engage in collective bargaining structures 
with African unions. The company failed to respond and the 
union wrote to D.W. Stutchbury, managing director and chief 
executive of Revertex Chemicals (England), who initially did 
not reply. It was only after the union in its third letter 
objected to "the lack of courtesy in not replying to letters 
and requesting a clear explanation of company policy with 
respect to the EEC Code of Conduct" that Stutchbury 
responded. 48 He said that the company had submitted a report 
to the South African Minister for Trade; that this issue would 
be re-opened only after the Wiehahn Commission had reported; 
and that the union was obliged to consult with the company's 
local management. 49 
The union was infuriated and reacted: 
46 CWIU, The CWIU at Revertex, 26 October 1979. 
47 CWIU, The campaign for recognition at Revertex, 28 
April 1979. 
48 CWIU, The campaign for recognition at Revertex, 28 
April 1979. 
49 Ibid, PP 2-3. 
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Your statements ... are characteristics of the 
inevitable response British managements make to 
requests for recognition by unregistered South 
African trade unions. We have come to regard such 
response as a deliberate effort to avoid recognition 
because apparently there has been no serious 
intention towards recognition ... Your company has 
spent the last six months using a variety of 
transparent devices to avoid committing itself to 
... recognis[ing] the union .... Whilst you allege that 
your company is extremely keen to have good 
relations with trade unions in South Africa as in 
Britain we wonder if you would treat British unions 
in the manner you have found it expedient to treat 
our organisation.so 
The company's position with regard to union recognition was 
supported by the South African government: "[the company's] 
action appears to be in line with what the government is 
seeking from companies in this matter". 51 For the union, this 
was taken as a deliberate attempt by both the government and 
company to block its recognition campaign. 
After October 1978, the company adopted a tough approach 
towards union recognition and recruitment campaigns. In order 
to discredit the union, the company in 1979 rejected the works 
committee's constitution which had been in operation for two 
years. 52 The union's shop stewards saw the move as an 
"attempt to subvert the continuing pursuance of union 
recognition by the committee and possibly to replace it with 
some other more compliant type of committee••. 53 The company 
also made various attempts to win worker support by raising 
wages without notice; promoted some shop stewards into semi-
supervisory positions; facilitated a fast payment of sick pay; 
gave merit increases to selected individuals; and promised 
5° CWIU, F6.2, CWIU correspondence, Open letter for 
attention D.W. Stutchbury, 30 April 1979. 
51 CWIU, F6.3.4. CWIU, The EEC Code of Conduct for British 
companies with interests in South Africa, July 1979, p 1. 
52 CWIU, The CWIU at Revertex, 26 October 1979. 
53 CWIU, CWIU at Revertex, Durban, Report number 4, 29 May 
1979, p 2. 
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workers a bonus at the end of the year.54 But, the company 
refused to negotiate an agreement with the committee over the 
more fundamental issues such as grievances and dismissal 
procedures, wages and working conditions. 
The union tried to capitalise on workers' grievances 
concerning conditions of work but management was quick to 
address them, for instance on the issue of health and safety. 
In a memorandum to management submitted by the works committee 
(together with a letter from the union's attorney threatening 
legal action) which outlined various breaches of health and 
safety legislation, the company was threatened and given one 
week to address those problems.55 The details given were that 
some workers inside tanks containing lethal gases were 
carrying out their duties with faulty respiratory equipment, 
and without safety harnesses, or proper precautions being 
used. In addition they were using dangerous machinery without 
the necessary training. Management responded quickly by 
"replacing defective protective clothing and giving previously 
neglected workers gumboots, aprons, gloves, goggles, earmuffs, 
respirators, safety harnesses - demarcating dust and noise 
zones, and repairing ventilation systems". 56 
The union also tried to mobilise on the issue of one day 
notice pay given to dismissed workers. Since the inception of 
the company in 1958, dismissed weekly paid labourers were 
given one day notice and received only one day's notice wage. 
This practice was against the law. In line with legal 
requirements, management changed this to a full week's wage in 
lieu of notice to which dismissed workers were legally 
entitled. 57 Thus with the major grievances resolved, the 
union had to revisit the issue of recognition soon after the 
Wiehahn Commission reported. Recognition was one of the issue 
54 CWIU, The CWIU at Revertex, 26 October 1979, p 2. 
55 Ibid, p 3. 
56 Ibid. I 
57 Ibid. 
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that kept the union going at Revertex and supplemented by 
actual achievements on the shop floor. 
On 23 May 1979, the works committee met management and 
discussed a workers' petition on union recognition. Management 
responded by stating that it would accept representation by a 
registered trade union, but the union was not satisfied with 
management's new stance because "registration for the CWIU 
means significant state control of union operations. Revertex 
would clearly like the CWIU to register hoping that it will be 
a tame union". 58 The union initially rejected the issue of 
registration on the basis that a vast majority of its members 
were migrant workers who could not be accorded trade union 
rights. The union remained adamant that Revertex could 
recognise it in spite of its non-registration status: 
There is nothing in the new legislation to prevent 
Revertex from recognising our union immediately. 
However Derek Jones [Production Manager], like other 
employers, has found South Africa's industrial law a 
most convenient camouflage to hide behind while 
denying workers the rights of collective bargaining. 
Jones cannot escape the fact that the large majority 
of his work force will not be eligible for 
registered union membership.59 
However, in October 1979 the government relaxed its bar on 
migrants and allowed all African workers except those from 
beyond the South African borders to join registered trade 
unions. Perhaps this shows, at one level, that the Wiehahn 
reforms helped to erode homeland powers, and that the African 
townships were becoming more autonomous by the 1980s. In so 
doing, the union found itself without any issue to rally 
workers around. Like all other FOSATU unions, the CWIU became 
embroiled in the registration debate and it was only in 1980 
that the CWIU became an officially registered trade union. In 
July 1982, th~ union and Revertex formally signed a 
58 CWIU, The CWIU at Revertex, 26 October 1979. 
59 CWIU, Report, Number 4, 29 May 1979, p 3. 
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recognition agreement.6° 
Henkel South Africa 
Another recognition battle by the union was launched in 
September 1978 at Henkel South Africa, a subsidiary of Henkel 
West Germany. 61 Henkel South Africa was based in Durban and 
Johannesburg and produced a wide range of products: chemicals, 
soaps, detergents and glues.62 An international company, 
Henkel at that time had 68 subsidiaries in 17 countries. 63 In 
South Africa, the company was half-owned by A. Rupert's giant 
Rembrandt Tobacco Group. In 1978, the Durban plant employed 
about 250 Africans, 40 Indians and 10 white foremen. 64 During 
that year, the union recruited about 150 African workers at 
Henkel's Durban factory. 65 A liaison committee was also 
established and by 1982 a majority of union members was 
elected onto the liaison committee (see Chapter 9 on 
independent unions' changed attitude towards the liaison 
committee). 66 Shop stewards were elected and many were 
members of the liaison committee. The following month, union 
shop stewards in the liaison committee requested recognition 
of their union and management agreed to inform the Board of 
Directors. 67 After months of delay, the company agreed to 
recognise the union as the legitimate representative of its 
members, but refused to "negotiate wages and working 
6
° CWIU, A history of the CWIU, 1974-1984 (Durban, 
FOSATU, 1984), p 14. 
61 CWIU, Report on dispute at Henkel SA (Durban Plant), 26 
April 1982. 
62 Ibid; see also Maree, "An analysis", p 257. 
63 CWIU, The workers' struggle at Henkel, 1982, p 2. 
64 CWIU, The CWIU at Henkel, Durban, Report 1, 21 
September 1978. 
65 Ibid. 
66 Ibid. 
67 Ibid. 
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conditions, to sign a recognition contract or negotiate 
seriously with the union on substantive issues [like] the 
unpopular company pension scheme".68 
On 16 May the following year, management disbanded the 
liaison committee on the grounds that those elected were union 
members, mainly Africans and replaced it with a Company 
Council which was supposed to be "multiracial and 
nationwide". 69 The union, workers and shop stewards voiced 
their concern against this Company Council. Firstly, it was 
not their choice and "its existence [was] not subject to the 
free will of employees". 70 Secondly, the seats on the Council 
' 
were divided on racial lines: in the Durban plant, four 
Africans, two whites and two Asians had to be nominated. 71 
Thirdly, it was undemocratic {in the eyes of workers and the 
union) in that when union members boycotted the elections, the 
company recognised non-union members who participated in the 
elections as representatives of both union and non-union 
members. About 161 union members signed a petition calling for 
the "elected" representatives to resign from the Council - a 
call that was lambasted by the company as "destructive, 
negative and intimidatory". 72 The company also threatened to 
break off relations with the union if such a campaign 
continued. Lastly, the union viewed the Council as an 
instrument that was meant to undermine it since agreements 
between the union and company had to be ratified by the 
Council. 73 Furthermore, the Council was the only body that 
had the right to deal with wages and conditions of work and 
68 CWIU, Report on dispute at Henkel, 26 April 1982. 
69 CWIU, The workers' struggle at Henkel, pp 5 and 20; and 
CWIU, Progress report on campaign for recognition at Henkel 
between 6 December 1978 and 4 April 1979. 
7° CWIU, K. Schweiker, Managing Director, 29 September 
1979, in The Workers' struggle at Henkel, p 20. 
71 CWIU, The workers' struggle at Henkel, p 20. 
72 Ibid, p 21 . 
73 Ibid. 
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its decisions were binding on all workers. 
Despite this setback, between 1980 and 1982, the union 
made considerable gains at Henkel; a grievance and dismissal 
procedure was established; stop order facilities were granted; 
union officials were given limited access to their members 
and, in September 1981, the company agreed to negotiate wages 
with the union. 74 This sudden change in attitude by company 
management was necessitated by worker struggles and campaigns 
at Colgate-Palmolive, which alarmed the chemical bosses (see 
below). But in January 1982 the company reneged on these wage 
negotiations. This resulted in further negotiations the 
following month, but the company still refused to negotiate 
wages. It also rejected the proposal by the union to resolve 
an outstanding grievance on the pension scheme; and it refused 
to negotiate the new 45 hour-a-week shift, reduced shift and 
over-time pay. 75 These were the main grievances which ignited 
the strike action on 9 March 1982. 
Soon after the strike began, management responded by 
dismissing all 230 African workers and scab-labour was 
immediately recruited. 76 Scab-labourers signed contracts to 
work for 45 hours-a-week, a demand which union members had 
rejected. 77 A week later, the union and workers agreed to 
call off the strike after realising that they were fighting a 
losing battle and decided to negotiate directly with 
management. The company selectively re-hired 75 workers who 
were required to sign contracts that stipulated longer working 
hours, lower shift and overtime pay. 78 For those who were not 
re-employed, the company was prepared to pay them only one 
week notice pay - a suggestion that led the union to call for 
74 Ibid, p 6. 
75 Ibid, p 7 and Daily News, 10 March 1982. 
76 See Friedman, Building tomorrow today, p 309. 
77 Natal Mercury, 19 March 1982. 
78 CWIU, Report on dispute at Henkel, 26 April 1982. 
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a consumer boycott of Henkel products on 27 March. 79 Strong 
links were beginning to develop between the union and township 
consumers. 
The consumer boycott received the full backing of FOSATU, 
which demanded the extension of the boycott to include 
products of the Rembrandt Tobacco Group if no solution was 
found. 80 The secretary general of the International Chemical 
and Energy Federation, C. Levinson, also pledged support for 
the boycott.81 Once a world-wide consumer boycott had been 
successfully implemented, the company initiated negotiations 
with the union, which culminated in the signing of a formal 
recognition and a settlement of the dispute agreement on 20 
April 1982. 82 Both the union and company agreed that all 
workers had to be reinstated (without loss of long service 
benefits); that a secret ballot be conducted to determine 
whether workers wanted to work for 40 or 45 hours-a-week; that 
the union's disciplinary procedure be implemented; and that 
correct retrenchment procedures be followed. 83 The union had 
reason to celebrate its victory at Henkel and thanked all 
organisations for their "speedy and effective support [which] 
has been instrumental in achieving the comparatively quick and 
satisfactory settlement".84 
Colgate-Palmolive 
Undoubtedly, one of the CWIU's key recognition campaigns 
occurred at Colgate-Palmolive in Boksburg between 1980 and 
and 
79 Ibid. 
80 Ibid. 
81 Rand Daily Mail, 27 March 1982. 
82 CWIU, Report on dispute at Henkel, 26 April 1982, 
CWIU, A history of the CWIU, 1984, p 15. 
83 CWIU, Report on dispute, 26 April 1982, p 2. 
84 CWIU, R. Crompton to all organisations, 26 April 
p 2; 
1982. 
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1981. 85 The recognition battle had far-reaching implications 
for chemical employers 1 particularly those based in the 
greater Durban area where the union had been organising since 
1974. Once the union was successful at Colgate-Palmolive it 
sounded a warning to Durban's chemical employers of the 
dangers of ignoring a representative union. 
When African workers at Colgate-Palmolive went out on 
strike, about 3 000 workers from the chemical industry came 
out in sympathy. The boycott of all Colgate-Palmolive products 
that was called by the CWIU was effectively implemented in 
Durban's African townships. It is worth looking at what 
happened at Colgate-Palmolive in order to understand the 
shifts in employers' attitude towards the union in the 1980s. 
From this Colgate-Palmolive incident, a number of patterns 
emerge very sharply particularly among Durban's chemical 
employers. The chemical bosses were now willing to negotiate 
with the union if it recruited a significant number of workers 
at their workplaces. Perhaps it was not only the threat posed 
by the union's strikes and consumer boycotts but also an 
attempt by government and business to stave off the political 
threat by socio-economic reforms. 
African workers at Colgate-Palmolive had a significant 
number of grievances; they complained about discrimination -
factory facilities being racially segregated; unfair 
dismissals; and improper representation at the company. 86 As 
soon as the union established a branch in the Transvaal in 
January 1980, African workers at Colgate-Palmolive flocked to 
join. Barely two months after the launch of the branch, the 
union had managed to recruit about 60 percent of the total 
workforce of 290 at the company. During that month, the union 
asked for recognition but for one year and five months 
thereafter, the company adopted a "blatantly anti-union 
85 See Friedman, Building tomorrow today, pp 247-250 & 
266. 
86 CWIU, The Colgate story, 1982, p 1. 
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stand". 87 
At a liaison committee meeting on 20 February 1980, the 
personnel director, e.G. Dyson, asked "whether the time was 
right for unionisation" at the company. The meeting resolved 
that "there was no justification at present for the 
establishment of a trade union within the workforce of 
Colgate-Palmolive".88 Because of this, the union questioned 
the company's credibility as one which was regarded a~ the 
I 
most progressive international company in South Afric~: 
Colgate is a household name all over the world w~th 
its toothpaste, soap and detergent products. It I 
justifies its presence in South Africa by declar~ng 
its 'sincere and ongoing commitment to the ! 
elimination of racial discrimination' and by 1 
claiming that multi-national business can play an 
important role in eliminating petty apartheid in 
business .... Is Colgate-Palmolive really the 
enlightened employer it claims to be?89 
Initially the company remained adamant on non-union 
recognition and was rather reactionary: "As a company 1we are 
opposed to the unionisation of our workforce" 90 ; and "~t is 
the Colgate-Palmolive policy that we resist the establishment 
of trade unions in our factories throughout the world". 91 
However, before long, the tone changed (soon after the union 
reminded it of the EEC Code of Conduct) to allow recognition 
under certain conditions: "The management of this company ... 
will only recognise a union or unions which have been 
registered in terms of the laws of the country governing 
87 CWIU, "Workers struggle at Colgate'', p 18. 
88 CWIU, Minutes of the meeting of the Colgate-Palmolive 
liaison committee, 20 February 1980 as cited in "Workers 
struggle at Colgate", p 19. 
89 CWIU, "Workers struggle at Colgate", pp 18 & 23. 
9° CWIU, Colgate's letter to CWIU, 12 May 1980, as cited 
in "Workers struggle at Colgate", p 19. 
91 CWIU, Letter to CWIU, 19 May 1980, as cited in "Workers 
struggle at Colgate", p 19. 
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registration of unions". 92 The company also listed a number 
of conditions before union recognition could be granted: 
Filing of an application for registration; accept 
the principle of freedom of association; agree to 
negotiate wages and working conditions only at 
industrial level through an industrial council; if 
unable to gain admission to such industrial council 
then the activity of the union in our company is 
confined to matters relating to shop floor 
grievances; and proof of majority membership. 93 
The CWIU strongly objected: "It is clear ... that the issue is 
not simply union recognition as such, but the type of 
recognition. Colgate wishes to emasculate any union it 
recognises by refusing to negotiate wages and working 
conditions directly".94 The union accused management of 
deliberately downgrading its position to that of the liaison 
committee, which dealt with trivial shop floor grievances such 
as "bins for towels", "toothpowder in the locker rooms"95 and 
"racism in shower and change rooms".96 
Because of major differences between the company and CWIU 
over the industrial council, the union declared an official 
dispute, and also applied for the establishment of the 
Conciliation Board to resolve it. But the Board failed to 
settle the issue and the union thus called for a strike ballot 
among workers. Of the 230 African workers only four voted 
against the strike action which was to become "the first legal 
strike ballot by a predominantly black union". 97 While the 
union followed the early-Wiehahn strike procedures, it also 
secured FOSATU and widespread community support for a boycott 
92 CWIU, Colgate to CWIU, 30 June 1980, as cited in 
"Workers struggle at Colgate", p 20. 
93 CWIU I The Colgate story, p 5; and CWIU, "Workers 
struggle at Colgate", p 20. 
94 CWIU, The Colgate story, p 6; and CWIU, "Workers 
struggle at Colgate", p 20. 
95 CWIU, "Workers struggle at Colgate", p 23. 
96 CWIU, The Colgate story, pp 14-15. 
97 Rand Daily Mail, 19 June 1981. 
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of Colgate-Palmolive products, during the 30 days "cooling -
off period" required in terms of the labour law. 98 
The boycott of the company's products received much 
support from trade unions and the African community in the 
townships. In 1982, workers at Revertex, Henkel, Unilever, NCS 
Plastics and AE&CI, all Durban-based companies, staged a two-
hour protest in solidarity with Colgate-Palmolive workers. 99 
Boycott stickers were distributed to workers through the 
Pinetown, Jacobs and Dalbridge branches. Although it is 
difficult to measure the success of the boycott in African 
townships, some residents responded to the call. The Jacobs 
branch reminded its members of "the task of conscientising the 
community about the boycott and how vital this is to our 
future struggles in the chemical industry". 10° In its annual 
report, FOSATU wrote: 
Whole communities became mobilised in support of the 
boycott call. Textile workers' hostels in towns like 
Mooi River were covered with boycott posters. TGWU 
members posted boycott stickers on buses on the East 
Rand, traders in Richards Bay, Uitenhage and the 
East Rand agreed to remove Colgate products from 
their shelves. 101 
Employers from other factories in the Boksburg area also 
expressed concern about the effects of an impending strike 
action at Colgate on their own plants. 102 With pressure 
mounting from all directions, Colgate-Palmolive agreed to 
bargain at company level with the union two days before a 
legal strike was to begin. 
On 28 June 1981, Colgate-Palmolive formally recognised 
the union; agreed to negotiate wages and conditions of service 
at the plant level; and also dropped its insistence on the 
98 FOSATU, Report, November 1980 to November 1981, p 10. 
99 CWIU, R. Crompton to all branches, 30 May 1982. 
100 CWIU, Branch secretary to all members re: Colgate-
Palmolive, June 1982. 
1 01 Ibid I p 11 . 
102 See Rand Daily Mail, 19 June 1981. 
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union to participate in the industrial council for the 
chemical industry. 103 Colgate-Palmolive had lost the battle 
and the dispute marked a turning point in Durban's industrial 
relations; it heralded similar victories thereafter at the 
Revertex, Henkel and Unilever companies, and a radical shift 
of policy towards industrial councils, particularly among the 
chemical employers. In fact, the tactic of negotiating with 
"progressive" employers was protracted and fraught at every 
turn; none of those companies became a pillar of organisation 
and enormous time and energy was consumed in drawn-out 
battles. For an extended period workers found no tangible 
benefits from sacrificing to build the union. 
One of the less fought recognition campaigns launched by 
the CWIU in the aftermath of the Colgate-Palmolive struggle 
was at Unilever company based in the Mayden area, south of 
Durban. The union started organising workers at Unilever in 
July 1982 and immediately elected a representative shop 
steward committee. Barely a month after, negotiations for 
recognition between union and company officials were 
initiated. The company agreed to recognise the union if it 
recruited more than half of the workers. After six months of 
intense recruiting, the union managed to reach the 75 percent 
majority membership. In January 1983, the union was officially 
recognised. 104 What persuaded the company to quickly 
recognise the union was the costly strike at Colgate-
Palmolive, which was a battle lost and more dramatically, the 
boycott of all its products. Unilever's management was not 
prepared to risk strikes and consumer boycotts. 
CWIU and the political dimension 
Throughout the 1970s and early 1980s, the CWIU, one of the 
pillars of FOSATU, remained opposed to forming an alliance 
103 CWIU, Dusty Ngwane, Colgate and Branch chairman to all 
FOSATU affiliates, 19 July 1981. 
104 CWIU, Recognition campaign at Unilever company, 12 
February 1983. 
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with any of the political movement on the grounds that it was 
likely to divert its energies from building working class 
organisation. A. Erwin, FOSATU's first General Secretary, 
voiced the same view: 
As an initial attempt to build unions, [we believe 
that] FOSATU could survive only if it was based on 
the shop floor. [In this way we] could resist 
repression and allow for organisation .... [We set 
out to organise] factories as a base of strength. If 
not [factory based, we would be] just posturing. We 
were resistant to doing what seemed futile. Our 
worker stewards felt that success could be achieved 
if we avoided [unnecessarily] dangerous activities 
which would divert resources and provoke state 
action against [our] embryonic movement. 105 
The CWIU eschewed national liberation politics and 
insisted on building strong shop floor structures, which 
catered for its members' economic interests. In defense of the 
union's policy, c. Makgaleng, president of the CWIO in 1983, 
stated: 
Our union believes that the political struggles of 
the day should be separated from workplace 
struggles. Any union which tries to get involved in 
political struggles will not survive for long. It 
has been our principled stand since the inception of 
this union that we do not get involved in wider 
community struggles. In any case, our primary task 
is to expand and build a strong union base for our 
members. 106 
The CWIU also maintained that it was able to attract workers 
with differing political ideologies, particularly in the 
greater Durban area and therefore did not want to affiliate to 
any political movement. Even during the.mid-1980s when there 
was growing township unrest in the greater Durban and 
surrounding KwaZulu areas, the CWIU (like the NOTW) refused to 
be drawn into formal alliances with any political or community 
organisation, in particular the newly formed UDF. In response 
105 Interview with A. Erwin, March 1988, in A.W. Marx, 
Lessons of struggle: South African internal opposition, 1960-
1990 (Oxford, OUP, 1992), p 196. 
106 CWIU, General correspondence, CWIO's political stand, 
October 1983. 
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to the issue of whether the CWIU should establish links with 
the UDF, R. Crompton stated: "Our union is a working class 
organisation ... comprising workers with differing political 
opinions. Formal affiliation therefore with the UDF is 
completely out of the question". 107 This implied that the 
union, unlike unions elsewhere in Britain, Germany, France and 
so on, was not to take any political decisions at all, not 
even those directly in the interests of their members. 
Dlamini, one of the CWIU organisers, also noted: 
Our union has always been opposed to direct 
participation in politics. Since 1974, we were all 
agreed that we should not make SACTU's mistake of 
being involved in Congress Alliance politic~. Our 
union consisted of members with different 
backgrounds and political ideologies. We had to 
avoid unnecessary division within the union .... We 
were all workers with one aim - we wanted the 
improvement of our wages and conditions of 
service. 108 
The CWIU was a symbol of opposition to involvement in broader 
political struggles and has been one of the manufacturing 
unions within FOSATU and COSATU that remained opposed to 
giving preference to the national liberation struggles over 
working class organisation. 
Conclusion 
Undoubtedly, the CWIU's momentous growth and rise was 
experienced orily between 1980 and 1985. The union's membership 
in the greater Durban area soared from a mere 1 020 in 1974 
and 6 230 in 1985. By 1984, the union had signed about 11 
formal recognition agreements in the greater Durban area; in 
fact, by 1985 the union had emerged with a large membership 
and with deeper roots in factories. The low years were those 
between 1974 and 1979 when union's demands for negotiating 
rights at plant level were totally rejected. It was only at 
Revertex and Henkel that a sizeable number of workers had 
107 CWIU, Rod Crompton's response to Joe Foster' speech, 
30 July 1982. 
108 Interview with D. Dlamini, 27 September 1994. 
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remained organised by 1979. Elsewhere union membership had 
suffered a precipitous decline. Although the union had 
experienced defeat throughout the 1970s, its moment of success 
seems to have begun in 1981 with victory at Colgate-Palmolive. 
In time especially in the late 1980s, the CWIU was able to 
establish itself as a powerful and leading trade union in the 
chemical industry. Undoubtedly, this union grew from strength 
to strength, particularly in the 1980s, learned lessons, 
failed in some areas and succeeded in others, and has become 
one of the chemical unions within COSATU to take the lead in 
the building of a strong working class organisation. 
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Chapter Twelve 
Conclusion 
This thesis has examined the development of the African 
labouring class and the rise of African independent trade 
unions in Durban between 1959 and 1985. To reach an 
understanding in this period, I have tried to break down the 
artificial division between labour history and social history, 
as well as that between the African working class and the 
broader community. This thesis therefore explicitly places its 
subject in the context of a wider society, for it is a working 
class that experienced complex relations not only in the 
workplace but also in the townships where people lived, and in 
the market place. Indeed, the apartheid city was a vital 
social arena beyond the factory gates: it was also a place 
where the political struggle against apartheid was formulated. 
The period under investigation is important for a broader 
understanding of the history of the era of "high apartheid", 
fittingly described by J. Rex as "apartheid gone mad" 1 , which 
has been inadequately explored by social historians. The 
workers' actions and the emergence of African independent 
trade unions has, however, generated a renewed interest among 
labour historians. Durban is particularly significant for the 
former in identifying distinctive features of the attempt to 
implement apartheid policies in the country's fastest growing 
industrial region, and for the latter because Durban was the 
focus of the 1973 strikes from which a new brand of African 
trade unionism emerged. 
Of material importance to these developments was the 
1 J. Rex, "The compound, the reserve and the urban 
location", SALB, vol 1, no 4 (1974), p 14. 
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unprecedentedly long period of economic growth that began in 
the 1960s. The economic boom that occurred in Durban, in the 
textile industry in particular, marked the city as one of the 
three great urban agglomerations in South Africa, together 
with the Rand and greater Cape Town. In the 1960s, a shift 
developed in the composition of industrial production towards 
heavy chemicals, textile clothing, furniture, paper and 
printing, and a degree of geographical diversification in 
border areas such as Hammarsdale occurred, in response to 
industrial decentralisation incentives offered by the 
government. It was precisely because of rapid economic growth 
under ever-hardening apartheid which prompted theoretical 
thinking among Marxist and liberal scholars. Radical South 
African historians and sociologists viewed apartheid and 
capitalism as mutually dependent entities, while liberals 
stressed the economic dysfunctionality of apartheid. 
The relationship was a complex one. In fact, the state 
reacted differently to problems which arose in various regions 
and economic sectors. This study has explored the relationship 
which existed between Durban's employers and the state. The 
evidence has shown that the relationship was marked by 
tension, conflicts, failures, deviations and occasional 
successes in the implementation of apartheid policies. It is 
probably true that the relationship was functional to capital 
in the 1960s, but this changed dramatically after 1973 when 
apartheid became so costly and therefore damaging to capital, 
more particularly to the operation of job reservation. 
While the relationship between capital and the state has 
been broadly examined by Marxist writers in the 1970s, it is 
no longer feasible to depict the state (local and central) as 
an instrument of capital. At least for the greater Durban 
area, there is some evidence that shows the existence of a 
conflictual relationship between the central and local state, 
and between capital and the state, particularly after 1970. My 
study has produced a number of examples in the history of 
Durban's African working class to illustrate these 
contestations, especially in the 1970s and 1980s. 
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Although this thesis focuses on Durban, it reinforces D. 
Posel's main argument that employers favoured the 
establishment of a settled, urban labour force and preferred, 
for many jobs, to employ migrant workers who were cheaper and 
more compliant rather than attract urban residents into work 
by higher wages; that the state ensured an adequate supply of 
African labour and channelled it to where it was needed most; 
and that the state imposed some restrictions on the process of 
African urbanisation in an attempt to control the social and 
political problems which accompanied the process. 2 Posel's 
arguments are viable but her account only goes as far as 1961, 
which invites research on what happened when the apartheid 
architects gained a freer hand after that. Furthermore, Posel 
examines the apartheid state's labour and urban policies at a 
national level. Too few studies have gone beyond the 1960s to 
examine the state-capital relationship. This work has made an 
attempt to do so. 
Perhaps the contradictory and dysfunctional relationship 
between the state and capital is best illustrated in Chapter 3 
where I consider how the control and allocation of labour 
under apartheid operated. Some employers of African labour 
contravened the state's influx control mechanisms and the 
workings of labour bureaux. Industrialists, such as the Frame 
Group and the Dunlop Rubber Company, were in favour of migrant 
labour and they, together with African work-seekers, adopted 
methods which undermined state labour recruitment policies. 
Commenting on state control mechanisms, P. Maylam notes: 
There is a danger in viewing control in 
teleological, monolithic, functionalist terms -
creating a picture of powerful state agencies ever 
tightening the screws of control, with growing 
effect, in the service of the dominant class. Such a 
picture is, paradoxically, both appropriate and 
misleading. Appropriate, because controls have been 
steadily tightened through the course of the 
twentieth century. But also misleading, because the 
whole apparatus of urban segregation and apartheid 
has been riddled with contradiction and 
2 See Posel, The making of apartheid; Posel, ''Influx 
control and urban labour markets", pp 411-430. 
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dysfunctionality.3 
The Durban local authorities were sometimes reluctant to 
implement state labour policies. Influx control measures were 
remodified to suit the labour requirements of capitalists, 
which generated conflict between the central state and local 
structures. 4 The labour bureau system was seen by employers as 
unnecessary and cumbersome, while employees themselves 
preferred to be employed/contracted at the gate or off the 
street, rather than follow the stipulated procedures of the 
state labour bureau system. (One of the contradictions within 
the employer position was that they found the labour bureau 
burdensome, but were totally opposed to paying for urban 
housing for African workers). The state's efforts to control 
and regulate the movement of African labourers from the 
reserves to white apartheid cities were a resounding failure 
since, as s. Greenberg puts it: "control has made necessary 
more controls; the successful damming up of labour in the 
African rural areas has created inducements to burst the 
dams". 5 In 1986, influx control was abolished and it was clear 
to the state that the system was not working and was "self-
defeating".6 As growing numbers of people undermined the 
system, it became costly to maintain the machinery of control, 
which Greenberg describes as "the greatly expanded coterie of 
clerks, managers, magistrates, inspectors and police". 7 
Perhaps the greatest event in the shaping of Durban's 
African working class was the forced removals of Africans from 
3 P.Maylam, "Explaining the apartheid city: 20 years of 
South African urban historiography", JSAS, vol 21, no 1 
(1995), p 34. 
4 Ibid, p 37. 
5 S.B. Greenberg, as cited in Maylam, "Explaining the 
apartheid city", pp 35-36; see also Maylam, "The rise and 
decline of urban apartheid in South Africa", African Affairs, 
vol 89 (1990), p 72. 
6 Maylam, "Explaining the apartheid city", p 35. 
7 Greenberg, as cited in Maylam, "The rise and decline of 
urban apartheid in South Africa", p 72. 
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inner-city shantytowns to newly created apartheid townships. 
They were vigorously implemented due to a number of factors: 
the "sanitation syndrome", 8 white racism (the desire to define 
Durban as a city built around a white core), notions of 
progress and modernity, as well as the commercial value of the 
inner-land.9 As alternatives to housing in the areas from 
which people were being removed, both local and central 
government structures provided formal houses for married 
couples and hostels for single men and women separated from 
the white residential areas. Although the provision of housing 
fell far short of what was required during the period under 
investigation, the apartheid state nonetheless provided an 
urban infrastructure for the African community to a degree not 
equalled by any previous government. 
These relocations forced the state to invest large sums 
of money in the construction of working-class townships around 
Durban. Of significance here was the state's concession to the 
fact that Africans constituted a permanent section of Durban's 
population. Although the African working class in Durban had 
already emerged in its numerical preponderance, occupied the 
central position with the labour process and had the necessary 
skills, it was in the 1970s that this working class posed the 
greatest challenge to the apartheid state. The migrant workers 
who existed without housing were part of the working class, 
and it was they who largely led the direct challenge to the 
state in the form of mass strike action. However, it was the 
capitalists who sought profits from the large-scale factories 
who were responsible for creating the objective grounds in 
which a working class with its traditions, informal and formal 
organisation, and conscious of its position within the class 
and racial structures of South Africa, emerged. Obviously, 
there was a high price which the African working people had to 
pay during this whole period - miserable conditions, poverty 
8 See M.W. Swanson, "The Durban system: Roots of urban 
apartheid in colonial Natal", African Studies, vol 35 (1976). 
9 Freund, Insiders and outsiders, p 64. 
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wages, family breakdown, crime and violence, police repression 
and the criminalisation of much social and economic life. 
Perhaps these observations, which have been developed in the 
context of Durban, could be useful in the broader 
understanding of South African labour history. 
Politically, Durban's labouring class was denied "open" 
representation when the state banned African political 
organisations in 1960 although there was considerable 
innovation in the sense that there were civic and underground 
structures built in Durban, a quite distinctive feature of the 
area. The repression, hostile indifference and changing 
strategic context finally led to passivity. Underground 
sabotage campaigns waged in and around Durban by Umkonto we 
Sizwe, beginning in 1961, failed to have an impact on the 
state or to "bring the government and its supporters to their 
senses ... ". 10 The end result was that, by the mid 1960s, 
African political organisations were completely paralysed 
inside the country, and therefore decided to go into exile. 
Not all leaders, however, went into exile; many stayed and 
helped in the formation of the next generation of resistance. 
The political centre for a whole period was located 
externally. This marked the end of mass mobilisation and a 
dramatic shift to township politics. Durban's African 
community no longer challenged the state directly, but 
indirectly by attacking local government structures 
established within the townships, such as Advisory Boards, 
Resident Committees and Urban Bantu Councils. The message was 
clear: the struggle against apartheid was waged by ordinary 
workers and the wider community and not by the declining 
popular political organisations. As I have demonstrated in 
this thesis, a major feature in the labour history of the 
period, and notably that of Durban, has been the constant 
challenge to both the state and capital from African workers, 
particularly from the 1970s. This view is supported by T. 
Lodge and B. Nasson, who saw resistance to the apartheid state 
10 Lodge, Black politics in South Africa, p 234. 
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during the 1970s and early 1980s as being "more often in the 
factories than in the townships, in trade unions rather than 
in political organisations". 11 
Even in the absence of a viable trade union movement, 
Durban's African workers responded to new economic challenges 
in a variety of hidden or disguised ways. B. Freund explains 
such forms of action only when and where working-class 
organisation had failed, as was the case with SACTU in the 
1960s. 12 Of significance here is the fact that the history of 
informal worker resistance, in particular in industrial 
establishments during the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s, is not 
documented. Some historians have tended to confine themselves 
merely to those workers' activities which can easily be 
identified, while others have concentrated on informal South 
African worker resistance on the mines. 13 Chapter 7 has tried 
to break this silence by examining the history of informal 
worker resistance in industrial Durban. Certainly, Durban's 
African working-class organisation and resistance to capital 
in the industrial sector has generated a considerable body of 
scholarly research among labour historians, yet the history of 
informal worker struggles remains peripheral, if not 
sidelined. Perhaps this is so because they faded into 
insignificance when opposition became bold and open. 
In the 1960s, African workers' political participation, 
like their industrial participation, was completely paralysed. 
Quite simply, they were excluded from both. However, the 
outbreak of the 1973 Durban strikes signalled a break with the 
11 T. Lodge and B. Nasson, All, here, and now: Black 
politics in South Africa in the 1980s (Cape Town, David 
Philip, 1991), p 28. 
12 Freund., "Theft and social protest", p 49. 
13 See, for instance, T. Dunbar Moodie, "The moral economy 
of the black miners strike of 1946", Journal of Southern 
African Studies, vol. 13, no.1 (1986); P. Warwick, Black 
people and the South African war (Cambridge, CUP, 1983); and 
C. Van Onselen, Studies in the social and economic history of 
the Witwatersrand 1886-1914, 2 vols (Johannesburg, Ravan 
Press, 1982). 
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past, in particular the shortcomings in labour legislation and 
collective bargaining structures. They marked a turning point 
in the development of trade unions and industrial militancy 
among African workers in Durban. 1973 also witnessed the 
beginning of a sustained increase in the level of strike 
action which, though varying from year to year, never fell 
back to the relatively low levels of the 1960s. Moreover, and 
more importantly, the aftermath of the 1973 Durban strikes saw 
the emergence of African independent trade unions which laid 
emphasis on strong shop floor organisation at the plant level. 
A "bottom-up" system of union organisation, based on a network 
of shop stewards, was established. In order to demonstrate 
this, two unions were selected and examined: the National 
Union of Textile Workers (NUTW) and the Chemical Workers' 
Industrial Union {CWIU). 
Until 1979, the industrial relations system was racially 
defined. A breakthrough in structural racial discrimination, 
entrenched in the labour legislation, occurred when the 
Wiehahn Commission recommended the inclusion of African 
workers in the definition of "employee". It was only after the 
promulgation of the Labour Relations Act in 1981 that real, 
substantial collective bargaining between African independent 
trade unions and Durban's bosses began to take a meaningful 
direction, though with some major setbacks. 
Apart from collective bargaining problems, independent 
trade unions such as the NUTW and CWIU had to confront the 
question of whether or not to align themselves with the 
broader struggles within the African community. The two unions 
argued that priority be given to the expansion of shop floor 
structures and they were not in favour of a wider political 
struggle beyond the factory gates. As one of the NUTW's shop 
stewards noted: 
A working class movement should not be deeply 
involved with a political movement. As workers we 
can participate in issues in the community, but not 
as a workers' movement. Some issues like rents we 
cannot avoid, but we must draw some lessons from the 
past, from the older unions like SACTU. Through deep 
political involvement, factory issues get left 
behind and too much time is spent over political 
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issues. 14 
The two unions grew from strength to strength, learned 
lessons, built in one area on the gains of another, were 
thrown back, were often defeated and forced to retreat before 
regrouping. By 1985, their presence was felt and acknowledged 
in many workplaces, and workers had managed to sign a 
significant number of formal recognition agreements with 
Durban's employers. These achievements captured the support 
and enthusiasm of Durban's African workers, who proved to be 
extremely resilient in the face of the apartheid state's 
repression. 
Perhaps the most important lesson to be deduced from the 
NUTW and CWIU unions was the survivalist strategy they adopted 
in the 1970s and 1980s, which they achieved by distancing 
themselves from the UDF, the Bantustans and the UBC 
collaborator-type of politics. There were, however, costs 
particularly in the growing separation from the youth movement 
and a lack of preparation to deal with the inevitable rise of 
a national movement of resistance. In fact, the two unions 
argued that high-profile involvement in national liberation 
struggles was inappropriate for trade unions; preference had 
to be given to bread and butter issues and independent "worker 
politics", as opposed to "populist" working-class movements. 
Even when the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) 
was formally launched in November 1985, which heralded a new 
beginning for African working-class organisation, the NUTW and 
CWIU (both COSATU affiliates and popularly known as 
"workerists") maintained strong opposition to broad community 
and political struggles. They emphasized putting down deeper 
roots among African workers on the factory floor and became 
influential industrial unions in Durban. As G. Adler and E. 
Webster wrote: 
The fledgling unions, in particular [the NUTW and 
CWIU], had made important strategic innovations, 
14 Interview by the Community and Labour Research Unit, 
"working class history in Natal project" (University of Natal, 
Durban, Sociology Department, October 1986). 
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which profoundly affected trade union development ••. 
in South Africa .... In pursuit of the long-term 
goals of ending apartheid ... , the unions emphasized 
legal means of struggle. They eschewed involvement 
in national political issues and refused to align 
themselves publicly to any political movement. 1S 
The successes and failures of independent trade unions 
opens up debate on the role of contemporary trade unions in 
politics. As R. Southall asks: "If ... democratic unions were 
after 1985 being propelled beyond economics towards systematic 
engagement in the political struggle, were they not open to 
the prospect of history repeating itself?" 16 In the 1980s, 
independent trade unions decided to participate in rather than 
boycott the state's labour reforms and this strategy invited 
huge criticism and created conflict with the banned ANC and 
the UDF, which called for a complete embargo against the 
apartheid state and all its structures. Yet it was the tactics 
adopted by independent trade unions, such as mass action, 
boycotts, protests, wildcat industrial action, and disruption 
on the shop floor, which actually undermined and weakened the 
state. Undoubtedly, the labour movement has been able to 
mobilise its power and apply mass protest strategies to 
achieve its demands, particularly during the negotiations at 
Kempton Park in 1992 - a tactic it had successfully used 
against employers who continually exploited workers and 
supported the repressive government. As Adler and Webster 
aver: "Labour reasserted its strategy of mass action to back 
up its negotiating position and confirmed the wisdom of 
extending the strategy to the political sphere." 17 The 
Tripartite alliance adopted this strategy during the 
negotiation period and managed to secure its demands. 
15 G.Adler and E. Webster, "Challenging transition theory: 
the labour movement, radical reform, and transition to 
democracy in South Africa", Politics and Society, vol.23, no.1 
(1995), p 80. 
16 Southall, Imperialism or solidarity?, p 291. 
17 Adler and Webster, "Challenging transition theory", p 
93. 
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Obviously, there is a degree of pessimism over the future 
relationship between the ANC government and COSATU. The 
question is whether or not the alliance can be sustained in a 
situation where the government, supposedly a caretaker of the 
interests of all South Africans, may oppose unions demands and 
industrial action in future. The likelihood is that of 
repressive corporatism rather than democratic corporatism as 
advocated by J. Maree and s. Godfrey, where the government is 
forced to undermine the collective bargaining rights of trade 
unions, which they have struggled for so long to achieve. 18 
If COSATU hopes to survive in the new dispensation, it has to 
maintain its position as an equal, not subordinate partner, in 
the alliance and concentrate on building strong shop floor 
structures, as advocated by manufacturing unions such as the 
NUTW (now SACTWU) and CWIU within the federation. However, as 
noted by Webster, the South African trade union movement has 
two faces - "the one economic, the other social and political" 
and "the challenge [therefore] now facing the black trade 
union movement is to blend these two faces of trade 
unionism." 19 The future will be shaped by how Durban's 
African working class organisations face this major challenge. 
The making of Durban's African working class during the 
apartheid era was no easy task, it went through every 
difficulty and its history shows some resilience in post-
apartheid South Africa. 
What is important about this thesis is that it provides a 
detailed regional case study which could provide a basis for 
research in other regions, particularly in view of the crucial 
role of trade unions in contemporary South African political 
economy. Perhaps its most important contribution is its 
discussion of how the African working class made itself, 
18 J. Maree and s. Godfrey, "Trends towards corporatism in 
South Africa: Industrial relations and industrial strategy in 
the textile industry", in A. van der Merwe (ed), Industrial 
sociology: A South African perspective (Johannesburg, Lexicon, 
1995), pp 86- 117. 
19 Webster, "The rise of social-movement unionism", p 281. 
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organised and built a strong independent labour movement, 
despite both the state and capital's opposition to the 
recognition of trade unions representing African people. It 
also shows how a working class with its traditions, informal 
and formal organisation, and conscious of its position within 
the class and racial structures of South Africa, emerged. 
Finally, the thesis argued that the African working class paid 
a high price, enduring miserable conditions, earning wages 
below the poverty line, experiencing a breakdown in family 
structure, and living with crime and violence, police 
repression and the criminalisation of much social and economic 
life. 
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Public Relations: Natal Chamber of Industries BA1/11/2/7 
(iv), 19 November 1973- 22 January 1974. 
2. Natal Archives, Pietermaritzburg 
(a) Bantu Administration and Development, Informa-
tion Officer - Senior Inligtings Beampte and 
Bantoe Kommissaris, 1954 - 1964. 
P/2/M, Persone Reeks Mthembu, L, Majozi and 
Mtungwa, 16 March 1959 - 3 July 1962. 
P/2/T, Persone Reeks Tshange, 14 July 1958 - 19 
March 1962. 
P/2/V, BA.O Persone Reeks Thomas I. Vezi, 2 
March 1960 - 24 May 1960. 
P/2/Z, Persone Reeks J, zondi, 25 January 1958 
August 1962. 
- 6 
P/2/X, Persone Reeks A, Xaba, 3 July 1958 - 9 August 
1962. 
P/2/C, Persone Reeks A.W.G, Champion, 26 June 1956 -
21 April 1962. 
P/2/G, Persone Reeks Gwamanda, Gumede and Gwaza, 6 
October 1956 - 7 June 1962. 
P/2/K, Persone Reeks Kanyi, G, Nxumalo, Kunene, 2 
March 1954 - 15 June 1962 
P/2/L, Persone Reeks Luthuli, 19 September 1957 - 20 
Jan. 1962. 
K/11, BA en 0 Kommissaris- General, 4 August 1960-
4 April 1962. 
O/ 3, Cato Manor ''Onluste", 1 September 1959 - 16 
March 1960. 
A/15/6, Department Bantoe Admin Kommissaris-General, 
7 September 1962 - 27 August 1964. 
(b) Port Natal Affairs Administration Board, P12/8/13. 
Box 25, 1/2/1/1/2/23, Trade Unions, 2 October 1975 -
30 July 1976. Trade Unions, 24 May 1973 - 7 July 
1976 
Box 27, 1/2/1/1/2/27, Staff Bantu Liaison Committee, 
4 May 1976 - 30 July 1976. Staff Advisory Bodies, 7 
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April 1974 - 30 July 1976. 
Box 48, 1/2/1/1/9, Labour, Identification of Labour, 
12 November 1973 - 12 November 1974. Labour 
Contributions, 11 September 1973 - 19 June 1975. 
Bantu Labour in Non-Prescribed Areas: District 
Labour Bureaux, 14 August 1974 - 30 August 1974. 
Labour, 1 October 1975 - 31 January 1976 
Box 49, 1/2/1/1/9, Labour, 1 February 1976 - 31 
March 1976. Labour, 1 April 1976 - 31 May 1976. 
Box 50, 1/2/1/1/9, Labour, 1 January 1975 - 30 April 
1975 Labour, 1 May 1975 - 31 July 1975 
Box 51, 1/2/1/1/9, Labour, 1 August 1975- 30 
September 1975. Bantu Labour in Prescribed Areas, 12 
March 1974 - 24 September 1974. Gathering Area Point 
Road, 2 September 1975 - 30 July 1976. Bantu Labour 
in Prescribed Areas: Placing of Bantu in Employment, 
12 November 1973 - 6 December 1974. 
Box 56, 1/2/1/1/9, Labour, 1 June 1976 - 30 July 
1976. Labour Policy, 4 November 1974-· 28 June 1976. 
Group Areas Policy, 4 August 1975 - 1 October 1975. 
Bantu Labour in Prescribed Areas: Influx Control 
Policy, 5 November 1973 - 16 January 1974. Bantu 
Labour in Non-Prescribed Areas: Placing of Bantu in 
Employment, 9 November 1973 - 28 February 1974. 
Prescribed Areas: Training of Bantu Policy, 17 June 
1975 - 17 June 1975. 
Box 79, 1/2/1/1/BAB/1, Bantu Advisory Board, 
Central, 12 September 1973 - 31 July 1976. Bantu 
Advisory Board, 10 June 1976 - 30 July 1976. 
Box 80, 1/2/1/1/BAB/2, Bantu Advisory Board, 2 
February 1976 - 30 July 1976. 
(c) Durban City Council, 3/DBN, Town Clerk, Durban. 
Council-in- Committee Minutes, 1953 - 1980 
Bantu Advisory Board, 1953 - 1968. 
3. Municipality of Durban, Records Office 
Town Clerk's File, 323, 3 Volumes. 
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B. UNOFFICIAL ARCHIVAL 
1. Killie Campbell Africana Library, University of Natal 
Bourquin Papers 
Mayton Papers 
Marwick Papers 
Black Sash Documents 
2. William Cullen Library, University of the Witwatersrand 
Historical and Literary Papers 
South African Clothing and Textile Workers Union (SACTWU) 
(a) The National Union of Textile Workers, 1973-1987 
D 1 History 
D 1.1 Profile of NUTW 
D 1.2 A short history, 1973-1980 
D 1.3 A short history- the first 8 years, May 1982 
D 1.4 History, growth and objectives by J. Copelyn 1984 
D 1.5 Report on NUTW, 1980-1984 
D 3 National Executive Committee (NEC), 1980-1987 
D 3.1 Minutes 1980-1987. Includes Regional reports to 
NEC meetings. Also includes Minute Book 1980-1985 
D 6.1-8 Annual general meetings, 1973-1987 
D 7 Head Office (Durban) 
D 7.1 Minutes of staff meetings 1974-1987 
D 7.2-8 Correspondence, 1973-1987 
D 7.3 Committees 
D 7.3.1 Education Committee, 1982-83, 1985, 1987 
D 7.3.1.1 Minutes of meetings 1985 
D 7.3.1.2.1 Branch secretaries, December 1983 
D 7.3.1.2.2 Shop stewards, 1985-1987 
D 7.3.1 .2.4 Organisers, 1982, 1985, 1987 
D 7.3.1.3.1 Coastal branch 
D 7.3.1.3.2 Pinetown branch 
D 7.3.1.3.3 Midlands branch 
D 7.4.4 Report on disputes between South African 
Affiliates of International Textile, Garment and 
Leather Workers' Federation (ITGLWF) prepared by NUTW 
to substantiate its refusal to participate in a 
consultative of such affiliates 
D 9.1.1 Model agreements: Includes recognitions, 
procedures, grievances and wages 
D 9.2.1-5 Correspondence 1981-1987 
D 9.3.3 Dispute settling and unfair labour practices. 
The role of the Industrial Court vis-a-vis the 
Industrial Council 
D 9.3.5 The status of unregistered trade unions 
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D 10.4 Health and safety, 1977-1988 
D 10.4.5 General correspondence, 1979-1988 
D 10.4.8 Brown lung campaign, 1981-1987 
D 10.4.8.3 Dealings with companies 1982-1983: Companies 
include Braitex, David Whitehead and Sons, Hebox 
Textiles, Industex, Mooi River Textiles, Natal Tread, 
SBH Cotton Mills and Table Bay Spinners 
D 10.4.14.2 Cotton dust kills, by Neil White, 1982 
D 10.6 Membership figures and returns 1981-1987 
D 11.1-5 Industrial councils 1980-1987 
D 12 Press cuttings 1976-1987 
D 13.1.1.4 Membership figures 1982-1984 
D 13.2 Natal 1973-1987 
D 13. 2.1.4 Branch reports 1980-1985, 1987 
D 13.2.1 .5 Factory reports 1982-1984 
D 14.1 Textile Forum 
D 14.2 The Textile Worker 1982-1984 
D 15 Miscellaneous: Includes NUTW' political stand, 
dossier on textile industry in South Africa, dealings 
with Department of Manpower {1982- 1984) and press 
statements 
(b) Chemical Workers Industrial Union, 1974-1987 
F 6.1 Constitution 
F 6.2 Correspondence 1979, 1983-1987: Subjects include 
Revertex, Sasol dismissals and detention of Chris 
Bonner 
F 6.3 Reports 1984, 1985, 1987 
F 6.3.1 Report on events at Sasol 2 and 3, Secunda, 
November 1984 
F 6.3.2 Report on campaign for reinstatement of Sasol 
workers, January 1985 
F 6.3.4 Report on EEC Code of Conduct for British 
companies with interests in South Africa 
F 6.4 Membership Figures 1984-1987 
F 6.5 Publications 1977-1987 
F 6.5.2 Booklets: Includes Rights for chemical workers, 
November 1977, Workers' struggle at Colgate 1981, and 
the workers' struggle at Henkel 1982 
F 6.6 General 1981-1987 
(c) Other Trade Unions 
(i) Textile Workers Industrial Union 1973-1988 
F 49.2 qorrespondence 1977-1988: Subjects include 
Relatfonship between NUTW and TWIU, Smith and Nephew 
F 49.3 Membership. figures as at November 1987 
F 49.4 Publications 1956-1958, 1978 
F 49.5 TWIU leaflets 
F 49.6 General: Includes notes and seminar papers, and 
NUTW memorandum re: Industrial agreement for the 
textile industry 
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(ii) Transport and General Workers Union 
F 50.2 Dealings with companies 
F 50.2.1 Anglo-American Property Services: Recognition 
and procedure agreement 
F 50.2.2 Mitchel Cotts: Recognition and procedural 
agreement 
F 50.3 General 1982-1985: Subjects include PUTCO, Trade 
union unity, Southern Natal Branch and South African 
Transport Services 
(d) Companies and Factories, 1961-1989 
G 1-44: Various companies dealing with NUTW 
G 45 Frame Group 1961-1989 
G 45.1 Agreements between Frame and NUTW 1985 
G 45.1.1 Recognition agreements (includes 
correspondence) 
G 45.2.1 1961, 1974-76 and 1980: subjects include 1961 
piece rate schedules (TWIU), 1976 holiday pay, short 
time, piece rates schedules and 1980 influx control 
G 45.2.2 1981-1984: Subjects include 1981 recognition 
negotiations, 1983 appointment of conciliation board 
and NUTW membership, dismissal of NUTW members 
G 45.3.1-4 Meetings between management and workers 
1974-1988: Frame 
G 45.4 Shop stewards meetings 1975-1980 and 1987 
G 45.4.1 Frametex meetings 1975-1980 
G 45.4.2 Minutes of joint factory shop stewards 
meetings 1975-1978 
G 45.6 Frame factories in Durban 1973-1988 
G 45.6.1 Afritex 1973-1976, 1986-1987 
G 45.6.2- 6.10 Companies dealing with NUTW 
G 45.7.1 Frame Group publications: Includes Framework, 
Frame Group 1928-1978 
G 45.7.2 NUTW booklets re Frame 
G 45.12.1 The state versus c. Mbali 1974: Charged with 
inciting a strike at Pinetex, Includes court record 
and judgement 
G 45.14 Wages 1963-1988: Includes salary slips, wage 
negotiations, job codes and grades, job rates, 
schedules and graphs 
G 45.16 Information and research on Frame 1964 1985 
(e) General 
H 23.3.1 Profiteering from cheap labour. Wages paid by 
British companies in South Africa. Published by South 
African Labour Education Project, London 1980 
H 23.3.2 Black trade unions in South Africa: The 
responsibilities of British companies by Rodney 
Stares, Published by Christian Concern for Southern 
Africa, 1977 
H 23.4.4 Black unions in South Africa, Publication by 
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Africa Fund, 1982 
J 3.1 The case for African unions, NUSAS 1977 
J 3.4 Handbook for African workers in urban areas, 
Durban, November 1978 by Women for Peaceful Change 
(f) FOSATU Papers 1979- 1985 
B 2.1 Inaugural Congress, April 1979 
B 2.2 Second Congress 
B 3.1- 1.4 Minutes of meetings 1979-1985 
B 4.2 Reports 1980-1982 
B 5.1-2 Correspondence 1979-1985 
B 6. 1-6 Reports (Annual) 1979-1985 
B 8.4 Correspondence 1979-1985 
B 8.9.3.9 Report on project on industry and labour in 
Natal 
B 8.9.3.10 Report on project: Trade unionism in Natal: 
An examination of the relationship between African, 
Indian and coloured workers 
B 8.10.5 Reform or control: the new South African 
labour dispensation, December 1981 
B 8.10.6 An introduction to FOSATU, June 1983 
B 8.10.8 Affiliates, facts and figures, April 1980 
B 8.10.14 Trade unions and popular movements 
B 8.10.18 Worker organisation 
B 8.10.25 Worker songs 
B 8.10.30 Trade unions and the community in 1982- An 
assessment 
B 8.10.33 Cotton dust kills 
B 8.10.39 The history of labour organisations in South 
Africa 
B 8.10.41 Industrial councils 
B 12.2 Natal 1983-1985 
B 12.2.1- 2.6 Regional Committee meetings, 
correspondence and reports 
3. Municipal Local History Museum, Durban 
Pictures for the 1973 Durban Strikes 
4. Durban Metropolitan Chamber of Commerce 
Reports and other Papers 
5. Natal Room, University of Natal 
David He~son Papers and Collection 
Other Papers 
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C. PRIVATE 
1. Jabulani Gwala 
Notes Relating to the 1973 strikes and other Strikes. 
Minutes of the Frametex Liaison Committee. 
The National Union of Textile Workers. 
II. PRINTED PRIMARY SOURCES 
A. OFFICIAL 
1. South African Government 
House of Assembly Debates 
South African Reserve Bank Quarterly Bulletin 
2. Municipality of Durban 
Mayor's Minute, 1960 - 1986 
City Medical Officer of Health, Annual Reports, 1959 -
1979 
B. UNOFFICIAL 
Durban Chamber of Commerce, Annual Reports, 1960-1974. 
Natal Chamber of Industry, Annual Reports, 1960-1973. 
Frame Group Statement, Annual Year Review, 1963-1967. 
C. NEWSPAPERS AND PERIODICALS 
Africa South (original and exile) 
Africa South (pro-apartheid journal launched in 1966) 
Ilanga Lase Natal, 1959-1970 
South African Commerce and Industry, 1959-1973 
South African Industry and Trade,1959-1974 
South African Observer 
The Natal Daily News,1958-1985 
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The Natal Mercury,1959-1985 
The Rand Daily Mail,1972-1985 
The Star,1970-1985 
The Sunday Tribune,1970-1985 
Textile Forum 
III. ORAL EVIDENCE 
A. Killie Campbell Africana Library, University of Natal 
1. KCAV Series 
Bourquin, S.B, KCAV 174-175 by Collins, D and Manson, A 
Durban, 18 October 1979. 
Bourquin, S.B, KCAV 987-991 by Edwards, I.L, 8 and 10 
September 1980. 
Bourquin, S.B, KCAV 367 by La Hausse, P, 23 January 1983. 
Gumede, M, KCAV 192 by Collins, D and Manson, A, 
KwaMashu, 3 July 1979. 
Hadibe, J, KCAV 308 by Mabaso, L, 26 April 1981. 
Majola, C.C, KCAV 142 by Collins, D and Mason, A, 
KwaMashu 20 June 1979. 
Makhatini, J, KCAV 140 by Collins, D and Manson, A, 8 
June 1981. 
Makhatini, B.B, KCAV 320 by Yengwa, E.N, 27 September 
1981. 
Mbutho, C.D.S, KCAV 168-169 by Collins, D and Manson, A, 
1 November 1979. 
Mngadi, M, KCAV 326 by Shum, C.N, 11 August 1980. 
Mpanza, L.B, KCAV 444 by Yengwa, E.N, 25 October 1981. 
Mzimela, KCAV 329 by Zulu, S, 23 September 1980. 
Ngubese, S.K, KCAV 184-185 by Collins, 28 November 1979. 
Wilson, R.G, KCAV 216-219 by Edwards, I.L, 23 Jan and 14 
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February 1981. 
2. David Hemson: 1973 Durban Strikes Project 
Badsha, 0, 3 December 1992. 
Bolton Harriet, 16 July 1993. 
Mothwa Maureen by Junerose Nala, 1993. 
Ndhlovu Moses, 4 September 1993. 
Sobeshe, F, 4 December 1993. 
Zuma Obed, 18 August 1993. 
3. Interviews by N.T. Sambureni. Where necessary, 
interpretation and translation services were provided by 
Mendi Dhlamini, Dumisani Nyawo, Zakithi Mbonane, Ria 
Dlodlongwana and Peace Cele. 
(a) Tapes and transcripts. 
Mr Moses Biyela, 16 May 1993 
Mr D. Dlamini, KwaMashu, 27 September 1994 
Mr P.M. Faya, KwaMashu, 1 September 1992. 
Mr Stephen Govender, Durban, 23 October 1992. 
Mr Jabulani Gwala, Bolton Hall, SACTWU Offices, 27 
September 1993. 
Mr c. Khumalo, 10 September 1993 
Mr E. Mgaga, assisted by D. Nyawo, Kwa-Dabeka, 20 
August 1992. 
Mr J. Mhlangu, Dalton Hostel, 3 October 1992. 
Miss Judith Msomi, Bolton Hall, Workers College, 16 
October 1992. 
Mr B. Ntuli, 25 October 1994 
Mr E, Nyawo, Umlazi, 30 July 1992. 
Mr J. Shabangu, KwaMashu, 12 October 1993. 
Mr J. Zikhali, Umlazi, 21 August 1994 
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Mr A.M. Zulu, KwaMashu, 12 October 1994 
(b) Untaped Interviews/Discussions. 
S.B. Bourquin, University of Natal, History 
Department, 6 October 1993. 
Jabulani Gwala, Bolton Hall, SACTWU Offices, 1992 
and 1993. 
David Hemson, 22 June 1994. I had several 
discussions with Dr David Hemson as a colleague and 
a trade unionist of the 1970s. He clarified quite a 
number of issues relating to African trade unionism 
and the Durban strikes of 1973. 
Shop stewards and trade unionists at the Workers 
College, Bolton Hall, Durban, who were undertaking a 
trade union course in 1992. 
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